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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to establish Nietzsche as a Metaphysician of Becoming, as a foreseer 
of the immanence of eternity and in turn to establish a deep correlation between his 
writing style and his account of an ―eternity‖ that is within Becoming and the 
unconscious self. It shows that there is a connection between the content of 
Nietzsche‘s works and his writing style as a manifestation of pathos, ―the unsaid‖ and 
of dancing-musical rhythms. This content includes the idea that tragic pathos and the 
dance better express reality than the conceptual or propositional uses of language. In 
outlining that Nietzsche is a metaphysician of Becoming, this thesis explores 
Nietzsche‘s notion of truth and the possibility of accessing reality through tragic 
insight into reality. It firstly ascertains what reality is for Nietzsche as Becoming and 
that it is through the unconscious or more specifically the ―great reason of the body‖  
that reality reveals itself. There follows an analysis of Nietzsche‘s spiritual hierarchy, 
that is the hierarchical nature of relating to Becoming. It then explores Nietzsche‘s 
―art of philology‖ as a way of relating to Becoming through pathos, blood and 
unconscious. Finally, the thesis further illustrates that it is through pathos, the 
unconscious that one experiences the ―untimely‖ or the non-spatiotemporal, an 
―eternity‖ within Becoming, which is best exemplified by the dance. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
    
The goal of this thesis is to establish Nietzsche as a metaphysician of Becoming, as a 
foreseer of a new Dionysian age and a higher dancing culture and in turn to establish a 
deep correlation between his writing style, his unconscious his higher self and his 
account of  reality.. In doing so, it will be shown that there is a connection between 
the content of Nietzsche‘s works and his writing style as a manifestation of pathos, 
―the unsaid‖ and of dancing-musical rhythms. This content includes the idea that 
tragic pathos and the dance are expressive of the nature of  reality in a manner that is 
denied to propositional or conceptual uses language. For Nietzsche, propositions can 
in no way express the higher than human, the  realm of Becoming. He recognizes the 
inadequacy of the conceptual and propositional uses of language characteristic of 
rational thinking in expressing his own experience of tragic insight into reality. 
Therefore, he chooses a style that can communicate this insight, the language of the 
Dionysian dithyramb, of the most intensified pathos, and of unconscious musical 
rhythms. Nietzsche rejects the rational, empirical or scientific justification of life, as 
he recognizes the limits of human reason, of propositional or conceptual thinking to 
capture reality. He rather advocates a metaphysical-aesthetic justification of life, and 
chooses the language of pathos to best express this justification. It is a life-affirming 
style; it is the language of ―Yes-saying‖ of the unsaid: ―For I love you, O eternity‖ (Z, 
III: ‗The Yes and Amen Song‘). He writes from his ipsissimosity, his unconscious 
self; it is the realm of the unsaid, of spiritual pathos. In this way, his writing style is 
closest to things themselves, or to the realm of Becoming. 
 
The first chapter of this thesis primarily focuses on the reality from which Nietzsche‘s                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
writings flow, and contends that Becoming, ―things themselves‖ speak through    
Nietzsche, the writer. This type of experience, Nietzsche refers to as ―inspiration,‖     
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―rapture,‖ or ―revelation‖ where he views himself as ―a medium of overpowering    
forces‖, as ―a mouthpiece.‖ (EH, ‗Z‘: §3) He also describes this experience as ―the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
feeling of divinity.‖ (EH, ‗Z‘: §3) In outlining that Nietzsche is a metaphysician of                                                                                                                                                                                            
Becoming, this thesis will explore Nietzsche‘s notion of  truth: that there is ―true 
knowledge‖ that is existentialist, an insight into a new totality, that of a Dionysian 
primordial reality. It will also become apparent that this insight takes the form of a 
spiritual experience. This thesis will explore not only what reality is for Nietzsche but 
what the most fundamental human relation is to that reality. The goal of the first 
chapter is to outline what this reality is, as Becoming or more specifically the ―inner 
logos‖ of Becoming, and that the higher self, as the organizing principle of the 
unconscious or the ―Great Reason of the Body" (Z, I: §4) is the site of reality 
revealing itself. In outlining this, it becomes apparent that the conscious or rational; 
self, the intellect, is not the most fundamental self.   
   
 The first chapter examines the problem of self-referentiality in Nietzsche to show that 
Nietzsche is not guilty of this paradox that his writings are an expression of truth. 
They are an expression of truth in being an expression of tragic insight which in 
‗accessing‘ reality is a true interpretation of the world. In doing so, this thesis is 
offering an unorthodox interpretation of Nietzsche. The chapter also mentions that 
type of truth that Nietzsche rejects, and that in spite of this rejection that he has an 
affinity with new truth that coincides with a life-affirmative ideal. The chapter also 
outlines that Nietzsche views  conscious thinking as a falsification of reality (GS: 
§354) such that it emerges that he prioritizes unique pathos (unconscious) over 
conscious, linguistic or rational thinking. For Nietzsche, it is through the unconscious 
that one comes closer to reality and it is therefore ranked higher than conscious 
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thought. It then becomes evident that there is a distinction in Nietzsche between tragic 
insight and empirical knowledge that is knowledge in the scientific or rational sense, 
and in turn between the unconscious and conscious self. The main aim of this thesis is 
to contend that there is a  reality for Nietzsche that is irreducible to the human and that 
it is through ―reading and writing in blood‖ (Z, I: §7) that there is insight into this 
reality. There are other conditions that make possible insight into reality, which will 
be explored in chapter two. Nietzsche engages in a tragic pathos, and musical and 
poetical rhythms whereby his style is an expression of his unconscious, and is in turn 
an expression of reality. In arguing that there is true knowledge in the form of tragic 
insight this thesis reveals that Nietzsche does not fall victim to the problem of self-
referentiality. The chapter also looks at Kant‘s influence upon Nietzsche which is as 
follows that Kant‘s phenomenalism informs Nietzsche‘s perspectivism; therefore, 
tragic insight must be mediated through the world. Alternatively there is the argument 
that tragic insight is to be distinguished from Kantian phenomenalism (scientific 
knowledge) and perspectivism in the conscious sense, and as a unconscious 
experience can ‗access‘ reality. Nietzsche‘s artist‘s metaphysics upholds the idea that 
through ―rapture‖ or ―intoxication‖ one can glimpse reality as it is. (WP: §799); (BT: 
§1, §2) He upholds a genuine ascetic ideal (non-moral) that provides the conditions 
for encountering the truth, and is followed up in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, 
whereby it is opposed to the Kantian ascetic ideal. In On the Genealogy of Morals, 
Nietzsche proclaims: ―All honour to the ascetic ideal in so far as it is honest!‖ (GM, 
III: §26) 
 
The final chapter of this thesis continues to regard Nietzsche as a metaphysician of 
Becoming and illustrates that in amor fati the philosophical type can encounter the 
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non-spatiotemporal or an ―eternity‖ within Becoming (EH, ‗Why I am So Clever‘: 
§10) In this thesis, it becomes apparent that tragic insight (unconscious) into reality is 
the necessary transcendental precondition for all other knowledge that is in the 
conscious, rational or linguistic sense. Therefore, this knowledge as tragic wisdom 
precedes the knowledge that arises from human language or conscious l thought. The 
chapter outlines the way in which reality can be ‗accessed‘ in which knowledge of 
reality as the ―inner logos‖ of Becoming, which Nietzsche describes as tragic or 
Dionysian wisdom. It is a revelatory  experience in the form of entering into a dancing 
oneness with reality whereby the individual type is a direct expression of this reality, 
and becomes its most beautiful appearance.  
 
The first chapter also explores this type of wisdom in the early period of Nietzsche‘s 
philosophy. In examining further what reality is for Nietzsche, and what the most 
primordial relation is to it, the chapter discusses Nietzsche‘s reading of Heraclitus in 
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. In this, it becomes evident that Nietzsche 
re-introduces Being as the logos or the law behind the flux, as ―the One‖ that is 
behind ―the Many,‖ that is constant or is referred to as the ―inner necessity‖ of 
Becoming. In spite of his introduction of a new being (non-substance), he is however 
overall a metaphysician of Becoming.  It also looks at Nietzsche‘s emphasis on the 
inadequacy of logical, scientific or conceptual thinking to capture reality. It 
demonstrates that tragic wisdom involves entering into the silent logos of Becoming 
and draws parallels between Nietzsche, Wittgenstein and Plato on the relationship 
between true knowledge and silence. It is through silence (non-linguistic) that one 
experiences the ―revelation‖ or the ―showing‖ of truth. The silent intuition of the 
logos coincides with self-knowledge, which renders it the ―most truthful‖ type of 
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knowledge. It also highlights that Nietzsche‘s rejection of the old correspondence 
theory of truth does not imply a rejection of truth per se but only language ‒ in 
particular the ‗herd-use‘ or the propositional use of language as a means of expressing 
reality. Nietzsche rather advocates a correspondence between a certain type of tragic 
pathos and reality such that the philosopher of truth in his experience of tragic pathos 
is the most adequate expression of that reality. Nietzsche himself will be argued to be 
an exponent of this type of truth, that his writings flow from intuition of the ―inner 
logos‖ of Becoming, and that this occurs through his unconscious self that belongs to 
the whole (SE: §6).  
 
This thesis does not offer an explicit analysis of the problem of self-referentiality in 
Nietzsche. However, in arguing that Nietzsche is a metaphysician of the real and that 
his writing style emerges from insight into this reality , it can be inferred that his 
works have an affinity with truth and are not self-refuting. His works flow from an 
―inspirational‖ experience where he stands as a prophet in the face of an absolute. 
(EH, ‗Z‘: §3) 
 
The chapter ends with a discussion of Nietzsche‘s musical style as an expression of 
the logos as opposed to the conceptual, doctrinal or propositional uses of language. It 
emerges that the truth of Nietzsche‘s writings is in his Dionysian life-experiences; he 
speaks from ―the innermost heart things.‖ (BT: §16) His writing style is not only in 
attunement with a musical whole but also is an expression of his true self, his ―inmost 
being‖ (Letter to Carl Fuchs, Dec 14th, 1887) or the ―Great Reason of the Body‖; in 
being an expression of his most fundamental self, they are in turn an expression of 
what is real.. The chapter includes an analysis of Nietzsche‘s rejection of the ordinary 
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use of language or what he refers to as the herd use of language in On Truth & Lies in 
a Non-Moral Sense. In doing so, it looks at the close resemblance between Nietzsche 
and Wittgenstein on the inability of language to capture reality; it draws upon 
Wittgenstein‘s mysticism in The Tractatus in order to highlight the mystical nature of 
Nietzsche‘s works. The realm of the mystical is the realm of the higher than human, 
of Becoming and lies outside of what is expressible in language or its referential 
capacities. Wittgenstein, like Nietzsche, argues that the transcendent cannot be 
referred to ―What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence‖ (The 
Tractatus: 7), and that, while there is a metaphysical self, it cannot be referred to by 
language.  Wittgenstein refers to it as a metaphysical self, Nietzsche rather refers to it 
in terms of the unconscious; it is an impersonal self that belongs to the whole. It is this 
―I,‖ like Nietzsche‘s idea of the unconscious or what Hutter (2006) stresses in 
Nietzsche as his ―ipsissimosity‖ (HH, II, Preface: §2) that is the site of reality 
revealing itself, and it is from this ―I‖ that Nietzsche‘s works arise. It is in this way 
that his works are an expression of a spiritual pathos and of ―the unsaid,‖ and in turn 
of the unsayable God that of Dionysus. Nietzsche ―writes in blood‖ in the same way 
that Hӧlderlin writes with ―words, like flowers.‖ (Bread and Wine) Nietzsche writes 
with blood, a tragic pathos; it is the language of Becoming, the language of stillness, 
of silence. Reality reveals itself through his writing, which expresses the revelatory 
nature of his poetic use of language. 
 
The second chapter of this thesis explores Nietzsche‘s notion of a spiritual hierarchy, 
which offers further insight into what reality or truth is for Nietzsche, and argues that 
it is through tragic pathos and the dance that the highest type can encounter reality as 
it is. His notion of a rank-order among varying psychological types or forms of 
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existence is determined by the degree to which the varying types encounter reality. He 
advocates hierarchy strictly in terms of spiritual status; those who encounter reality as 
it is, higher reality, the ―untimely,‖ or atopian, they are the few that are ranked 
highest. The chapter elucidates Nietzsche‘s use of the term ―pathos of distance‖ 
(BGE: §257), which refers to the distinction between the highest and lowest types of 
human being. It is a pathos that not only reiterates a distinction amongst psychological 
types but is ―an experience itself‖ that the higher type undergoes. This spiritual pathos 
involves the higher type‘s ascent to reality as Becoming or more specifically an 
―eternity‖ that is within Becoming, and implicates him in the experience of ―loving 
contempt‖ (Z, Prologue: §4) as ―love of man for God‘s sake.‖ (BGE: §60) As Mc 
Intyre (1997) stresses that for Nietzsche, the higher type has a profound contempt for 
the ―human, all too human‖ and condemns it as unworthy of true seriousness but 
grants to man a measure of value when brought under the rule of something higher 
than man. The new measure of value is love of reality, of the highest things; the noble 
type can love man only for the sake of something higher than man or for God‘s sake. 
In exploring the relationship between the higher type and reality, the chapter 
establishes the new measure of value for Nietzsche, as love of reality or truth 
(universal), and only by way of implication it becomes apparent that Nietzsche does 
not adhere to a relativism of perspectives where truth has no meaning for us. It is the 
relationship to this reality that determines rank.  
 
The chapter also discusses Nietzsche‘s rank-order in terms of ―grand politics‖ and in 
turn draws parallels between Nietzsche and Plato. In this thesis, in looking at 
Nietzsche as a foreseer of a new Dionysian age, of a ―Kingdom of Heaven on Earth,‖ 
Nietzsche‘s notion of a spiritual hierarchy is examined as conducive to the coming of 
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an age. The best order is possible or the highest epoch in history as the ―seventh day‖ 
(BGE: §225) can only take place only through reconciliation of the realm of polity of 
an ―eternity‖ within Becoming and the empirical realm, as the human or political 
realm. In the new age to come, the realm of politics is subordinated to polity. It is 
through the philosopher‘s experience of life-affirmation in glimpsing eternity that he 
thereby renders Becoming as the highest measure of value for the human world. It is 
in this way that the philosophical self has a spiritual authority over baser types. As Mc 
Intyre (1997) suggests that for Nietzsche, the higher type or the philosophical type 
acts as a cultivating influence (BGE: §61), and gives meaning to society and in turn 
he initiates the enshrinement of a new law book of values.  
 
The chapter continues to uphold the argument that it is through Dionysian rapture or 
revelation that truth is grasped. Nietzsche‘s advocacy of a spiritual hierarchy is also 
looked at as reinforcing the argument that the truth of Nietzsche‘s works is based 
upon philosophical ―insight‖ (EH, ‗BT‘: §2) or divine ―inspiration‖ whereby they are 
an expression of the Oneness of Becoming. It also explores Nietzsche‘s notion of the 
higher self in detail, and his experience of spiritual insight not only to re-iterate his 
relation to reality but also to establish the type of person that can enter into the silent 
logos of an author. This type of experience which belongs to ―reading and writing in 
blood‖ is to be examined in the third chapter of this thesis. Nietzsche associates the 
―art of reading well‖, slow reading, reading as ―rumination‖ (GM, Preface: §8) with 
the higher type in contrast with the lowest type as the ―newspaper-reading demi-
monde of the spirit.‖ (BGE: §263) The second chapter offers detailed analysis not 
only of the varying spiritual types, rank-order amongst psychological types but also a 
rank-order amongst values. The measure of value is the universal; therefore, that 
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which is valued the most is that which brings the highest type into attunement with 
reality. The conditions that enable one to enter into the most primordial relation with  
reality,  are what Nietzsche refers to as values, such as self-overcoming, solitude, 
discipline, and suffering. These ascetic values also form a necessary part of the 
experience of ―reading and writing in blood,‖ of entering into the silent logos of 
Becoming. They act as cultivating influences upon the philosophical type whereby he 
develops his higher self. The will to power is looked at as a spiritual eros that leads 
the soul upwards towards Becoming. This chapter also illuminates Nietzsche‘s notion 
of ―higher justice‖ as a virtue of the noble type in his experience of truth. It is a virtue 
that involves images of wholeness and beauty whereby the higher self as a unified 
subjectivity is cultivated towards reality as it is. This includes the realization that ―all 
things are One.‖ (PTAG: §3) The redemptive nature of entering into the whole is best 
exemplified by laughter and the dance, both of which are values, for Nietzsche, as he 
associates them with entering into the whole. It is only the ―highest caste,‖ the fewest, 
who ―represent happiness, beauty, and graciousness on earth. Only to the most 
spiritual human beings is beauty permitted: among them alone is graciousness not 
weakness‖ (AC: §57). This chapter is also a continuation of the first one in developing 
the idea that Nietzsche seeks a new metaphysics following Kant; that his rejection of 
the old ascetic ideal is to be replaced by a new one, a genuine one of true insight into 
reality as it is. It is this genuine asceticism that provides the ideal conditions for the 
higher type to encounter truth.  
 
The third chapter of this thesis further compounds the argument that there is a unity 
between Nietzsche‘s writing style, his unconscious self or higher self, (SE: §6) and  
reality as Becoming. His writing style flows from his higher self, which is in turn an 
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expression of the whole. It explores the relation between Nietzsche‘s metaphysics of 
Becoming and the art of reading and writing. In this way it is evident that there is a 
connection in Nietzsche between his style, ―writing in blood‖, a tragic pathos that 
flows from the silent logos of Becoming and his message that that pathos captures 
reality more accurately than the propositional or conceptual uses of language.  
 
This chapter firstly explores ―the art of philology‖ (AC: §52), and in doing so it 
examines what the most fundamental relation or the most truthful standpoint is to an 
author. In The Antichrist, Nietzsche mentions what he means by the ―art of philology‖ 
that it is to read a text without falsifying it by interpretation, which raises the question 
as to what it is to not falsify the text or to enable the text to reveal itself. It also 
implies that Nietzsche is an advocate of the metaphysical independence of the text 
from interpretation. Nietzsche returns to the ―art of reading well‖ in his later works is 
safeguard us against the relativistic tendencies of perspectival knowledge. In The Will 
to Power he expresses the same idea that the art of philology is ―to read off a text 
without interposing an interpretation‖ (WP: §479). In light of chapter one where it is 
outlined that consciousness and language is a falsification of reality,  it becomes 
apparent that to read Nietzsche at the surface level of the word is inadequate in 
coming to a true understanding of the meaning of his works. The third chapter then 
further reiterates this point in outlining the important role of tragic pathos, ‗blood‘ and 
the unconscious, in coming to a true understanding of his works. Nietzsche‘s works 
must be recognized to be an expression of the personal, blood and the unconscious, 
and in turn reality. The ideal readers, as the ―select few‖ must suspend all pragmatic, 
utility or herd ―interests‖ in order to enter into the most fundamental relation with him 
as an author. It is through bringing a similar pathos (non-linguistic) to the text that the 
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reader enters into a primordial relation with an author, which is one of silence. It 
requires that that one takes a presuppositionless disposition to the text; it requires an 
epochē or ephexis (AC: §52) or that the intellect or ―linguistic or social 
interestedness‖ be suspended. It is being argued that the most fundamental self that 
can enter into a primordial relation with Nietzsche is what he refers to as the ego 
ipsissimum (HH, Preface: §1) the unconscious self that is impersonal in belonging to 
the whole or the untimely. This self is referred to by Nietzsche by many names the 
―basic material of your being‖ (SE: §6) the ―spiritual granite‖ (BGE: §231) or the 
―essential self‖ (BT: §5). It is the higher self that is ―untimely‖. 
 
This chapter also highlights Nietzsche‘s affinity with existentialist truth, and its 
connection with his writings. It does so in discussing in-depth Nietzsche‘s notion of 
bodily writing as the impact writing has on the unconscious. In bringing life- 
experience to the text, and in writing from his body, Nietzsche participates in the 
whole or reality as it is. It is through the personal that one comes into attunement with 
truth. In this way there is an intimate connection between existentialist truth and 
Nietzsche‘s writing style. The chapter also explores how inseparable his ―inmost 
being‖ (Letter to Carl Fuchs, Dec 14th, 1887) or his unconscious is from Becoming 
itself.. It also asserts therefore that the true meaning of Nietzsche‘s works lies in his 
higher self or impersonal self that belongs to the whole. It examines in detail 
Nietzsche‘s notion of writing the self, the impact of writing on the unconscious. 
Writing the self involves a certain type of awareness or consciousness that reflects 
upon itself as the self-reflective ego or the transcendental mind whereby it reflects 
upon the impact the discipline of writing has on the unconscious. The chapter also 
looks at the cultivating influences upon Nietzsche, the role reading and writing played 
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in the restoration of Nietzsche to a unified subjectivity, and in realizing his ―life-task‖ 
(EH, ‗Why I Am So Clever‘: §9) as a foreseer of raising humanity to the highest level. 
In realizing his ―life-task‖ that it is in this way that his writing style emerges from a 
feeling of ―rapture‖ or ―revelation‖, from Nietzsche‘s insight into reality as it is. (EH, 
‗Z‘: §3) 
 
The chapter ends with a comprehensive discussion of the ―art of reading‖ for 
Nietzsche. It continues to assert that the most fundamental reading is reading from 
one‘s ―heart‖, one‘s unconscious horizon as ‗blood‘, one‘s ipsissimosity or from what 
Wittgenstein refers to as the metaphysical ―I‖, the ―I‖ that is the transcendental limit 
of the world that cannot be referred to by language. It is opposed to the empirical self, 
the self as object that can be referred to by language. In The Tractatus Wittgenstein 
argues that the metaphysical subject ―it is like the eye in relation to the field of sight; 
the eye that cannot see itself‖ (5.633-6.331)  It involves the reader entering into the 
realm of the ―unsaid,‖ of silence through bringing a similar pathos (non-linguistic) to 
the text, and in turn participating in the ―immortality‖ of his works or in the ―total 
union of all being.‖ (HH, I: §208) It also explores Nietzsche‘s idea of the art of 
reading as ―rumination‖ or digestion (GM, Preface: §8) and the role it plays in the 
cultivation of the reader‘s higher self towards reality. It therefore looks at the 
connection between self-knowledge and reading, as is expressed by Nietzsche in the 
preface to On the Genealogy of Morals (§1). It also looks at the notion of ―reading 
and writing in blood‖ as a form of education (paideia) or cultivation towards the 
highest things, reality such that the reader participates in the dance: ―Only in the 
dance do I know how to tell the parable of the highest things: and my highest parable 
remained unspoken in my limbs.‖ (Z, II: ‗The Tomb Song‘) The philosophical eros of 
14 
    
love for the highest things is presupposed by education. Reading ―in blood‖ provides 
the ideal conditions for encountering reality, which coincides with the conditions 
outlined in the previous chapter; it involves self-overcoming through reading. It in 
turn examines the wounding nature of reading Nietzsche and asserts that the most 
ideal readers are ―warriors‖ (Z, I: ‗On Reading & Writing‘; GM, III). It is in this way 
that reading ―in blood‖ is a true asceticism that enables the reader to encounter reality 
as it is. His writings instil creative acts of self-shaping through the discipline, self-
overcoming, and exhaustion involved in reading his works. It also strengthens the 
transcendental mind of the reader in consciously examining the impact reading has on 
one‘s unconscious in order to get in touch indirectly with one‘s life task or 
unconscious telos, goal or meaning. In this thesis, it is being maintained that 
Nietzsche‘s role as a writer is to initiate struggles of self-overcoming in his free-
spirited readers. He wishes to assist in the development of his reader‘s souls and in 
turn to prepare those select readers for the ―Zarathustra Kingdom of a Thousand 
Years‖ (Z, IV: ‗The Honey Sacrifice‘) or what is referred to in the Bible as 
―Millennial Kingdom‖. The chapter maintains that the meaning of philosophical 
reading for Nietzsche is that those ―select few‖ through ―reading in blood‖ can go on 
to encounter reality as it is. This meaning also includes that the reader enters into the 
silent logos of an author. The art of reading not only involves mental focus upon the 
written word and digestion where reading has an impact on the unconscious, but also 
making the transition to reading with ears, and then entering into the silent logos of 
the author. In doing so, the author reveals himself whereby the text cannot be 
digested. Reading Nietzsche primordially is twofold; it involves both enabling his 
ideal readers to encounter reality as it is or Becoming in amor fati, and in turn, in 
bringing a similar pathos to the text, it involves entering into the silent logos of an 
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author and of Becoming. In this way Nietzsche will be looked at as an ―untimely‖ 
educator of the ears and of the heart. 
  
The final chapter examines Nietzsche‘s new metaphysics, where his refutation of the 
Christian moral god or what he refers to as the death of God lays open the way for a 
new Divine God such as the dancing God ―Dionysus‖. In The Gay Science Nietzsche 
expresses the latter when he proclaims that he still withholds a metaphysical faith in a 
section entitled ―In what way we, too, are still pious‖: 
 
 
...you will have gathered what I am getting at, namely, that it is still a 
metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests—that even we 
knowers of today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire, too, 
from the flame lit by the thousand-year-old faith, the Christian faith which 
was also Plato‘s faith, that God is truth; that truth is divine... (GS: §344) 
 
The loss of belief in the Christian God is to be overcome through belief in the God of 
dance, the new ―Yes-Saying‖ totality. Nietzsche overturns the old ―No-saying‖ or life-
denying Christian totality by introducing the idea of a new totality that is life-
affirmative, and in turn overcomes the nihilistic affects of the death of God. This new 
totality is a reality irreducible to the human and is that of innocence of Becoming. 
This reality can be felt through Dionysian insight, tragic pathos or ―transfiguration.‖ 
(GS, Preface: §3) In transfiguration, the philosopher artist can be argued to be ―the 
lightest shade of appearance‖ (BGE: §34) or ―reality once more‖ (TI, ‗Reason‘: §6). 
The highest type‘s spirit shines—an aura or raiment by which the body and one‘s 
whole being is glorified. The final chapter will discuss this as an artist‘s metaphysics: 
Nietzsche as a ―writer in blood‖ takes the most truthful standpoint to reality, that of 
rising above the human, or the mere ―ways of the world‖ (Z, I: ‗On the Flies of the 
Marketplace‘). In this way, Nietzsche initiates a new measure of value as the universal 
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or the ―more-than-human,‖ and that which in turn enables the individual type to attune 
himself to the whole such as solitude, suffering, self-overcoming, and ―reading and 
writing in blood.‖ (Z, I: §7) The final chapter also explores the spiritual significance 
of this transfiguration experience; it is a divinity that is life-affirmative. It is also 
comparable to Christ‘s ecclesiastical teachings that relate to life-affirmative Christian 
praxis, and speak of experiences that include ―a state of the heart‖ (AC: §34) which 
relates to the ―Kingdom of Heaven that is within you‖ (AC: §34). The chapter outlines 
not only that there is a new totality for Nietzsche but also shows its redemptive nature. 
For Nietzsche, it is through the ―Great Reason of the Body‖ (Z, I: §4) that one enters 
into the most primordial relation to reality. For Nietzsche, as for Jesus, one does not 
encounter truth in propositions but rather one is the truth, as one is an expression of 
―eternity‖ that is within Becoming. In the experience of transfiguration the highest 
type is the truth or is an expression of the truth, which is reminiscent of Jesus‘ claim 
―I am the truth‖. This type of truth is distinct from truth that has an abstract character, 
where truth is always distinct from the person who sets it forth. Nietzsche wishes to 
overturn conceptual truth, where truth and the person who lays claim to it are seen as 
two distinct spheres. Jesus, in a vein analogous to Nietzsche‘s life affirmative type, 
does not have the truth but is himself the truth: in Christ, the truth and the person are 
fused in an unity. This experience of truth is to realize that ―all is One;‖ that there is a 
necessity to all of life‘s events and that even the most demonic ones play a role in the 
creation of the most divine. Nietzsche emphasizes the inability to communicate the 
truth; one can only communicate it indirectly. The final chapter makes clear that the 
expression of truth is in the experience of ―intoxication,‖ ―transfiguration,‖ like 
Nietzsche‘s own experience of ―rapture,‖ ―revelation,‖ and ―inspiration,‖ or what 
Hölderlin refers to as ―the holy pathos‖. Christ, like Nietzsche, emphasizes ―the 
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innermost‖: ――life‖ or ―truth‖ or ―light‖ is his word for the innermost‖; it is the site of 
reality revealing itself. This chapter not only stresses Nietzsche‘s affinity with truth or  
reality but it also looks at the relationship between this truth and the earth; the 
relationship between eternity and the earth. The chapter will illuminate Nietzsche as a 
foreseer of the earth becoming divine, of eternity becoming immanent in the world. In 
this way the earth becomes the sole source of value. The world and eternity become 
one; however, eternity is irreducible to the earth. This chapter highlights Nietzsche as 
a prophet of the earth reaching its highest state or becoming ‗Godlike‘, of a ―Kingdom 
of Heaven on Earth‖ or what is referred to as the ―Millennial Kingdom‖ or the 
―Zarathustra Kingdom of a Thousand Years‖ (Z, IV: ‗The Honey Sacrifice‘). 
 
This chapter also goes on to explore in more detail what  reality is for Nietzsche, and 
what the most primordial relation is to that reality, as the necessary self (unconscious) 
and its relation to the eternal. It will be argued that the reality which the highest type 
affirms will be argued to be an ―eternity‖ within Becoming. c This chapter explains in 
further detail Nietzsche‘s idea of God as the ultimate, which is comparable to 
Anselm‘s ―that which nothing greater can be thought.‖ In exploring Becoming as 
reality for Nietzsche, the chapter examines Nietzsche‘s own experience of the eternal 
return of the same, and how it marks the beginning of entering into a new era entitled 
the ―Noon period‖ where eternity becomes manifest in the world. The final chapter 
will also look into Nietzsche‘s pantheism the idea of the eternal return of the same as 
god or the ultimate, and the relation in turn between God and the temporal. In doing 
so, it is possible to argue that, for Nietzsche, ―God is in every moment.‖ It also 
addresses the question ‗to which reality do we belong?‘. The reality to which we 
belong will be argued to be eternity or objective reality that is independent of space; it 
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is the non-spatial or the heavenly. It is through the unconscious that one experiences 
the ―feeling of eternity‖ (AC: §34). It can be experienced through the divine act of the 
dance (Z, III: §4).  
 
In order to further establish that Nietzsche has an affinity with truth and ―true 
knowledge‖ in the form of tragic insight as a glimpse into eternity  for Nietzsche, this 
chapter looks at Nietzsche‘s return to tragic wisdom in the later period in the work 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. It enquires into Nietzsche‘s notion of ―The Return Home‖ or 
what is also referred to as the homecoming. (Z, III: ‗The Return Home‘). This 
experience is the site of reality revealing itself to the higher self as the ―Great Reason 
of the Body‖. It involves ―true knowledge‖ in the sense of the higher self, as the most 
necessary self, the divine self glimpsing eternity in ―deep wells‖ (Z, III: ‗Before 
Sunrise‘), which is Nietzsche‘s metaphor for the heavens or what he refers to as the 
―highest spheres‖ (Z, II: ‗On the Rabble‘). The chapter goes on further to argue that 
for Nietzsche there is a universal, as  reality that is non-spatial, and that in amor fati, 
the necessary self belongs to it. The final chapter coincides with the second chapter on 
the view of Nietzsche as a metaphysician of the real, examining his notion that there 
is a spiritual hierarchy associative of the New Age where the highest type, the 
redeemer is representative of the epoch to come. In looking at Nietzsche‘s idea of 
―The Homecoming,‖ it reveals Nietzsche as a thinker who wishes to overcome the 
loss of an old totality, of a sense of homelessness that comes with the death of God or 
the loss of belief in God. In arguing that Nietzsche is a metaphysician of Becoming, 
the chapter also examines parallels between Nietzsche and Plato (as opposed to 
Platonism). It is the higher self that is outside space that is the self that experiences 
―the untimely,‖ the heavenly or eternity. The climax of Zarathustra‘s wisdom of ―The 
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Yes and Amen Song‖ will also be explored; it is referred to as ―bird-wisdom‖ or a 
―dancing wisdom‖. It will be argued that true enlightenment, for Nietzsche, is best 
exemplified by the dance and is expressed through the writing style of the Dionysian 
Dithyramb. This experience of true enlightenment is inextricably linked with ―reading 
and writing in blood.‖ In this way, the final chapter is a continuation of themes 
introduced in the third chapter. The chapter further explores the relationship between 
eternity and the earth whereby it becomes apparent that Nietzsche is a prophet of the 
earth becoming eternal or divine, and in turn of the highest dancing culture. In Ecce 
Homo, he speaks of the ―tremendous hope‖ of his essay entitled The Birth of Tragedy, 
where he promises ―a tragic age‖ to come, the ―highest art in saying Yes to life‖ 
whereby tragedy will be reborn (EH, ‗BT‘: §4). He speaks as a prophet of a ―new 
party of life‖, a Dionysian future of music:  
 
 
Let us look ahead a century; let us suppose that my attempt to assassinate 
two millennia of anti-nature and desecration of man were to succeed. That 
new party of life which would tackle the greatest of all tasks, the attempt to 
raise humanity higher, including the relentless destruction of everything 
that degenerating and parasitical, would again make possible that excess of 
life on earth from which the Dionysian state, too, would have to awaken 
again (EH, ‗BT‘: §4). 
 
He speaks as a prophet of the ―great noon at which the most elect consecrate 
themselves for the greatest of all tasks...‖ and upholds ―the vision of a feast‖ (EH, 
‗BT‘: §4) He reveals that it is in the dance that one encounters the earth becoming 
‗godly‘. In ‗To the Mistral: A Dance Song‘ Nietzsche writes in poetic song, and 
makes a call for dancing between the heavens and the earth: 
                                                
 
                                                ...On a thousand backs we‘re dancing, 
                                                         billow—backs and backs of chancing— 
                                                         hail to dances new, I say! 
                                                         Let us dance in every manner, 
                                                         Free—so shall be our art‘s banner, 
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                                                         And our science—shall be gay! 
 
                                                         From each flower let us garner 
                                                         Just one blossom for our honour, 
                                                         For our wreath just two leaves worth! 
                                                         Then like troubadours in riches 
                                                         We shall dance ‗tween God and Earth! 
 
                                                          ...—And to mark this joy forever, 
                                                          leave a will that time can‘t sever, 
                                                          Take this wreath up where you are! 
                                                          Hurl it higher, further, madder, 
                                                          storm the sky on heaven‘s ladder, 
                                                          Hang it there—upon a star! 
 
Finally, the chapter further analyses Nietzsche‘s idea of an artist‘s metaphysics: that 
the higher type, in his experience of returning home, is the most accurate 
representation of reality. The artist‘s metaphysics will be argued to be present in The 
Birth of Tragedy and that it is continuous with his later works. Nietzsche himself is 
viewed as an artist metaphysician in his experience of what he calls ―inspiration.‖ 
(EH, ‗Z‘: §3) In ―writing in blood,‖ Nietzsche himself becomes the ―most accurate 
representation‖ of reality. In exploring his artist‘s metaphysics, it further reiterates the 
argument that reality reveals itself to the most primordial self, and that this is the 
realm of the unsaid, of silence. In this way, his writing style as a silent expression of 
the logos is one and the same as his message that tragic pathos and the dance better 
capture reality than that of the propositional or conceptual uses of language. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
 
Nietzsche‘s Metaphysics of Becoming & Tragic Wisdom as Insight into 
the Whole. 
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 I 
 Relative Truth and the Problem of Self-reference  
 
This thesis wishes to establish that Nietzsche is a metaphysician of the real, of 
Becoming, such that for Nietzsche there is a reality that is irreducible to the human 
and that the most truthful standpoint towards it is in the form of Dionysian wisdom. In 
this way, for Nietzsche there is the idea of glimpsing reality but only in the form of 
tragic insight into this reality. This tragic insight takes the form of ―a this-worldly‖ 
artist‘s metaphysics; the Dionysian artists are those who enable us to be raised up ―we 
have to be lifted up—and who are those who lift us? They are those true men, those 
who are no longer animal, the philosophers, artists and saints.‖ (UM, III: §5) 
Nietzsche embraces the idea of insight into reality or truth but only in the tragic sense 
but clearly rejects it in the dogmatic, conceptual and absolute sense. He considers 
perspectivism important in highlighting that absolute, dogmatic knowledge is itself 
perspectival in nature. It is necessary in calling into question dogmatic viewpoints 
such as the ―God‘s eye view‖, that is Cartesian absolute knowledge in the abstract and 
conceptual sense; he views it as a necessary scepticism that is a transitional phase 
towards a more fundamental way of relating to reality, that is perspectival. Nietzsche 
actually rejects Cartesian metaphysics that embodies a theory of reality which is non-
perspectival. However, this does not imply that Nietzsche is not a metaphysician, as 
Nietzsche seeks a more fundamental truth than a theoretical approach, a truth distinct 
from knowledge of things and their properties. The type of truth that he seeks as an 
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―artist-metaphysician‖ is the non-theoretical truth of Becoming rather than the 
theoretical truth of ―Being‖.1   
 
However, there is also according to commentators, the idea that there is scepticism 
about the truth of any perspective, and in turn about a reality, one that is irreducible to 
the perspective. This relates to the problem of self-reference, the contention that 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy is itself a mere perspective, and is therefore self-
undermining.
2
 There are certain commentators like Vattimo who seem to suggest that 
                                                          
1
 Nietzsche rejects conceptual knowledge as the most truthful knowledge, as it falsifies the truth of 
Becoming into doctrines about stable entities or things. For Nietzsche, this type of knowledge meets 
with man‘s biological needs, and is a product of human logic such that humans require thing-hood for 
their own needs. He contends that the world of thing-hood is a world that is conditioned by language 
and needs, and is therefore false. The metaphysical realm of ‗Being‘ is also false because it is created 
by man rendering absolute what is actually a human exigency, that is thing-hood.   
 
2
 Groothius in his article entitled ‗Postmodernism and Truth‘ identifies the problems of postmodernism, 
one of which is the problem of self-reference, consistency, and perspectivism. He asks of the reader to 
consider the statement:  
 
All ―truth‖ is a social construction of language, and nothing more. It cannot 
orient us to any objective reality outside a system of discourse. 
(Philosophia Christi, Series 2, vol., 2, no.2, 2000, p.279) 
 
He then goes on to consider the problem that arises with such a consideration of truth. He refers to the 
above statement in order to do so: ―This statement refers to all truth and says that truth is nothing but a 
contingent construction that cannot connect us to objective reality at all. This statement includes the 
statement itself in its description or range of reference.‖ (ibid.) He contends that postmodernists claim 
that truth is merely a social construction, and that such a statement itself cannot ―accurately depict the 
reality it purportedly describes. Therefore, it is false.‖ (ibid.) He then puts it another way, that ―the 
statement sets up truth conditions or reality requirements that it cannot fulfil.‖ (ibid.) In considering the 
statement to be ―self-referentially inconsistent,‖ he refers to Alvin Platinga‘s work ‗Reason and Belief 
in God‘ who also uses this term (A. Platinga & N. Wolterstorff, eds., Faith and Rationality: Reason 
and Belief in God, Notre Dame, In: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983, p.60) A statement is self-
referentially inconsistent when it refers to or implicates itself and ends up refuting itself because it 
cannot account for itself. The paradoxes associated with self-reflexive reference have long been noted 
in the history of philosophy, and have a special importance in set theory and the philosophy of 
mathematics. These include the paradox of the Liar, Russell‘s paradox, Cantor‘s paradox, the Burali- 
Forti paradox and the Grelling-Nelson paradox (cf. Champlin, TS, Reflexive Paradoxes, Routledge, 
1988). 
 
The problem of self-reference is also associated with Nietzsche‘s philosophy of perspectivism. 
Groothius looks at Nietzsche‘s‘ perspectivism as having shaped many postmodern approaches to truth. 
The particular statement of Nietzsche‘s that is referred to in order to illustrate this point is as follows: 
―There is ―no true world‖, only ―a perspectival appearance whose origin lies in us.‖ (WP: §15, cited in 
this form in Groothius, ibid, p.279) He also refers to Nietzsche‘s claim ―that there are no facts, but only 
interpretations (or constructions)...‖ in order to illustrate postmodernists‘ relative approach to truth. 
Groothius mentions the outcome of such an approach to truth: ―Everything is a matter of relative and 
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for Nietzsche, the anthropocentric and therefore perspectival character of all 
interpretation reduces reality to a perspective or denies its ‗accessibility‘. Vattimo in 
his work ‗The End of Modernity‘ draws upon Nietzsche‘s The Twilight of the Idols in 
claiming that Nietzsche‘s philosophy is one of erring:  
 
As The Twilight of the Idols was later to argue, the real world has become a 
fiction and even the ‗apparent‘ world has dissolved along with it. Given 
there is no longer a truth or a Grund that could contradict or falsify the 
tissue of erring, all these errors are to be understood as kinds of roaming. 
(Vattimo 1988: 169-170)  
 
For Nietzsche, all knowledge maybe perspectival but this does not imply reality is 
itself perspectival, but rather that there is a reality that is irreducible to the human and 
that through tragic pathos one enters into the most truthful relation to it. Nietzsche‘s 
perspectivism does not rule out getting at truth itself, as there is the possibility of 
reality revealing itself through tragic insight such that one adheres to the most truthful 
interpretation of the world. Lampert in his ‗Nietzsche‘s Task‘ (2001) argues similarly 
that perspectivity does not condemn the perspectival knower to insurmountable 
scepticism about the truth of any perspective. According to Lampert, there is for 
Nietzsche a perspective from the broadest base (BGE: §207) that is ―truer‖ than 
narrower perspectives, whereby the esoteric few acquire tragic insight into reality.
3
 It 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
pragmatic perspective, with no method by which to adjudicate rationally between perspectives in order 
to discern an objective truth for everyone.‖ (Groothius, D., Op. cit., p.279)  
 
3
 There are also to the contrary, commentators who like Sadler in his ‗Nietzsche Truth and Redemption: 
Critique of the Postmodernist Nietzsche‘ argue that the problem of self-reference in Nietzsche can be 
solved through arguing that there is truth in Nietzsche that is non-perspectival. (London, The Athlone 
Press, 1995) In spite of his acknowledgement of the significant role perspectivism plays, for Nietzsche 
in overturning absolute truths (GM, II: §12), and in criticizing positivism (WP: §481), the old 
correspondence theory of truth that suggests that propositions can capture reality or are statements of 
fact; however, he also suggests that for Nietzsche, there is the possibility of a more fundamental way of 
relating to reality than through a perspective. He argues that for Nietzsche, this more truthful way of 
relating to reality is not a return to Descartes‘ approach to truth as absolute knowledge, the ―view from 
nowhere‖ or ―God‘s eye view‖, as Nietzsche‘s perspectivism calls this into question. It is a form of 
tragic insight that cannot be conflated with his perspectivism, which he argues is a form of conscious 
activity (GS: §354). 
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is an experience of the highest nature, of amor fati and of saying ―yes to life‖ in terms 
of belonging to the whole or participating in ―the untimely‖. There are for Nietzsche 
various modes of expressing reality, such as through conscious and linguistic activity 
whereby there are various degrees and shades of appearance; however, for Nietzsche 
the ―aesthetic‖ relation to reality is the most beautiful. This idea of aesthetic truth is 
expressed as ―instinctual‖, ―mystical‖ or ―rapturous‖. This truth is in the form of 
tragic insight and is not ‗absolutist‘ or ‗dogmatic‘; it is a genuine ideal of affirming 
becoming as becoming in amor fati, and therefore can be argued to be the most 
accurate interpretation of the world. 
 
Although Nietzsche is critical of truth that is in the absolutist sense, this thesis contends that 
Nietzsche does embrace truth or an objective reality that of Becoming. Nietzsche criticizes the 
type of truth that serves authoritarian structures of power, absolutes that are actually 
theoretical in nature, truth that subsists in the rational inquiry into the essence of things, or 
moral absolutes that are dogmatic in nature. He also critiques the ―disinterested‖ truth of 
scholars, scientists, and of modernists, that do not take into account their own subjective 
interests. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche criticizes the prejudices of philosophers (§6), 
for not taking their own subjective state into account. The genuine philosopher‘s perspectival 
relation to the whole is one of revealing and concealing, truth and untruth. However, in spite 
of Nietzsche‘s rejection of truth there is also a type of truth that he accepts, one whereby 
reality reveals itself. He associates this new truth with the new philosophers to come, a new 
ideal of experiencing amor fati; it is the opposite ideal to the ascetic ideal that is the Christian 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Sadler argues that tragic insight in Nietzsche is a new ideal, the genuine insight into reality that is not 
conscious perspectival or mediate knowledge.  In spite of Kant‘s aim to overturn the ―God‘s eye view‖ 
in Descartes (immediate direct knowledge), and argue that all knowledge is ―perspectival‖ or mediate 
showing the limits of reason, he introduces a new ideal. According to Nietzsche, the latter does not 
consist of genuine insight into reality but is rather an unattainable moral ideal that of a reward in the 
afterlife. Nietzsche declares that this is actually a ―perspective‖, and its denial of this, is what renders it 
dogmatic. According to Sadler, Nietzsche reclaims the genuine ideal, he rather advocates the idea of 
the genuine philosopher, the higher type who acquires genuine insight into reality, a new ideal that of 
amor fati.  
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or Platonic ideal of self-denial. Lampert similarly states that the ―genuine philosopher‖ is the 
rarest of beings whose will to truth drives him to discover the ―intelligible character‖ of the 
world and to glimpse the ideal appropriate to it...‖ (2001: 114-119, 196, 207) This new ideal 
involves a certain attunement to a new totality, to what is referred to as a Dionysian 
primordial reality in the early work The Birth of Tragedy (BT: §4)  and as Becoming 
in the later works.
4
 For Nietzsche, only certain kinds of individual can enter into the 
most truthful relation to reality or to a metaphysically independent author or text. 
 
 
In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks this idea of Dionysian life-affirmation 
is not expressed in discourse; Nietzsche refers to it as a ―mystic intuition‖ (PTAG: §3) 
where ―scientific reflection‖ serves only as ―a sad means‖ (PTAG: §3) where the 
mystical receives expression through words and concepts. Although Nietzsche 
abandons the term ―intuition‖ in the later works5, this thesis explores his affinity with 
tragic wisdom of the early period. It will also explore tragic insight of the later period, 
in the work Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which can be argued to be an interpretation of 
                                                          
4
 It must also be noted that the early work The Birth of Tragedy must be read with specific cautions 
considering Nietzsche‘s ‗Attempt at Self-Criticism‘ or the new preface to the work. This self-criticism 
suggests that Nietzsche became critical of his earlier use of Kantian and Schopenhauerian formulations 
expressed in the work. In this way, this has led commentators to contend that Nietzsche‘s abandonment 
of the term ‗Primal Unity‘ implies that it has Schopenhauerian or Kantian associations of which he 
became critical of. There are commentators that argue both in favour and against this idea, which will 
be discussed in third section of this chapter. It is rather the term ―Becoming‖ that Nietzsche adheres to 
from Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks through to the later works, which also coincides with 
his admiration for Heraclitus.  
 
5
 Although this thesis makes reference to the term ―intuition‖ as a form of tragic insight for Nietzsche, 
it must be acknowledged that Nietzsche‘s affinity with the term resides only in the early works, such as 
The Birth of Tragedy, Philosophy in the tragic Age of the Greeks and On Truth & Lies. It emerges in 
BT as ―instinctive certainty‖ (§1) in PTAG (§3) as ―mystic intuition‖, and in the redemptive sense in 
On Truth & Lies (§2). There are commentators who argue that this term shows how Nietzsche came 
under Schopenhauer‘s influence, and contend that Nietzsche abandons the term in the later works. 
Tragic insight is for Schopenhauer a form of immediate knowledge that is not knowledge of the world. 
In light of Lampert‘s argument in Nietzsche‘s Task, tragic insight of the later works is for Nietzsche an 
interpretation of the world. This insight takes the form of ―revelation‖ and ―rapture‖ (EH, ‗Z‘: §3) or of 
the revelatory experience of Zarathustra in ―Before Sunrise‖, all of which will be discussed throughout 
the thesis. Nietzsche also associates the term intuition with Heraclitus in PTAG, a philosopher he 
continues to admire in the later works (EH, ‗BT‘: §3), (TI, ‗Reason‘: §2). There are commentators like 
Sadler who argue that that term as a form of tragic insight persists throughout his philosophy. 
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the world.  It is through tragic wisdom that certain types of individual come closest to 
reality. This mystical experience occurs at a pre-conscious level and therefore 
precludes conscious activities such as discourse or theoretical thinking and the 
propositional or conceptual uses of language. These activities are conscious and are 
therefore a ―falsification‖ of reality (GS: §354). It is consequently possible to infer 
that it is through instinctive experience that one comes closest to reality rather than 
through conscious linguistic activity, which, for Nietzsche, is only a mere means for 
its expression. This relation to reality is the most fundamental one; and it involves 
taking a presuppositionless position where one suspends all theories of what truth is. 
For Nietzsche, in coming to the truthfulness of existence one must bracket all 
―objectivistic assumptions‖ about the nature of philosophy. The most truthful 
standpoint towards reality does not consist of what Nietzsche subjectively thinks 
reality should be, but rather consists of philosophical insight into reality in its most 
bare form.  
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 II 
 Nietzsche on Language and Consciousness as the Falsification of Reality & Tragic 
Pathos as the Most Truthful expression of Reality 
 
In this section, the passage from The Gay Science (§354) will be discussed in order to 
elucidate Nietzsche‘s contention that both ordinary language and consciousness is a 
falsification of reality. It intends to assert that he prioritizes pathos and unique 
experience over linguistic and conscious activity when it comes to matters of relating 
to reality in the most fundamental way. It also determines that there is a distinction in 
Nietzsche between a mere conscious ego and a higher self that is the unconscious self 
that belongs to reality as a whole. 
 
The idea that consciousness and the herd use of language is a falsification of reality is 
apparent in a passage that comes from aphorism (§354) of Book V of The Gay 
Science, ―On the Genius of the Species‖. It offers us insight into the connection 
between the origin of consciousness, the need for communication, the ―surface—and 
sign—world‖, the difference between the herd nature of man and the individual type 
and finally into conscious knowledge and truth as tragic insight: 
 
 
This is what I consider to be true phenomenalism and perspectivism: that 
due to the nature of animal consciousness, the world of which we can 
become conscious is merely a surface—and sign—world, a world turned 
into generalities and thereby debased to its lowest common denominator, 
— that everything which enters consciousness thereby becomes shallow, 
thin, relatively stupid, general, a sign, a herd-mark; that all becoming 
conscious involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification, 
superficialization, and generalization. In the end, the growing 
consciousness is a danger, and he who lives among the most conscious 
Europeans even knows it is a sickness. As one might guess, it is not the 
opposition between subject and object which concerns me here; I leave that 
distinction to those epistemologists who got tangled up in the snares of 
grammar (of folk metaphysics.) Even less am I concerned with the 
opposition between ‗thing-in-itself‘ and appearance: for we ‗know‘ far too 
little to even be entitled to make that distinction. We simply have no organ 
for knowing, for ‗truth‘: we ‗know‘ (or believe or imagine) exactly as much 
as is useful to the human herd, to the species: and even what is here called 
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‗usefulness‘ is finally also just a belief, a fiction, and perhaps just that 
supremely fatal stupidity of which we shall someday perish. 
 
 
It is necessary to make clear what Nietzsche actually means by ―consciousness‖ and 
―becoming conscious‖. In the same aphorism, Nietzsche offers us an insight into 
conscious activity:  
 
For once again: man, like every living creature, is constantly thinking but 
does not know it; the thinking which becomes conscious is only the 
smallest part of it, let‘s say the shallowest, worst part—for only that 
conscious thinking takes place in words, that is, in communication 
symbols; and this fact discloses the origin of consciousness. (GS: §354) 
 
For Nietzsche, ―consciousness‖ and ―thinking‖ are not the same; rather, he holds that 
conscious thinking is only the ―shallowest, worst part‖ of thinking. In associating 
conscious activity with the use of words, he views it as a tool for social 
communication characteristic of the herd rather than of the individual type of 
existence.
6
 Nietzsche draws a distinction between pre-conscious and conscious 
                                                          
6
 Kathleen Higgins examines the passage (§354) of The Gay Science  in her article entitled ‗Nietzsche 
on Music‘ where  Nietzsche argues that not only does language falsify reality, but it also developed 
along with consciousness to facilitate the survival of the proto-human herd animals (Higgins, K., 
Nietzsche on Music, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 47, no.4, 1986, p.663). She claims that 
Nietzsche draws three conclusions on language; the first is that language developed in order to serve a 
species need out of the ―intimate association of each animal with every other...‖ (ibid. p.664) Higgins 
notes that from the first conclusion arises the second, that language itself is inherently social: ―So much 
is language a social phenomenon, in fact, that the individual who attempts to express his experience 
through language must subordinate the aspects of his experience that are unique and personal to the 
generalized, conventional categories that specific words label and connote.‖ (ibid.) She maintains that 
Nietzsche concludes thirdly ―that words do violence to the immediacy and individuality of human 
experience. Words can only refer to those aspects of experience that have been made conscious, ―all 
becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities 
and generalization. Ultimately the growth of consciousness becomes a danger...‖ (GS: 354, cited in this 
form in Higgins, ibid., p.664) She also notes that Nietzsche makes this argument in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, where ―Zarathustra warns that to name and describe one‘s personal virtues with common 
words does violence to the virtue.‖ (Higgins, K., Op. cit., p.664) She then cites the passage from 
Zarathustra as follows:  
 
You would do better to say, ―Inexpressible and nameless is that which 
gives my soul agony and sweetness and is even the hunger of my entrails.‖  
May your virtue be too exalted for the familiarity of names: and if you 
must speak of her, then do not be ashamed to stammer of her. (Z, I: ‗Of 
Enjoying and Suffering the Passions‘, cited in this form in Higgins, ibid., 
p.664) 
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activity, which is in turn emblematic of the distinction between the individual and the 
herd. Thus, again in aphorism (§354): 
 
 
My idea is clearly that consciousness actually belongs not to man‘s 
existence as an individual but rather to the community—and herd—aspects 
of his nature; that accordingly, it is finely developed only in relation to its 
usefulness to community or herd; and that consequently each of us, even 
with the best will in the world to understand ourselves as individually as 
possible, ‗to know ourselves‘, will always bring to consciousness precisely 
that in ourselves which is ‗non-individual‘, that which is ‗average‘; that 
due to the nature of consciousness—to the ‗genius of the species‘ 
governing it—our thoughts themselves are continually as it were outvoted 
and translated back into the herd perspective. At bottom, all our actions are 
incomparably and utterly personal, unique, and boundlessly individual, 
there is no doubt; but as we translate them into consciousness, they no 
longer seem to be… 
 
Nietzsche argues that preconscious thoughts are ―translated back into the herd 
perspective‖ where consciousness reduces thinking to the level of social utility. For 
Nietzsche, both ordinary language and consciousness which he calls ―a surface— and 
sign—world‖ is ―shallow‖, ―thin‖, ―corrupt‖, and ―false‖. Nietzsche associates 
consciousness and perspectivism with the practical needs of the species and pre-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Higgins explores Nietzsche‘s view of language as a mode of consciousness that falsifies reality in order 
to draw a distinction between music and language in his philosophy; music is argued to ―directly 
express the ground of being that underlies all existence‖ whereas language only represents things. 
(Higgins, K., Op. cit., p.670-1) She also contends that for Nietzsche the human capacity to experience 
music is the transcendental precondition for the possibility of human language. (ibid., p.663, 671) 
  
Higgins in another of her articles entitled ‗Nietzsche‘s View of Philosophical Style‘ examines again 
passage (§354) of The Gay Science. She notes that Nietzsche‘s discussion of language in this passage 
―clearly reiterates the view that words, developed as a social phenomenon, are not devised in a way that 
is well suited to the expression of uniquely personal experience‖ (Higgins, K., Nietzsche‘s view of 
Philosophical Style, International Studies in Philosophy, vol. xviii/2, B. Magnus & J.T. Wilcox (eds), 
Baltimore, Scholars Press, 1986, p.69). She also draws upon passages from On Truth and Lies in a 
Non-moral Sense and from Twilight of the Idols in order to express Nietzsche‘s contention that 
language falsifies and vulgarizes individual experience, and is incapable of expressing the particularity 
of unique individual experience. She contends that for Nietzsche it is through style that individual 
experience can be communicated. It is style as the communication of pathos that enables the 
overcoming of the limitations of ordinary language. It is also removed from the herd and is conducive 
to the self-development of the philosophical type. It is in this way that the ideal reader of Nietzsche 
must read him at a level prior to consciousness, at the level of pathos. She reiterates the relationship 
between the unconscious and style in Nietzsche, and that his relationship with style developed from his 
rejection of language as an adequate mode of communicating unique philosophical experience. The 
final section of this chapter will examine the way Nietzsche‘s style in being musical and an expression 
of pathos is in turn a more fundamental mode of communication, as it relates to reality more 
fundamentally than language. It emerges therefore that the style of his works is in an attunement to a 
musical whole, and in turn to reality as Becoming.  
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conscious activity with the ―metaphysical needs‖ of the individual. Sadler (1995: 23) 
indicates that that which is translated back or becomes conscious is ―not unconscious 
mental processes,‖ as Nietzsche ―is talking about the value of conscious versus 
unconscious thought: his references to corruption and falsification indicate that he is 
alluding to thoughts which are prior to consciousness not at the level of mental events 
but at the level of worth.‖7 The distinction between conscious and pre-conscious 
activity links in with what Nietzsche means by rank order. The individual type is 
ranked ‗higher‘ than the herd type as his pre-conscious activity brings him closer to 
the truth or reality. This activity has more worth as the individual in transcending this 
surface—and sign—world catches sight of ―the really great problems and question 
marks‖ (GS: §373) the ―essential questions‖ that arise at an existential level. 
 
The difficulty that could arise with discerning what Nietzsche means by pre-conscious 
thought is the problem of identifying whether it is ―correct‖ or not. This type of 
knowledge is non-epistemological and precludes standards of ―correctness‖ that 
operate within the epistemic sphere of empirical reality, the human ―surface—and 
sign—world‖. As Sadler (1995: 24) states, the ―greatest obstacle to understanding 
what Nietzsche means by pre-conscious or pre-verbal thought, as well as the kind of 
‗truth‘ and ‗knowledge‘ which is defined at this level, is the implicit imposition of an 
epistemological standard of reference: the question will constantly insinuate itself as 
to how such thought could be ‗correct‘ in a sense which is philosophically relevant.‖ 
Sadler accordingly (1995: 24) argues that this correctness is transposed onto an 
                                                          
7
 Sadler examines the distinction between conscious and unconscious thought. He does so in the 
context of arguing that for Nietzsche consciousness is perspectival and is a falsification of reality and 
that through unconscious activity enters into a more truthful relation to reality. He argues that for 
Nietzsche, perspectivism is a falsification of reality, and critiques the postmodern depiction of 
Nietzsche that claims that perspectival truth is the only truth within his philosophy. He in turn argues 
that there is a distinction between tragic pathos and a perspective, for Nietzsche. 
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existential level where it means something prior to the ―adequacy‖ of discursive 
thought. Nietzsche rejects epistemological knowledge of empirical objects as the 
source of truth. There are two types of truth for Nietzsche, first order and second 
order. Nietzsche acknowledges that truth has a second-order meaning, which is 
―truth‖ that pertains to propositions, assertions, and conventions. Truth in the first-
order sense is more fundamental, it is not philosophical discourse propounding the 
―truth‖ but rather the philosopher ―existing in the truth‖ where one is open to ―life‖ or 
reality. For Nietzsche, ―knowledge‖ and ―truth‖ must be redefined at the level of 
unconscious activity, where ―to know‖ means ―to enter‖ into and not to conceptualize, 
and ―truth‖ means coming into attunement with reality. This can either take the form 
of ―entering‖ into an author in terms of a philosophical reading of what is written ―in 
blood‖ (Z, I: §7 ‗On Reading & Writing‘)8 or ―entering‖ into reality in the experience 
of amor fati.  
 
 
Genuine philosophical reading, for Nietzsche, is not bound to conscious words that 
reside on ―the surface‖, and his ideal readers are those who share in a similar pathos 
                                                          
8
 It is for this reason that Nietzsche advocates that only a reader who shares in the same tragic pathos 
will be capable of sharing in his blood. As Sadler (1993: 234) states in his article ‗The Postmodernist 
Politicization of Nietzsche‘, Nietzsche‘s select readers will be attentive to the pre-conscious activity 
from which his writings flow. Sadler‘s argument is also in the context of critiquing the postmodernist 
portrayal of Nietzsche such that he contends that for Nietzsche, it is the non-perspectival reader that 
will be capable of sharing in Nietzsche‘s ―blood‖: 
He is also quite emphatic that the significance of his own utterances is not 
given along with the publicly available words or signs in which he 
expresses himself. This is the reason that Nietzsche knows he will not be 
understood by those (the vast majority) who do not share his basic 
experiences. The average human being, and therefore Nietzsche‘s average 
reader, is inattentive and unalert to what is prior to consciousness, is 
fundamentally dominated by his herd nature and the perspectives which go 
along with it, by words, concepts and conventions. And as long as one tries 
to understand Nietzsche merely through his words or his ‗perspective‘ one 
is doomed to failure.  
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as Nietzsche himself. It is this type of reader who also ―enters‖ into the most 
fundamental relation to reality  through pre-conscious activity; these are the 
individuals that are referred to as ―philosophers‖. Nietzsche does not state that these 
philosophers remove themselves entirely from conscious activity, as speech and the 
use of herd perspectives are indispensable for life. However, the important point he is 
making is that these individuals can transcend their herd natures and experience the 
most fundamental relation with reality. It is now clear that Nietzsche prioritizes pathos 
and unique experience over linguistic or mere conscious activity, and that it is through 
pathos that one can enter into the most primordial relation to reality.  
 
The passage entitled on the ―Genius of the Species‖ of The Gay Science (§354) 
highlights not only that consciousness is a falsification but that it suits the interests, 
needs and wants of the herd or the human species, and that by contrast he associates 
the unconscious with meeting ‗the metaphysical needs‘ of the individual. In this way 
there are not only different dimensions to the self but also different types of human 
beings. The highest type engages in preconscious activity more than the lower types 
who participate predominantly in conscious activity. For this reason a distinction can 
be inferred between a lower self and a higher self. The former engages primarily in 
conscious activity in knowing things; however, the higher type who engages primarily 
in unconscious activity experiences the deepest existentialist states. The higher self 
can also be referred to as a ―philosophical self‖ distinct from the lower or herd self 
only in so far as this type has what is referred to as ―the Great reason of the Body‖ (Z, 
I: ‗On the Despisers of the Body‘)9 or the intelligent instincts, an ―organizing‖ 
                                                          
9
 See V., Gerhardt‘s essay in A Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche entitled ‗The Body, the Self, and 
the Ego‘ who examines this chapter from Thus Spoke Zarathustra where Nietzsche discusses ―the 
Great reason of the Body‖ (I: §4). He notes Nietzsche‘s distinction between the ―great reason‖ of the 
body and the ―small reason‖ of consciousness (In: K.A., Pearson (ed.), A Cambridge Companion to 
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principle that restores the self to an ―ordered‖ state, and in turn disciplines the self to 
the whole. (EH, ‗Clever‘: §9) This passage from Ecce Homo not only shows that for 
Nietzsche, like the above passage from (GS: §354) consciousness is a surface, but also 
that there is a ―rank-order‖ among capacities. It is the higher self, which has the 
ability to be disciplined to a metaphysically independent whole that of Becoming, a 
self which he compares to Goethe, a poet he admires in his ability to be disciplined to 
the whole (TI: ‗Skirmishes‘: §49). In spite of Nietzsche‘s rejection of the self as self-
identical substantial ego, which is declared a fictional entity
10
, he embraces the idea of 
a higher self as the ―Great Reason of the Body‖, the self as a pre-conscious entity. 
Although, the self for Nietzsche is not a fixed entity and exists as a state of becoming 
or overcoming; he does advocate the task of ordering the body or as Thiele suggests 
of ―ordering the soul‖11 (1990: 213), of unifying a multiplicity of instincts. For the 
philosophical type, what determines ―who he is‖ is ―what order of rank the innermost 
drives of his nature stand in relation to each other.‖ (BGE: §6) The genuine 
philosopher takes into account the personal that the philosopher‘s works reflect who 
he is, their creations are not the product of some transcendent reason, but, rather they 
mirror their own drives. The philosophical type becomes himself; he realizes that his 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Nietzsche. Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, p.273) He states that Zarathustra speaks not only of the 
―body‖ and the ―ego‖ but also of the ―self‖ in the same chapter. He also contends that Nietzsche could 
have treated self just as he did ―substance‖ or ―God‖ that is view them as grammatical errors (Gerhardt 
p.274 citing HH, I: §8; TI, ―Reason‖: §5) but that he rather retains the idea of ―self‖: ―In the case of the 
body‘s ―self,‖ however, things seem to stand differently. ―Self‖ is treated as if it had the same 
ontological dignity as ―body.‖ In fact, the ―self‖ proves to be the thoroughly real mediator between 
body and ego...in the end it is nothing other than the self that holds the body and soul, or body and ego, 
together.‖ (ibid., p.274) 
 
10
 See such passages as WP: §484 and GM, I: §13 where Nietzsche rejects the self as substance or as a 
linguistic illusion, and the self as Cartesian ego. He also rejects the self as substance or atom that is the 
Christian conception of the soul. The idea of the higher self expressed above is not a fragmented self, 
although a becoming self, there is an aspect to the ―self‖ that enables it to be restored to the whole, such 
as in amor fati. This self is distinguished from the herd self, which relates to the idea of rank-order in 
Nietzsche. 
 
11
 In spite of Thiele‘s reference to soul, it must be acknowledged that Nietzsche proclaims in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra that the ―soul is only a word for something about the body‖ (Z, I: §4). 
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passion is to ―become what he is‖ (HH, 1: §263). The highest order of rank involves 
the ―innermost drives‖ being restored to a unity; in this way there is the idea of a new 
unified subjectivity.
12
 According to Moles, ―The source of bodily unity is not a 
unifying agent, but the self-regulating totality of drives, which constantly maintains 
itself in a balance.‖ (1990: 103) The drives‘ ability to restore balance, for Nietzsche is 
an ability that belongs to the higher type. Moles explains that for Nietzsche there are 
various levels of intelligence,  
 
At one end of the scale, there is a relatively simplified and superficial 
conscious intelligence...At a deeper level, however, conscious intelligence 
is revealed as merely a reflection of the intelligence of the drives 
themselves, whose subtlety is directed toward maximizing their degrees of 
power. Now Nietzsche proposes a level which is deeper yet. What he sees 
underlying all the drives is an even greater ruling intelligence which 
dominates and regulates the whole system of drives as it advances through 
the world. (1990:11)  
 
Nietzsche calls this ruling intelligence the ―shepherd‖ to the flock of drives, the 
resolution of their mutual strife or their unifying principle (Moles 1990: 11 citing Z, I: 
§4). This ruling power as Moles suggests is not one that is beyond the body, or of a 
different nature, such as the soul in the traditional sense. The unifying principle is 
what Nietzsche calls the body itself; he also calls it the ―self‖. (Z, I: ‗On the Despisers 
of the Body‘) The body searches for the optimum of favourable conditions under 
                                                          
12
 For a discussion of the idea of a unified subjectivity in Nietzsche see J.F., Whitmire‘s article entitled 
‗The Many and the One: the Ontological Multiplicity and Functional Unity of the Person in the Later 
Nietzsche.‘ (Vol.4, Number 1, Spring 2009, pp.1-17) Whitmire in citing Thiele, Parkes and Gemes 
argues against the idea of the self as chaotic ontological multiplicity, but rather argues that Nietzsche is 
in favour of the unity of the body. Whitmire notes that the idea of a unified subjectivity is described by 
Nietzsche only in aesthetic terms and that the passage that is most quoted to express this occurs in The 
Gay Science ―One thing is needful.—To ‗give style‘ to one‘s character—a great and rare art! It is 
practiced by those who survey the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an 
artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even delights the eye.‖ (Whitmire 
ibid. p.7 citing GS: §290) Thiele also stresses in his work ‗Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the 
Soul: Studies of Heroic Individualism‘ the idea that Nietzsche advocates a unified subjectivity, that to 
―order the soul‖ for Nietzsche is to ―stylize one‘s life‖. In speaking of Nietzsche‘s higher man, Thiele 
states that ―His overwhelming project is to unify a multiple soul. This effort to ―impose upon becoming 
the character of being‖ is the mark of ―the supreme will to power‖ (WP 330). The higher man‘s self-
appointed destiny is to make a cosmos of his chaotic inheritance.‖ (Thiele, L., Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1990, p.212)  
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which it can achieve its overall maximum level of power. It achieves this through 
overcoming resistances, the most painful experiences such that its power is increased 
(Moles 1990: 107 citing AC: §2). The increase in power gives rise to an increased 
level of pleasure. Therefore in many places we see Nietzsche affirming the wisdom of 
suffering, as a means to creativity and spiritual power (GS: §318); (D: §114). In Ecce 
Homo, Nietzsche also refers to the idea of a ruling intelligence, an ―organizing 
―idea‖‖, an unconscious ‗teleology‘ that enables one to discover one‘s life purpose, 
one‘s ―life-task‖ that is to ―become what one is‖. (EH, ‗Clever‘: §9)  
 
To become what one is, one must have the faintest notion of what one is. 
From this point of view even the blunders of life have their own meaning 
and value—the occasional side roads and wrong roads...that are remote 
from the task. The whole surface of consciousness—consciousness is a 
surface—must be kept clear of all great imperatives...Meanwhile the 
organizing ―idea‖ that is destined to rule keeps growing deep down—it 
begins to command...that will one day prove to be an indispensable means 
toward a whole—it trains all subservient capacities before giving any hint 
of the dominant task, ―goal,‖ ―aim,‖ or ―meaning.‖ (EH, ‗Clever‘: §9) 
 
This ―idea‖ is the ruling force that leads us back from side roads and wrong roads, all 
of which prove to be an indispensable means toward a whole. ―To become what one 
is‖ is to be disciplined to the whole, to experience the absolute innocence and joy of 
all becoming, and in turn of going beyond good and evil. The philosophical type is not 
determined by a pre-given essence; the higher type must be master of his own 
destiny
13
, and get in touch with his ―life-task‖. The ―secret force‖ and ―necessity‖ of 
                                                          
13
 Leiter, B. in his essay ‗The Paradox of fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche‘ also refers to the 
passage ‗To Become what one is‘ from Ecce Homo (‗Clever‘: §9) in order to stress the idea of a 
fatalism in Nietzsche (In: J. Richardson & B. Leiter (eds.), Nietzsche. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2001, p.286). He also attempts to solve the paradox in Nietzsche between the idea of ‗self-creation‘ and 
his fatalism. He wishes to argue that self-creation presupposes the discovery of what is ‗lawful and 
necessary‘ in one‘s life, for Nietzsche. (Leiter, p.315 citing GS: §335) He suggests that in spite of 
Nietzsche‘s critique of the concept of the ‗Causa Sui‘ or the notion of ‗free will‘ that Nietzsche 
embraces the idea that we are causally determined by natural facts or the environment. (ibid., p.299) 
There is also no conscious ‗self‘ in self-mastery; self-mastery rather arises from a struggle of drives 
being played out. (ibid., p318) Then, Leiter suggests that ―how they play out determines what he 
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this task is expressed in the preface to Human, all too Human (I: §6), it rules ―among 
and in the individual facets of his destiny like an unconscious pregnancy—long before 
he has caught sight of this task itself or knows its name.‖ In speaking of his 
―eccentricities‖ in a Letter to Carl Fuchs, he expresses the idea of a ―task‖, which 
closely parallels the idea of being disciplined to the whole in Ecce Homo (‗Clever‘: 
§9). He expresses how his ―eccentricities‖ play a role in the realization of his ―task‖ 
 
In Germany there are strong complaints about my ―eccentricities.‖ But 
since people do not know where my centre is...Likewise today it seems an 
eccentricity that I should have been a Wagnerite. It was an inordinately 
dangerous experiment...To be sure, one‘s inmost being gradually 
disciplines one back to unity; that passion, to which no name can be put for 
a long time, rescues us from all digressions and dispersions, that task of 
which one is the involuntary mission. (Letter to Carl Fuchs, Dec14th, 
1887) 
 
It is this idea of ―one‘s inmost being‖ that is analogous to the ―organizing‖  ――idea‖‖ 
that is expressed in Ecce Homo.
14
 Nietzsche refers to this idea of the self as an 
organization of intentionally directed drives in Beyond Good and Evil as ―our spiritual 
fatum‖ and our ―unteachable very ―deep down‖‖, which is part of a larger Totality. 
(TI, ‗Skirmishes of an Untimely Man‘: §49) It is the ―untimely I‖ that belongs to the 
whole as Becoming; it is what Nietzsche refers to as his ―innermost history‖ or 
becoming self. (EH, ‗UM‘: §3) For Nietzsche, consciousness is argued to be 
superfluous, as there are deeper drives that keep the body attuned to reality. As Parkes 
(2011: 97) notes in his article ‗Nietzsche, Panpsychism and Pure Experience: An 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
believes, what he values, what he becomes. But, qua conscious self or ‗agent‘, the person takes no 
active part in the process.‖ (ibid., p.318-19) This implies that Nietzsche uses a familiar term ‗self-
mastery‘ in an unfamiliar way, ―one that actually presupposes the truth of fatalism.‖ (ibid., p. 319) 
 
14
 For Nietzsche, the ―Great Reason of the Body‖ (Z, I: §4), the ―organizing ―idea‖‖ that is at work in 
one‘s depths, the unconscious (EH, ‗Clever‘: §9) and ―one‘s inmost being‖ (Letter to Carl Fuchs, 
Dec14th, 1887) can be argued to closely relate to one another. It is the higher type or Nietzsche‘s idea 
of the genuine philosopher that has this aspect to the ―self‖ or the body. It is a higher self in that not 
everyone has this aspect to the self. The idea of the higher self coincides with rank-order in Nietzsche, 
and also the idea that he writes for the select few, which will be discussed in the third chapter. 
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East-Asian Contemplative Perspective‘ in speaking of the superfluous nature of 
consciousness, he states that for Nietzsche 
 
 
A less sick way to live, then, would be to let the drives that give rise to our  
everyday consciousness and its thinking in words become quiescent, no 
longer interpreting the situation from their own perspectives, and to 
thereby allow what is going on beneath thinking to flow through the body 
in silence, without commentary. What is going on is basically drives—not 
exfoliating into consciousness or commenting on the text of experience, 
not the egocentric drives that sustain the illusion of the I—but now only the 
more ancient, deeper drives through the millennia of adaptation have kept 
the human being attuned to its physical environment  Paradoxically, it is by 
putting ourselves in a situation where we do not need to be concerned with 
preserving ourselves that we can get to a condition in which it is only those 
natural, environment-related and life-preserving drives that are operative. 
Under such conditions, one‘s responses to the world are naturally 
spontaneous, and one‘s actions stem not from the narrow confines of the 
small self, but from the forces of heaven and earth as they operate through 
the well trained body. 
 
 
The idea of a higher self is also intimately connected with the realization of a ―life-
task‖ such a task is to encounter the tragic or something higher than oneself that 
―outweighs all of life‘s struggles‖. Nietzsche expresses this in his discussion of ―the 
meaning of tragedy‖ 
 
 
 
The individual must be consecrated to something higher than himself—that 
is the meaning of tragedy; he must be free of the terrible anxiety which 
death and time evoke in the individual: for at any moment, in the briefest 
atom of his life‘s course, he may encounter something holy that endlessly 
outweighs all his struggle and all his distress—that what it means to have a 
sense for the tragic; all the ennoblement of mankind is enclosed in this 
supreme task; the definite rejection of this task would be the saddest 
picture imaginable to a friend of man. That is my view of things! There is 
only hope and one guarantee for the future of humanity: it consists in his 
retention of the sense for the tragic. (UM, ‗Richard Wagner in Bayreuth‘, 
§IV) 
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III 
Nietzsche on Tragic Insight into Truth as Primordial Reality or Becoming 
 
The following section looks at how Nietzsche‘s perspectivism is traceable back to a 
Kantian phenomenalism, and examines the contention that his notion of tragic insight 
is a new metaphysics. It can be argued that in light of Nietzsche‘s perspectivism, as in 
the case of Lampert (2001) that tragic insight is itself an interpretation of the world. 
Alternatively, there are commentators like Sadler (1995) who argues against those 
who follow a strict perspectival reading of Nietzsche and view truth in perspectival 
terms, claiming that reality cannot be accessed. They view Nietzsche‘s perspectivism 
in light of Kant‘s ―Copernican Revolution‖ that the limits of human reason show that 
the world as noumenon can never be known, that there is only mere phenomenal or 
perspectival knowledge and that accordingly  reality can have no meaning for us.  
 
Sadler (1995) also suggests that there is a clear connection between Nietzsche‘s 
perspectivism and Kantian empirical knowledge (or what is commonly referred to as 
Kant‘s phenomenalism), in order to show that his perspectivism is a form of 
scepticism.
15
 This view entails that the idea that objective knowledge of the thing-in-
                                                          
15
 Doyle, in her work ‗Nietzsche on Epistemology and Metaphysics,‘ argues that Nietzsche‘s 
perspectivism doesn‘t involve scepticism. She argues that knowledge for Nietzsche is anthropocentric 
but that it is of a mind-independent empirical reality. She is an example of a perspectivist commentator 
of Nietzsche who falls on the analytical side. She claims that Nietzsche is an empirical realist; that 
there is perspectival knowledge of empirical reality and that this reality is knowable. She therefore 
claims to solve the scepticism charge (problem of self-reference) against Nietzsche. She traces 
Nietzsche‘s perspectivism back to Kantian phenomenalism, but argues that Nietzsche rejects the idea 
that empirical reality exists as a mental representation, and that the self is disconnected from the thing-
in-itself. (Doyle, T., Nietzsche on Epistemology and Metaphysics, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University 
Press, 2009, p.53) She claims that Becoming as empirical reality can be known, and that it is 
irreducible to human minds because of its intrinsic nature. Her emphasis is on epistemic knowledge of 
things; however, she does not explore the relationship between Nietzsche‘s perspectivism and his 
artist‘s metaphysics. She argues that Nietzsche never abandoned the language of falsification in his 
later works, and in doing so she refers to the passage cited above from The Gay Science (§354) to 
compound her argument. She references an excerpt from the passage as follows: ―all becoming 
conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and 
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itself (reality) is an unattainable ideal or ―God‘s eye view‖, which has led in turn to 
the idea that scientific knowledge or phenomenal knowledge is not only the sole form 
of knowledge but is also devalued, in that it cannot capture the thing-in-itself or 
objective reality. This in turn has led to the dominance of multiple perspectival truths, 
which as ―devalued‖ knowledge is a form of nihilism and as representational 
knowledge has led to the nihilistic notion that reality can have no meaning for us. 
Scientific knowledge became, for Kant, representational knowledge and as a form of 
mental representationalism, reality became the ‗object of knowledge‘ rather than 
being viewed as metaphysically independent of human thought. As Sadler (1995: 27) 
notes, Kant ―discredits metaphysics‖ in rendering metaphysical knowledge an 
impossibility, and claiming that the only knowledge is phenomenal. He argues that 
Nietzsche reclaims the true metaphysics whereby tragic insight as the genuine 
metaphysics is non-perspectival. Kant introduces a scepticism that reality cannot be 
known and it can be argued that for Nietzsche through tragic insight this scepticism 
can be overturned. It can be surmounted either by arguing that this tragic insight is not 
conscious phenomenal or perspectival knowledge, as in the case of Sadler or that it is 
to the contrary an interpretation of the world, either way tragic insight is ranked 
highest and can be argued to be a new standard of truth, for Nietzsche. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
generalization.‖ (GS: §354, cited in this form in Doyle, ibid. p.73) Doyle‘s aim is to show that 
Nietzsche overturns a Kantian scepticism, that reality cannot be known. Therefore, there is a mind-
independent reality that is perspectivally known and there is no epistemic gap between self and world. 
Doyle argues that, for Nietzsche, the idea that there is perspectival knowledge of empirical reality 
implies that this reality is knowable, and hence the scepticism charge against Nietzsche (that reality is 
unknowable) can be removed. However, Doyle‘s argument that the charge of scepticism can be 
removed conflicts with her assertion that Nietzsche retains the language of falsification throughout his 
work. 
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The aim of this thesis is to argue that Nietzsche retains the idea of the thing-in-itself 
not as substance or as representation, but as a reality, that of Becoming, and that 
―metaphysical knowledge‖ of this reality is possible only in the tragic sense. The type 
of metaphysical knowledge that Nietzsche rejects is intellectual knowledge in the 
sense of the ―conscious intellect‖ capturing the thing-in-itself. He also rejects 
scientific or phenomenal as representational knowledge where reality becomes the 
―object of knowledge‖. In order to argue that Nietzsche retains the idea of the ―thing-
in-itself‖ only as a reality of Becoming and the possibility of corresponding to it, it is 
necessary to examine his relationship with those philosophers such as Kant and 
Schopenhauer who also uphold the idea of the thing-in-itself. Schopenhauer 
recognized in Kant the metaphysical need to gain access to the thing-in-itself through 
the conscious intellect, but, like Nietzsche, rejects this approach to metaphysics. 
Nietzsche is also anti-Kantian in terms of his criticism of Kant‘s adherence to abstract 
or conceptual thought as a way of accessing the thing-in-itself, which turns out to be 
an impossible ideal. Nietzsche rejects this ideal, the ascetic ideal as a moral law that 
renders reality a ‗beyond‘, an inaccessible reality or ‗x‘. In recognizing Kant‘s 
acknowledgement that conceptual thought cannot capture reality, Nietzsche does not 
take scientific or phenomenal knowledge as a substitute for metaphysical knowledge 
or tragic insight. Nietzsche is a Kantian only in the sense of relating to Kant‘s desire 
to satisfy the metaphysical need of accessing ―the thing-in-itself‖ or for Nietzsche, a 
reality that is irreducible to the human that is not an unknowable ‗x‘, but not when it 
comes to the way in which this need is to be satisfied. Nietzsche recognizes that he 
retains this same desire but takes a different route to its fulfilment; rather than through 
conceptual or abstract thought, he argues that there is alternative, non-representational 
knowledge that can gain access to reality. This non-representational knowledge is, for 
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Nietzsche of the early period, intuition, a term borrowed from Schopenhauer
16
 
Schopenhauer rejects, in the same way as Nietzsche, Kant‘s notion that the positive 
sciences or representational knowledge can act as a substitute for tragic insight.  
 
Schopenhauer maintains that if representational knowledge cannot gain access to the 
thing-in-itself then there must be a form of non-representational knowledge which 
can. This latter type of knowledge is what he calls intuition, which is a form of ‗inner 
experience‘ distinct from the outer experience of empirical perception. Kant makes 
the false assumption that if abstract conceptual thought cannot make possible 
objective knowledge of the thing-in-itself, then it could not be known at all. However, 
as Sadler (1995: 29) notes, even ―Schopenhauer‘s subjective way to the thing-in-itself 
cannot reveal the latter in all its pristine nakedness.‖ It becomes apparent that no kind 
of metaphysical thinking in the intellectual or conceptual sense  can access reality, 
―but inner experience will lead us as closely as humanly possible.‖ (ibid.) Both 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche retain the idea of the Thing-in-itself as they only reject it 
                                                          
16
 As has been aforementioned Nietzsche drops the use of the term ―intuition‖ in the later works. It 
must also be mentioned at this point that this thesis is not a complex study of the relationship between 
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer; however, it must be acknowledged that in spite of the early Nietzsche‘s 
affinity with him that this relationship is one of opposition in the later period. Regardless of their 
complex relationship, it can be argued that Schopenhauer influenced Nietzsche on intuition and the 
unconscious. In The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer refers to intuitive ―aesthetic 
experience‖ as ―intuitive cognition‖, ―Knowledge of perception‖ or ―feeling‖; it is non-conceptual or 
non-propositional knowledge (abstract knowledge). In aesthetic terms it implies that the genius artist 
(tragedian) momentarily escapes pain in his identification with the Will. It is a bodily experience. For 
Schopenhauer‘s elevation of the body to philosophical importance, see (WWR, I: §18, 100, 102, E.F.J. 
Payne (ed.), 2 vols., New York, Dover, 1969). It is expressed by certain commentators that 
Schopenhauer played a role in the discovery of the unconscious. On Schopenhauer‘s anticipation of the 
late Freud on the unconscious see, Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1983, p.284) Parkes in his work ‗Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche‘s 
Psychology‘ notes Schopenhauer‘s influence upon Nietzsche‘s psychology, that the idea of will (‗will 
to life‘) as the ―innermost being of the whole of nature‖ that is the force that drives in nature is an 
anticipation of Nietzsche‘s notion of the will to power (Parkes, G., Composing the Soul, Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1994, p.50 citing The World as Will and Representation, I: 21-23) 
However, it must also be noted that Nietzsche is critical of Schopenhauer‘s idea of will; he views it as 
moralistic (GS: §344) and he also criticises Schopenhauer for assigning to the will properties that are 
only appropriate at the level of phenomena. For a detailed discussion of Schopenhauer‘s influence upon 
Nietzsche, see ‗Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche‘s Educator‘, C. Janaway (ed.), 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998 wherein Higgins discusses the differences between the philosophers. 
(ibid. p.158) 
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as an ‗object of human knowledge‘ or in the form of a mental representation. 
Nietzsche refers to this ―totality‖ or ―whole‖ as the ‗Primal Unity‘ in his early work 
The Birth of Tragedy (§6) and it is also referred to as ―Life‖ or ―Becoming‖ in his 
later works. It must be stressed that Nietzsche emphasizes strictly ―Becoming‖, as 
opposed to the ―Primal Unity‖ in the later period.  Nietzsche upholds the idea of a 
metaphysically independent reality and advocates that knowledge of it is possible, and 
he describes this type of knowledge as tragic wisdom or as Dionysian wisdom; it is a 
form of insight into  reality.
17
 This insight can be referred to as an unconscious, pre-
cognitive aesthetic experience, where one ―enters into‖ correspondence with the 
whole. It is the individual type who can make his life a work of art that is most 
truthful in corresponding to reality in what is called a ―beautiful appearance‖. For 
Nietzsche, in the same way that there are varying degrees of expressing reality, there 
are varying degrees of being truthful or untruthful or there are varying shades of 
appearance where the lightest are those that are most truthful. There are both direct 
and indirect expressions of reality  which in turn coincide with the distinction between 
verbal and pre-verbal thought which has been discussed in the previous section. 
Nietzsche refers to pre-verbal thought or unconscious activity in the form of a dancing 
oneness with reality as a direct expression it.. Although Nietzsche‘s use of the term 
―intuition‖ or ―instinctive certainty‖ (BT: §1) is dropped in the later philosophy, 
Nietzsche returns to the notion of tragic wisdom in the form of a ―dancing revelatory 
experience‖ (Z, III: §15-16). Verbal thought, for Nietzsche is an indirect expression of 
                                                          
17
 This tragic wisdom is also referred to as the ‗Great Reason‘ of the Body (Z, I: ‗On the Despisers of 
the Body‘) or ‗Lioness wisdom‘ or ‗wild wisdom‘ (Z, II: ‗The Child with the Mirror‘), as ―bird-
wisdom‘ (EH, III, ‗The Yes & Amen Song: §7). It is also referred to as ―recovered reason‖ in Twilight 
of the Idols, ‗The Four Great Errors‘: §2). In  Ecce Homo it is referred to as the ‗strangest ―objectivity‖‘ 
(EH, ‗BT‘: §4), ―tragic wisdom‖ (EH, ‗BT‘: §3), ―inspiration‖, ―rapture‖, and ―revelation.‖ (EH, Z: §1)  
Nietzsche refers to wisdom as intuition in his early works; however, it is looked at in terms of the 
intelligent drives or the ―Great Reason of the Body‖ in the later works. (Z, I: ‗On Reading & Writing‘) 
Nietzsche‘s early works emphasizes intuitive wisdom in the early works whereas he looks at it in 
relation to the ―Great Reason‖ of the body (the most intelligent drives) in the later work ‗Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra‘ (I: §7). 
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reality, it is constituted within inter-subjective relations and is an expression of a 
group or community. Nietzsche often refers to this type of verbal thought as 
―abstract‖ or ―conceptual‖ where there is no difficulty of comprehension. Intuitive 
thought, in contrast requires artistry, or what Schopenhauer refers to as the quality of 
genius. This is why Fink (2003: 27) asserts that ―Nietzsche‘s concept of the genius 
must ultimately be understood and interpreted via the human dedication to truth. Truth 
here does not refer to scientific cognition but to the tragic intuition of the cosmic 
ground... he becomes the medium of universal truth.‖ Fink refers to the idea of genius 
as the instrument of a divine power ―which the cosmic ground creates in order to 
encounter itself‖, and that for Nietzsche ―The genius is the caretaker of the truth of the 
primordial cosmic ground, the location of its revelation.‖ (2003: 30) 
 
In terms of looking at both Kant and Schopenhauer‘s influence upon Nietzsche, it is 
important also at this point to consider whether the ‗Primal Unity‘ of The Birth of 
Tragedy is the Schopenhauerian ‗Primal Will‘ or ask the question to what extent does 
The Birth withhold a Schopenhauerian metaphysic? The ―Attempt at Self-criticism‖ 
(1886) tends to raise this problem; Nietzsche is viewed as being critical of his earlier 
relationship with Kant and Schopenhauer and that at the later period he abandons 
these tendencies.
18
  
                                                          
18
 It must be noted that both Nietzsche‘s ‗Attempt at Self-Criticism‘, a new preface to The Birth of 
Tragedy and the fact that he dropped the term ‗Primal Unity‘ after this early work has led to the idea 
that Nietzsche‘s early work may have embodied a Schopenhauerian pessimism or a Kantian scepticism. 
There is the contention held that Nietzsche‘s ‗Primal One‘ is ‗metaphysical‘ in a Schopenhauerian 
sense, as like Schopenhauer‘s ‗primal will‘, it seems to imply a distinction between reality ‗in itself‘ 
and ‗appearance‘. There are commentators who argue in favour and those who argue against this 
estimation. It is suggested by certain commentators that Nietzsche should not have inherited it 
considering The Birth was written ―in the post-Kantian Epoch‖, at a time when Nietzsche was aware of 
Kant‘s Copernican Revolution that reality cannot be known through conscious thoughts or the mind. 
See Sadler, T. who argues against such commentators in arguing that The Birth does not inherit a 
Schopenhauerian or Kantian metaphysic (Nietzsche: Truth and Redemption, London, The Athlone 
Press, 1995, p.132). For a detailed outline of who these commentators are, that suggests that he does 
adhere to a Schopenhauerian pessimism see Han, B., in her article ‗Nietzsche‘s Metaphysics in the 
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One may question whether Nietzsche‘s subsequent critical comments in the ―Attempt 
at Self-Criticism‖ may affect my using it to support the claim that he is a 
metaphysician. Although Nietzsche regrets his ―romantic‖ tendencies, his use of 
Kantian and Schopenhauerian terms, his belief in Wagnerian music as a panacea to 
the ills of modernity, he nevertheless maintains that the book hints at thoughts that his 
later works had more ―courage‖ to express (BT, ‗Attempt‘: §6) He wanted to express 
―strange and new valuations‖ not necessarily Schopenhauerian but by ―means‖ of 
Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulas ―which were basically at odds with Kant‘s 
and Schopenhauer‘s spirit and taste! What, after all, did Schopenhauer think of 
tragedy?‖ (BT, ‗Attempt‘: §6)19 It could be argued that he regrets using certain 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Birth of Tragedy‘, European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3): 2006, p.20, n.2. She herself in this article 
claims that Nietzsche didn‘t adhere to a Schopenhauerian pessimism in The Birth. What is actually 
meant by this pessimism will be discussed later in the section. If The Birth does withhold a Kantian 
scepticism, the question that then arises is what is meant by this dualism? This dualism consists of a 
mind versus reality opposition that the mind cannot access reality, and therefore is set in opposition to 
it. The former distinction is the one that The Birth is accused of inheriting. Kant does not deny reality 
but only its accessibility through the mind‘s activity, such as conceptual and theoretical thinking. 
However, the ‗Primal One‘ of The Birth is not an object of theoretical knowledge. If The Birth inherited 
the Kantian prohibition about the ‗know-ability‘ of reality, the Dionysian wisdom of this early work 
would have to be theoretical in nature. See also Sadler, T. who argues that The Birth does not adhere to 
a Kantian scepticism, Op. cit., p.133. It is theoretical knowledge that cannot ‗access‘ reality and creates 
an opposition between the ‗mind‘ and reality. Nietzsche rejects the opposition but not the reality itself; 
the term ‗in-itself‘ is rejected only in the sense that it implies a barrier to reality, but what the term 
refers to, that is a reality is not rejected. It is possible to argue that the relationship between 
reality/‗Primal Unity‘ and appearance in The Birth does not coincide with the reality/appearance 
distinction in Kant. Appearance, for Nietzsche, in The Birth is the experience of the Dionysian artist 
who looks ―truly into the essence‖ and possesses ―true knowledge, an insight into the horrible truth.‖ 
(BT: §7) The Dionysian artist identifies with the ‗Primal Unity‘ in the intoxicating experience of 
entering into a dancing oneness with reality itself. Appearance, for Kant is rather theoretical, abstract 
and conceptual such that it sets up a distinction or opposition between phenomenon and noumenon 
(reality/in-itself).  
 
19
 See the Appendix to ‗Willingness and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche‘s Educator‘ for all of 
Nietzsche‘s references to Schopenhauer. Janaway outlines that the ‗Attempt at Self-Criticism‘ of BT 
(§6) shows that Nietzsche in BT uses Schopenhauerian formulae, but is against Schopenhauer‘s view of 
tragedy. (Janaway, C., (ed.) Willingness and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche‘s Educator, Op. 
cit., p266. Nietzsche‘s account of tragedy is distinct from Schopenhauer‘s which is pessimistic in 
nature, as it implies the conclusion that ‗All life is suffering‘ (WWR, I: 56, 310), and that the will is 
insatiable. (WWR, I: 56, 308) such that suffering cannot be overcome. 
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Schopenhauerian terminology, as he didn‘t understand tragedy to the same degree as 
Nietzsche himself.  
 
In spite of Nietzsche‘s use of Schopenhauerian formulae, The Birth is actually trying 
to break away from a Schopenhauerian pessimism, which he views as life-denying. 
This criticism towards Schopenhauerian pessimism intensifies in the later works in 
particular in a section entitled ‗What is romanticism?‘ of The Gay Science (§370). In 
his early work, he withholds a life-affirmative philosophy that the most intense 
suffering can be overcome, which also makes his philosophy redemptive in nature.
20
 
It also must be noted that the ‗Primal One‘ is not a Schopenhauerian term21; it seems 
that the main Schopenhauerian term used by Nietzsche is that of the ―principium 
                                                          
20
 Nietzsche‘s early work ‗The Birth‘ is in no way life-denying; it is life-affirmative, it upholds the 
philosophy that man can justify his life in the face of a ―terrifying‖ and ―absurd‖ abyss of life. In this 
early work, Nietzsche rejects a higher Christian or theological purpose to life, in the form of after-
worldly hopes. It expresses the ‗tragic‘ insight which must be once again re-embraced after the 
―optimistic intellectualism‖ beginning with Socrates that is a rational justification of life that Nietzsche 
criticizes. Although Nietzsche came under Schopenhauer‘s influence, he is to be distinguished from the 
latter‘s conclusion that life must be ‗denied‘. The Birth expresses a life-affirmative philosophy that of 
‗life-intoxication‘. Although Nietzsche breaks away from Schopenhauer in the later works, he is at the 
same time indebted to him on the distinction between life-denying and life-affirmative values. His 
critique of Schopenhauer‘s pessimism enables him to develop a dichotomy between life-denial and life-
affirmation in the later works, such as ―Dionysus versus the Crucified‖ in Ecce Homo. The ‗Yes-
saying‘ pathos of The Birth is clearly expressed in the following passage as ―Life is at bottom of things, 
despite all changes of appearances, indestructibly powerful and pleasurable‖ (BT: §7) Nietzsche‘s 
metaphysics shows us that although life may seem like a vale of suffering, its overall meaning is 
positive, as suffering can be overcome. This is probably the most radical way that The Birth departs 
from Schopenhauer, which anticipates later themes in his thought, in particular artistic sublimation in 
Twilight of the Idols (‗What I owe to the ancients‘: §4), and of amor fati (love of one‘s fate) in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra. 
 
21
 This claim that the ‗Primal One‘ is not a Schopenhauerian term also implies that it is not what 
Schopenhauer means by the ‗Primal Will‘. In an essay entitled ‗On Schopenhauer‘  written in 1868, he 
strongly criticises the latter for having forgotten the Kantian prohibition about the unknowability of 
things-in-themselves and as a result relapsed into a dogmatic metaphysics by attributing to the will 
qualities which can only pertain to phenomena. In this way it is unlikely that Nietzsche in The Birth, 
which was published in 1872, subsequently to his essay on Schopenhauer that he did what he criticizes 
the latter for doing, i.e., to deck out ―a totally obscure , inconceivable X ... as if in brightly coloured 
clothes, with predicates drawn from a world alien to it, the world of appearance.‖  (Nietzsche, F., ‗On 
Schopenhauer‘ (1868), In: C. Janaway (trans.), Willingness and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as 
Nietzsche‘s Educator, Op. cit., p.262) Janaway offers the full translation of this essay in ‗Willingness 
and Nothingness‘, pp.258-265). 
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individuationis‖.22 Although the term ‗Primal Unity‘ disappears in the later works, it 
re-emerges under different terms such as the ―will to power‖ and ―Becoming‖. 
Looking back on his early work in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche remarks that ―the 
cadaverous perfume of Schopenhauer sticks to only a few formulas‖ (EH, ‗BT‘: §1), 
which suggests that not all the terms of The Birth were Schopenhauerian in nature. 
However, it must also be acknowledged that Nietzsche did come under some sort of 
Schopenhauerian influence, and that he becomes more critical of Schopenhauer in the 
later works, in particular towards his ―romantic pessimism.‖ (GS: §370) Although the 
alleged ―romantic tendencies‖ of his early period are abandoned in the middle work 
Human, All too Human, his ―sceptical‖ or ―intellectual‖ period, Nietzsche returns to 
the idea of the Dionysian in his later works Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond Good 
and Evil and The Gay Science. Nietzsche‘s self-criticism could also be argued to be 
equally self-promoting in the sense that his criticism of an earlier self is compatible 
with the promotion of his present self. In his ―Attempt at a Self-Criticism‖ Nietzsche 
has come to a place where he has overcome fully Schopenhauerian and Kantian 
formulae, and he feels that his notion of tragic wisdom that is expressed in the later 
work ‗Thus Spoke Zarathustra‘ (BT, ‗Attempt‘: §7) actually supersedes either of 
these thinkers influences. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, he speaks of the ―concept of the 
                                                          
22
 In BT Nietzsche uses the above term to refer to the individuating experience of the tragedian who is 
removed from the oneness of all things. This individuating process involves suffering and isolation, 
existentialist states that Nietzsche advocates throughout his philosophy. He does so, as he sees them as 
a stimulus to life and that can be overcome. The type of suffering that Nietzsche advocates is not one 
that is purposely self-induced but rather consists of what life just happens to bring to the tragedian‘s 
experiences. Schopenhauer‘s use of the term is rather in the moralistic sense that it involves fasting, 
and absolute chastity, which Nietzsche would reject. The above term also refers, for Schopenhauer to 
the way in which we cognitively apprehend the world that is through the human categories of space, 
time and causality (the world as representation). Nietzsche notes this in ‗On Schopenhauer‘ (1968) 
(Op. cit., p.262) In BT: §18 Nietzsche admires both Kant and Schopenhauer for recognizing that space, 
time and causality are human categories. Nietzsche‘s tragedian ‗transcends‘ these categories in entering 
into a dancing oneness with the primal unity (―untimely‖). In the later philosophy such as in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra experiences the ―untimely‖ under a different guise in entering into an 
oneness with ―eternity‖, that is ―eternity‖ that is within Becoming or the ―untimely‖. In this way, 
Nietzsche overturns a problem in Schopenhauer, the problem of transcending time. 
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―Dionysian‖‖ that it becomes ―a supreme deed‖ in relation to Zarathustra‘s climb or 
ascent that it forms part of this most Yes-saying or life-affirmative of spirits:  
 
 
The ladder on which he ascends and descends is tremendous; he has seen 
further, willed further, been capable further than any other human being. In 
every word he contradicts, this most Yes-saying of all spirits; in him all 
opposites are blended into a new unity. (EH, ‗Z‘: §6)  
 
In his work ―Nietzsche‘s Task‖ Lampert explores Nietzsche‘s idea of the return of 
Dionysus of section (§295) of Beyond Good and Evil. Lampert asks the question 
―What does the return of Dionysos mean?‖ and answers with the claim that ―Within 
the economy of Nietzsche‘s writings it means the return of the god whose banishment 
Nietzsche judged, in his first book, the most significant event of Western history (BT 
12-17)‖ (Lampert 2001: 288) He also identifies the affinity this early work has with 
Beyond Good and Evil: ―Beyond Good and Evil shows that Nietzsche remained true to 
his early judgement about this event while expanding and deepening his conception of 
just what happened there.‖ (Lampert 2001: 288) He also observes Nietzsche‘s affinity 
with the Dionysian in Twilight of the Idols in the section ‗What I owe to the ancients,‘  
 
 
...what he finally owes them is ―the fundamental fact of the Hellenic 
instinct,‖ the Dionysian condition. There too Nietzsche ends by noting the 
trajectory of his career, beginning with the Birth of Tragedy and 
culminating in the deeper understanding and greater explicitness of the 
later works: ―I, the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysos, —I, the 
teacher of the eternal return... (Lampert 2001: 288)    
 
 
Lampert also notes a passage from The Gay Science (§370) where Nietzsche speaks of 
the return of Dionysus as the next greatest recent event after the death of God. It is the 
return of the ―genius of the heart‖, the ―tempter god‖, (BGE: §295) ―whose mastery of 
knowing how to seem gives him access to every soul.‖ (Lampert 2001: 290) In 
examining the aphorism (§370) of The Gay Science, it is apparent that Nietzsche still 
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has an affinity with the Dionysian; he refers to it as ―Dionysian pessimism‖ as 
opposed to a Schopenhauerian pessimism. He also exhorts that it is his ‗ownmost‘ 
intuition and vision that the Dionysian returns, a prophetic vision:  
 
(That there could be a completely different pessimism, a classical one—
this intuition and vision belongs to me as inseparable from me, as my 
propium and ipsissimum; only the word ‗classical‘ offends my ears; it has 
become far too trite, round, and indistinct. I call this pessimism of the 
future—for it is coming! I see it coming!—Dionysian pessimism.) 
 
The section next looks at Nietzsche‘s early work entitled ‗On Truth and Lies in a 
Non-Moral Sense‘, it is evident that Nietzsche has an affinity with intuition in this 
work, that is tragic wisdom of the early period and that there is a certain truth that he 
embraces. In spite of his very critical attitude to truth at that time, such as truth in the 
dogmatic sense, this work suggests that there is a certain type of truth that Nietzsche 
advocates. This is truth in the redemptive sense; that is through intuition the higher 
type gains insight into reality. For Nietzsche, as for Schopenhauer, the intellect knows 
only the world as representation; it is only a ―surface power‖, ―subjective‖ or 
―superficial.‖ (The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle between Art and 
Knowledge: §54) The main point, for both thinkers, is not only that the conscious 
intellect cannot access to reality; but also that it does not need such access, because it 
only serves the practical needs of the herd. Nietzsche confirms this when he states that 
―the intellect unfolds its principle powers in dissimulation, which is the means by 
which weaker, less robust individuals preserve themselves—.‖ (On the Truth & Lies 
in a Non-Moral Sense: §1) Nietzsche identifies the intellect with herd-utility values, 
and he rejects these as a source of truth. This is a work where Nietzsche is an advocate 
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of multiple perspectival truths in his rejection of dogmatic truths.
23
 It is also a work 
where Nietzsche rejects language as an adequate expression of reality whereby he 
makes the claim that it cannot capture reality. (On the Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral 
Sense: §1) It can be argued that Nietzsche contends that reality can be ‗accessed‘ but 
through non-linguistic tragic wisdom. Nietzsche‘s rejection of abstract, conceptual or 
linguistic truth does not imply a rejection of truth entirely, as his early works address 
the notion of philosophical truth and its connection with tragic insight.  
 
This thesis also examines the connection between Nietzsche‘s style and truth where it 
will be shown that his writings are in attunement to Becoming. It will be shown that 
Nietzsche engages in the art of writing in blood or writing that flows from life 
experience or tragic insight as opposed to theoretical knowledge, which in turn makes 
his writings closer to truth. This coincides with Nietzsche‘s criticism of Parmenides‘ 
use of ―bloodless abstractions‖ as an inadequate expression of reality which contrasts 
with the truth expressed by Heraclitus, the type of truth ―grasped in intuitions.‖ 
(PTAG: §9) In this way, his style will be argued to be an expression of the whole that 
it is an expression of tragic wisdom and of his life experience.  
 
It is in ‗On Truth & Lies in a Non-Moral Sense‘ that Nietzsche associates intuition 
with redemption and truth: 
                                                          
23
 The work ‗On the Truth & Lies‘ is one in which postmodernists refer to in order to argue the idea 
that Nietzsche advocates multiple perspectival truths  either in the sense that perspectives cannot access 
reality or that there are only perspectives whereby reality or truth is overlooked. See Higgins, K., in her 
essay ‗Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: Temperament and Temporality‘ who also notes that this work is 
adhered to by postmodernists in arguing for multiple perspectival truths. (In: C. Janaway, Op. cit., 
p.151-178) There are also commentators like Sadler who argue that postmodernists overlook intuition 
in this work, as they adhere to the idea that Nietzsche‘s perspectivism which in being traceable back to 
a Kantian phenomenalism cannot capture reality. There is also the contention that Nietzsche‘s affinity 
with intuitive wisdom is a Schopenhauerian influence that he later abandons and that his perspectivism 
coincides with tragic wisdom such that the later Nietzsche views tragic insight as perspectival as 
opposed to being intuitive. 
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The man who is guided by concepts and abstractions only succeeds by 
such means in warding off misfortune, without ever gaining happiness for 
himself from these abstractions. And while he aims for the greatest 
possible freedom from pain, the intuitive man, standing in the midst of a 
culture, already reaps from intuition a harvest of continually inflowing 
illumination, cheer, and redemption—. (On the Truth & Lies in a Non-
Moral Sense: §2)  
 
The connection between truth and intuition arises where Nietzsche discusses the 
distinction between the abstract thinker and the intuitive thinker or the philosopher of 
wisdom. For Nietzsche, both the abstract man and the intuitive man ―both desire to 
rule over life‖; the former through meeting ―his principle needs by means of foresight, 
prudence and regularity‖ whereas the latter ―by disregarding these needs and, as an 
―overjoyed hero,‖ counting as real only that life which has been disguised as illusion 
and beauty.‖ (ibid.) Nietzsche also describes the notion of a liberated intellect as one 
that ―will now be guided by intuitions rather than by concepts‖, one which will be 
removed from ―the land of ghostly schemata, the land of abstractions.‖ (ibid.) 
 
Nietzsche also associates this redemption with spiritual transfiguration as a form of 
mysticism; he describes the experience of corresponding to the ―oneness of all things‖ 
as a mystical experience, one in which he himself participates in. Nietzsche also 
describes this experience as a form of seeking one‘s own ‗blessedness‘ where one 
encounters the redemptive act of becoming oneself. Nietzsche draws a distinction 
between the philosopher and the scientist, where the former is associated with 
ultimate knowledge and the latter with knowledge of things or ―augmented 
knowledge‖: ―The individual who wishes to rely upon himself requires ultimate 
knowledge, philosophy. Other men require a science which is slowly augmented‖ (The 
Struggle between Science and Wisdom: 129). The philosopher encounters ―ultimate 
knowledge‖ in the experience of the ―oneness of all things‖ 
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Reality, for Nietzsche, is a totality irreducible to the human mind and independent of 
theoretical constructs. Nietzsche‘s writings are attuned to this totality that can be 
referred to as ‗one will, one health, one soil, one sun‘ (GM, Pref.: §2),  a reality that is 
a necessary whole made up of many interrelated parts, which ties in with the 
Heraclitean ‗One-Many‘ relation. This reality in no way ‗grounds‘ Nietzsche‘s works 
but is rather the  underlying totality that his works belong to. Nietzsche rejects the 
type of system which is a human construct, a mental representation; he rather is an 
advocate of a reality that is mind-independent. In this way, it will be argued that his 
works are an expression of truth or that they form part of the whole or the ‗One‘.  
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IV 
Nietzsche on a New Truth: Reality as the ‗inner logos‘ of Becoming 
 
This section intends to propose not only that reality for Nietzsche is the ―inner 
lawfulness‖ of Becoming, but also that it is closely related to what he considers 
‗eternity‘ to be, as is expressed in ‗The Seven Seals (Or: the Yes and Amen Song)‘ (Z, 
III: §16) The very same desire for ‗eternity‘ that is associated with traditional 
metaphysics exists also for Nietzsche except that it is not to be viewed in terms of 
Parmenidean or Platonic Being but rather in terms of the metaphysics of the ―inner 
necessity‖ of Becoming. Nietzsche only repudiates the thing-in-itself as a causal 
ground that is characteristic of substance-based metaphysics, but retains the idea of 
‗thing-in-itself‘ that is in the sense of a reality as Becoming. The following section 
consists of a brief examination of what Nietzsche considers reality to be, that is 
Becoming or more specifically the ‗inner lawfulness‘ of Becoming, ―the law in 
becoming‖ (PTAG: §8)24 . It is this ―inner lawfulness‖ of Becoming or logos that 
relates to what eternity is for Nietzsche and it is the philosopher of truth who intuits 
the logos that experiences amor fati.  
 
This thesis contends that the self-overcoming that occurs at the level of the drives is a 
necessary stage in overcoming dogmatic truth towards the stage of Dionysian wisdom 
or insight into reality. The self-overcoming that occurs at the level of the drives is a 
physiological perspectivism, which includes the instinctual activity of ―reversing 
                                                          
24
 This section refers to Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks in order to argue that Nietzsche is a 
philosopher of intuition or tragic wisdom. It must be acknowledged that it is not only an early work of 
Nietzsche‘s, but is also an unpublished work. However, in the latter stages of this section, I mention the 
way Nietzsche‘s affinity with tragic insight into Becoming re-surfaces in the later work Ecce Homo (a 
published work), in particular in its association with Heraclitus. (EH, ‗BT‘: §3) His admiration also for 
Heraclitus and his emphasis on Becoming persists throughout his works (See TI, ‗Reason‘: §2), (WP: 
§437). 
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perspectives‖. (EH, I: §1) It is what Nietzsche refers to it as ―another kind of 
phenomenal world‖. (WP: §569) However, it is through the ―Great Reason‖ of the 
body that one‘s ―intrinsic nature‖25 is manifested or is disciplined towards the whole 
in a state of ―becoming who you are.‖ (EH, ‗Why I am So Clever‘: §2) Nietzsche 
identifies the self that participates in the ―eternity‖ within Becoming as one‘s ‗higher 
self‘26, that of the genuine philosopher or higher type or the self that belongs to 
                                                          
25
 This notion of an intrinsic nature is explored by Doyle when she argues that Nietzsche appeals to the 
‗inner or intrinsic nature of force‘ that renders force existentially independent of other forces, or that 
the activity of an individual power is informed by an ‗inner will‘ as its intrinsic nature is existentially 
independent of perspectives taken on it from an external vantage–point.‘ (Doyle, T., Op. cit., p.179) 
Doyle examines Nietzsche‘s notion of intrinsicality in terms of a new model of causality based on 
causal powers that is opposed to an event model of causality. She mentions that this new model is 
opposed to Hume‘s event model of causality where ‗cause and effect relate to one another in terms of 
temporal succession‘ (ibid.) or where relations can obtain only between actually existent relata. (Hume, 
D., A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992 [1888], Book I, part III, 
section xiv.) She argues that Nietzsche rather suggests ‗that the power is intrinsically connected to its 
effect understood as the manifestation of its ‗inherent‘ nature and that when manifested this relata is 
simultaneous rather than successive.‘ (Doyle, T., Op. cit., p.180). Nietzsche proposes ‗a power model 
where cause and effect are simultaneous rather than reducible to one another and where the effect is the 
manifestation of the power‘s nature rather than its interpretation by another power.‘ (ibid.) Doyle 
mentions that it is ‗the degree of causal efficacy that dictates a power‘s capacity to express its nature by 
overcoming resistances or by preserving itself against the encroaching attempts of other powers.‘ (ibid., 
p. 179) Ultimately, she is stating that for Nietzsche, powers can exist independent of their manifestation 
and that the manifestations are simultaneous rather than successive. In this thesis I extend Doyle‘s 
argument by contending that self-overcoming and discipline, for Nietzsche, provide the ideal 
conditions for the manifestation of the ‗intrinsic‘ nature or ‗inner necessity,‘ and come into attunement 
with  reality. This manifestation is called ‗Becoming who you are‘. Doyle maintains that for Nietzsche, 
all powers both weak and strong have intrinsic natures; however, there are only a few who manifest 
their ‗inner necessity‘. This relates to the ‗problem of rank order‘ in Nietzsche which will be addressed 
in the following chapter. Doyle does not explore the order of rank among values but does mention that 
the ‗question of value‘ cannot be viewed independently of epistemological or metaphysical 
commitments. (Doyle, T., Op. cit., p.12). This thesis will argue that the state of ‗Becoming who you 
are‘ is a pre-cognitive state, which is the most truthful standpoint towards a metaphysically independent 
reality. The ultimate principle of rank-order for Nietzsche is truth or that which comes into 
correspondence with reality as it is. 
 
26
 This idea of the ‗higher self‘ is also known as the ‗Great Reason‘ of the Body and is deeper than 
consciousness and even the drives‘ ability to perspectivally know. It could be argued that this is an 
aspect of the self that is irreducible to a perspective or that ensures the metaphysical independence of 
the self from perspective. This higher self involves the experience of what Nietzsche calls ‗tragic 
wisdom‘, of ‗Becoming who you are‘ or of being disciplined to the whole. Nietzsche makes many 
references to this type of self that belongs to the Universal (reality). In Ecce Homo (‗The Untimely 
Ones‘: §3) he refers to it as his ‗innermost history‘ or his ‗becoming‘, also as the ‗nethermost self‘ that 
no longer listens to other selves as the ‗return to myself‘ or ‗a supreme kind of recovery‘ (EH, ‗H‘: §4), 
as an intuitive experience it is referred to as his ‗own inmost experience‘ (EH, ‗BT‘: §2) where the 
Dionysian is referred to as the ‗only parable‘ for this experience. In the preface to Human, All Too 
Human vol. II: §1, he refers to it as ‗my innermost self‘ and indicates that his writings are an expression 
of this self. In a letter to Carl Fuchs (Dec 14
th, 1887) he refers to it as ‗one‘s inmost being‘ that 
‗gradually disciplines one back to unity‘ or as his ‗task‘ or his ‗centre‘. This type of self will be referred 
to as the essential, necessary or philosophical self.  
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―Life‖, as the whole or Becoming, which is the most truthful standpoint towards 
reality. This section is an examination of Nietzsche‘s early work Philosophy in the 
Tragic Age of the Greeks not only to explore Nietzsche‘s affinity with Becoming but 
also to look at the early Nietzsche and his relationship with tragic insight as intuition. 
Nietzsche goes on to drop the term ―intuition‖ but in taking into account his 
perspectivism, it can be argued that tragic wisdom of the later period is an 
interpretation of the world.  
 
This idea of reality or Being as Becoming can be traced back to Nietzsche‘s early 
lectures on the Pre-Socratic philosophers. In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the 
Greeks, Nietzsche, like Heraclitus, opposed the living flux of Becoming to the frozen 
false reality of Parmenides‘ being. Nietzsche only rejects being (PTAG: §5) in the 
Parmenidean sense; however, he embraces the idea of Being as the Heraclitean logos 
or ‗the inner lawfulness of Becoming.‘ (PTAG: §8) Nietzsche denies being in the 
same way as Heraclitus, he denies the equation of reality with ‗things‘ —  that is, a 
substance-based metaphysics — which he views as a falsification that takes place by 
the human mind. Nietzsche re-introduces Being as the logos or the law behind the 
flux, as ‗the One‘ that is constant or is referred as the ‗inner necessity‘ of Becoming 
whereby he replaces the traditional idea of being with becoming. For Both Nietzsche 
and Heraclitus, ‗the One‘ can exist concurrently with the many. In Philosophy in the 
Tragic Age of the Greeks, he notes Heraclitus‘ teaching of the ―law of becoming and 
of play in necessity.‖ (PTAG: §8) Nietzsche adopts the term ‗play‘ from Heraclitus in 
order to illustrate what is meant by ‗eternity‘ or ‗necessity‘: that it is not the causal 
necessity of the laws of nature characteristic of mechanism but rather amor fati. 
Nietzsche notes that the intuition guides the ―childhood innocence‖ that is associated 
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with the play of becoming in amor fati, which is in opposition to the ―seriousness‖ 
that Nietzsche equates with rational reflection. Nietzsche criticizes Parmenides for 
assigning primary importance to abstract thought and conceptualization: ―The content 
of our thinking, according to Parmenides, is not present in sense perception but is an 
additive from somewhere else, from an extra-sensory world to which we have direct 
access by means of our thinking.‖ (PTAG: §11) Nietzsche refers to the Kantian 
critique of knowledge to make the point that thought is only capable of grasping 
reality according to pre-determined forms: ―Through words and concepts we shall 
never reach beyond the wall of relations, to some sort of fabulous primal ground of 
things. Even in the pure forms of sense and understanding, in space, time and 
causality, we gain nothing that resembles an eternal verity.‖ (PTAG: §11) As is also 
made clear by Houlgate, (1986: 114) ―Kant argues that the categories of the 
understanding are inadequate to the knowledge of reality ‗in itself‘ because they are 
generated by the mind and therefore subjective .... Kant thus rejects the conviction 
held, but not fulfilled, by metaphysics ... that thought can articulate the structure of 
reality itself‖. In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche, like Kant, 
stresses that one cannot access Being through thought and words, and states that 
―Words are but symbols for the relations of things to one another and to us; nowhere 
do they touch upon absolute truth.‖ (PTAG: §11) Nietzsche became aware that the 
belief in abstract thought as a means to accessing being as upheld by both Plato and 
Parmenides was overthrown by Kant and Schopenhauer. It is in this way that he refers 
to the pre-conceptual thought or ‗intuitive‘ thought of Heraclitus and his ability to 
grasp reality as Becoming. Fink (2003: 127) notes that  
 
Concepts are in general something questionable for Nietzsche with only 
limited application to reality.... Nietzsche thus believes that ontological 
concepts are ‗abstractions‘ and ‗abstract concepts‘. He does not clarify his 
opinion. He does not analyse the abstraction itself. He merely asserts it. 
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Philosophical concepts appear to him to be ‗the final vapour of a 
condensing reality‘, that is a trace and a postscript. Concepts such as 
‗being‘ are for him utmost abstractions and manifold copies of reality. 
Contrary to the metaphysical method one should commence with the 
senses, the concrete presence, the changing reality and with intuition not 
with the concept.  
  
Nietzsche views Parmenides as the first philosopher to assign primacy to the concept 
in grasping truth. Parmenides‘ relation to Heraclitus is for Nietzsche what ice is to fire 
and what logical concepts are to intuition. In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the 
Greeks, Nietzsche calls both Heraclitus and Parmenides ―truth-tellers‖ but at the same 
time emphasizes that both have different approaches to truth. Heraclitus‘ truth is 
acquired through intuition whereas Parmenides‘ truth is acquired through reason and 
logic: ―While each word of Heraclitus expresses the pride and the majesty of truth, but 
of truth grasped in intuitions rather than attained by the rope ladder of logic, while in 
Sibylline rapture Heraclitus gazes but does not peer, knows but does not calculate, his 
contemporary Parmenides stands beside him as counter-image, likewise expressing a 
type of truth-teller but one formed of ice rather than fire, pouring cold piercing light 
all around.‖ (PTAG: §9) Nietzsche does not reject the possibility of acquiring insight 
into an eternal verity or metaphysically independent reality, but what he does reject is 
words and life-less concepts as a means to grasping this reality. Nietzsche considers 
the intellect or consciousness as inadequate for comprehension of it  (PTAG: §11) 
whereas intuition, blood, and tragic pathos is considered adequate for grasping the 
logos. Nietzsche thinks that Parmenides‘ being is only an abstract term for a fiction of 
the human imagination, an anthropomorphic representation of reality. Being, for 
Parmenides is a substance-based realm that is fixed, immovable, rigid, lifeless, and is 
in turn bloodlessly opposed to Becoming. He views Parmenides as a thinker who is 
frozen in his lifeless abstractions. Nietzsche uses various metaphors in order to 
illustrate the distinction between concepts and life:  
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But no one lays hands with impunity on such fearsome abstractions as ―the 
existent‖ and ―the nonexistent.‖ Slowly, upon touching them, the blood 
congeals.… One‘s sympathy toward phenomena atrophies; one even 
develops a hatred for phenomena including oneself, a hatred for being 
unable to get rid of the everlasting deceitfulness of sensation. 
Henceforward truth shall live only in the palest, most abstracted 
generalities, in the empty husks of the most indefinite terms, as though in a 
house of cobwebs. And beside such truth now sits our philosopher, 
likewise as bloodless as his abstractions, in the spun out fabric of his 
formulas. (PTAG: §10-11) 
  
 
For Nietzsche, reality is not being in the Parmenidean sense, it is rather Becoming and 
to gain insight into reality is to participate in the Heraclitean logos. Nietzsche refers to 
such participation in the form of intuitive knowledge or philosophical wisdom; it is 
not a conceptual or an intellectual relation to independent reality ‗out there‘ but rather 
is a divine experience of becoming one with the logos. This notion of truth for 
Heraclitus involves participation in what is common to all existing things, that which 
is the logos or the ‗inner lawfulness‘ of Becoming. As Fink (2003: 169) asserts, 
 
 
Nietzsche does not believe that this human truth of the cosmos realizes 
itself in an abstract or conceptual thinking. This thinking takes the form of 
an insight or an intuition. This implies however no immediate sense 
perception of the given for Nietzsche, but the divinatory intuition of the 
essence of the cosmos which cannot be expressed in common everyday 
language. It eludes the concept and remains perhaps inexpressible .... even 
for Plato the heart of philosophy is guided by silence. It is Arrheton—
unsayable. Thus even in his rejection of the discursive concept and with the 
conception of the highest truth as a ‗showing‘ Nietzsche still remains on 
the ground of the tradition which he intends to overcome.  
 
 
Nietzsche rejects  discursive opinions as a way of participating in the logos, it is 
strictly through intuition or tragic pathos does the philosophical ‗warrior type‘ 
participate in reality or the silent logos of an author or of Becoming. Nietzsche 
proclaims ―the highest truth‖ as a ―showing‖, which is reminiscent of Wittgenstein‘s 
distinction between ―saying‖ and ―showing‖ in The Tractatus. For Nietzsche, this is 
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referred to as a lightning flash, a metaphor borrowed from Heraclitus; it is the leading 
metaphor for the event of truth or of insight. Philosophical wisdom for Heraclitus, as 
for Nietzsche, doesn‘t come from engaging in discourse or listening to many opinions 
but rather through intuitive participation in the logos. These many opinions 
presuppose the logos itself. Nietzsche mentions that Heraclitus‘ statement ―I sought 
and consulted myself‖ (PTAG: §8) is associative of ―the Delphic dictum ‗Know 
thyself,‘‖ that is, to participate in the logos comes through self-observation as opposed 
to the ―fact-gathering‖ of ――historical‖ men‖ (PTAG: §8) or the quest for ‗absolute‘ 
knowledge. Lampert (2001: 189) notes that for Nietzsche, the ―great failure of 
objectivity‖ or of Socratic knowledge is ―its loss of aptitude for subjectivity‖ such that 
――Know thyself‖ is lost in the subject‘s turn to the objective‖ and ―such a loss is fatal 
if psychology is the path to the fundamental problems.‖ Nietzsche expresses that it is 
the intuitive reader who through an examination of his or her life experiences (or the 
indirect analysis of his unconscious) and who identifies a similar pathos to Nietzsche 
is the reader who comes to participate in the silent logos of his thought. In the Preface 
to On the Genealogy of Morals (§1), Nietzsche distinguishes between the abstracted 
knowing self who is concerned with abstract knowledge of things, the ―men of 
knowledge‖ and the existing human being who seeks to know himself:  
 
We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge—and with good 
reason. We have never sought ourselves—how could it happen that we 
should ever find ourselves? ... So we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, 
we do not comprehend ourselves, we have to misunderstand ourselves, for 
us the law ―Each is furthest from himself‖ applies to all eternity—we are 
not men of knowledge with respect to ourselves. 
 
In the Preface to On Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche also discusses the connection 
between ―the art of exegesis‖ (GM, Preface: §8) and self-knowledge, that one is 
―bringing something home‖ (GM, Preface: §1), which refers to the return home of the 
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self to itself as expressed in ―The Return Home‖ passage (Z, III: §9). This idea of the 
homecoming to the self implies for Nietzsche the ―return to that element of the 
complex self which partakes of eternity.‖ (Sadler 1995: 169) The type of self that 
―partakes of eternity‖ or experiences redemption in the life-affirmative sense is the 
―inmost centre‖ that has been disciplined by the ―Great reason‖ of the body towards 
the whole; the self that comes home not just to itself but to ‗Life‘. It is no longer a self 
viewed as ―my body‖; it is rather viewed as a living body or as ‗Life‘ as part of the 
whole. This art of exegesis, which is referred to as ―the art of reading well‖ in The 
Antichrist (§52, §59) is a certain type of reading that does not falsify the text but 
allows the author to reveal himself. Nietzsche also expresses that through this type of 
reading that one can discover oneself, as the art of reading involves being disciplined 
towards the whole or towards a state of ‗becoming who you are‘, and in this state one 
enters into the silent logos of an author. Nietzsche maintains that in taking the most 
fundamental standpoint or attitude towards ‗Life‘ that one at the same time becomes 
who one is. It is through the subjective or personal that one comes to the objective or 
enters into the most truthful standpoint to reality. It is coming into attunement with 
Becoming that one is redeemed at a subjective level; it is an experience of Dionysian 
rapture or der Rausch.  
Nietzsche expresses that the way to reality is through the personal or through one‘s 
most fundamental self, and that a certain type of reading can play a pivotal role in 
becoming attuned to it. 
 
In the introduction to Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Marianne Cowan 
(1962: 11) states that Nietzsche reveals two of his perennial concerns with 
philosophy. They can be summed up as follows: ―What are the functions and uses of 
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philosophy?‖ and ―What are the prominent features of the men who engage in 
philosophy?‖ Cowan (1962: 11) identifies section three of Philosophy in the Tragic 
Age of the Greeks as the section where Nietzsche discusses what he takes to be the 
functions of philosophy: ―It seems clear that he identifies philosophical thinking with 
intuition, scientific thinking with reasoned thought, and takes theses two functions to 
be complementary to each other, though, as well, often temporarily opposed.‖ The 
distinction between philosophical and scientific thinking represents the distinction 
between Heraclitus and Parmenides. These differences include philosophy‘s ―refined 
taste‖ in opposition to science‘s lack of taste, philosophy‘s speedy realization of the 
oneness of all things due to its intuitive insight rather than through the use of artifice 
which accounts for the slowness of the scientific approach. The first distinction 
between the philosopher and the scientist, as outlined by Nietzsche, lies in the 
philosopher‘s superior sense of ―taste‖. In discussing as to why the ancient Greeks 
referred to their earliest thinkers as ―sages,‖ Nietzsche states that the ―sage‖ 
 
 
... is etymologically related to sapio, I taste, sapiens, he who tastes, 
sisyphos, the man of keenest taste. A sharp savouring and selecting, a 
meaningful discriminating, in other words, makes out the peculiar art of the 
philosopher, in the eyes of the people. The philosopher is not a man of 
intellect. (PTAG: §3) 
 
For Nietzsche, the philosopher‘s strength lies not in his ―intellect‖ but in his intuitive 
capacity. Also one of the ultimate concerns of the philosopher is his desire to reach 
the ―healing and the purification of the whole‖ (PTAG: §2) whereas the scientist is 
primarily concerned with the acquisition of knowledge. This idea of the ―healing and 
the purification of the whole‖ (ibid.) relates to what Nietzsche refers to as the 
experience of the ―Great Health.‖ (GS: §382) It is through a certain purification 
process that the highest type comes to feel ―eternity‖, the ―heavenly‖, as the ―inner 
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logos‖ of Becoming. It is the intuitive philosopher who has the ability to act as a kind 
of cultural physician.
27
 Nietzsche maintains that this idea of taste as a refined sense 
directs the philosopher to discriminate between things extraordinary and things 
unexceptional. According to Nietzsche, the philosophical type encounters the 
―unusual, the astonishing, the difficult and the divine‖28 whereas the scientist is rather 
concerned with ―intellectual cleverness by its emphasis on the useless.‖ (PTAG: §3)  
 
In order to highlight the difference between philosophical and scientific thinking, 
Nietzsche engages the metaphor of mountain climbing, where the philosopher and the 
scientist are described as two different mountain climbers. Nietzsche draws an 
analogy between mountain climbing and thinking which persists in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. (Z, I: §7 & EH, ‗Why I Am So Wise‘: §1) In both cases the art of 
reading and writing is compared to mountain climbing; it involves ―leaps of intuition‖ 
                                                          
27
 This idea of Nietzsche as a cultural physician relates to Nietzsche as an author who is also a 
physician, and in turn a healer. The connection between the unconscious, physiology, and self-healing 
as a new science will be explored in the third chapter of the thesis in the context of reading and writing 
in blood. (Z, I: §7) 
 
28
 He also associates this type of taste with his ideal readers. He writes in the preface to The Antichrist 
that his ―predestined readers‖ must possess ―new ears for new music‖, ―new eyes,‖ and ―the will to the 
economy of the great style‖. This ability to discriminate is evident with regard Nietzsche‘s own ability 
to make a distinction in his audience:  
Every nobler spirit and taste selects his audience when he wants to 
communicate; in selecting it, he simultaneously erects barriers against ‗the 
others‘. All subtler laws of a style originated therein: they simultaneously 
keep away, create a distance, forbid ‗entrance‘, understanding, as said 
above—while they open the ears of those whose ears are related to ours.‖ 
(GS: §381) 
It is the intuitive writer with a certain taste for communication who adheres to all ―the subtler laws of a 
style‖. Nietzsche‘s taste determines the audience he selects, an audience of readers with ears related to 
his own, or those that there are capable and worthy of the same pathos. (EH, ‗Why I Write Such Good 
Books‘: §4) Nietzsche also makes references to his ‗taste‘ in relation to his nasal capacity: 
It is my fate that I have to be the first decent human being; that I know 
myself to stand in opposition to the mendaciousness of millennia.—I was 
the first to discover the truth by being the first to experience lies as lies—
smelling them out.—My genius is in my nostrils. (EH, IV: §1) 
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or acts of self-overcoming. Nietzsche, as a writer is comparable to the artist being 
impregnated by his work, which shows how the artist has an intuitive or ‗untimely‘ 
relation to the whole. (GM, III: §4) In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of Greeks, he 
explains that the peak that both climbers wish to reach represents the realization that 
―all things are one.‖ (PTAG: §3) The intuitive process ‗quickly‘ leads the philosopher 
to the resolution of the oneness of all things, and Nietzsche‘s mature account of this 
resolution is amor fati. Nietzsche notes that the clearest distinction between the two 
climbers lies in the philosopher‘s more rapid ascent. He goes on to explain this 
metaphorically: ―Philosophy leaps ahead on tiny toe-holds; hope and intuition lend 
wings to its feet.‖29(ibid.) The scientist, on the other hand, ―lumbers heavily behind, 
looking for better footholds for reason too wants to reach that alluring goal [that all 
things are one] which its divine comrade [the philosopher] has long since reached.‖ 
(ibid.) This passage continues to emphasize that philosophy derives its power and 
strength from its capacity to think intuitively.  
 
                                                          
29
 That ―hope and intuition lend wings to its feet‖ is reminiscent of Nietzsche‘s many other references 
to philosophical thinking as ―running,‖ ―leaping,‖ ―dancing,‖ or ―flying.‖ (Z, III: ‗On the Spirit of 
Gravity‘), (TI, ‗What the Germans lack‘: §7) Nietzsche ascribes these verbs to his very own way of 
thinking or his own philosophical method. He draws a distinction between his ―task‖ as a philosopher 
and that of the scholar, and in doing so, he compares the diet of a dancer to that of the philosopher:   
Maybe we philosophers are all in a bad position regarding knowledge these 
days: science is growing, and the most scholarly of us are close to 
discovering that they know too little. But it would be even worse if things 
were different—if we knew too much; our task is and remains above all not 
to mistake ourselves for someone else. We are different from scholars, 
although we are inevitably also, among other things, scholarly. We have 
different needs, grow differently; have a different digestion: we need more; 
we also need less. There is no formula for how much a spirit needs for its 
nourishment;... It is not fat but the greatest possible suppleness and 
strength that a good dancer wants from his nourishment—and I wouldn‘t 
know what the spirit of a philosopher might more want to be than a good 
dancer. For the dance is his ideal, also his art, and finally also his own 
piety, his ‗service of God‘. (GS: §381) 
The idea of philosophical thinking as dancing re-emerges in his mature works. In Twilight of the Idols, 
under a section entitled ‗What the Germans Lack‘ Nietzsche criticizes the scholars of philosophy and 
the Germans for their inability to ―think‖. 
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There is another difference between the philosopher and the scientist, which lies in the 
way each approaches obstructions in their path. Continuing to engage the metaphor of 
the mountain climbers, Nietzsche states that the philosopher, when obstructed by ―a 
wild mountain stream that is tossing boulders along its course‖, ―light-footedly leaps 
over it, using the rocks to cross, even though behind and beneath him they hurtle into 
the depths‖ (PTAG: §3), whereas the scientist ―stands helpless; he must first build 
himself a fundament which will carry his heavy cautious steps.‖ (ibid.) The 
philosophers‘ ability to ―light-footedly leap‖ over obstacles is also indicative of his 
ability to self-overcome.  
 
Nietzsche stresses the distinction between two types of realities: Parmenidean Being, 
on the one hand, and Heraclitean Becoming, on the other. Parmenides equates truth 
with absolute knowledge in terms of conceptualization and abstraction, which also 
corresponds to the ―historical‖ men‘s ―fact-gathering‖ (PTAG: §8) approach to 
accumulating knowledge. This conceptual type of knowledge is governed by rational 
certainty, where the concept is supposed to fix the object of knowledge. This makes 
reality not only fixed but also anthropomorphically conceived through concepts, and 
this type of certainty can also be contrasted with the type of certainty that Nietzsche 
advocates, which is called an ―intuitive certainty‖. In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of 
the Greeks, Nietzsche associates the philosopher‘s intuitive capacity to directly 
apprehend the ―essence and core of all things.‖ (PTAG: §3) 
 
This ―certainty‖ depends neither on logical or scientific proofs. Intuitive certainty 
arises from immediate self-evidence, which in The Birth of Tragedy he speaks of as 
―immediate certainty‖. (§I) It is tragic insight into reality that consists of a dancing 
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revelatory experience. In his early work Nietzsche speaks of the languages of the 
Dionysian Dithyramb such as dance and song that are better able to capture reality 
than those of concepts or abstract thought: 
 
 
In the Dionysian dithyramb man is incited to the greatest exaltation of all 
his symbolic faculties; something never before experienced struggles for 
utterance—the annihilation of the veil of māyā, oneness as the soul of the 
race and of nature itself. The essence of nature is now to be expressed 
symbolically; we need a new world of symbols; and the entire symbolism 
of the body is called into play, not the mere symbolism of the lips, face and 
speech but the whole pantomime of dancing, forcing every member into 
rhythmic movement. Then the other symbolic powers suddenly press 
forward, particularly those of music, in rhythmic, dynamics, and harmony. 
To grasp this collective release of all the symbolic powers, man must have 
already attained that height of self-abnegation which seeks to express itself 
symbolically through all these powers—and so the dithyrambic votary of 
Dionysus is understood only be his peers.‖ (BT: §2) 
 
 
 This type of certainty takes the form of philosophical wisdom, and is contrasted with 
the ―blind desire to know all at any cost‖ (PTAG: §3), which is characteristic of 
conceptual thinking. It involves intuition of the ―ultimate resolution of all things‖ and 
―overcomes, by means of such intuition, the vulgar restrictions of the lower levels of 
knowledge.‖ (PTAG: §3) Nietzsche speaks of such intuitive knowledge in relation to 
Thales‘ vision of the ―unity of all that is‖ and highlights the inadequacy of scientific 
reflection for the communication of what he has seen, a ―totally different sphere and 
speech.‖ (PTAG: §3) This also stresses the inadequacy of verbal language to express 
the logos. It relates to the problem of the incommunicability of the logos through 
language: that intuition of the logos is inexpressible.
30
 There is a connection between 
―individual original experience‖ (‗On the Truth & Lies in a Non-Moral Sense‘: §1) of 
                                                          
30
 This thesis will explore Nietzsche‘s style as the communication of a pathos, which arises from his 
experience of insight into the logos, and the way in which his style transcends the inadequacies of 
language. In doing so, his style will be argued to be closer to truth or reality than the style characteristic 
of the old metaphysicians who engaged in the propositional or doctrinal uses of language.  
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a primordial nature and tragic intuition or insight into the logos. This is of course 
contrasted with conceptual knowledge of the intellect which serves the species or the 
herd. It is conscious linguistic conceptual knowledge that falsifies reality, for 
Nietzsche and primordial tragic pathos that corresponds to  the ―inner lawfulness‖ of 
Becoming. Intellectual knowledge requires the assimilation of different cases under a 
single word, which is to be differentiated from the flux of Becoming. Nietzsche states 
in ‗On the Truth & Lies in a non-Moral Sense‘ §1, 83 that  
 
Every word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not 
supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual 
original experience to which it owes its origin; but rather, a word becomes 
a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less 
similar cases—. 
 
For Nietzsche, what counts as true is intuitive insight into reality made possible 
through the ―Great Reason‖ of the Body. (Z, I: ‗On the Despisers of the Body‘) 
Nietzsche actually identifies the traditional metaphysical use of reason in Ecce Homo 
(II: §2) as ―unreason‖; it is irrational to view reality as a projection of human 
consciousness or to view ‗being‘ as a substance-based reality or as a causal ground. 
Nietzsche considers that both Parmenides and Plato should view ―reason in reality—
not in ―reason‖‖ (TI, X: §2) or not reality in reason. This idea of viewing ―reality in 
reason‖ relates to anthropomorphic projections of reality characteristic of the idealist 
tradition, reality as a product of the human mind or reason. Nietzsche considers this 
type of ―reason‖ to be actually irrational. He identifies reason of the idealist tradition 
with ―unreason‖ (EH, II: §2) in Ecce Homo, whereas he identifies tragic insight as a 
product of the ―Great Reason‖ of the body. (EH, I: §6) It is for this reason that 
Nietzsche criticizes conceptual thinking as it only theorizes reality and is in this way 
incapable of philosophical insight into reality. This idea of conceptual knowledge for 
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Parmenides presupposes a correspondence relation between subject and object. 
Nietzsche considers this ―adequate expression of an object in the subject‖ as a 
―contradictory impossibility‖, for ―between two absolutely different spheres, as 
between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness and no expression; 
there is at most, an aesthetic relation.‖ (‗On the Truth & Lies in a Non-moral sense‘, 
§1, 86) This ―aesthetic relation‖ is referred to in ‗On the Truth & Lies in a Non-moral 
Sense‘ as an ―attitude‖ or disposition. The type of truth correspondence that Nietzsche 
advocates is one between a certain tragic pathos and the ‗inner lawfulness‘ or logos of 
Becoming, where the philosopher of truth (artist metaphysician) in the experience of 
‗amor fati‘ takes a certain standpoint or disposition towards reality. This consists of a 
Dionysian existential attitude towards reality that takes the form of philosophical 
wisdom, and is rather opposed to theorizing or conceptualizing reality. The truth 
correspondence that Nietzsche advocates replaces the old correspondence theory of 
truth between subject and object or linguistic form and object. Nietzsche maintains 
that language cannot capture reality, and that language is ultimately inadequate for 
expressing the logos. The philosopher of truth does not conceptualize reality, but 
rather participates existentially within the logos. Therefore, rather than 
intellectualizing truth, the philosopher of truth, is lead by intuitions: ―There exists no 
word for these intuitions; when man sees them he grows dumb, or else he speaks only 
in forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of concepts.‖ (‗On the Truth 
& Lies in a Non-moral Sense‘: §2, 90)  
 
The literal or conceptual use of language presupposes an intuitive or unconscious  
standpoint towards reality, as for Nietzsche intuitive insight into reality takes 
precedence over linguistic determinations of reality. The philosopher of truth realizes 
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the overall inadequacy of language to express reality; even his own ―unheard of 
language‖ is inadequate for expressing the logos. Nietzsche considers both the literal 
and metaphorical uses of language to be a falsification of reality. The metaphors 
Nietzsche consequently uses are only those that are based upon his pre-linguistic and 
intuitive insights. Houlgate (1986: 236) states that ―Nietzsche‘s views on language 
expressed in ‗On Truth & Lies in a Non-moral Sense‘ though refined and developed, 
do not change fundamentally throughout his philosophical career‖, and also refers to 
such early passages as BT: §6 and PTAG: §3 where Nietzsche speaks of ―the divorce 
between language and philosophical or ‗musical‘ intuition, a divorce which parallels 
the distinction between language and life. In The Birth of Tragedy (§6), Nietzsche 
maintains that  
 
 
Language can never adequately render the cosmic symbolism of music, 
because music stands in symbolic relation to the primordial contradiction 
and primordial pain in the heart of the primal unity, and therefore 
symbolizes a sphere which is beyond and prior to all phenomena. Rather, 
all phenomena, compared with it, are merely symbols: hence language, as 
the organ and symbol of phenomena, can never by any means disclose the 
inner most heart of music; language, in its attempt to imitate it, can only be 
in superficial contact with music... 
 
It is for this reason that Nietzsche‘s style as the communication of tragic pathos or of 
musical intuition, intuition of the logos is a style that corresponds more adequately to 
reality than the literal, conceptual, propositional or even the metaphorical uses of 
language. The dancing and rhythmical style of Nietzsche‘s writings as an attunement 
to a musical whole also highlights his realization of the inadequacy of words. 
Nietzsche‘s style engages in ‗musical intuition‘ or what is referred to as unconscious 
musical rhythms. Although Nietzsche is even more critical of Schopenhauer in his 
later period, of his ―romantic pessimism‖, it does not imply that he no longer engages 
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in the language of unconscious musical rhythms or tragic pathos, both of which he 
brings to his writing style.   
  
The following shows that the ‗Primal Unity‘ is not to be viewed as a causal ground; 
however, the section goes on to emphasize that Becoming is reality, for Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche rejects being only as a conceptual posit, and in its place embraces reality in 
the early work The Birth of Tragedy as the ‗Primal Unity‘ (BT: §4) or as a reality 
independent of human minds. Nietzsche‘s affirmation of reality as the ‗Primal Unity‘ 
is not to be equated with the thing-in-itself as a causal ground of reality, which is 
characteristic of traditional metaphysics. It is therefore an error to associate The Birth 
of Tragedy with traditional metaphysics. The ‗Primal Unity‘ is actually viewed as 
Thing-in-itself in the form of primal ‗reality‘ not as a conceptual theory. This also 
shows that tragic insight for Nietzsche in BT is not conceptual, As Sadler (1995: 44) 
states, Nietzsche equates the primal One with the Thing-in-itself only in a loose sense, 
i.e., only in the sense that it is the primal ‗reality‘. In his view, the Thing-in-itself is, 
strictly speaking, a conceptual posit of the abstract thinker. ―If The Birth of Tragedy 
had assumed the Thing-in-itself in this strict sense, its language would have been 
theoretically discursive, which it is not...‖31 For Nietzsche, it is the Dionysian 
                                                          
31
 Doyle holds the same view as Sadler that there are no things-in-themselves in The Birth of Tragedy. 
She argues like Sadler that for Nietzsche that The Birth does not adhere to a Kantian scepticism. In this 
way she claims that there is no metaphysical dualism in this early work. She argues that for Nietzsche, 
empirical reality is mind-independent as it is informed by a primordial intellect. The Primordial reality 
as the innermost Kernel of things or appearances is re-worked in the later works in terms of what Doyle 
refers to as the ‗intrinsicality‘ of forces. See chapter three of Doyle‘s work ‗Nietzsche on Epistemology 
and Metaphysics,‘ where she looks at the way his early metaphysics is to a large extent continuous with 
his later metaphysics. (Doyle, T., Op. cit., pp. 81-110) It is in this chapter that she claims that 
Nietzsche‘s intention is not to draw a distinction in dualistic terms between empirical and primordial 
reality, as the former, Doyle argues, is rather ―informed‖ by the latter: 
One might ask, however, what Nietzsche means by reality. Is he referring 
to the primordial intellect or to empirical reality? For Nietzsche, at least on 
the most charitable reading of his early writings, the answer must come in 
the form of a disjunction. He does not consider the primordial intellect and 
empirical reality to be two different things. Rather, his appeal to the   
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experience that brings one into correspondence with ―the truly existent primal unity‖ 
(BT: §4) and it is this experience that brings with it ―Not reflection, no—true 
knowledge, an insight into the horrible truth‖ or ―the horror or absurdity of existence‖ 
that arises when the ―everyday reality re-enters consciousness;‖ when the tragic artist 
is no longer under the ―rapture of the Dionysian state.‖ (BT: §7) Nietzsche‘s account 
of ‗Being‘ not only contrasts with Parmenides‘ metaphysics of being but also in terms 
of the relationship that the philosopher of truth upholds in relation to that reality. For 
Parmenides, knowledge of being is intellectual or conceptual in nature, which is 
distinct from what Nietzsche considers to be a more fundamental relationship to 
reality where one is an expression of primordial reality rather than merely theorizing 
it. In looking back at the ―wonderful phenomenon of the Dionysian‖ in Ecce Homo, 
Nietzsche states that ―I had discovered the only parable and parallel of my intimate 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
primordial intellect is intended to capture the inner nature of appearances. 
This is suggested by both his description of the primordial intellect as the 
‗innermost kernel‘ of things and his claim that appearances and the 
primordial intellect share a unity. Consequently, Nietzsche‘s appeal to the 
primordial intellect and empirical reality is not intended to be one between 
appearance and reality. Rather, to use one of later descriptions, they stand 
for lighter and darker shades of appearance.  (Doyle, T., Op. cit.,  p.101)  
In this thesis it will be argued that this primordial reality is ultimate reality for Nietzsche, and that the 
most truthful standpoint towards it is an extra-perspectival or intuitive one. However, Doyle is strictly 
examining Nietzsche‘s epistemology, that there is no epistemic gulf between self and world, and that it 
is cognitive knowledge of the empirical realm or the mind-independent realm of Becoming. There is a 
mind-independent empirical reality of Becoming that can be perspectivally known; however, there is 
the ‗inner logos of Becoming‘, which can only be intuitively known (Heraclitus on the intuition of ‗all 
things are One.‘) (PTAG §3) This thesis holds that truth for Nietzsche is not a cognitive relation to 
empirical reality but rather a pre-cognitive intuitive and existential relation with primordial reality or 
the ‗inner logos of becoming.‘ In this thesis, I shall argue that the lightest shades are those of the 
individual type coming into a tragic relation to reality, which reveals that Nietzsche upholds an artist‘s 
metaphysics. This will be explored in the final chapter of this thesis, where it will be maintained that 
this artist‘s metaphysics is in both the early and later works.  
The relationship between empirical and primordial reality that is expressed in The Birth of Tragedy is 
of concern for Doyle, as it compounds her argument that the later Nietzsche maintains that ―empirical 
reality, although knowable by us, is, by virtue of the intrinsic natures informing its relational 
constituents, irreducible to human minds.‖ (Doyle, T., Op.cit., p.12) She explores Nietzsche‘s view on 
the relationship between empirical and primordial reality as she wishes to argue that, for Nietzsche, 
reality is irreducible to human perspectives, and also to show that the ‗empirical world is intrinsically 
constituted from within.‘ (ibid., p.193) This argument resulted from her ambition to solve the problem 
that the relationality of force rules out its ontological independence or its intrinsicality, a problem set 
out by Welshon & Hales, and Peter Poellner. (ibid., p.171, 173)  
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intuition in history.‖32 This intimate intuition or ―inmost experience‖33 is the most 
fundamental experience for Nietzsche; it is wisdom as the highest insight into reality. 
 
Nietzsche is only critical of being which has been allocated to it determinations that 
are only appropriate at the level of phenomena, which is then viewed as a thing or 
substance rather than as the unity of Becoming. It is for this reason that Nietzsche 
objects to Kant‘s distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself:  
 
Kant no longer has a right to his distinction ―appearance‖ and ―thing-in-
itself‖—he had deprived himself of the right to go on distinguishing in this 
old familiar way, insofar as he rejected as impermissible making inferences 
from phenomena to a cause of phenomena— in accordance with his own 
conception of causality and its pure intra-phenomenal validity—which 
conception, on the other hand, already anticipates this distinction, as if the 
―thing-in-itself‖ were not only inferred but given. (WP: §553)  
 
It is in this way that Nietzsche‘s ‗Primal Unity‘ of The Birth of Tragedy is in no way 
to be viewed as a causal ground in the Kantian or Schopenhauerian sense. Nietzsche is 
critical of Schopenhauer‘s association of the will or thing-in-itself with determinations 
which are only valid at the level of phenomena. Nietzsche emphatically rejects 
viewing the ‗Primal One‘ as a thing-in-itself (conceptual posit): ―One would like to 
know what things-in-themselves are; but behold, there are no things-in-themselves!‖ 
(WP: §555) 
 
                                                          
32
 Fink in his work ‗Nietzsche‘s Philosophy‘ chapter one makes this reference p. 11. The translator of 
the book, Georg Richter, states that Fink cites from an edition of Nietzsche‘s works prepared by 
Elizabeth Forster Nietzsche in 1905. p.175. (Fink, E., Nietzsche‘s Philosophy, G. Richter (trans.), New 
York, Continuum, 2003) 
 
33
 Walter Kaufmann translates this ‗intimate intuition‘ as an inmost experience: ―I had discovered the 
only parable and parallel in history for my own inmost experience.‖ (Nietzsche, F.,  Basic Writings of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, W. Kaufmann (trans.), New York, Random House, Inc., 1967 p.727) or cited as 
(EH, ‗BT‘: §2) in this thesis. 
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The ‗Primal Unity‘ for Nietzsche cannot be viewed at the level of phenomena; it is in 
this way a mistake to ask what it is or to set out to acquire conceptual knowledge of it. 
It is for this reason that Nietzsche says:  
 
The question ―what is that?‖ is an imposition of meaning from some 
other viewpoint. ―Essence,‖ the ―essential nature,‖ is something 
perspective and already presupposes a multiplicity. At the bottom of it 
there always lies a ―what is that for me.‖ (WP: §556) 
 
The truth of Becoming is, for Nietzsche, more fundamental than theoretical or 
conceptual truth, a truth that is presuppositionless and distinct from knowledge of the 
properties of things. Nietzsche‘s metaphysics consists of insight into Becoming rather 
than of conceptual truth of the being of beings or phenomena. Nietzsche does not 
deny the phenomena of individuated being but only their objective validity when 
considered to be reality. Knowledge of the individuated reality of things is, for 
Nietzsche, not only a falsification of the true reality of Becoming into doctrines or 
theories about stable fixed entities, but this type of knowledge is also viewed as 
necessary in accordance with man‘s basic needs. Fink (2003: 147) discusses the way 
in which cognition is, for Nietzsche, not a means to understanding the will to power: 
cognition does not grasp the will to power but is rather that which the will to power 
forms. In the same way that cognition cannot grasp the will to power, it is also unable 
to grasp the flux of Becoming or reality, and is in this way viewed as a falsification of 
reality. Fink (2003: 147) claims that Nietzsche‘s criticism of cognition or conceptual 
knowledge does not imply that Nietzsche undermines the validity of his own claims to 
knowledge as his rejection of conceptual knowledge is based upon another type of 
knowledge, intuitive insight into reality:   
 
The will to power is at work in that which we ordinarily call cognition. 
This does not only mean that the desire to understand is an instinct of 
power or a drive to possess and conquer but even more that understanding 
is subject to the determinations of the will to power. To put it differently: 
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what we ordinarily call cognition is not a suitable device to understand the 
will to power. Such understanding is already itself formed by the will to 
power. As the forming element the will to power is not grasped itself by 
that which it forms, namely by ‗cognition‘. However, how does Nietzsche 
know this? He only relies on his philosophical intuition which is different 
from all ontological intuition of any kind. This intuition flows from a 
receptivity for the flow of becoming, for the forming and destroying ‗life‘ 
and for the force of the will to power. Only the knowledge of tragic 
wisdom breaks through the structure of power and gains an insight into the 
power of life. Tragic wisdom becomes critical for all ordinary cognition.  
 
For Nietzsche, tragic wisdom is that which makes ordinary knowledge possible, 
where intuition of the logos is the presupposition upon which ordinary knowledge 
rests. Intuitive knowledge is that which affirms becoming as becoming and does not 
attempt to determine or fix reality. It is in turn not a falsification of reality but a type 
of insight into reality that allows reality to reveal itself. Nietzsche views cognition as 
that which falsely fixes the flow of Becoming into the being of enduring things; he 
considers the ‗thing‘ or substance to be a fiction or a violation of the flux of 
Becoming. Nietzsche claims that man, in forgetting that the thing has been created 
and in taking reality to be the anthropomorphically created being of beings, carries out 
an act of violence against Becoming.  
 
This cognition of the being of beings is also viewed by Nietzsche as a necessary 
fiction:  
 
This distortion is a biological necessity for us. Necessity breeds invention. 
The need to live in a world in which everything constantly changes, 
recedes, passes and spins has created the concepts and the categories which 
makes this incomprehensible change comprehensible and fixes it, 
underpinning the events with a basis. (Fink 2003: 149)  
 
These categories are for Nietzsche, a ―humanization of the world‖, ―an 
anthropomorphic interpretation which ‗fixes us up‘ in positing a fixity‖ where they 
actually possess no objective validity. (Fink 2003: 149) It is for this reason that 
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Nietzsche does not conceive of reality as the being of beings or things, but as the 
‗inner logos‘ of becoming.  
 
Nietzsche rejects language as an adequate expression of reality or of Becoming and 
that this does not therefore imply that ―Becoming is altogether inaccessible and 
inexpressible.‖ (ibid.) He rejects the old correspondence theory of truth that took 
language ―as the adequate expression of all realities‖, and replaces it with a more 
fundamental way of corresponding to reality where the philosopher of truth is an 
―adequate‖ expression of reality. Nietzsche advocates a correspondence between a 
certain type of tragic pathos and reality that is to replace an exact correspondence 
between reality and linguistic form. Nietzsche maintains that Becoming is not 
linguistically expressible or theoretically knowable. The inability to express his 
philosophy through theoretical concepts ties in with the problem of self-referentiality: 
from what standpoint does Nietzsche justify his own claims? If Nietzsche rejects 
equating truth with perspectivism, then this implies that his own claims must not be 
‗mere perspectives‘; they must stem from something more fundamental: ―The way of 
this perspectivism itself, i.e., by reference to that non-perspectival intuition which 
Nietzsche presupposes from the very beginning.‖34 (Sadler 1995: 47) 
 
                                                          
34
 Krebbs in his work ‗Nietzsche‘s hymn to Life: A Buddhist Reading‘ (Austin: University of Texas) 
and in his article ‗Criticism and Perspectivism: The Transition between Nietzsche‘s Truths‘ (The 
European Legacy. 2: 388-393) Krebbs (1998: 15) examines Nietzsche‘s account of intuition and argues 
that to ―limit Nietzsche‘s epistemology to perspectivism leaves him open to the charge of relativism‖, 
and discusses the way in which his account of intuition relieves him of this charge. In his thesis he 
argues that Nietzsche‘s perspectivism acts as a kind of transition or bridge to a more comprehensive 
experience of reality. 
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For Sadler (1995) the starting point for Nietzsche is primordial intuition of reality or 
tragic insight into Becoming and all perspectival claims only presuppose intuition of 
the logos. This removes Nietzsche from the charge of relativism that his claims are 
perspectival and are therefore relative; they rather flow from intuition of reality as the 
inner logos of Becoming. Alternatively, there is Lampert (2001) who argues that 
tragic insight as an interpretation of the world or as an expression of truth solves the 
problem of self-referentiality in Nietzsche, that Nietzsche‘s philosophical claims as 
―perspectives‖ are not self-undermining but rather an expression of truth. It seems that 
tragic insight whether a perspective or not, can be argued to be a standard of truth, for 
Nietzsche. It also removes Nietzsche from the charge of self-refutation, a charge that 
claims that Nietzsche is undermining himself; that by rejecting cognitive forms of 
knowledge he calls into question the validity of his own knowledge claims. If 
cognition is false how can he claim to know that it is? However, Nietzsche‘s own 
criticism of cognition is itself based upon intuitive wisdom. Nietzsche‘s philosophical 
claims actually flow from what he considers to be prior to epistemic cognition; they 
flow from primordial intuition of Becoming, and are therefore not subject to the 
concepts of cognition. As Fink (2003: 150) suggests, 
 
 
One misunderstands the extent of the polemic against the categories if one 
sees it merely as a fictional epistemology. Nietzsche does not progress 
from a critical analysis of the faculty of cognition arriving at a rejection of 
the categories in which the thingness of the thing is conceived according to 
the ideal of the ego. He rather starts with a primordial intuition of his 
fictional Heraclitean philosophy that relies on Becoming as the only truth. 
Since the categorical concepts cannot grasp becoming, since they arrest it, 
forge it, and base it on something persisting, they are deceptions. He denies 
finite and individual being with his fundamental conception of being as 
becoming... More precisely, Nietzsche does not deny the phenomena of 
individuated being but only its objective significance... Nietzsche‘s 
fictional epistemology which understands the will to power as the 
deceiving and violating power of the intellect is in its important aspects a 
negative ontology of things: there are no things. His critique does not target 
all cognition but only the cognition of being, empirical cognition and 
particularly apriori cognition, that is the ontological interpretation in 
accordance with the categories. His intuition or his philosophical vision of 
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becoming is not affected by his critique of cognition. It is rather the 
presupposition that enables this critique in the first place. In other words, if 
and only if this intuition is true does this critique of ontic and categorical 
cognition make sense and have validity. Nietzsche himself does not 
distinguish clearly enough between the truth of becoming and the truth of 
being. The former is intuitive and the latter is conceptual.  
 
The truth of becoming is a revelation of the existing cosmos as opposed to the truth of 
being which implies belief in fictions of substance and ego. This distinction for 
Nietzsche is one between knowledge of the properties of things and insight into 
primordial reality as becoming. It is an error to associate his philosophical claims with 
the type of cognition that he rejects, and to infer from this that he undermines the 
validity of his own claims, or that they cannot be knowledge claims that are true. It is 
rather that Nietzsche‘s philosophical claims that flow from the primordial intuition of 
becoming actually make possible his criticism of cognition, as this criticism 
presupposes intuition of the logos. It is in this way that knowledge of becoming is not 
subject to the criticized concepts of cognition. The criticism against Nietzsche that his 
knowledge claims are inadequate as he himself rejects cognitive knowledge assumes 
that there is only one type of knowledge and that it is conceptual in nature. This 
criticism fails to take into account that Nietzsche‘s philosophical claims constitute 
another kind of knowledge that is tragic insight into reality, and this intuition into the 
logos is presupposed by conceptual knowledge. Fink (2003: 150) explains the way 
Nietzsche‘s claims can be mistakenly viewed as contradictory:  
 
 
One often criticizes Nietzsche for using a circular argument. He connects 
cognition on the one hand with an instinct for deception but proclaims on 
the other hand a new philosophy which is obviously a new form of 
cognition. He believes that cognition is an expression of the will to power 
and yet claims cognition of this very will to power itself. This critique 
misses the point because the cognition of becoming which leads to a 
critical rejection of all categorical cognition destroying the authenticity of 
becoming is not itself subject to the criticized concept of cognition. The 
truth of becoming has a completely different nature than ordinary 
understanding of truth which is only achieved on the basis of the deceptive, 
fixed concepts.  
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Nietzsche considers both thinking and the intellect to be deceptive in the sense that 
they are only subjective sources of reality and actually withhold no objective validity. 
According to Nietzsche, man actually projects his own subjectivity onto the world, 
and in doing so denies reality its own metaphysical independence. It is in this way that 
man has actually removed himself from reality in so far as he engages in the 
categories for cognition.  
 
Nietzsche has an association with tragic wisdom that is intuitive in the early works; 
however in the later works Nietzsche speaks of tragic wisdom in terms of  ―rapture,‖  
―revelation,‖ and ―inspiration‖. Although this thesis refers predominantly to the early 
work Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks in emphasizing Nietzsche‘s affinity 
with intuition or his association of intuition with wisdom, Nietzsche‘s admiration for 
Heraclitus persists throughout his works, and is evident as we see below particularly 
in Ecce Homo. Also Nietzsche not only has respect for Heraclitus and the Stoics for 
their ability to think intuitively, but he himself has an affinity with this wisdom. He 
wishes to distinguish his kind of thinking from those who came before him, and in 
this way refers to it as a form of ―inspiration‖. In speaking about the ―inspirational‖ 
experience from which his Thus Spoke Zarathustra arose in Ecce Homo, he states  
 
 
If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one‘s system, one 
could hardly reject altogether the idea that one is merely incarnation, 
merely mouthpiece, merely a medium of overpowering forces. The concept 
of revelation—in the sense that suddenly, with indescribable certainty and 
subtlety, something becomes visible, audible, something that shakes one to 
the last depths and throws one down—that merely describes the facts. One 
hears, one does not seek; one accepts, one does not ask who gives; like 
lightning, a thought flashes up, with necessity, without hesitation regarding 
its form—I never had any choice.  (EH, Z: §3) 
 
Nietzsche speaks of the ―involuntary‖ nature of the entire inspirational experience, 
which is also referred to as a divine experience of amor fati. It is an experience which 
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results from his superior sense of ―taste‖, which he equates with the sages or the 
genuine philosopher‘s intuitive ability to apprehend the ―difficult‖ and the ―divine.‖ 
(PTAG: §3) The inspirational experience is a divine experience that occurs 
necessarily in the face of an absolute, 
 
 
Everything happens involuntarily in the highest degree but as in a gale of a 
feeling of freedom, of absoluteness, of power, of divinity.—The 
involuntariness of image and metaphor is strangest of all; one no longer 
has any notion of what is an image or a metaphor: everything offers itself 
as the nearest, most obvious, simplest expression. It actually seems, to 
allude to something Zarathustra says, as if the things themselves 
approached and offered themselves as metaphors (―Here all things come 
caressingly to your discourse and flatter you; for they want to ride on your 
back. On every metaphor you ride to every truth...Here the words and 
word-shrines of all being open up before you; here all being wishes to 
become word, all becoming wishes to learn from you how to speak‖) 
 
This is my experience of inspiration; I do not doubt that one has to go back 
thousands of years in order to find anyone who could say to me, ―it is mine 
as well‖ (EH, ‗Z‘: §3) 
 
 
In referring to his involuntary experience, he claims that one would have to go back 
thousands of years to find someone else who experienced the same wisdom. This 
person could perhaps be Heraclitus. There is a passage from Ecce Homo which seems 
to suggest that both philosophers possess the same sense of ―tragic wisdom‖. In 
speaking of his search for philosophers with the same wisdom, he proclaims: 
 
 In this sense I have the right to understand myself as the first tragic 
philosopher—that is, the most extreme opposite and antipode of a 
pessimistic philosopher. Before me this transposition of the Dionysian into 
a philosophical pathos did not exist: tragic wisdom was lacking; I have 
looked in vain for signs of it even among the great Greeks in philosophy, 
those of the two centuries before Socrates.  I retained some doubt in the 
case of Heraclitus, in whose proximity I feel altogether warmer and better 
than anywhere else. The affirmation of passing away and destroying, 
which is the decisive feature of a Dionysian philosophy; saying Yes to 
opposition and war; becoming, along with a radical repudiation of the very 
concept of being—all this is clearly more related to me than anything else 
to date. The doctrine of the ―eternal recurrence,‖ that is, of the 
unconditional and infinitely repeated circular course of all things—this 
doctrine of Zarathustra might in the end have been taught already by 
Heraclitus. (EH, ‗BT‘: §4)  
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I think that this passage is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, in Nietzsche 
identifying tragic wisdom with Heraclitus, a philosopher of intuition, it shows that 
Nietzsche in the later works still has an affinity with Heraclitean wisdom that is 
insight into reality. Also, the passage shows that Nietzsche‘s relationship to the 
Dionysian persists in his discussion of The Birth of Tragedy in Ecce Homo. He still 
associates himself with the Dionysian of The Birth suggesting that he didn‘t turn his 
back on this early work. Also, the passage suggests that Nietzsche‘s philosophy of the 
Dionysian and Heraclitus‘ philosophy of the Innocence of Becoming closely parallel.  
 
  
In spite of Nietzsche‘s emphasis upon Becoming in the early work Philosophy in the 
Tragic Age of the Greeks and in the later works, there are some passages which 
suggest that Nietzsche didn‘t entirely resist Being, such a passage is as follows:  
 
 
He who regards his life as no more than a point in the evolution of a race or 
of a state or of a science, and thus regards himself as wholly belonging to 
the history of becoming, has not understood the lesson set him by existence 
and will have to learn it over again. This eternal becoming is a lying 
puppet-play in beholding which man forgets himself, the actual distraction  
which  disperses the individual to the four winds, the endless stupid game 
which the great child, time, plays before us and with us. That heroism of 
truthfulness consists in one day ceasing to be the toy it plays with. In 
becoming, everything is hollow, deceptive, shallow and worthy of our 
contempt; the enigma which man is to resolve he can resolve only in being, 
in being thus and not otherwise, in the imperishable. Now he starts to test 
how deeply he is entwined with becoming, how deeply with being—a 
tremendous task rises before his soul: to destroy all that is becoming, to 
being to light all that is false in things. (UM, Schopenhauer as Educator: 
§4) 
 
This suggests that there is an ambiguity in Nietzsche on the ontological terms, and in 
spite of this, the terms seem to imply the same thing, a metaphysically independent 
reality, which is ‗eternal‘. However, it must also be stressed that Nietzsche in no way 
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embraces ‗Being‘ in the transcendent static sense such as that expounded by Plato or 
Parmenides, and that he predominantly refers to Becoming throughout his works. This 
ambiguity that resides between the terms ‗Being‘ and ‗Becoming‘ is also apparent in 
the recapitulation passage of The Will to Power.  Although Nietzsche is critical of 
being that is characteristic of the metaphysical tradition, it can be argued that he 
advocates a conception of ‗being‘ which is no longer to be viewed in opposition to, 
but rather inclusive of, becoming. Nietzsche seems to suggest that there is some sort 
of a relationship between Being and Becoming, or that Becoming comes as closest to 
‗Being‘ in eternal return of the same.  It is possible to infer that for Nietzsche that the 
‗eternity‘ that he embraces in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is comparable to the ‗necessity‘ 
expressed in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (§8). However, it must be 
stressed that it is an ‗Eternity‘ that is within ‗Becoming‘ that Nietzsche advocates. For 
Nietzsche, there is a distinction between the will to power within cognition that forms 
knowledge of things and the will to power as cognition as tragic insight into reality or 
what Fink (2003: 152) refers to as the will to power of the greatest cosmic truth. ―To 
impose upon becoming the character of being—that is the supreme will to power.‖ 
(WP: §617) Fink considers what Nietzsche means by this statement, that the greatest 
will to power as cognition is knowledge or intuitive insight into being as becoming. 
(2003: 152) This type of knowledge is to be contrasted with deceptive knowledge of 
things. For Nietzsche, the thought of the eternal return as the ―high point of the 
meditation;‖ (WP: §617) is knowledge as intuitive insight into reality: ―That 
everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of 
being:—high point of the meditation.‖ (WP: §617) The truth of the eternal return is 
for Nietzsche exempt from the statements about the truth of things. The tragic 
knowledge of the eternal return does not fix or determine becoming but rather affirms 
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becoming as becoming. It is for this reason that intuition does not determine reality or 
an author but rather affirms reality as it reveals itself as a silent logos. It is in this way 
that intuition in the form of tragic pathos or insight does not falsify reality or an 
author and is to be considered the source of philosophical truthfulness. This also 
implies that Nietzsche‘s epistemology is not a form of scepticism where his denial of 
the truth of cognitive knowledge is taken to mean that there is no truth or that it 
undermines the justifiability of his own philosophical claims: ―The insight into the 
fictional character of the categorical ontology is grounded in an indubitable 
philosophical insight of the will to power, of becoming as ultimate truth and of the 
eternal return.‖ (Fink 2003: 153) Nietzsche also associates intuitive insight into reality 
with the redemption of ―tragic warrior-like human, the hero‖, and he also ascertains 
that the redemption of tragic insight into reality constitutes ―the advent of a 
redeemer‖, and a new theology of the master of the tragic. (Fink 2003: 154) 
 
 In this thesis, it will be argued that what Nietzsche means by Being is the ‗inner 
lawfulness‘ or ‗inner necessity‘ of Becoming, and that he views philosophical 
truthfulness as that which is oriented to the ‗inner logos‘ of Becoming, and it is this 
‗inner necessity‘ that is considered to be ‗eternal.‘ It is this ‗inner necessity‘ of the 
world, what Heraclitus refers to as the ‗inner lawfulness‘ of Becoming, is what is 
eternal for Nietzsche. The next section will explore the nature of philosophical 
truthfulness in terms of the connection between reality, Nietzsche‘s writing style, and 
his ―ego ipsissimum‖ or necessary self. 
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V 
Nietzsche‘s Writing Style as an expression of the Silent Logos 
 
This section looks at the way Nietzsche‘s musical-dancing style is an expression of 
the silent logos of Becoming. It looks at Nietzsche‘s criticism of conceptual language 
as a way of expressing reality, and that his style aims to transcend the fixed rigidity of 
concepts. The truth of Nietzsche‘s writings does not lie in the words but in their 
rhythmical effect, their pathos and in turn in their relation to reality. In engaging in 
tragic pathos or what Hölderlin refers to as ―holy pathos‖ Nietzsche‘s works are an 
expression of ―the unsaid‖. This section also looks at the close resemblance between 
Wittgenstein and Nietzsche on the inability of language to capture reality. Nietzsche‘s 
idea of his ‗innermost self‘ (HH, Preface: §1) is compared to Wittgenstein‘s idea of 
the transcendental ego that cannot be referred to by language. For Wittgenstein, it is 
the realm of the unsaid, and in turn the realm of the Transcendent. Nietzsche however 
writes from his ―ipsissimosity‖35; it is the realm of Becoming, a totality to which we 
belong.  
                                                          
35
 This is a reference to Nietzsche‘s self that he refers to in the Preface to Human, All too Human II 
(§1), it is his overcoming or becoming self that belongs to the Totality that is Becoming. It is not the 
self as fixed enclosed essence or atomistic substance; it is the self that is open-ended to the future. It is 
transcendental in the sense that it forms one‘s horizon that is open-ended to the future. Nietzsche writes 
from this ‗I‘ or his ipsissimosity and in this way his writings are open-ended to the future such that they 
aim to create the future selves of his ―select readers‖. Hutter in his work ‗Shaping the future: 
Nietzsche‘s New Regime of the Soul and its ascetic practices‘ also contends that even though 
Nietzsche‘s writings are ―intensely personal, Nietzsche‘s writings are still open-ended to the future that 
they aim to create‖ (Oxford, Lexington Books, 2006, p.127) He does so in making reference to the 
same passage from the preface to Human, All too Human II: ―Nietzsche‘s aphoristic writings thus 
reflect his movement away from his innermost self (ego ipsissimus) toward his innermost self (ego 
ipsissimum)‖ that his writings reflect a movement from the personal to the impersonal. It is in this way 
that Nietzsche writes in an untimely fashion, as he writes to shape his posthumous or future readers; 
this will be discussed more indepthly in the third chapter. The transcendental structure of Nietzsche‘s 
idea of ‗ipsissimosity‘ closely parallels the apriori structure of Kant‘s idea of the transcendental ego, 
that is in its structure or Wittgenstein‘s idea of the metaphysical ‗I‘ but only in the strict sense that it is 
not the self as an ‗object‘ in the world. However, it is radically distinguished from the Kantian idea of 
this transcendental ego in its pursuit of the moral law or of any Christian or Platonic idea of soul as 
substance or as atom. It must also be stressed that it is closely relates to the unconscious for Nietzsche 
whereas for Kant, the emphasis is on reason, the conscious mind and intuition for Schopenhauer.. 
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Nietzsche criticizes the metaphysical ideas of fixed entity or ‗being‘ which is created 
by the categories of human logic and language. He maintains that it is our senses 
which create the original impression that things are in some sense identical through 
time in order to meet the need for a sense of stability in life. He criticizes language for 
building upon and reinforcing a fiction which the senses have created. For Nietzsche, 
the judgements that we form in language falsify life either by simplification of the 
complexity or particularity of things or by distorting the unique character of our 
experiences. Language distorts the concrete individuality of experience, and describes 
it in terms of universal qualities and properties. Nietzsche expresses that reality as 
becoming is fundamentally in flux and that, insofar as language creates the illusion of 
stability, it fails to capture what the world is really like. (WP: §715) The main 
criticism Nietzsche holds against language is that it is unable to express the flux of 
Becoming because, through the use of concepts, we turn things into substances which 
have immutable form.
36
 It is for this reason that Nietzsche draws a distinction between 
language and philosophical or ‗musical‘ intuition, as he recognizes alongside 
Schopenhauer the inadequacy of language to capture ‗Life‘ or the ‗Will‘. According 
to Nietzsche, metaphysical thinking is thinking which believes in the reality of the 
ideal forms that language creates. He wishes that we overcome our naive ―faith in 
                                                          
36
 Alex McIntyre in his work ‗The Sovereignty of Joy notes how the human subject is elucidated by 
Nietzsche, ―as an ‗indistinguishable drunkenness‘ (GS, 57), an inexorable mythology that is ‗concealed 
in language‘ (WS, 11)‖ (McIntyre, A., The Sovereignty of Joy: Nietzsche‘s Vision of Grand Politics, 
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1997, p.28) He outlines that for Nietzsche language structures 
the human subject such that ―it conceals the ‗continuous…indivisible flowing‘ (WS, 11) of becoming 
and breaks it up into isolated and self-identical beings, into substantialized atoms.‖ (McIntyre, A., Op. 
cit., p.28) According to McIntyre, Nietzsche maintains that language ―creates this complex and illusory 
dichotomy between appearance and the thing-in-itself, even before conceptual thought, by throwing a 
veil of metaphors over the undivided and indivisible flowing.‖ (ibid.) He then references a quote from 
Human, All Too Human I: ―The significance of language for the evolution of culture lies in this, that 
mankind set up in language a separate world beside the other world, a place it took to be so firmly set 
that, standing upon it, it could lift the rest of the world off its hinges and make itself master of it.‖ (H I: 
11 cited in this form by Mc Intyre, ibid.)  Language actually veils reality such that for Nietzsche the 
most truthful relation to it is non-linguistic. Nietzsche rather advocates existential pathos as the most 
truthful expression of reality or of Becoming. 
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grammar‖ (TI, ‗―Reason‖ in Philosophy‘: §5), and recognize that we are artistic 
creators of our linguistic world. 
 
It is for this reason that Nietzsche is mainly critical of the propositional or conceptual 
uses of language characteristic of the old correspondence theory of truth. This model 
of truth upholds the idea that linguistic or logical forms that correspond to the world 
of beings, the ―true world‖ are statements of fact; that the statements that correspond 
to basic states of affairs or things are true. He rejects this model of truth as it has not 
only created the fiction of the ‗true world‘ viewed in terms of stable substance, a 
world of beings, but also because it upholds the idea that language can express what is 
real. For Nietzsche, all language operates with stable grammatical forms, and it is in 
this way that language or linguistic consciousness cannot therefore articulate the 
dynamic flux of ‗Life‘ or that which Nietzsche considers reality to be. In ‗On the 
Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense‘ (§1) Nietzsche rejects truth in the sense of 
accurate or adequate articulation of ‗Life,‘ where the term ―adequate expression‘‘ 
stands in opposition to the word ‗truth‘: ―with words it is never a question of truth, 
never a question of adequate expression‖. Language cannot, for Nietzsche, articulate 
or express reality as the dynamic flux of becoming or the inner logos of Becoming.
37
 
                                                          
 
37
 This idea that language cannot capture reality is also expressed by Wittgenstein. Stenius in his work 
Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus notes that, for Wittgenstein, there is certain kind of experience, the mystical, 
which cannot be expressed through language. He refers to this type of experience as ‗ineffable‘ or 
‗inexpressible‘, the ‗unsayable‘ or ‗non-sensical‘. It is expressed as a feeling: ―One ‗experiences‘ the 
mystical as a form of emotional experience which in German would be called Erlebnis in 
contradistinction to ordinary fact-stating ‗experience‘ that is called Erfahrung.‖ (Stenius, E., 
Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus, Connecticut, Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1981, p.223) Stenius then makes 
reference to The Tractatus where he quotes Wittgenstein‘s statement that ―‗The contemplation of the 
world sub specie aeterni is the intuition of it as a—limited—whole‘. And Wittgenstein adds: ‗This 
feeling of the world as a limited whole is a mystical feeling.‘ (6.45)‖ (ibid.). (italics used by Stenius) 
Stenius elaborates on what Wittgenstein means by this ―One could perhaps characterize this feeling as 
an emotional experience of the world from what one feels as God‘s point of view. This has nothing to 
do with ‗facts‘ describable in language.‖ (ibid.) This mystical experience is transcendent and as a result 
lies outside what is expressible in language. Wittgenstein also upholds that God is within this domain, 
the sphere of the inexpressible: ―‗God does not reveal himself in the world.‘ (6.432)‖ (ibid., p.222) 
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There is no linguistic statement that captures the complexity and uniqueness of the 
―facts‖ or of reality; all linguistic statements, including even Nietzsche‘s own 
metaphorical statements, involve a creative falsification and simplification of reality. 
Nietzsche abolishes the idea of truth in terms of the old correspondence theory; thus 
when he states that ―facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations,‖ (WP: 
§481) he is rejecting the old correspondence theory that there is a linguistic mode of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Life‘s deepest problems are within the realm of the transcendent. Wittgenstein, alongside Kant, not 
only recognizes that life‘s deepest problems are unsolvable by theoretical reason (Kant‘s transcendental 
reduction) but that they are also not to be viewed problematically. Life‘s deepest problems are within a 
different realm from the theoretical: ―‗the deepest problems are properly speaking not problems‘ (4. 
003)‖ (italics are used by Stenius). (ibid., p.222) ―‗For an answer which cannot be expressed the 
question too cannot be expressed.—The riddle does not exist‘ (6.5).‖ (ibid.) In the preface to The 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein mentions that the whole meaning of the book ‗could be summed up as follows: 
―Whereof one cannot speak, thereon one must be silent.‘ (ibid., p.2, 225)  
 
In a section entitled Wittgenstein‘s ‗Transcendental Lingualism‘ Stenius maintains that this connection 
between the transcendent and the unsayable relates to Wittgenstein‘s distinction between the empirical 
self and the transcendental self. Stenius notes Wittgenstein‘s linguistic turn in terms of Kantian 
transcendental idealism: ―the form of experience is ‗subjective‘ in the transcendental sense, the 
metaphysical subject being the ‗subject‘ which uses and understands language, and which must be 
distinguished from the empirical self, which is part of the world describable in language.‖ (ibid., p.220-
21) For Wittgenstein, ―the limits of language are the transcendental limits of the world and since 
language is my language (the only language which I understand) the limits of language are the limits of 
my world. The Ego to which the word ‗my‘ refers to is the metaphysical subject...‖ (ibid., p.221) The 
metaphysical subject does not exist as an empirical object among objects, in a way it ―does not exist‖ 
(5.631), because it is transcendental, it ‗does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world‘ 
(5.632)—it is like the eye in relation to the field of sight; the eye cannot see itself (5.633-6.331). And 
the metaphysical subject is to be distinguished from the empirical ego: in the book ‗The world as I 
found it‘ there is an ego which must be described, but of the metaphysical ego there could be no 
mention in this book (5.631)‖ (ibid., p.221) The limit for Wittgenstein can only be drawn in language, 
and what lies on the other side of the limit is the unsayable, ‗non-sense,‘ the realm of the transcendent. 
The realm of Being cannot be referred to in language; therefore it is within the realm of the unsaid. 
Wittgenstein argues, in a similar vein to Kant, that ‗existence is not a predicate‘ or cannot be viewed as 
a thing or a property of a thing. It cannot be pointed to in the same way as a thing can, and therefore it 
cannot be referred to in language. This idea of the transcendental ego being within the realm of the 
unsaid, that language cannot capture the transcendent is also apparent in Nietzsche, and plays a 
significant role in Nietzsche‘s style. It is in this way that Nietzsche rejects the propositional and 
theoretical uses of language characteristic of the old correspondence theory of truth, which falsely 
upheld that this type of language could capture the essence of things. It is for this reason that Nietzsche 
engages in pathos, as he recognizes the limits of language; it is a religious pathos, it is of the realm of 
the spiritual ‗unsaid‘. The notion of a transcendental self, for Nietzsche is the higher self; it is a totality 
made up of the ―Great Reason of the body‖, the soul, and mind. Nietzsche embraces the idea of the 
transcendental capacity of the mind, the ―transcendental mind‖ (Hutter, H., Shaping the Future: 
Nietzsche‘s New Regime of the Soul & its Ascetic Practices, Op. cit., p.173), which will be discussed in 
chapter three of this thesis. The higher or intuitive self is more fundamental than the transcendental 
mind; it is the self that brings pathos to the text. This intuitive self is a harmonized human totality that 
is in attunement with the whole. The relationship between the intuitive self and the transcendental mind 
will be explored in the third chapter where it will be discussed in the context of ‗reading and writing in 
blood‘. (Z, I: §7) 
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expressing reality or the facts. He is rejecting the propositional use of language for 
adequately expressing reality, which is similar to Wittgenstein‘s argument in The 
Tractatus (6.53) However, this does not imply that Nietzsche thinks that this reality is 
not accessible nor is he overlooking reality; he is only rejecting reality that is viewed 
in terms of thing-hood or ‗beings.‘38 He wishes to replace the old correspondence 
theory with a new kind of existential truth, whereby the philosopher in his experience 
of ―rapture‖, ―revelation‖, ―inspiration‖ is an adequate expression of reality (EH, ‗Z‘: 
§3) or the ‗inner logos‘ of Becoming. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche mentions what 
―Zarathustra wants‖: a certain type of person who ―conceives reality as it is,‖ a being 
who is strong enough to do so, and so ―is not estranged or removed from reality‖ in 
his manner of understanding or in his existence. (EH, ‗Why I Am a Destiny‘: §5) It is 
for this reason that Nietzsche‘s own philosophical method as an intuitive mode of 
being is a method that is a form of valuable insight (AC: §13); his writing style 
emerges from rapturous insight into the ‗inner logos‘ of Becoming. This is what 
makes it a ‗Yes-saying‘ or life-affirmative style. In being an expression of tragic 
pathos, and his ego ipsissimum (HH, Pref: §1) his works are also in turn an expression 
of ―the unsaid‖. In The Antichrist §59, Nietzsche discusses scientific method as the 
―art of reading well‖, a natural science which includes ―the sense for facts‖, and ―the 
good, the delicate sense of tact and taste‖; these methods are to be understood as 
―body, as gesture, as instinct—as reality, in short.‖ This idea of taste is reminiscent of 
the idea of taste expressed in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks: §3, where 
he associates it with a philosopher‘s intuitive capacity. This intuitive capacity 
resembles the ―sense for the facts‖ described by Nietzsche as the ―most valuable and 
                                                          
38
 Nietzsche‘s rejection of the old correspondence theory of truth highlights the inadequacy of language 
to capture reality; however, it does not imply that reality has no meaning for us, or cannot be 
―accessed‖. This thesis contends that through tragic wisdom the highest type can glimpse the whole.  
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of all the senses.‖ (AC: §59) He mentions that the ―art of reading well‖ as the unity of 
science, the ―natural sciences‖ must include this capacity.  
 
Nietzsche‘s criticism of language rests upon his insight into reality as ‗Becoming‘ or 
‗Life‘. His scepticism regarding the ability of language to capture truth or reality rests 
firmly upon a pre-linguistic insight, such that his style – wholly unlike the conceptual, 
theoretical or propositional uses of language – is an expression of the reality to which 
it relates. This pre-linguistic insight into reality forms part of a cosmic event whereby 
Nietzsche discovers his fate through the revelation of the truth of Becoming. As Fink 
(2003: 165) puts it,  
 
 
The deviation from the path of metaphysics is not just a new method or 
mode of thought, something that man could accomplish himself. It is rather 
and more primordially an event which captures man or a fate which he 
experiences. In Ecce Homo Nietzsche finds the language for the 
consciousness of his fate... Nietzsche is struck by lightning. He is burnt by 
a light of a new dawn of the truth of being in its entirety.  
 
 
Nietzsche describes the realization of his fate as a revelation, a form of lightning, and 
as a ―cosmic intuition‖. (Fink 2003: 165) The revelatory nature of this experience 
implies that the body is no longer to be viewed as ‗my body‘, but as part of the whole, 
as ‗Life‘, he describes it as his becoming self (EH, ‗The Untimely Ones‘: §3) that 
which is his most fundamental self. This self has been disciplined to wholeness by the 
―Great reason‖ of the body, and in the experience of belonging to the whole ―one 
becomes what one is.‖ (EH, ‗Why I am So Clever‘: §9)  
 
In Twilight of the Idols, ‗Skirmishes of an Untimely Man‘: §26 Nietzsche recognizes 
the difficulty of philosophical communication: 
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We no longer esteem ourselves sufficiently when we communicate 
ourselves. Our true experiences are not at all garrulous. They could not 
communicate themselves even if they tried. That is because they lack the 
right word. Whatever we have words for, that we have already got beyond. 
In all talk there is a grain of contempt. Language, it seems, was invented 
only for what is average, medium, communicable. With language the 
speaker immediately vulgarizes himself. Out of a morality for deaf-mutes 
and other philosophers.  
 
Nietzsche associates conceptual language with serving the needs of the herd rather 
than the individual and in this way it cannot be the medium of philosophical truth. 
Truth as the realm of Becoming does not express itself through the conceptual use of 
language. For Nietzsche, Becoming is not a thing that can be signified; it is therefore 
not to be viewed in conceptual terms. In engaging in the conceptual use of language 
through consciousness, one exchanges the personal for the social, the individual for 
the herd; the herd use of language forgets the individual and unique origins of social 
and conceptual transformations. (‗On the Truth & Lies in a Non-moral Sense‘: §1) In 
The Gay Science: §354 Nietzsche explains that it is because of the ―Genius of the 
Species‖ or of the herd that the uniquely personal and individual is exchanged for a 
herd or social perspective. It is for this reason that Nietzsche‘s style as the 
communication of pathos, of an inward state, of the individual and the personal is a 
better medium for the expression of Becoming; his intuitive style that of tragic pathos 
can communicate Becoming as an expression of a unique and experiential moment
39
. 
Nietzsche associates the communication of pathos with the individual and the 
personal, and in turn with self-knowledge, as his writings speak of his self-
overcoming. It is for this reason that Nietzsche claims that his philosophy is not in the 
words but ‗in‘ his experience, and in this way his style is a communication of this 
                                                          
39
 This experiential moment is amor fati for Nietzsche, the loving embrace of reality as it is, and 
involves the feeling of tragic pathos, of ultimate joy. This tragic pathos is one he himself experiences, 
and he expresses it in The Birth of Tragedy as tragic insight and in the later works as one of ―rapture‖ 
(EH, ‗Z‘: §3). He therefore recognizes the limits of reason and language and as a result brings pathos to 
his writing style. In The Birth of Tragedy he rejects the rational justification of life put forward by the 
Socratic tradition, and his writing style mirrors this message. It is a ‗yes-saying‘ life-affirmative style. 
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experience. It is those readers who share similar experiences as him that understand 
him best. He associates the herd use of language with the social need for 
communication, which is in contrast with his own tragic style and its connection with 
self-knowledge and personal experience. Nietzsche‘s style in being an expression of a 
unique personal experience, an inward state of tragic pathos, is a ‗truer‘ expression of 
reality in its particularity than is possible with the conceptual or propositional use of 
language.  
 
In The Will to Power, Nietzsche also expresses that conceptual language cannot 
capture or express reality where he states that ―the demand for an adequate mode of 
expression is senseless.‖ (WP: §625) He is repudiating language as an adequate mode 
of expressing reality. Nietzsche rejects facts only in the sense of things or states of 
affairs which correspond to concepts; however, this does not imply that the 
philosopher has no access to primordial reality or the ―inner logos‖ of Becoming. This 
access to reality is not acquired through  conscious, rational thinking or the herd-use 
of language but rather through tragic pathos or philosophical insight. Nietzsche is 
refuting only the idea that concepts can correspond to facts or things, and it is an error 
to infer from this that he denies that there is a way of accessing it or expressing it. It is 
not just that Nietzsche wishes to acknowledge that facts in the sense of dogmatic 
truths are interpretations, but rather that truth or reality cannot be expressed 
linguistically. . Nietzsche rejects dogmatic facts that are anthropomorphic concepts 
taken to be the essence of things-themselves, as he claims that they are perspectives. 
In this way, Nietzsche‘s style  emerges from tragic insight into reality or Becoming 
such that Nietzsche‘s works are an expression of the silent logos. 
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In recognizing that ‗our true experiences are not at all garrulous‘ (TI, ‗Skirmishes of 
an Untimely Man‘: §26), Nietzsche calls for us to view his philosophy not in his 
words but ‗in‘ his life. He in this way prioritizes life-experience over the written 
word. He recognizes the inability of writing to express his philosophical meaning, and 
therefore turns to the more expressive medium of music. In ‗the Attempt at Self-
Criticism‘ (§3) at the outset of The Birth of Tragedy he states that he ―should have 
sung, this ―new soul‖—and not spoken!‖ The climax of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a 
dancing song entitled ―The Seven Seals Or: The Yes & Amen Song‖. In the final 
aphorism of The Gay Science where he wishes to remind his readers of the virtues of 
―reading in the right way‖ (GS: §383); he expresses that The Gay Science is an 
expression of the ―Kingdom of the Dance‖, and suggests that to read in the right way 
is to enter into the musical totality that his works belong to: 
 
 
I hear all around myself most malicious, cheerful, hobgoblin-like laughter: 
the spirits of my book are themselves descending upon me, pulling my ears 
and calling me to order. ‗We can‘t stand it anymore‘, they shout, ‗stop, 
stop this raven-black music! Are we not surrounded by bright mid-
morning? And by soft ground and green grass, the kingdom of the dance? 
Was there ever a better hour for gaiety? Who will sing us a song, a 
morning song?... (GS: §383) 
 
 
In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche suggests the he dances with the pen, as he wishes to 
transcend the fixed rigidity of concepts, and also the inadequacy of words to express 
the logos. 
 
For one cannot subtract dancing in every form from a noble education—to 
be able to dance with one‘s feet, with concepts, with words: need I still add 
that one must be able to do it with the pen too—that one must learn to 
write?.. (TI, ‗What the Germans Lack‘: §7)   
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In Ecce Homo he refers to Thus Spoke Zarathustra as a work where ―eloquence 
become music‖ and where ―lightning bolts hurled forward into hitherto unfathomed 
future.‖ (EH, ‗Why I Write Such Good Books‘, ‗Z‘: §6) In the same work under the 
section entitled ‗Why I am So Wise‘ he refers to it as a ―dithyramb on solitude.‖ (§8) 
In referring to writing with ―lightning bolts,‖ Nietzsche wishes to communicate 
through the pre-linguistic realm of Becoming. The language of ―lightning bolts‖ also 
relates to the religious or apocalyptic use of language:  
 
 
What I am today, where I am today—at a height where I speak no longer 
with words but with lightning bolts—ah, how remote from this I still was 
at that time... The great calm in promising, this happy gaze into a future 
that is not to remain a mere promise!‖ (EH, ‗The Untimely Ones‘: §3)  
 
In Ecce Homo, he also states that ―Zarathustra may be reckoned as music;‖ and that 
―certainly a rebirth of the art of hearing was among its pre-conditions.‖ (EH, Z: §1) 
Nietzsche also emphasizes that only a select few can be the listeners to the speeches 
of Zarathustra: ―the tempo of these speeches is a tender adagio. Such things reach 
only the most select. It is a privilege without equal to be a listener here. Nobody is 
free to have ears for Zarathustra.‖40 (EH, Preface: §4) In the same passage Nietzsche 
refers to Zarathustra as the ―greatest present‖ —it is also the deepest, born out of the 
innermost wealth of truth‖ and ―Above, all, one must hear aright the tone that comes 
from this mouth, the halcyon tone, lest one should do wretched injustice to the 
meaning of its wisdom.‖ Zarathustra was written from his becoming self that which 
belongs to the whole and is in this way an expression of Becoming or ‗Life‘.  
                                                          
40
 Parkes, G., notes also the musical nature of Thus Spoke Zarathustra in an introduction to Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra and contends that for Nietzsche the best way to read this work is with a ―third ear‖, such 
that the art of reading coincides with the art of listening. Parkes observes that the art of reading with a 
―third ear‖ is expressed in Beyond Good and Evil (§246). Parkes offers a detailed discussion of the 
musicality of Zarathustra in terms of lengths of sentences, punctuation and use of repetition. (See 
Parkes, G., (ed.), Introduction, In: Translation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (with an introduction and 
notes), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, xxx-xxxi.  
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Nietzsche‘s style tries to communicate an ―inward tension‖ of pathos (EH, ‗Why I 
Write Such Good Books‘: §4) and is ―always presupposing that there are ears—that 
there are those worthy and capable of the same pathos.‖ The fact that Nietzsche‘s 
writing style flows from a musical whole implies that the reader will only understand 
the ‗truth‘ of his writings through hearing their rhythmical effect. One does not 
comprehend the truth of his works if one searches for it in the words themselves. It is 
for this reason that he criticizes ―books written in German‖: ―What torture books 
written in German are for anyone who has a third ear! How vexed one stands before 
the slowly revolving swamp of sounds that do not sound like anything and rhythms 
that do not dance, called a ―book‖ among Germans!‖ (BGE: §246) The truth of 
Nietzsche‘s writings lies in the fact that they are an expression of Becoming, an 
attunement to reality and it is through the Dionysian Dithyramb that the logos can find 
expression. The kind of reading that Nietzsche advocates is not one that remains on 
the surface that seeks meaning or truth in his words. Nietzsche‘s words do not bring 
us to the complexity of his experience; they leave us on the surface. In the Appendix 
to Ecce Homo (§2) he speaks of what is required in order to understand his works:  
 
 
Silence is as much of an instinct with me as is garrulity with our dear 
philosophers. I am brief; my readers themselves must become long and 
comprehensive in order to bring up and together all that I have thought, 
and thought deep down. 
 
 This notion of the ideal reader becoming ‗long and comprehensive‘ is reminiscent of 
the highest type of soul that of Zarathustra, which is described as that which ―reaches 
down deepest—the most comprehensive soul... the most necessary soul‖, which 
―catches up with itself in the widest circle,‖ ―the wisest soul.‖ (EH, ‗Z‘: §6), (Z, ‗On 
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Old & New Tablets‘: §19) It is this type of soul that enters into the silent logos of 
Nietzsche‘s thought. 
 
It is only the intensity of the reader‘s own experience of ‗Life‘, reading with a similar 
pathos, which enables him to understand the truth of Nietzsche‘s works. It is for this 
reason that Nietzsche states that if the reader takes his philosophy to be ‗in‘ his texts 
or in the words he falsifies the text or does it an injustice. In speaking about his words 
as an expression of an inward pathos or of what is most painful, he mentions that 
these experiences can be redeemed by ―the great freedom‖ or by the whole:  
 
Here every word is experienced, is deep, is inward; what is most painful is 
not lacking: there are words in it that are virtually bloodthirsty. But a wind 
of the great freedom blows over everything; even wounds do not have the 
effect of objections. (EH, ‗The Untimely Ones‘: §3)  
 
Nietzsche expresses the connection between discovering his own true self, which he 
refers to as his ―inmost being‖ or ―centre‖ (Letter to Carl Fuchs Dec., 14th 1887) and 
those real educators of his past those who played a role in his self-discovery. These 
educators or influences from his past enabled his self-discovery to take place through 
that which his most fundamental or intuitive relation to history as the whole. 
Nietzsche calls this relationship to reality as the whole as ‗my becoming‘ or as ―my 
innermost history.‖ (EH, ‗The Untimely Ones‘: §3) The connection between ―one‘s 
inmost being‖ or intuitive self, ―explosive‖ education and history or tradition will be 
explored in the third chapter of the thesis. For Nietzsche, his writings are an 
expression of his self-overcoming; his philosophy lies ‗in‘ his experience of 
Dionysian wisdom rather than in his words.  
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One should speak only when one may stay silent; and then only of that 
which one has overcome—everything else is chatter, ‗literature,‘ lack of 
breeding. My writings speak only of my overcomings: ―I‖ am in them, 
together with everything which was inimical to me, ego ipsissimus [my 
very own self] indeed, if yet a prouder expression be permitted, ego 
ipsissimum [my innermost self]. (HH, II, Pref.: §1)    
 
It is for this reason that it cannot be ascertained in terms of an analysis of the 
relationship amongst his central concepts. This is characteristic of a theoretical 
approach which Nietzsche wishes to overcome. In the Appendix to Ecce Homo (§2), 
in the context of Nietzsche outlining the pre-requisites for understanding his works, he 
states that ―Finally, I speak only of what I have lived through, not merely of what I 
have thought through; the opposition of thinking and life is lacking in my case. My 
―theory‖ grows from my ―practice‖—oh, from a practice that is not by any means 
harmless or unproblematic!‖  
 
The type of reading that Nietzsche advocates involves bringing a similar tragic pathos 
as the author‘s to the text. The truth of Nietzsche‘s writings lies in his experiences 
where those personal experiences are an expression of Becoming. It is for this reason 
that only ―those worthy of the same pathos‖ can take a truthful standpoint toward 
Nietzsche‘s works. It is those readers that share similar experiences as Nietzsche 
come to understand or come into correspondence with him as an author. In bringing 
similar experiences as Nietzsche‘s to the text, not only is the reader capable of 
understanding the truth of his texts but also their understanding of those experiences 
can be deepened: ―Ultimately, nobody can get more out of things, including books, 
than he already knows. For what one lacks access to from experience one will have no 
ear.‖ (EH, ‗Why I Write Such Good Books‘: §1) It is these readers that are in an 
attunement to an author (AC: §52); they are intuitive readers that share a similar 
pathos to Nietzsche, and they recognize that his writings are an expression of his 
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intuitive or innermost self (HH, II, Preface: §1), which are in turn an expression of 
reality. This truthful standpoint towards an author involves making a transition from 
the written word to hearing the spoken word to reading with ears, and finally to 
entering into the silent logos of an author where an author belongs to the whole or is 
immortalized in his writing. This type of reading stands opposed to the postmodern 
denial of the priority of speaking to writing: ―The postmodern ―author‖ thus becomes 
a substitute for the divine maker himself by sacrificing the logos that issues from his 
lived presence into the dead form of the written text.‖  (Hutter 2006: 173) Nietzsche 
as an author reveals himself to only a select few:  
 
I have cast my book for the select ―few,‖ and even then without 
impatience; the indescribable patience and dangerousness of my thoughts 
are such that a long time must pass before there are ears to hear them... 
(Letter to Malwida von Meysenbug, May 12, 1887) 
 
 
 It is through the reader‘s ―inmost self‖ or intuitive self that he can enter into this 
silent logos. Nietzsche speaks of the redemptive nature of a certain type of reading 
that ―the virtues of reading the right way‖ (GS: §383) involve the reader entering into 
a dancing oneness with reality, discovering himself in the act of ―Becoming what one 
is.‖ (EH, ‗Why I am So Clever‘: §9) This type of reading involves taking a 
presuppositionless position in relation to a metaphysically independent author. This in 
turn entails taking a pre-linguistic or non-theoretical standpoint in relation to reality, 
the text or an author. For Nietzsche, there are those who take a theoretical standpoint 
towards reality and those in the experience of Dionysian wisdom ‗enter into‘ or 
participate within reality. This distinction or rank order will be explored in the 
following chapter.  
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Chapter Two  
 
 
Nietzsche‘s Notion of a Spiritual Hierarchy 
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I 
 
Nietzsche on Rank-Order and Higher Justice: 
 
         The following chapter in exploring Nietzsche‘s notion of a spiritual hierarchy, it offers 
further insight into what reality is for Nietzsche, and argues that it is through tragic 
pathos and the higher self as the ―Great reason of the Body‖ (Z,  I: §4) that the highest 
type encounters reality as it is. It elucidates Nietzsche‘s use of the term ―pathos of 
distance‖ (BGE: §257), that the highest type removes himself from the ―human, all 
too human‖ in his ascent to  Becoming. He experiences what is referred to as ―loving-
contempt‖; the higher type has a profound contempt for the ―human, all too human‖ 
and out of love for a reality higher than the human, he grants to man a new measure of 
value. (Z, Prologue: §4) It is only by way of implication that it becomes apparent that 
Nietzsche does not adhere to a relativism of perspectival truths (human) where truth 
has no meaning for us. This section argues that for Nietzsche the new measure of 
value is reality (non-perspectival) and also that the most fundamental or truthful 
relation to reality is tragic wisdom. Tragic wisdom as an interpretation of the world is 
therefore ranked highest. This new measure of value is love of reality, or is truth. This 
new measure gives meaning to the human world, which forges the way for a New 
Dionysian Age. In this way the chapter looks at Nietzsche as a foreseer of a new 
Epoch, and the spiritual hierarchy that belongs to it. It also contends that the 
subordination of the ‗Many‘, the realm of the human, and politics to the ‗One‘ of 
Becoming in ―grand politics‖ coincides with the initiation of the new age.  It also 
examines in detail the varying types of human beings, a distinction determined by 
their relation to truth. It also explores the conditions for encountering the truth as 
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reality. It expresses that rank-order presupposes the non-perspectival nature of truth, 
and that Nietzsche‘s works have a relation to this truth. 
 
          The philosophical type who engages in the ‗higher‘ form of existence, and who 
suffers the ―pathos of distance‖ (BGE: §257) is rendered distinct from herd 
involvements and as a result is declared the most ‗worthy‘ of human beings. The 
philosophical type falls into the category of the few: the ―genius‖ and the ―great 
human beings‖, ―the best and most fruitful people‖ (GS, I: §19, §4)41 or in 
Schopenhauer as Educator (§3, 146) he is referred to as ―the highest fruit of life‖, 
where the ―genius‖ justifies and is a redeemer of life. The notion of genius and the 
―great human beings‖, Nietzsche believes, are the outcome of strict discipline, 
breeding, and cultural hierarchy.
42
 In Twilight of the Idols, he refers to the ―genius‖ as 
                                                          
41
 In The Gay Science, Nietzsche discusses the relevance of ‗evil‘, that it is necessary in providing the 
―favourable conditions‖ for ―great growth‖:  
 
Evil.—Examine the lives of the best and the most fruitful people and 
peoples and ask yourselves whether a tree which is supposed to grow to a 
proud height could do without bad weather and storms: whether misfortune 
and external resistance, whether any kinds of hatred, jealousy, 
stubbornness, mistrust, hardness, greed, and violence do not belong to the 
favourable conditions without which any great growth even of virtue is 
scarcely possible? The poison from which the weaker nature perishes 
strengthens the strongman—and he does not call it poison. (GS, I: §19)  
 
42
 In his ‗The Sovereignty of Joy: Nietzsche‘s Vision of Grand Politics McIntyre‘ discusses Nietzsche‘s 
notion of hierarchy or ‗the order of rank (Rangordnung)‘, and notes its parallels with Plato‘s political 
philosophy in terms of his notion of grand politics. He claims that in spite of Nietzsche‘s criticism of 
Socrates and Plato ‗as symptoms of decay, as agents of the dissolution of Greece, as pseudo Greek, as 
anti-Greek‘ (TI, ‗The Problem of Socrates,‘ 2), he shares their view of hierarchy as the fundamental 
structure of any genuine political society. (McIntyre, A., Op. cit., p.75) He notes that ―hierarchy is a 
significant aspect of Nietzsche‘s work and has triggered a great deal of critical reaction that neither 
understands nor attempts to understand this dimension of his political philosophy.‖ (ibid.) He maintains 
that when it comes to hierarchy in Nietzsche, the main issue is with ―the meaning of inequality.‖ (ibid.) 
He ascertains that ―the principle of inequality of status as expressed in his concept of hierarchy has 
nothing in common with the principle of inequality of power as expressed in class structure or social 
stratification.‖ (ibid.) Nietzsche advocates hierarchy strictly in terms of spiritual status; those who 
encounter the higher things or that which is higher than the human world, the ‗untimely‘ or atopian, 
they are the few that are ranked highest. Nietzsche is critical of the notion of equality, according to 
McIntyre, as he views it as a form of subjective idealism: ―For equality, as a moral idea, is a part of a 
subjectivist interpretation of society as a contract formed by abstract and asocial individuals: that is, the 
private person precedes and creates society in accordance with his free will. The assumptions of 
egalitarian political theory derive from two political sources: the subjective morality (Moralität) that 
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―the great destiny‖, and goes on to say that ―Once the tension in the mass has become 
too great, then the most accidental stimulus suffices to summon into the world the 
―genius,‖ the ―deed,‖ the great destiny‖, who are also referred to in the same passage 
as the specimens of a ―higher morality.‖ (TI, ‗Skirmishes of an Untimely Man: §44) 
The genius is understood here by Nietzsche as the ―most high-spirited, most alive, 
world-affirming human being‖ (BGE: §56), as a spiritually superior person who 
experiences revelation as direct insight into the deepest meaning of things. (HH, I: 
§162), (BGE: §295) In Beyond Good and Evil, this type of genius is referred to as the 
―Genius of the Heart.‖ (BGE: §295) This philosophical type or rare type is one of 
those who experiences the most extraordinary things, ―who is struck by his own 
thoughts as from outside, as from above and below, as by his type of experiences and 
lightning bolts; who is perhaps himself a storm pregnant with new lightnings...‖ 
(BGE: §292) The philosophical type, in the experience of wisdom as the deepest 
insight into reality, is the person who ―often runs away from itself, often is afraid of 
itself—but too inquisitive not to ―come to‖ again—always back to himself.‖ (ibid.) 
 
         In contrast to a pluralisation of expressions of life and health, Nietzsche rather 
advocates a rank-ordering of psychological types; he clearly believes that certain 
forms of health, in particular the ―Great health‖ (GS: §382, HH, pref.: §4), are more 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
followed the collapse of the morality of custom (Sittlichkeit) and the Christian concept of freedom as 
the free will of the abstract subjectivity.‖ (ibid.) According to McIntyre, Nietzsche‘s Overman is 
neither a free spirit nor a tyrant but a noble individual who embodies a modesty, innocence and 
freedom from revenge in his experience of immersion in the joy of becoming or belonging to the 
whole. Hierarchy, for Nietzsche is far from being a vertical relation of domination, it is a ―horizontal 
relation of encompassing in which the lesser is enclosed within the greater as a circle within a larger 
circle; the relation of ‗encompassment‘ embodies a holism, whereas egalitarianism exemplifies a 
radical individualism in which social relations are construed as oppressive restraints that are artificial, 
external, and abstract.‖ (ibid., p.76) McIntyre contends that for Nietzsche domination is more central to 
egalitarian relationships than to relationships of genuine hierarchy (ibid., p.162) McIntyre notes this 
idea of genuine hierarchy as a relation between whole and part, that which encompasses and that which 
is encompassed from Louis Dumont (Homo Hierarchicus, London, Paladin, 1972, 24; cf. 114-18. He 
uses the following translation of Twilight of the Idols (R.J. Hollingdale (trans.), Harmondsworth, 
Penguin Books, 1986).   
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valuable than others.  Nietzsche embraces the ―great health‖  as a condition that 
enables the philosophical type to enter into a unity with reality. The ―Great health‖ is 
at the apex of the hierarchy of souls, and one of its distinctive features is its uniquely 
intimate relation to suffering the pathos of the will to power itself. The term ―pathos 
of distance‖ refers to hierarchies: the term ―distance‖ is understood as a distinction 
between ―higher‖ and ―lower‖ forms of life. It is those who suffer the pathos of 
distance that are ranked highest. The term ―pathos‖ variously refers to ―suffering,‖ ―a 
course of events,‖ a ―movement‖ and ―experience itself.‖ Nietzsche views this 
―pathos of distance‖ in spiritual terms as a ―loving contempt‖ that the higher type 
firstly feels contempt for man, and then subsequent to his experience of his ascent to  
reality,  he can love man in granting him a new measure of value, truth. It is through 
the eros of the will to power that the higher type ascends above the human. Through 
the higher type‘s experience of ―the untimely‖, he can now ―love man for God‘s sake‖ 
or the sake of something higher than man.
43
 (BGE: §60) In The Birth of Tragedy, 
                                                          
43
 Mc Intyre examines in detail the pathos of distance in Nietzsche in terms of ―loving contempt‖ and 
―love of man for God‘s sake‖. In this way, he looks at truth (reality) as the new measure of value for 
Nietzsche. McIntyre also maintains that for Nietzsche, ―the relationship between the noble individual as 
law-giver and his people in grand politics reveals certain similarities to Plato‘s vision of political 
philosophy. In particular there is a difference in kind between the noble and the good and, at the very 
least, a difference in degree between the noble and the free spirit.‖ (Mc Intyre, A.,, Op. cit., p.76) In 
drawing comparisons between Nietzsche and Plato on matters of hierarchy and the noble type‘s ascent 
to higher reality, he explains what Nietzsche means by the ‗pathos of distance‘: ―This ‗pathos of 
distance‘ that distinguishes the noble and his ‗seriousness in play,‘ the political essence of the 
philosophic life, has its basis in the spiritual pathos that Nietzsche calls ‗loving contempt.‘‖ (ibid.) 
According to McIntyre, ―both Plato and Nietzsche have a profound contempt for man and the polis in 
general, and, accordingly, emphasize the great distance that stands between the philosopher and his 
political society.‖ (ibid.) They both ―look down upon the human all-too-human‖ and condemn it ―as 
unworthy of true seriousness‖ but however ―grant to man a measure of consideration if and when he is 
brought under the rule of something higher than man‖ and in this way ―the political thought of Plato 
and Nietzsche would inevitably be pervaded by this paradoxical, atopian relationship to man and 
politics.‖ (ibid.)McIntyre explains the term ‗atopian‘ as ‗untimely‘, placelessness, outside the city, 
above man, beyond the human, all too human. The genuine philosopher is always atopian: outside the 
city or above man, but nonetheless, the foundation and law-giver of true polity or ‗grand politics‘. It is 
as a result of one‘s contempt for the human, all too human that one can love what is more than human. 
McIntyre asserts that ―For both Plato and Nietzsche, ‗loving contempt‘ is the fundamental precondition 
of the philosophic eros because it determines ‗what can be loved in man‘ (Z, Prologue, 4) and thus 
what can be taken seriously in man-that which constitutes the measure of man and that which the 
philosopher as law-giver establishes as the foundation of true polity.‖ (ibid., p.77) In a section entitled 
‗To Love Man For God‘s Sake‘ McIntyre explains that the philosophical life begins with the de-
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Nietzsche views the pathos of distance in terms of the ―primordial agony of 
individuation‖ or as ―the transfiguring genius of the principium individuationis‖ (BT: 
§16): ―In the heroic effort of the individual to attain universality, in the attempt to 
transcend the curse of individuation and to become the one world-being, he suffers in 
his own person the primordial contradiction that is concealed in things...‖. (BT: §9) 
This ―pathos of distance‖ not only entails being removed from the ―lower‖ forms of 
existence but also being removed from the whole in the experience of disunity. It not 
only involves the separation of the higher types from the lower ones, but also of part 
from whole.  
 
Nietzsche ranks human beings in accordance with their relation to reality and in turn 
by varying levels of insight into reality. He ranks highest those who acquire tragic 
insight into reality such that that their interpretation of the world is ranked highest. 
The type of individualism that that is commended by Nietzsche is attainable only 
through a relation to something universal. This universal value, this ultimate principle 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
legitimisation of the familiar, conventional world and that ―the negation of this past legitimacy actually 
arises from a positive, new force: eros, will to power, the love for something higher than the human 
world.‖  (ibid., p.78) McIntyre mentions that for both Plato and Nietzsche, it is this mysterious force 
that lies at the heart of philosophy‖, and that both education (paideia), which Nietzsche re-thinks as 
cultivation (Züchtung), and the play of creation presuppose the erotic passion of will to power (ibid.) 
He also explains that the most paradoxical quality of eros is what Nietzsche calls, in referring to Moses, 
‗the love of man for God‘s sake‘ (BGE, 60), ―As the philosophic eros leads the spirit above its people 
and engenders a new love for things beyond the all-too-human, this same passion makes it possible to 
give the human things a certain seriousness and thus to love them. To love man for God‘s or, as 
Nietzsche implies, for the sake of something higher than man, the übermensch, ‗has so far been the 
noblest and most remote feeling among men‘...(BGE, 60)‖ (ibid.) McIntyre maintains that for 
Nietzsche there is a distinction in reality between higher and lower ―the philosophic passion establishes 
an order of rank through its distinction between the higher and the lower that initially drives the spirit 
towards the former, and yet paradoxically its desire for the higher and the most serious things compels 
it to return to and love man with the higher as its measure. The philosopher‘s contempt for the all-too-
human emerges from the nature of the philosophic eros (the desire for the highest things), and yet this 
love that drives him beyond man also teaches him to love man and grant him a seriousness; he learns 
‗seriousness in play‘ (HH, I: 628)‖ (ibid.) The new measure of value is the higher world, which is an 
eternity within Becoming and the philosopher‘s experience of the higher things in turn allows him to 
give man a higher measure of value. McIntyre uses the following translations of Human, All Too 
Human (R.J., Hollingdale (trans.), 2 volumes, Cambridge University Press, 1984) abbreviated as HH; 
of Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No-One, (R.J. Hollingdale (trans.), 
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1961) abbreviated as Z; and Beyond Good and Evil (W. Kaufmann 
(trans.), New York Vintage Books, 1966) abbreviated as BGE. 
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of rank-order is truth or reality. ―Zarathustra is more truthful than any other thinker. 
His doctrine and his alone, posits truthfulness as the highest virtue; this means the 
opposite of the cowardice of the ―idealist‖ who flees from reality.‖ (EH, ‗Why I am a 
Destiny‘: §4) Nietzsche expresses an aristocratic politics of the soul where self-
contempt provides the stimulus for inner struggle and self-overcoming.
44
 For 
Nietzsche, it is the ‗hierarchical‘ nature of truth that determines the ‗hierarchy of the 
spirit‘ or the spiritual rank-ordering of types: it is the relation to the universal (reality) 
that determines rank. This relationship to the universal can be achieved only through a 
certain internal state that is the ‗higher self‘ or the divine self or what is referred to by 
Leslie Thiele as an ―aristocratically ordered soul‖. (1990: 52) Nietzsche‘s rank-order 
of the spirit is not in any way politically determined; it is a rank-order determined by 
one‘s spiritual relation to  reality. This relation is what Nietzsche refers to as ―grand 
politics‖ where the empirical realm of politics and law (‗many‘) is subordinated to 
realm of polity, the ‗One‘ of Becoming.45 Nietzsche‘s rank-order of spirit also relates 
                                                          
44
 This notion of self-contempt that provides the stimulus for inner struggle relates to what McIntyre 
draws upon in Nietzsche, the idea of ‗loving contempt‘ that is contempt for oneself and contempt for 
others. He outlines how it plays a role in coming to love higher things and cultivate a higher self. The 
philosophical eros, or spiritual pathos of the will to power lies in the passion or love for higher things, 
which compels the philosopher ―to think back to himself (cf. UDH, 10)‖ (ibid., p.79): ―To think back to 
the self is thus to think and cultivate a higher self, to create beyond oneself. For Nietzsche, this is the 
essence of love and philosophy.‖ (ibid.) According to McIntyre, the philosophic passion of loving 
higher things, for Nietzsche presupposes ―both a self-dissatisfaction and a love for the self in order to 
improve itself, the desire for self-knowledge (thinking back to oneself) involves both a self-rejection 
(contempt) and a love for a higher self, a desire to create beyond oneself. Philosophy, education, self-
overcoming, and creation coincide in ‗loving contempt,‘ in the philosophic eros‖ (ibid.) It is in this way 
that education plays a role in overcoming self-contempt, in coming to know oneself and in cultivating a 
higher self. It is those who discover a higher self are also those that place themselves within the realm 
of culture or reality. For Nietzsche, both philosophy and culture coincide in the sense that both involve 
self-cultivation. McIntyre asserts that, for Nietzsche this ―love of the higher self presupposes ‗the hour 
of great contempt‘ (Z, Prologue, 3 cited in this form by Mc Intyre, ibid., p.79); self-overcoming 
presupposes an intense dissatisfaction and contempt for oneself.‖ (ibid.) McIntyre uses the following 
translation of On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. In R.J. Hollingdale (trans.), Untimely 
Meditations Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983. (abbreviated as UDH) 
 
45
 McIntyre similarly argues that Nietzsche‘s rank-order is spiritual and relates to the realm of polity, 
and is to be distinguished from the realm of empirical politics or the power politics of the state. He 
examines the relationship between polity and politics in terms of Nietzsche‘s formula, ‗to love man for 
God‘s sake‘ (BGE, 60), which mirrors Plato‘s conception of man as ‗serious play.‘ (ibid. p. 80) The 
relationship between polity and politics reflects the distinction between Being and Becoming, where 
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to the division in psychological types, the distinction between those who are well-
constituted and experience the ―Great health‖ as the purification of the whole and 
those who are ill-constituted and embody ressentiment. Nietzsche‘s rank-order is 
political only in the sense of a politics of soul, as Leslie Thiele has put it. In his work 
‗Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul‘ (1990: 66-67) Thiele offers an 
account of Nietzsche‘s aristocratically ordered soul: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the former is concerned with the realm of Being, and the latter the realm of Becoming. McIntyre notes 
a significant advance in Plato‘s later dialogues (especially the Statesman, Timaeus, Critias, and the 
Laws) beyond the Republic ―by demonstrating a new sensitivity to the realm of becoming ‗co-eternal‘ 
with the Idea/being.‖ (Mc Intyre, A., ibid., p.80 citing Voegelin, E., Plato, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
State University Press, 1966, p.140).  However, Mc Intyre does go on to stress that Becoming is reality 
for Nietzsche, (not Being) it could be inferred from Mc Intyre‘s reading of Nietzsche that this reality is 
not necessarily the empirical. Mc Intyre then states that  
 
It follows that the best order possible within the realm of history must 
reconcile being and becoming, and nous and ananke....Plato‘s philosopher 
ascends to being through contempt for becoming and yet learns to take the 
latter seriously out of concern and even love for man-insofar as man 
becomes worthy of consideration by responding to the divine tugs of the 
golden cord upon his soul. (Mc Intyre, A., Op.cit., p.80)  
 
It is in this way that McIntyre views Nietzsche‘s philosophical statesmanship as paradoxical, and he 
draws upon Ricouer‘s distinction between le politique or ‗polity‘ and la poltique or ‗politics‘ to 
illustrate this point. (Mc Intyre, A., ibid., p.81 citing Ricouer, P., ‗The Political Paradox,‘ in History 
and Truth, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965, 248ff) According to McIntyre, Ricouer 
understands the term ‗polity‘ to refer to ―the ideal sphere of political rationality within which empirical 
politics can take place; the reality of political rule is this ideality, and this reality is not reducible to 
mere power or class domination.‖ (Mc Intyre, A., Op.cit., p.81) McIntyre claims that for Nietzsche 
polity and politics are to distinguished as follows: ―The concept of polity will be used to refer to the 
supra-historical horizon of culture that defines a people through its pre-reflective customs, traditions, 
and values...The term ‗politics‘ refers to power politics as it takes place within the horizon of polity, 
including the actual struggle for the attainment and preservation of power within and around the state.‖ 
(ibid.) McIntyre also makes the point that the relationship between politics and polity or ‗grand 
politics‘ is one of subordination, that politics is to be subordinated to polity:  
 
In terms of this distinction between polity and politics, both Plato and 
Nietzsche attempt to achieve a relativization of the power politics of the 
state. They wish to demote politics (the state and its legal-military 
complex) to the secondary status of an instrument of polity or the principal 
reality of culture. For Nietzsche, culture is the creation of something 
beyond the human things by which humanity becomes worthy of serious 
consideration and real value. Thus, politics is a secondary reality, 
something less real, because both Plato and Nietzsche have carried out a 
fundamental displacement of reality beyond the political to culture, polity, 
and the supra-human-a displacement achieved through ‗loving contempt‘ 
which grants to politics a certain seriousness by subordinating it to self- 
overcoming, culture, or polity, by relativizing politics to polity through 
‗grand politics.‘ (ibid.)      
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The higher man, in short, is the man with an aristocratically ordered soul: 
he serves as the measure for all men. Nietzsche was concerned with 
pursuing ideals, not with establishing norms. Nietzsche wished to make a 
rule of the exception. The higher self becomes the measuring stick against 
which human life is evaluated. To realize his potential, man must struggle 
such that his higher self may rule. One seeks, in other words, to extend the 
time one lives in a state of inspiration. 
 
         The mystical experience of inspiration is considered a mark of the higher self or the 
wise type; it is an intrinsic feature of his development or self-discovery. This type of 
inspiration is a form of spiritual insight. Thiele (1990: 159) also argues that, for 
Nietzsche, ―experience of a mystical ecstasy is intrinsic to the higher soul‖, and that 
the experience itself cannot be theorized, ―nor can communication of someone else‘s 
experience replace the real thing‖. He also notes that, for Nietzsche, such 
communication is impossible: ―To understand one another, it is not enough that one 
use the same words; one also has to use the same words for the same species of inner 
experiences; in the end one has to have one‘s experiences in common.‖ (BGE: §268) 
The expression of truth being incommunicable not only relates to the inadequacy of 
words but also that true understanding of Nietzsche must arise from sharing similar 
experiences to him. Thiele states that, for Nietzsche, ―spiritual insight, not the faculty 
of reason‖ is the ―sole conveyor of the highest truths. Like his mentor, Heraclitus, 
Nietzsche held that truth is grasped in ―rapture‖ through ―intuitions‖ rather than via 
―the rope ladder of logic.‖ (PTAG: 69 cited in this form in Thiele 1990: 161) He 
(1990: 161) claims that Nietzsche‘s mysticism ―proves to be the highest potency of 
his individualism. For truth remains fundamentally personal and essentially 
incommunicable. In short, ―whatever is perfect suffers no witnesses.‖ (NCW 665)‖46 
 
                                                          
46
The particular translation of Nietzsche contra Wagner: Out of the Files of a Psychologist (abbreviated 
as NCW) by Thiele is as follows: Nietzsche, F., Nietzsche contra Wagner: Out of the Files of a 
Psychologist, In W. Kaufmann (trans.), The Portable Nietzsche, New York, Viking Press, 1968, p. 665. 
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         Nietzsche is not only an advocate of a rank-order among psychological types but 
declares that there is a closely related rank-order among values. He writes in the 
Preface to Human, All too Human I, that ―it is the problem of order of rank of which 
we may say it is our problem, we free spirits.‖ (HH, Preface: §7) In a similar vein he 
expresses in On the Genealogy of Morals that ―All the sciences have from now on to 
prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers: this task understood as the 
solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among 
values.‖ (GM, I: §17) It is apparent from his early writing ‗Human, All too Human‘ 
that he draws a distinction between what is ‗aristocratic‘ and what is ‗plebeian‘ in the 
spiritual hierarchy. For Nietzsche, rank-order is determined by one‘s relation to reality 
(reality that is non-perspectival), and that tragic wisdom as an interpretation of the 
world is ranked highest. In this way, the truth of Nietzsche‘s work is not based upon a 
‗mere‘ perspective, but rather upon philosophical insight into reality or divine 
inspiration. 
 
         Nietzsche also affirms a rank-order among values, values which provide the 
conditions for coming into relation with a universal. This also has implications for 
humanity where there is a spiritual order of rank on earth, and a new law book of 
values. The spiritual order of rank is conducive to the coming of an age, of a new 
Dionysian Epoch. Ultimately, for Nietzsche, universal value or truth determines rank-
order;
47
 however, it is the type of human being who engages in these conditions is 
                                                          
47
 This idea that the universal or the whole determines rank-order is also expressed by McIntyre, where 
he contends that the world higher than the human is the measure that determines not only the rank-
order among souls, but also the rank-order among values. McIntyre claims that ―The philosopher 
comes into being, then, by turning his back on the reality of the city (the Sittlichkeit of his people) and 
creating a higher self and, from this, a higher world beyond man; and yet without abandoning his 
height, the philosopher seeks to make this higher world into a basis a measure for the human world of 
culture and politics. He seeks to establish not simply a noble type of man (an exception), but a 
relationship of authority between noble and base types.‖ (McIntyre Op. cit., p.84) Through the 
philosopher‘s experience of life-affirmation, ‗joy in the actual‘, of ‗belonging to the whole‘, he thereby 
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ranked ‗higher,‘ as he in turn enters into an ideal relation with the universal. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
renders reality, reality or the supra-historical realm (atopian) as the measure of value for the human 
world. He also because of his experience of insight into higher reality (Becoming) has spiritual 
authority over the lower or baser types. According to McIntyre,  
 
Both Nietzsche and Plato demand of the philosopher, as the spiritual power 
underlying a culture, that he institute, first, a hierarchical, spiritual-political 
order of rank between noble and common souls and thus, through his 
‗selective and cultivating influence,‘ (BGE, 61) create a truly good or noble 
type of spirit to justify or give meaning to society; second, a new law-book 
of values enshrined as the supreme authority; and third, a culture or people 
which the philosopher founds and which represents the collective unity of 
the order of rank, the law-book (or ‗holy lie‘), and the institutions of the 
state. In short, a people is the unity of polity and politics which the genuine 
philosopher initiates under the authority and legitimacy of the former. 
(ibid., p.84) 
 
For McIntyre, the ―table of values is realized in and through an order of rank (Rangordnung), a 
hierarchy.‖ (ibid., p.85) The principal features of the order of rank are outlined by McIntyre as follows: 
hierarchy is an order of precedence that involves spiritual status rather than power; ―it is not the 
abstract individual of the liberal imagination who embodies the same equal rights as all other subjects 
that is the origin of society but the relation of whole and part;‖ (ibid.) Those who embody the whole are 
ranked higher than those with lesser souls, the whole takes precedence over the parts. Spiritual 
hierarchy does not involve mastery over others: ―the criterion that determines nobility is self-mastery or 
autonomy; the highest status, the noble individual, holds no public power and has no common rights 
except his own personal privileges. It is in terms of this concept of hierarchy that Nietzsche is entitled 
to call the peasant the most noble type of his time. (Z, ‗Conversation with the Kings,‘ 1).‖ (ibid.) 
McIntyre also examines the notion of privilege (AC 57), and claims that for Nietzsche, ―‗privilege‘ is 
then not really a ‗private possession,‘ but rather an expression of who one is: a mark of one‘s release 
into the innocence of becoming.‖ (ibid., p.87). A privilege is ―an index of one‘s self-overcoming‖ and 
―unlike common rights, cannot be a passive possession given by a constitution.‖ (ibid.) He also argues 
that ―by making ‗right‘ into an expression of ‗privilege,‘ Nietzsche goes beneath not only the 
underlying principle of hierarchy-the order of status that is determined by one‘s power to legislate 
oneself. Privilege, as Vor-Recht, represents the level of hierarchy, the level of the encompassing 
innocence of becoming that circumscribes the world of rights.‖ (ibid., p.88) The term privilege could 
also arguably be the conditions of self-overcoming, discipline, solitude, suffering, that enable the ascent 
towards the supra-human world of true being or what is referred to as eternity for Nietzsche, an eternity 
within Becoming. 
 
McIntyre notes how Nietzsche draws a distinction between three types of men of ‗divergent 
physiological tendency‘ and three castes to correspond to the former. Nietzsche identifies three types of 
man: ‗the predominantly spiritual type‘; the ‗predominantly‘ muscular and temperamental type; and a 
third and residual category, ‗the mediocre type‘ which is neither one nor the other. (AC, 57 cited in this 
form by Mc Intyre, ibid., p.88) The highest and most important caste is ‗the very few...the perfect caste‘ 
(AC, 57), they are the most spiritual, and they are the rulers. They rule only on the basis of what they 
are and on the basis of necessity; ―they rule on the basis of something much deeper than the will and 
certainly not out of a subjective desire to dominate, which is the province of base spirits twisted with 
ressentiment.‖ (ibid.) The second in rank are ‗the guardians of the law‘ or ‗the executives of the most 
spiritual order‘ and ―thereby relieve the highest caste of the pettiness and coarseness of actual 
government‖ (ibid., p.86). It is in this way that the philosopher legislates above the state, and politics is 
to be subordinated to polity. The criterion of true politeia or grand politics is always extra-
constitutional, for Plato, who similarly to Nietzsche contends that ―the noetic power of the soul, its 
degree of mastery over the logos‖, is what ―distinguishes who rules truly from those who rule actually‖ 
(ibid., p.89) In this thesis, it is similarly argued that ‗the inmost centre‘ or ‗the Great reason of the 
Body‘ of the highest types are those who in realizing mastery over themselves, in turn experience 
mastery over the logos. McIntyre uses the following translation of The Antichrist (R.J. Hollingdale 
(trans.), Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1986.) 
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values that Nietzsche advocates are those that enable one to enter into a Dionysian 
dancing oneness with reality. They are ranked according to the extent that they render 
the individual existentially more in alignment with reality or that make possible the 
experience of amor fati. For Nietzsche, ‗values‘ are evaluated in terms of whether 
they constitute the criteria for coming to the most truthful standpoint towards reality. 
In relation to the ‗rank order among values‘ (GM, I: §17) Nietzsche outlines them in 
terms of what is characteristic of the individual type or what provides the ideal 
condition for self-overcoming. The first and most important value that determines 
rank-order for Nietzsche is solitude:  
 
             First question concerning order of rank: how solitary or how gregarious 
one is. (In the latter case, one‘s value resides in the qualities that secure the 
survival of one‘s herd, one‘s type; in the former, in that which 
distinguishes, isolates, defends one, and makes one‘s solitariness possible.) 
(WP: §886) 
 
 
 
         In Beyond Good & Evil (§263), he mentions that reverence has high ranking in the 
rank-order among values: ―There is an instinct for rank which, more than anything 
else, is a sign of a high rank; there is a delight in the nuances of reverence that allows 
us to infer noble origin and habits.‖ Nietzsche as a psychologist and ―reader of souls‖ 
(Thiele 1990: 52) outlines that the ―task‖ of searching out souls is employed ―in order 
to determine the ultimate value of a soul and the unalterable, innate order of rank to 
which it belongs: he will test it for its instinct of reverence.‖ (BGE: §263) This 
instinct of reverence is to be contrasted with the ―high-speed intestines of every kind‖ 
or the ―newspaper-reading demi-monde of the spirit.‖ (ibid.) Nietzsche rather 
associates the instinct of reverence with slow digestion, the art of reading as 
rumination (GM, Preface: §8) and concern for the essential questions that arises from 
a certain kind of existential experience. In a section from Beyond Good & Evil (§213) 
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Nietzsche mentions ―what a philosopher is‖ that ―it cannot be taught: one must know 
it from experience—or one should have the pride not to know it.‖ He expresses that 
there is a link between being a philosopher or philosophical states and a certain type 
of experience or tragic pathos, and that this existential pathos is characteristic of the 
few: ―But nowadays all the world talks of things of which it cannot have any 
experience, and this is most true, and in the worst way, concerning philosophers and 
philosophical states: exceedingly few know them, may know them, all popular 
opinions about them are false.‖(ibid.) This type of philosopher whose concern is with 
existential truth is to be contrasted with ―most thinkers and scholars‖ where nothing is 
known from their own experience and where thinking is viewed as ―something slow 
and hesitant... but not in the least as something light, divine, closely related to dancing 
and high spirits.‖ (ibid.) 
 
         The philosophical type‘s concern with experience makes him in turn concerned with 
the ―highest problems‖ (ibid.). In the same section of Beyond Good and Evil (§213), 
Nietzsche states that ―ultimately, there is an order of rank among states of the soul, 
and the order of rank of problems accords with this‖ and that ―the highest problems 
repulse everyone mercilessly who dares approach them without being predestined for 
their solution by the height and power of his spirituality.‖ These ―highest problems‖ 
that are to be solved by the highest spiritual type arise from a certain existential 
pathos, a ―philosophical pathos‖ or ―tragic wisdom‖ (EH, ‗BT‘: §3) or the pathos of 
suffering or the pathos of the deepest joy, of ―Yes-saying‖ to ‗Life‘. This existential 
pathos is to be brought to Nietzsche‘s works as they themselves are a communication 
of such pathos. It is this type of reading, which is referred to as ―reading and writing 
in blood‖ (Z, I: §7) involves bringing one‘s real life experiences to the text. Nietzsche 
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refers to ―blood‖48 as self-overcoming, which is a necessary prerequisite for self-
cultivation: ―For every high world one must be born; or to speak more clearly, one 
must be cultivated for it: a right to philosophy—taking that word in its great sense—
one has only by virtue of one‘s origins; one‘s ancestors, one‘s ―blood‖ decide here, 
too.‖ (BGE: §213) 
 
          It is because the ―highest problems‖ are arrived at through a certain kind of suffering 
that Nietzsche outlines that one‘s capacity for suffering determines the order of rank 
of a person:  
          
 
            The spiritual haughtiness and nausea of every man who has suffered 
profoundly—it almost determines the order of rank how profoundly human 
beings can suffer... that by virtue of his suffering he knows more than the 
cleverest and wisest could possibly know, and that he knows his way and 
has once been ―at home‖ in many distant, terrifying worlds of which ―you 
know nothing‖—this spiritual and silent haughtiness of the sufferer, this 
pride of the elect of knowledge...finds all kinds of disguises necessary to 
protect itself against contact with obtrusive and pitying hands and 
altogether against everything that is not its equal in suffering. Profound 
suffering makes noble; it separates. (BGE: §270) 
 
                                                          
48
Walter Kaufmann discusses Nietzsche‘s conception of ―blood‖ in his Nietzsche, Philosopher, 
Psychologist, Antichrist where he mentions that ――blood‖ was not to Nietzsche‘s mind a biologistic 
conception any more than ―breeding‖ (Kaufmann, W., Nietzsche: Psychologist, Philosopher & 
Antichrist, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 306), it rather refers to ―giving breeding 
to oneself.‖ (EH, ‗The Untimely Ones‘: §3 cited in this form by Kaufmann, ibid., p.306) He explains 
that Nietzsche uses the term ―blood‖ in order to overcome the idea of ―pure spirit‖ characteristic of 
idealism or solipsism. Nietzsche refers to ―blood‖ in the context of those influences that form part of a 
tradition that the cultivation of Nietzsche‘s soul or the soul of the noble type arises from certain 
influences from the past, that self-cultivation requires tradition. (Kaufmann W., Op. cit., p.306)  
 
What Nietzsche means by ―blood‖ is well illustrated by another note: 
―When I speak of Plato, Pascal, Spinoza, and Goethe, then I know that 
their blood rolls in mine‖ (xxi, 98). Elsewhere, Nietzsche jotted down: 
―My ancestors: Heraclitus, Empedocles, Spinoza, Goethe‖ (xiv, 109). 
(Kaufmann, p.306 citing Nietzsche, Gesammelte Werke) 
 
Kaufmann outlines how his use of the terms ―blood‖ and ―breeding‖ are within the strict sense of self-
cultivation or self-overcoming through the past or as discipline, of ―giving breeding to oneself.‖ (EH, 
U: 3 cited in this form by Kaufmann, ibid.) He claims that Nietzsche omits any use of such words as 
―breeding‖ and ―blood‖ for the last part of his magnum opus, (Ecce Homo, 1908) he rather uses the 
term ―overcoming‖ (xviii, 345) instead, and that his last outlines introduce the conception of eternal 
recurrence (xviii, 348 ff.). Kaufmann uses the following translation of Nietzsche: Werke: Gesammelte 
Werke, Musarionausgabe, 23 vols. Munich, Musarion Verlag, 1920-29.  
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         In another section of Beyond Good and Evil (§225) Nietzsche refers to the discipline 
of suffering, and the role it plays in cultivating man towards what he refers to as 
―divinity, and seventh day‖. He views discipline as the means to cultivation of the 
higher souls in order to prepare them for the initiation of a new Dionysian Age. It is 
this ―great suffering‖ that Nietzsche associates with ―the higher problems‖ (ibid.)  
          
 
             The discipline of suffering, of great suffering—do you not know that only 
this discipline has created all enhancements of man so far? That tension of 
the soul in unhappiness which cultivates its strength, it shudders face to 
face with great ruin, its inventiveness and courage in enduring, 
persevering, interpreting, and exploiting suffering, and whatever has been 
granted to it of profundity, secret, mask, spirit, cunning, greatness—was it 
not granted to it through suffering, through the discipline of great 
suffering? (BGE: §225)
49 
 
         These values of solitude, reverence, and the capacity for suffering, and hence the 
higher problems are ranked high, as they provide the ideal conditions for the 
acquisition of truth. Truth here is to be understood in an existential sense, as the most 
appropriate standpoint towards reality. It is for this reason in the Preface to Ecce 
Homo that Nietzsche puts out the question in relation to truth: ―How much truth does 
a spirit endure, how much truth does it dare? More and more that became for me the 
real measure of value.‖ (§3) The most appropriate position towards reality is insight, 
which Nietzsche refers to as ―lightning‖ or as ―wisdom‖ (Z, IV, ‗On the Higher Man: 
§7).  
          In his essay ‗On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life‘ (1873) Nietzsche 
outlines that justice or the ―will to be just‖ distinguishes the genuine from the 
mendacious truth-seeker. In this essay he asserts that the most truthful standpoint 
towards reality is that of ―justice‖. This idea of the will to justice is discussed in the 
                                                          
49
 Walter Kaufmann in his Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist translates the ―discipline of   
suffering‖ as ―the breeding [Zucht] of suffering‖ in order to make the point that breeding for Nietzsche 
is be understood in the context of the discipline of suffering. (ibid., p. 305) 
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context of ―objectivity‖ and the ―striving for truth.‖ (UD: §6, 88-89) Nietzsche‘s 
conception of justice is to be distinguished from justice conceived in the political 
sense as the promotion of the common good. Nietzsche‘s understanding of justice is 
similar to that of Socrates who, according to Plato, considered justice as the health or 
right-ordering of the human soul.
50
 This idea of ―higher justice‖ is viewed as the 
―rarest of all virtues‖ and those who possess it are ―venerable‖ because ―the highest 
and rarest virtues are united and concealed in justice.‖ (UD: §6, 88) The just man, rare 
and solitary, is ―the most venerable exemplar of the species man.‖ (UD: §6, 88) The 
truth that the just man seeks differs from both ―cold, ineffectual knowledge‖ and 
instrumental knowledge. This striving towards the truth is rare: ―The truth is that few 
serve truth because few possess the pure will to justice, of those few only a few also 
possess the strength actually to be just.‖ (UD: §6, 89) Those few are to be contrasted 
with those who are driven by a variety of drives or motives such as ―curiosity, flight 
from boredom, envy, vanity, the desire for amusement‖, which have nothing whatever 
to do with truth, which has its roots in justice.‖ (UD: §6, 89) It is this sense of justice 
which allows the noble type to distinguish the ―highest problems‖ from those 
problems that are a ―matter of complete indifference.‖ (UD: §6, 89)  
 
         Justice, for Nietzsche, requires distinguishing between what is grand and noble and 
what is mean and petty and is to be viewed as distinct from objectivity conceived by 
modern scholars as ―neutrality toward all events and individuals.‖ (UD: §6, 93) 
Objectivity that is conceived in this way does not take into account the psychological 
ability to decipher between noble and base types. Nietzsche condemns modern man‘s 
                                                          
50
See Plato‘s ‗Republic‘ (443c-445b, also 592b) where justice is discussed in terms of health and 
beauty; health as the constitution of bodily forces that ―they shall master and be mastered by one 
another in accordance with nature‖, and justice as the constitution of ―the powers of the soul that shall 
master and be mastered by one another in accordance with nature‖ (Plato, Republic, J. Llewelyn Davies 
& D.J. Vaughan (trans.), Hertfordshire, Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997, p. 144). 
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conception of objectivity because it has its roots in weak natures, fails to recognize 
crucial moral differences and is oblivious to ―what is worth knowing and preserving 
in the past.‖ (UD: §6, 94) Nietzsche also criticizes conventional or scholarly 
objectivity for the reason that it conceals or distorts the facts about the higher life and 
in turn overlooks the higher type. 
 
         In contrast to ―this region of indifference‖ to the highest problems, of those who ―may 
well succeed in becoming a cold demon of knowledge‖ characteristic of an age of 
scholars and inquirers, there is ―a stern and great sense of justice‖ that is ―the noblest 
centre of the so-called drive to truth.‖ (UD: §6, 89) The scholarly conception of 
objectivity is to be distinguished from justice, which demands that history serve the 
goal of displaying what is high and rare. Historical or conventional objectivity seeks 
general propositions whereas justice requires images of wholeness and beauty. The 
acquisition of wholeness and beauty occurs through self-cultivation and organization 
of the chaos within the soul; it is for this reason that he admires the Greeks who 
―gradually learned to organize the chaos by following the Delphic teaching and 
teaching back to themselves, that is, to their real needs, and letting their pseudo-needs 
die out.‖ (UD: §10, 122) This cultivation can occur through being influenced by past 
philosophers; therefore, to be cultivated towards the whole comprises of what is 
referred to as the noble education. (TI, ‗What the Germans Lack‘: §7) Nietzsche‘s 
conception of ‗justice‘ takes into account how various historical figures play a role in 
the noble type coming to realize his essence or in fulfilling the Delphic dictum ―Know 
thyself.‖ (PTAG: §8), (UD: §10). The realization that ―all things are one‖ (PTAG: §3) 
and acceptance of the great suffering that forms a necessary pre-requisite stage to self-
knowledge constitutes this idea of ―higher justice.‖ The experience of entering into an 
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oneness  with reality is the redemptive aspect of this ‗higher justice‘. In this 
experience of amor fati or of ‗higher justice,‘ the ‗highest type‘ overcomes the spirit 
of gravity, and is rendered ―capable of golden laughter.‖ (BGE: §294) Nietzsche 
proclaims that ―golden laughter‖ determines the rank of a philosopher: ―I should 
actually risk an order of rank among philosophers depending on the rank of their 
laughter—all the way up to those capable of golden laughter.‖ (ibid.)51 For Nietzsche, 
there are varying degrees of relating to the whole.. Nietzsche claims that there are few 
that are capable of truth, and that it is an experience for the rare:  
          
 
 
             Are these coming philosophers new friends of ―truth‖? That is probable 
enough, for all philosophers so far have loved their truths. But they will 
certainly not be dogmatists. It must offend their pride, also their taste, if 
their truth is supposed to be a truth for everyman—which has so far been 
the secret wish and hidden meaning of all dogmatic aspirations... In the end 
it must be as it is and always has been: great things remain for the great, 
abysses for the profound, nuances and shudders for the refined, and, in 
brief, all that is rare for the rare. — (BGE: §43) 
 
 
         It is the higher self that encounters reality , an experience which Nietzsche refers to as 
transfiguration (GS: pref., §3), rebirth or as an experience of the heart (WP: §161). It 
is for Nietzsche, a spiritual experience which is comparable to Christ‘s of 
encountering the unsayable truth. (AC: §33) 
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 In ‗The Attempt at Self-Criticism‘ of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche refers to a quote from Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, which expresses that laughter has the highest rank: ――This crown of the laugher, the 
rose-wreath crown: to you, my brothers, I throw this crown. Laughter I have pronounced holy: you 
higher men, learn—to laugh!‖‖ (Z, IV, ‗On the Higher Man‘ §17-20 cited by Nietzsche in Nietzsche, 
F., 1967. Basic Writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, W. Kaufmann (trans.), New York, Modern Library, 
1967, p.27)  
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II 
The Spiritual Lower Class: 
          
         In looking at Nietzsche as a philosopher of truth and a foreseer of the earth becoming 
divine, this section looks at the way the lowest type is opposed to the highest type in 
its inability to reach the most truthful standpoint to Becoming. This idea of the 
spiritual lower type is reminiscent of Plato and Aristotle, both of whom were 
advocates of rank-order of the spirit or the soul. According to Thiele, the justification 
of the world through abstract thought is for Nietzsche, thought ―free from any 
utilitarian function‖, ―without destination‖; it is thought which carries the philosopher 
into a rapturous state of life-affirmation. (1990: 116) Nietzsche conveys that such a 
state and such feelings are the essence of philosophy, as noted by Thiele (1990: 117), 
this is ―Philosophy as love of wisdom... not love of men, or of gods, or of truth, but 
love of a condition, a spiritual and sensual feeling of perfection: an affirmation and 
approval out of an overflowing feeling of the power to accept.‖ (Thiele 1990: 117 
citing Nietzsche‘s Gesammelte Werke 16:70) Thiele makes a reference to Goethe, 
Nietzsche‘s philosophical model of life-affirmation, and maintains that, for Nietzsche, 
―one truly thinks only when that of which one thinks cannot be thought out.‖ (ibid.) 
Philosophy, for Nietzsche, as the most spiritual will to power, is the love of wisdom, 
which he refers to as ―knowledge in the great and exceptional sense.‖ (BGE: §26) 
Wisdom in the most spiritual sense is not to be viewed in terms of the accumulation of 
knowledge or data; it rather consists of a vision of ―a world justified and made 
perfect‖ or the ―wonder at being.‖ (Thiele 1990: 117) The philosopher as a lover of 
wisdom views himself as distinct from the ―average man,‖ but also recognizes the 
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necessary role he plays in his ―life-history‖ alongside ―much disguise, self-
overcoming, familiarity, and bad contact.‖ (BGE: §26) 
 
The motivations of the base, of ―hunger, sexual lust, and vanity‖ (BGE: §26) are of 
those who are indifferent to wisdom. It is in this way that Nietzsche is similar to Plato 
and Aristotle with regard matters of the soul, in that, for him, the lowest part of the 
soul partakes in the basest pleasures. In many of Plato‘s dialogues, the base motives 
which are prominent in the vast majority of human beings are identified in those who 
partake in non-philosophical forms of existence. (cf., for example, Republic IV: 439d)  
The lower self is distinguished from the unified soul or ―beautifully ordered soul‖ 
(Republic: 443d). The same association of spiritual shallowness with base motives is 
to be found in Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethics. Nietzsche also emphasizes the 
decadent power of the lower ―browner pleasures‖ (GS, Preface: §4):  
 
 
How repulsive enjoyment is to us now, that crude, muggy, brown 
enjoyment as understood by those who enjoy it, our ‗educated‘, our rich, 
and our rulers!... How the theatrical cry of passion now hurts our ears; that 
whole romantic uproar and tumult of the senses...how foreign it has 
become to our taste!‖(GS, Preface: §4)  
 
These ―crude, muggy, brown‖ pleasures are completely removed from the tastes of the 
rarest type or the philosophical type who in recovering from ―severe illness‖ or 
―abysses‖ ―returns newborn, having shed one‘s skin, more ticklish and malicious, 
with a more delicate taste for joy, with a more tender tongue for all good things with 
merrier senses, joyful with a more dangerous second innocence, more childlike, and at 
the same time a hundred times subtler than one had ever been before.‖ (ibid.)  
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In Thus Spoke Zarathustra (I: §13 ‗On Chastity‘), Nietzsche criticizes the satisfaction 
of the sexual desires that ―those for whom chastity is difficult should be counselled 
against it, lest it become their road to hell—the mud and heat of their souls.‖52 
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 Stanley Rosen, in The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche‘s Zarathustra, elaborates what Nietzsche 
means by this passage: ―Nietzsche does not mean abstinence by ―chastity,‖ and he opposes the 
enforced chastity of Christianity,‖ (Stanley, R., The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche‘s Zarathustra, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.109) however that the ―return to the body and the 
earth must be chaste in the sense that it is a turn to the spiritual production of a new epoch or a new 
table of values...‖ (ibid.) Rosen emphasizes here the body; however, it can be argued that Nietzsche 
does embrace the idea of the soul as the intuitive (unconscious) self or as the ―Great Reason‖ of the 
body (Z, I: ‗On the Despisers of the Body‘). Rosen maintains that for Nietzsche, ―the creator is a divine 
figure who is detached from human beings by the loftiness of his vision and the refinement of his spirit. 
He cannot experience the indiscriminate lust of promiscuity, since this is a mark of humanity,‖ and 
because of this ―Zarathustra is closer to Christ than he is to the pagan gods‖ (Stanley, R., Op. cit., p. 
109). Rosen then makes reference to the Zarathustra passage ‗On Chastity‘: ―Mud is at the ground of 
their souls; and woe if their mud still has spirit! (69)‖ (ibid.) Rosen goes on to explain that ―In other 
words, the promiscuous entrepreneur, intellectual, or ideologue is much worse than the lusty peasant or 
worker, who is expressing an animal passion. In the case of the intellectual, lust is transformed into 
ideology; words and ideas are prostituted to the service of passions and are used to justify the lowest 
and most perverted desires.‖ (ibid.) 
 
Rosen subsequently quotes from the same passage of Zarathustra ―Would that you were as perfect [or, 
literally, complete] as the beasts. But innocence belongs to the beast.‖ He then explains that Nietzsche 
affirms the beast‘s satisfaction of sexual desire as they act strictly from instinct, which is therefore 
deemed innocent and ―complete‖; however, with regard human beings they are not complete and ―they 
can debase instinct by the artifice of language‖ and ―they can become corrupt or decadent‖ whereas 
―the beasts cannot.‖ (ibid.) Human beings as rational creatures do not act purely from instinct. The type 
of chastity that Nietzsche embraces is in the philosophical sense and is to be contrasted with the 
Christian notion of chastity, as Rosen claims that ―Zarathustra counsels the innocence (Unschuld), not 
the murder, of the senses. Sexual love is the natural basis of reproduction as well as of community...  
But Zarathustra does not associate it with spiritual creativity...‖ (ibid.) On this point he differs from 
Plato who ―advocates the sublimation or purification of sexuality in the erotic ascent. For Zarathustra, 
there is no erotic ascent, but two different levels of Eros, corresponding crudely to the difference 
between the body and the soul, or the many and the few. His doctrine of Eros is thus distantly related to 
the previously mentioned distinction made by Pausanias in Plato‘s Symposium between the Uranian and 
the pandemic Eros.‖ (ibid.) 
 
The sexuality of the few is chaste or innocent, and on that point only it resembles the animals. The very 
few like Nietzsche himself will be chaste in the literal sense ―because their energies are devoted to the 
highest spiritual tasks.‖ (ibid., p. 110) According to Rosen, Nietzsche associates philosophical chastity 
strictly with those few souls who are destined for spiritual creativity. In this thesis, these spiritual tasks 
will be viewed in terms of the initiation of a higher Epoch or what is referred to as the Millennial 
Kingdom (Rev. 20: 2) or the kingdom of a thousand years (Z, IV: ‗On the Honey Sacrifice‘), where  
Nietzsche will be viewed as a prophet of the ―Second Coming‖ of Christ. Rosen also notes this point in 
his discussion of ‗On the Honey Sacrifice‘ that certain souls will become who they are through 
overcoming or through activation of Nietzsche‘s prophecy, and ―the honey is the promise of happiness 
arising from the work of overcoming.‖ (Rosen, S., Op. cit., p. 210) The reference to honey is also 
meant in the sense of wisdom as contemplation of the eternal return (ibid. p. 26-27). Rosen also notes 
that Zarathustra‘s prediction of the coming of his kingdom of a thousand years echoes Christ (―Thy 
kingdom come‖). (ibid., p. 210). It also must be acknowledged that Nietzsche affirms chastity in the 
larger sense that is ―compatible with an ―innocent‖ sexual love that is in accord with nature as noted 
above: for reproduction, community, friendship.‖ (ibid., p.110) Rosen also asserts that this idea of 
chastity in the larger sense does not imply that chastity is ―universally applicable‖ as is expressed by 
Nietzsche: ―Chastity is a virtue in some, but almost a vice in many (70).‖ (ibid.) Nietzsche is highly 
critical of the Christian conception of chastity ―which conceals, distorts, intensifies, and corrupts the 
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         The weakness of the herd type must be viewed in terms of the inadequacy of their 
relationship to the whole. For Nietzsche, rank-order is ultimately an order of 
truthfulness to be viewed in terms of degrees of truthfulness; power is to be viewed in 
terms of the degree of truthfulness one can attain. The herd self cannot encounter 
reality as it is. The lower self lacks the ability to encounter the whole not because he 
does not possess the ability to accumulate knowledge in the intellectual sense or 
possess a certain theoretical understanding. Nietzsche is actually rather critical of 
modernity and the way in which it associates truthfulness with superficial intellectual 
accomplishments. These types of ‗educational‘ endeavours are to be distinguished 
from what Nietzsche considers to be the ‗noble education‘ (TI, ‗What the Germans 
Lack‘: §7) characteristic of the genuine spirit. Nietzsche addresses the shallowness of 
modern educational institutions in an essay entitled ‗David Strauss, the Confessor and 
the Writer‘, one of Nietzsche‘s Untimely Meditations, where he criticizes the 
scholarly approach to education as it does not take into account certain life 
experiences, the way in which a certain pathos or suffering can be brought to a text, or 
that one can self-overcome through reading or bring one‘s self-overcoming to the 
works. This type of education involves the noble type entering into the ―highest 
problems‖ (BGE: §213) of existence; true education must take into account the 
―highest problems‖ of existence or of philosophy itself. As early as The Birth of 
Tragedy, Nietzsche draws upon a distinction between the weakness of the Socratic 
intellectual and the strength of the highest type to acquire insight into the ‗terrible‘ 
Dionysian truth. Socrates represents theoretical man who has the ―unshakable faith‖ 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
sexual drive by denying it or identifying it with original sin.‖ (ibid.) Rosen states that ―the net result of 
Christian Puritanism, as one could put this point, is the doctrine of Freudianism. Freud reveals the nasty 
secret that the Christian soul is in fact a sex maniac!‖ (ibid.) Nietzsche mentions in the ‗On Chastity‘ 
passage that lust behind Christian chastity is disguised and called compassion: ―Is it not merely your 
lust that has disguised itself and calls itself compassion? (70)‖ (Z, I, ‗On Chastity‘, cited in this form by 
Rosen, ibid., p.110).  
118 
    
(BT: §15) that by rational thought he can penetrate the depths of existence and even 
correct it. He symbolizes the idea that all truth is rationally accessible and ―ascribes to 
knowledge and insight the power of a panacea‖ (ibid.) Nietzsche maintains that 
Wissenschaft, philosophy in some of its logical and epistemological aspects, has its 
limits, and the ―unshakeable faith.‖ (ibid.) in its power ensures that its followers press 
on until they reach those limits and discover for themselves its ultimate powerlessness 
to solve the problem of existence. At this point the powerlessness of theoretical man 
makes way for a new kind of awareness, tragic awareness, as Wissenschaft reaches its 
limits it prompts a regeneration of tragic art, of Dionysian music as ―the general 
mirror of the universal will.‖ (BT: §17) Such thinkers as Kant and Schopenhauer have 
also used the apparatus of Wissenschaft to demonstrate the limits of Wissenschaft. The 
optimistic belief that the essence of reality can be explored by scientific laws is 
exposed as a failure and these laws are shown to be the elevation of mere phenomenal 
knowledge. In a tragic culture, knowledge is superseded by wisdom, which looks for a 
total view of life, seeking to come to terms with its essential suffering and aspiring, as 
in Goethe‘s words, ―to live resolutely in wholeness and fullness.‖ (BT: §18) Nietzsche 
relates this ―deeper wisdom‖ to ―a profound contemplation and survey of the whole‖, 
and that its meaning ―does not at all obtain adequate objectification in the spoken 
word‖ or cannot be ―put into words and concepts.‖ (BT: §17) It is for this reason that 
Nietzsche is critical of opera music in ‗The Birth of Tragedy‘, as he views it as the 
invention of the theoretical man, the critical layman, not the artist. It lacks any sense 
of the Dionysian depths of music; it assumes that words took precedence historically. 
As with the New Attic Dithyramb, this type of music aspired to nothing higher than 
tone-painting, in imitation of the world of phenomena: ―It was the demand of 
thoroughly unmusical hearers that before everything else the words must be 
119 
    
understood, so that according to them a rebirth of music is to be expected only when 
some mode of singing has been discovered in which text-word lords it over 
counterpoint like master over servant.‖ (BT: §19) The connection between theoretical 
intellectualism and weakness is also demonstrated in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of 
the Greeks, where Heraclitus‘ ability to affirm the eternal strife of Becoming is 
contrasted with Parmenides‘ ―striving for certainty.‖ (PTAG: §11) Ultimately, for 
Nietzsche, the weak are those who flee from reality; they are referred to as the 
―idealists‖ (EH, ‗BT‘: §2), and are contrasted with the strong who can ―approach the 
truth‖ and ―Knowledge‖ as wisdom in saying Yes to ‗Life‘ and embracing reality: 
          
 
 
            This ultimate, most joyous, most wantonly extravagant Yes to life 
represents not only the highest insight but also the deepest, that which is 
most strictly confirmed and born out by truth and science. Nothing in 
existence may be extracted, nothing is dispensable—those aspects of 
existence which Christians and other nihilists repudiate are actually on an 
infinitely higher level in the order of rank among values than that which 
the instinct of decadence could approve and call good. To comprehend this 
requires courage and, as a condition of that, an excess of strength: for 
precisely as far as courage may venture forward, precisely according to 
that measure of strength one approaches the truth, Knowledge, saying Yes 
to life, is just as necessary for the strong as cowardice and the flight from 
reality—as the ―ideal‖—is for the weak, who are inspired by weakness. 
(EH, ‗BT‘: §2) 
 
         The psychology of the average man implies that the type of existence he engages in 
involves flight from reality. In his later writings, Nietzsche associates the cowardice 
of the idealist with the psychology of ressentiment or of revenge.  
 
         The distinction between the weak and strong is also a matter of physiology. Nietzsche 
refers to the weakest men as ―men of ressentiment‖ who are ―physiologically 
unfortunate and worm-eaten;‖ these are the men that, for Nietzsche, engage in ―a 
whole tremulous realm of subterranean revenge.‖ (GM, III: §14) Nietzsche makes 
explicit that the ―pathos of distance‖ and ―solitude‖ is to keep the task of the higher 
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type separate from the lower: ―But no worse misunderstanding and denial of their task 
can be imagined: the higher ought not to degrade itself to the status of an instrument 
of the lower, the pathos of distance ought to keep their tasks eternally separate!‖ 
(ibid.) The highest type must remove himself from the sick ―madhouse and hospitals 
of culture! And therefore let us have good company, our company! Or, solitude, if it 
must be!‖ (ibid.) The most typical of spiritual plebs are those who seek revenge 
against not only those stronger in spirit but also against reality itself. 
 
         The cowardice of the weakest type not only implies that he removes himself from 
reality but also that he does not seek self-knowledge. It is because this Dionysian 
‗Yes-saying‘ to ‗Life‘, the highest and deepest insight, is incommunicable and is only 
experienced by those few individual selves that the herd deem it to lack utility or 
practicality. The spiritual lower type does not come to know himself or become who 
he is; he is only a ‗self‘ construed by the herd. In Daybreak (§105) under a section 
entitled ‗Pseudo- Egoism‘, Nietzsche states that  
 
            Whatever they may think and say about their ‗egoism‘, the great majority 
nonetheless do nothing for their ego their whole life long: what they do is 
done for the phantom of their ego which has formed itself in the heads of 
those around them and has been communicated to them; as a consequence 
they all of them dwell in a fog of impersonal, semi-personal opinions, and 
arbitrary, as it were poetical evaluations, the one for ever in the head of 
someone else, and the head of this someone else again in the heads of 
others: a strange world of phantasms—...all these people, unknown to 
themselves, believe in the bloodless abstraction ‗man‘... and every 
alteration effected to this abstraction by the judgements of individual 
powerful figures... produces an extraordinary and grossly disproportionate 
effect on the great majority—all because no individual among this majority 
is capable of setting up a real ego... 
 
         The sole concern of the herd is species-preservation: ―In ordinary ―egoism‖ it is 
precisely the ―non-ego, the profoundly average creature, the species man, who desires 
to preserve himself: if this is perceived by rarer, subtler, and less average men, it 
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enrages them. For they judge: ―we are nobler! Our preservation is more important 
than that of those cattle!‖‖ (WP: §873) The spiritual lower type is for this reason 
fearful of solitude and lives in the ―market-place‖, a place of noise and garrulousness. 
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche expresses this in a section entitled ‗On the Flies 
of the Market Place‘: ―Where solitude ceases the market place begins; and where the 
market place begins the noise of the great actors and the buzzing of the poisonous 
flies begins too‖ (Z, I: §12), and in a section entitled ‗On the Higher Man‘ he 
expresses that the mob do not believe in the higher men:  
 
            You higher man, learn this from me: in the market place nobody believes 
in higher men. And if you want to speak there, very well! But the mob 
blinks: ―We are all equal.‖ (Z, IV: §13) 
 
             
 
         Nietzsche refers to the garrulous type who engages in a certain type of reading and 
writing as the ―scribbling rabble‖: ―We have tried to get away from the rabble, all 
these scream-throats and scribbling blue-bottles, the shopkeepers‘ stench, the 
ambitious wriggling, the foul breath—phew for living among the rabble.‖ (Z, IV: §3) 
In the section entitled ‗On Reading & Writing,‘ Nietzsche dissociates writing with 
blood from the type of writing characteristic of the masses: ―That everyone may learn 
to read, in the long run corrupts not only writing but also thinking. Once the spirit was 
God, then he became man, and now he even becomes rabble.‖ It is these type of 
people that remain in ―a surface—and sign-world‖ (GS: §354), a world removed from 
one‘s true self, inward states of tension, and pathos. It is because they are unable to 
think beyond language that they are disconnected from tragic pathos or unconscious 
activity that which is most worthy and divine. 
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         For Nietzsche, there is a distinction between the conscious self,
53
 and the higher self, 
or the self which embraces the dictum ―to become who you are.‖ (GS: §270), (EH, 
‗Why I Am So Clever‘: §9) This distinction in turn informs his distinction between 
the herd self and the higher self. The herd self does not self-overcome and develop his 
unconscious self. The spiritual aristocrat cultivates his higher self, the ―true nature‖ or 
self that Nietzsche considers is ―not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably 
high above you.‖ (Schopenhauer as Educator: §1)54 He will also wear ―masks‖ when 
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 The idea of a higher self, for Nietzsche, is distinct from the self as substance or as linguistic illusion 
(WP: §484), the Cartesian ego. (GM, I: §13).  
 
            
54
 In Schopenhauer as Educator (§I), Nietzsche claims that one must firstly recognize one‘s true self 
before one can realize it, and the most revealing question is ―what have you truly loved up to now, what 
has drawn your soul aloft, what has mastered it and at the same time blessed it?‖ The answer will show 
you that ―your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at 
least that which you usually take yourself to be.‖ This work is a Meditation on Schopenhauer as 
Educator which is Nietzsche‘s own attempt to discover his own true self by considering those traits he 
admired in Schopenhauer but also all of which shaped him ―our friendships and enmities, our glance 
and the clasp of our hand, our memory and that which we do not remember, our books and our 
handwriting.‖ (ibid.) He also recognizes Schopenhauer‘s honesty and integrity and also his 
―cheerfulness‖ (§2) and he also meditates on Schopenhauer‘s ―separation‖ from the universities, and on 
the dangers of loneliness and of the ―despair of the truth‖ (§3). Later in Ecce Homo as an 
autobiographical text which is subtitled ‗How One Becomes What One Is‘ Nietzsche reveals his true 
self, his innermost or becoming self, while referring to his third and fourth Meditation, he claims that 
he had pictured then ―Schopenhauer and Wagner or, in one word, Nietzsche‖ (EH, ‗The Untimely 
Ones‘: §3), and he elaborated:  
            Plato employed Socrates in this fashion... in Schopenhauer as Educator 
my innermost history, my becoming, is inscribed. Above all, my promise! 
What I am today, where I am today—at a height where I speak no longer 
with words but with lightning bolts... But I beheld the land... it is 
admittedly not ―Schopenhauer as Educator‖ that speaks here, but his 
opposite, ―Nietzsche as Educator.‖ (ibid.) 
            In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche also mentions that ―To become what one is, one must have the faintest notion 
what one is.‖ (EH, ‗Why I Am So Clever‘: §9) Here, he claims that there is no single route to reaching 
one‘s goal and that some of our detours turn out to eventually to have been invaluable. It is possible to 
claim that his tribute to Schopenhauer was a detour and that Nietzsche as the author of the Untimely 
Meditations did not yet have the ―faintest notion‖ of what he himself was. This idea of an individual 
essence or ―true nature‖ is not pre-given to us by nature; it is rather given to us as a task, a spiritual task 
to be taken up by those individuals, those select few. In Schopenhauer as Educator (§3), it is referred to 
as a ―transfigured physis‖ or a ―productive uniqueness‖ and he claims that only few realize it, as the 
many are too lazy and afraid: ―Most find this unendurable, because they are, as aforesaid, lazy, and 
because a chain of toil and burdens is suspended from this uniqueness.‖ However, life for the ―singular 
man who encumbers himself with this chain, life withholds almost everything—cheerfulness, security, 
ease, honour—that he desired of his youth; solitude is the gift his fellow men present to him.‖ Solitude 
is again emphasised as the necessary requisite stage to self-fulfilment. He also speaks of the dangers of 
solitude: ―Where there have been powerful societies, governments, religions, public opinions, in short 
wherever there has been tyranny, there the solitary philosopher has been hated‖ but that in turn that 
―philosophy offers an asylum to a man into which no tyranny can force its way, the inward cave, the 
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he enters the ―market place‖ as he knows that nobody believes in higher men in the 
market place (Z, IV: ‗On the Higher Man‘), and he also knows that his philosophical 
self or that type of tragic pathos is ―incommunicable‖: ―A great man—a man whom 
nature has constructed and invented in the grand style—what is he?... He knows he is 
incommunicable: he finds it tasteless to be familiar; and when one thinks he is, he 
usually is not. When not speaking to himself, he wears a mask.‖ (WP: §962) The idea 
of the higher man wearing a mask, for Nietzsche is a means of overcoming his 
inability to communicate his deepest insight. It is also possible to infer from 
Nietzsche‘s style as the communication of a particular type of pathos that his works 
are aimed at the same type of self as Nietzsche himself at the level of pathos, blood 
(unconscious) and insight. His books were in no way written for the conscious self or 
the herd self that it the socially conditioned self. In an essay entitled ‗Nietzsche and 
Postmodern Subjectivity,‘ Kathleen Higgins (1990: 192) criticizes the postmodern 
portrayal of Nietzsche and in doing so comments that Nietzsche ―aims at direct and 
personal encounter‖, while the ―Postmodernists, in contrast, do not seem particularly 
concerned with personal subjectivity‖.55 Nietzsche‘s works are rather written for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
labyrinth of the heart: but there too lurks the greatest danger‖, and that the second danger is that to 
―despair of the truth‖ (Schopenhauer as Educator: §3), and the third that he ―harbours a profound 
desire for the genius in him.‖ (ibid.) 
 
55
 In the same article, Higgins maintains that many postmodern commentators wrongfully reject the 
idea of a unified subjectivity and in turn the author‘s presence and personal encounter with the reader. 
She asserts that ―the full human subject is absent from postmodern discourse‖ (Higgins, K., Nietzsche 
and Postmodern Subjectivity, In: Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra, Clayton, Koelb 
(ed.), Albany, The State University of New York Press, 1990, p.192), and that  
 
One of the reasons that it becomes difficult to say who postmodernists are, 
as we have observed, is that they typically reject as illusory any unified 
subjective being or experience. A postmodernist stance in writing is thus 
typically the stance of one who claims to be ―elsewhere‖ (as contemporary 
debate about the ―author‖ in relation to the text reveals). Perhaps one can, 
in a sense, ―define‖ the postmodernist as someone else the last time, 
someone who will be someone else the next time. In this sense, Nietzsche 
is far from a postmodernist. His writing aims at direct and personally 
invested encounter far more than at a demonstration of the impossibility of 
―being there.‖ (ibid.)  
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philosophical self that engages in a tragic pathos, the type of person who can bring 
similar personal experiences to the text. Nietzsche rather claims that his books are 
written for the ―subterranean man‖ for the self who ―tunnels and mines‖ (Daybreak, 
Pref.: §1) beneath the conscious ―surface—and sign-world.‖ (GS: §354) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
She then quotes Nietzsche‘s phrase ‗writing in blood‘ as this type of writing is writing from personal 
experience: ――Of all that is written, I love only what a man has written with his blood‖‖ (Z, I: §7, cited 
in this form in Higgins, ibid., p.192) In the following chapter it will be argued in similar terms that 
Nietzsche as an author is present, and it will be explored what the ideal relation between reader and 
author is. This will be discussed within the context of Nietzsche‘s idea of a unified subjectivity, and a 
noble education. 
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III 
 
The Spiritual Middle Class 
 
         This section looks at the way that Nietzsche argues that the ―intellectual scholar‖ 
overlooks pathos, true insight into Becoming in their adherence to conventional or 
rational approach to objectivity. Nietzsche views this as the Socratic rationalist 
approach to truth that is to be overcome in order to retrieve a more fundamental way 
of relating to reality. Nietzsche‘s first experience of scholarly criticism was when his 
first book The Birth of Tragedy was ill-received. The Birth of Tragedy is itself an 
expression of contempt for the scholarly approach to philosophy.
56
 It not only marks a 
transition from the scholarly approach to philosophy, it is an expression of a pathos 
which is of no concern to the scholar. In Beyond Good and Evil (§213), Nietzsche 
criticises the scholars, as he recognizes that they are removed from the ―genuinely 
philosophical combination, for example, of a bold and exuberant spirituality that runs 
presto and a dialectical severity and necessity that takes no false step;‖ this 
combination is unknown to the scholars from their own experience and those who 
speak of it are deemed ―incredible.‖ (ibid.) Only an ―exceedingly few‖ experience true 
philosophical states. The experience of the Dionysian or of the ‗Yes-saying‘ pathos is 
strictly for the few. The spiritual weakness of the scholars renders them inadequate to 
the solution of the ―great problems and question marks‖, of the great existentialist 
questions, as they do not participate in the mystery of Becoming or its ―ambiguous 
character.‖ (GS: §373)  
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 In spite of Nietzsche‘s criticism of the scholarly approach to philosophy, he recognizes the necessary 
role it played in his life in acquiring discipline. He identifies it as a necessary stage in his own self-
development and acknowledges that the scholarly tradition places no value on discipline in education 
or in relation to self-knowledge. The following chapter will explore the relevance of discipline in 
education, for Nietzsche, or its relevance in what Thiele refers to as the ―art of arranging the soul.‖ 
(Thiele, L., Op. cit., p.171) 
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          In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche devotes an entire section entitled ‗We Scholars‘ 
to the problem of ‗the scholar, the average man of science.‘ (BGE: §206) Nietzsche 
criticizes the scholar‘s equation of philosophy with scholarship. Nietzsche also 
admonishes the scholars for their ―fear of masked mysticism and a correction of the 
limits of knowledge leaped forward‖ and ―their lack of respect for individual 
philosophers that had involuntarily generalized itself into lack of respect for 
philosophy.‖ (BGE: §204) The scholar shows no concern for the ―great problems‖ as 
he is only a believer in utility values. They do not experience insight into  ‗Life‘  or 
reality, and they also view it as inadequate as it has no utility or practical value. 
 
         In the second of Nietzsche‘s Untimely Meditations, ‗On the Uses and Disadvantages 
of History for Life,‘ he criticizes the scholarly approach of the academic historian. In 
this essay he criticizes the ―impersonal‖ stance of the scholar which cuts him off from 
his own self and thus from all philosophy. The scholar upholds the position that the 
more impartial the stance the more truthful it is; for that reason, he fails to take the 
self into account, which is actually the most fundamental position to reality. The 
supposed ‗impartial‘ position of the scholar is actually representative of their spiritual 
weakness or their adherence to herd-values. For Nietzsche, the mask of ‗objectivity‘ 
conceals a petty egoism of the scholar. In ‗On the Uses and Disadvantages of History 
for Life‘ the scholar is compared to the academic historian whose weak and self-
deluded human character, which is caused by oversaturation with history, leads to the 
degradation of ―the most truthful of all sciences, the honest naked goddess 
philosophy.‖ (UD: §5, 85) In replacing philosophy with scholarship, the attempt to 
fulfil the ―law of philosophy‖ in Life is abandoned. Instead, scholars undertake the 
127 
    
project of mounting for public exhibition the now extinct philosophical doctrines. 
(UD: §5, 85) This scholarly approach to education involves overlooking the works 
themselves and their relation to reality and the focus is on the history of the author or 
his biographical data. (UD: §5, 87) The scholar who adheres to the conventional 
notion of objectivity or dogmatic truth does not fulfil the ―law of philosophy‖ or the 
―law of life‖57 (GM, III: §27) or ―the law of the necessity of ―self-overcoming‖ in the 
nature of life‖ (ibid.); he does not experience redemption or purification of the whole. 
It is in this way that the scholar shows no concern for self-reflection, self-knowledge 
or in fulfilling the maxim to ―become what one is‖ (EH, ‗Why I am So Clever‘: §9), 
and for this reason becomes twice removed from reality in adhering to an ‗impartial‘ 
standpoint. Nietzsche criticizes the pursuit of disinterested knowledge as a form of 
――unselfing‖‖, which also forms part of the ―depersonalization of the spirit.‖ (BGE: 
§207) The scholar in no way seeks out the personal in philosophy. In this way, the 
scholar is representative of a wissenschaftlich age where the personal is not taken into 
account when it comes to matters of truth. 
 
          For Nietzsche, the reduction of philosophy to ―theory of knowledge‖ (BGE: §204) or 
scholarship is an expression of the later Socrates and the rise of Wissenschaft or what 
he refers to as ‗the problem of science.‘ (BT, ‗Attempt at Self-Criticism‘: §2) He 
associates Wissenschaft with the term ‗Wissen‘, knowledge and the process of 
cognition in general. In The Birth of Tragedy, the term ‗Wissenschaft‘ is treated as 
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 In the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche expresses the nature of the ―law of life‖ 
in the context of Christianity as a dogma bringing about its own self-destruction by its own morality. 
The term ‗the law of life‘ is a purely formal demand of self-overcoming whereby anything that stands 
outside it is destroyed. Elsewhere, the term mainly ties in with Nietzsche‘s concept of justice, and its 
redemptive nature as is expressed in The Untimely Meditations and in Daybreak (§4). He uses the term 
‗justice‘ in the metaphysical sense to refer to a particular relation between the individual type and the 
world or ‗reality as a whole‘. It consists of an accordance that obtains between the just person and the 
world, an affirmative standpoint in amor fati, in the realization that ‗all things are one.‘ (PTAG: §3, 39) 
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another compound from Wissen, cognate with the ―high pyramid of knowledge in our 
own time‖ (BT: §15) or such concepts as ―ocean of knowledge‖ (BT: §18) and 
―intellectual culture‖ (ibid.), which are all the products of man‘s ―hunger for 
knowledge‖ (BT: §15), his ―hunger for insatiable and optimistic knowledge‖. 
Nietzsche claims that when the limits or ―boundaries‖ of science and logic are 
recognized or when the optimism of science ―suffers shipwreck‖ (BT: §15) that a new 
form of insight breaks through, tragic insight, ―when they see to their horror how 
logic coils up at theses boundaries and finally bites its own tail—suddenly the new 
form of insight breaks through, tragic insight...‖ (ibid.) In The Birth of Tragedy, it is 
Socrates who is the archetypal Wissenschaftler, he is the ―mystagogue of science‖ 
(BT: §15) and the embodiment of hypertrophied reason. (BT: §13) In The Birth of 
Tragedy Nietzsche criticizes Socrates for creating the ―profound illusion‖ in ―the 
unshakeable faith that thought, using the thread of causality, can penetrate the deepest 
abysses of being, and thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of 
correcting it.‖ (BT: §15) His criticism of Socrates re-emerges in Twilight of the Idols 
in a section entitled ‗The Problem of Socrates,‘ where he admonishes him for creating 
the idea that thought can capture reality. It is with Socrates that thought begins to get 
ideas above its station; it aims at universality and believes it can ―fathom the nature of 
things‖ (BT: §15), which leads to what Nietzsche considers an insidiously optimistic 
belief in progress that he condemns as a form of escapism, an evasion of the 
Schopenhauerian, pessimistic truth of the gravity and senselessness of existence. 
Nietzsche rather advocates the possibility of tragic insight or ―mystic intuition‖ into 
reality. Socrates, Nietzsche considers, counted the new ‗theoretical‘ standpoint in 
philosophy as higher than any claim to superior insight. In Twilight of the Idols, he 
ranks Socrates, and claims that he belongs in the ―lowest class‖ among the plebs. (TI, 
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‗The Problem of Socrates‘: §3) In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche notes that both 
Kant and Schopenhauer recognize that truth in the theoretical sense or the view that 
logic solves the riddles of the universe only ―elevates mere phenomenon:‖ (BT: §18)  
        
 
             The extraordinary courage and wisdom of Kant and Schopenhauer have 
succeeded in gaining the most difficult victory, the victory over the 
optimism concealed in the essence of logic—an optimism that is the basis 
of our culture. While this optimism, resting on apparently unobjectionable 
aeternae veritates, had believed that all the riddles of the universe could be 
known and fathomed, and had treated space, time, and causality as entirely 
unconditional laws of the most universal validity, Kant showed that these 
really served only to elevate the mere phenomenon, the work of māyā, to 
the position of the sole and highest reality, as if it were the innermost and 
true essence of things, thus making impossible any knowledge of this 
essence or, in Schopenhauer‘s words, lulling the dreamer still more 
soundly asleep. (ibid.) 
 
 Nietzsche identifies Socrates as the plebeian character who, in a democratic polis, 
introduced dialectics and theoretical knowledge so that everyone could have the truth 
equally. It is theoretical truth that needs to be proven inter-subjectively; it is in this 
way that truth becomes levelled out or reduced to public criteria or inter-subjective 
criteria of validity. Nietzsche‘s main criticism against the democratic spirit of 
scholarship is that it reduces truth to something that is accessible by all. Nietzsche 
also criticizes the Socratic, rational or theoretical approach to philosophy as he sees 
that it has led to the demystification of the world. He condemns it for its excessive 
reliance on logic and science and its attempt to correct being (reality) by knowing in 
the rational sense. Nietzsche rather advocates tragic pathos as ways of glimpsing 
reality as it is. His criticism of Socratic optimism or the elevation of mere phenomena 
ties in with his critique of the oldest appearance that of absolute space being made 
into a metaphysics, which will be explored in the final chapter of the thesis. 
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IV 
The Spiritual Highest Type or the Wisest Type: 
 
         The following section looks at the way Nietzsche identifies the spiritual, noble type 
with the philosopher, that is, the concrete human being who takes the most truthful 
standpoint towards reality. It is in this way that he plays a formative role in forging 
the way for a new age. It also contends that the higher type‘s ascent to Becoming, an 
―eternity‖ within Becoming as the ―joy in the actual‖ is comparable to Plato‘s 
―descent of creation‖. He favours philosophy in its existentialist or practical form over 
―philosophy‖ as scholarship, as a disembodied theoretical structure of ―knowledge‖. 
For Nietzsche, philosophy in its existentialist form is spiritual; it is on a par with what 
he refers to as Christian praxis. In The Antichrist (§33), Nietzsche emphasizes the 
divine nature of Christian praxis as the experience of ―blessedness‖ or of redemption, 
as a form of ―evangelical practice‖ that ―leads to God, indeed, it is ―God‖!‖ The 
practical existentialist relation to reality is more fundamental than the theoretical 
standpoint. It is for this reason that the individual type is to be admired in his concrete 
relation to reality. It is the individual who embraces the whole and it is this universal 
truth that Nietzsche values. He criticizes the intellectualist tradition for claiming that 
thought can capture reality; and in doing so, he maintains that in embracing mere 
logical abstractions they are actually turning away from reality. This parallels 
Kierkegaard‘s account of the ‗aesthetic man‘ in volume I of Either/Or. 
 
         Nietzsche‘s main concern is with the ‗personalities‘ of the great philosophers, as he 
claims that philosophy is always a reflection of the personal: ―Gradually it has 
become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal 
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confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir.‖ (BGE: 
§6) The philosophy is an expression of the personal or of who the philosopher is: ―In 
the philosopher, conversely, there is nothing whatever that is impersonal; and above 
all, his morality bears decided and decisive witness to who he is—that is, in what 
order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other.‖ (ibid.) 
It is through the personal that one gains insight into philosophical types and their 
relation to reality. In contending that every philosophy is expressive of the personal, 
Nietzsche mentions that the ―drive to knowledge‖ cannot be viewed as the father of 
philosophy, as there is another drive behind this. Nietzsche in the same section goes 
on to associate the supposed ‗impersonal‘ approach of the scholar who does not 
become ―who he is‖ with his real ―interests‖, that is with his family, the pursuit of 
money or politics: 
          
 
 
             To be sure: among scholars who are really scientific men, things may be 
different—―better,‖ if you like—there you may really find something like a 
drive for knowledge, some small, independent clockwork that, once well 
round, works on vigorously without any essential participation from all the 
other drives of the scholar. The real ―interests‖ of the scholar therefore lie 
usually somewhere else—say, in his family, or in making money, or in 
politics. Indeed, it is almost a matter of complete indifference whether his 
little machine is placed at this or that spot in science, and whether the 
―promising‖ young worker turns himself into a good philologist or an 
expert on fungi or a chemist: it does not characterize him that he becomes 
this or that.‖ (ibid.) 
 
         In Heraclitus, Nietzsche recognized a kindred spirit and in Philosophy in the Tragic 
Age of the Greeks he identifies him as the paradigmatic philosophical type. In 
Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche mentions that he treats the name of Heraclitus with the 
―highest respect‖ (TI, ‗―Reason‖ in Philosophy‘: §2), in whose proximity he felt 
―altogether warmer and better than anywhere else,‖ and whose understanding of strife 
and eternal becoming were more closely related to Nietzsche‘s own philosophy ―than 
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anything else thought to date.‖ (EH, ‗BT‘: §3) The Heraclitean world of constant flux 
is seen by Nietzsche as the reflection of a man strong enough to accept the terrifying 
instability of the world of Becoming. Nietzsche upholds the view that the philosophy 
is inseparable from the personality of the philosopher or that both philosophy and 
philosopher are one and the same. It is in this way that Nietzsche views Heraclitus‘ 
doctrine of Becoming as inseparable from the man himself. It is therefore possible to 
infer that it is an expression of those character traits which Nietzsche associates with 
the philosophical or individual type such as solitude, independence, strength and 
courage. It is also expressive of a wisdom that sees the harmony and ‗justice‘ behind 
the universal strife of existence as the ―one‖ of Becoming. The wisdom of Heraclitus 
recognizes the necessity of suffering, its potential and its benefit. (PTAG: §7, 61-62) 
This is the wisdom of the ascending soul, the soul in search of order: 
 
             Do guilt, injustice, contradiction and suffering exist in this world? They 
do, proclaims Heraclitus, but only for the limited human mind which sees 
things apart but not connected, not for the con-tuitive god. For him all 
contradictions run into harmony, invisible to the common human eye, yet 
understandable to one who, like Heraclitus, is related to the contemplative 
god. Before his fire-gaze not a drop of injustice remains in the world 
poured all around him; even that cardinal impulse that allows pure fire to 
inhabit such impure forms is mastered by him with a sublime metaphor. In 
this world only play, play as artists and children engage in it, exhibits 
coming to be and passing away, structuring and destroying, without any 
moral additive, in forever equal innocence. (ibid.) 
 
         In particular, Nietzsche affirms solitude as a disposition of the higher self that reveals 
reality as it is or enables the noble type to encounter the universal whole. Zarathustra 
tells his followers: ―Now I go alone, my disciples. You too, go now, alone. Thus I 
want it.‖ (Z, I, ‗On the Gift-Giving Virtue‘: §3) Nietzsche emphasises the necessity of 
solitude as the medium in which one individual type encounters the whole. Solitude is 
not advocated as a criterion by which one follows, but rather is a spiritual condition 
that provides the self-overcoming necessary to encounter Dionysian ecstasy in the 
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experience of the whole. It is only a select few that experience this type of solitude; it 
is the spiritual condition that necessitates the confrontation of individuality. The 
highest type or philosophical type ―has solitude not because he wishes to be alone but 
because he is something that finds no equals.‖ (WP: §985) In Beyond Good and Evil, 
solitude is deemed a ―virtue‖ by Nietzsche alongside ―courage, insight, sympathy.‖ 
(BGE: §284) The type of solitude that Nietzsche advocates is not the solitude of a 
―nun‖ that ―leads to a fruitless, perhaps melancholy solitude. It has nothing in 
common with the solitude of the vita contemplativa of the thinker‖ (D: §440), as the 
true thinker finds in solitude his greatest fruitfulness. For Nietzsche, that which makes 
solitude a heroic virtue is its agonal character or that it consists of an internal agonal 
struggle. The solitary is not only his own best friend, but also his own worst 
antagonist.
58
 The internal struggle of the solitary is a torment, but it also enables him 
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 In an essay entitled ‗The Wanderer and His Shadow‘ (Human, All Too Human: vol.: II), Nietzsche 
makes it apparent his own inner struggle or his struggle with himself. In the same essay he mentions 
that the thinker is his own worst critic: ―This thinker needs no one to refute him: he does that for 
himself.‖ (HH, II, ‗The Wanderer and his Shadow‘: §249) The shadow is one of Nietzsche‘s most 
enduring images, which follows the wanderer as his alter ego, and is reflective of the friend-foe 
relationship that Nietzsche maintains with himself. The wanderer cannot escape his shadow, and in his 
shadow he finds both a companion and a critic.  In an aphorism entitled ―From the seventh solitude‖ he 
speaks of the torment of solitude: ―—One day the wanderer slammed a door shut behind him, came to a 
halt, and wept. Then he said: ‗This penchant and passion for what is true, real, non-apparent, certain—
how it exasperates me! Why does this gloomy and earnest oppressor follow me of all people! I want to 
rest, but he won‘t allow it.‖ (GS: §309) For Nietzsche, the life of a solitary must consist of echoes and 
shadows: ―In solitude.—When one lives alone, one neither speaks too loud nor writes too loud, for one 
fears the hollow echo—the criticism of the nymph Echo. And all voices sound different in solitude!‖ 
(GS: §182) The idea of the solitary contending with echoes and shadows is reminiscent of Socrates‘ 
inner voice or inner daemon, which was an unrelenting critic, a critic Socrates always met while he was 
alone. Nietzsche refers to this inner voice in The Birth of Tragedy (§13) as the ――daimonion of 
Socrates‖‖, a divine voice, an ―instinctive wisdom‖, which appears for Socrates ―only in order to 
hinder conscious knowledge‖. Nietzsche affirms the voice as an instinctive wisdom, but criticizes 
Socrates for making instinct the critic, and consciousness the creator, which he exhorts is ―—truly a 
monstrosity per defectum!‖ (ibid.) He notes that ―in all productive men it is instinct that is the creative-
affirmative force, and consciousness acts critically and dissuasively‖ (ibid.) It is for this reason that he 
refers to Socrates as a non-mystic: ―Socrates might be called the typical non-mystic, in whom, through 
a hypertrophy, the logical nature is developed as excessively as instinctive wisdom is in the mystic‖ 
(ibid.) Nietzsche rather takes a mystical approach, and associates the inner voice with intuition and the 
instincts. This mysticism is also evident in Thus Spoke Zarathustra where Nietzsche tells Zarathustra to 
inform his listeners of the plight they face in the practice of solitude: ―But the worst enemy you can 
encounter will always be you, yourself; you lie in wait for yourself in caves and woods.‖ (Z, I: ‗On the 
Way of the Creator‘) The practice of solitude ties in also with the art of writing and its discipline, 
which is another form of internal struggle, for Nietzsche. The art of writing and its ability to discipline 
the writer towards the whole will be explored in the following chapter. 
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to encounter the most profound joy that of Dionysian ecstasy in becoming one with 
the totality of reality.
59
 The basis of solitude is intense suffering and in man‘s 
suffering there exists a tension between himself as individual and the totality of 
reality, which is expressed as the principle of individuation or ‗principium 
individuationis‘ in The Birth of Tragedy. (BT: §1, §2, §4, §16 & §21) It is through 
self-overcoming that this distinction is abolished and man becomes one with the 
whole of reality. In this experience man and God or man and reality are identical and 
this unity involves a state of ecstasy. In the third essay of The Untimely Meditations, 
Nietzsche refers to theses solitary types as ―demi-gods‖ whose solitude drives ―them 
so deep into themselves that when they re-emerge it is always as a volcanic eruption.‖ 
(Schopenhauer as Educator: §3, 140) Nietzsche emphasizes the explosive power that 
comes with overcoming this kind of solitude, those demi-gods who ―can endure to 
live, and live victoriously, under such terrible conditions...‖ where their works of 
genius evidence their victory. (ibid.) It is these types who live the great style whose 
lives encounter the whole; they are the true lovers of wisdom, they are the types of 
genius that Nietzsche advocates.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
59
 John McGowan, in his work Postmodernism and its Critics, notes Nietzsche as one of the main 
precursors of postmodernism. He also looks at the modernist strain in Nietzsche and its opposition to 
the postmodernist standpoint, in particular on solitude. McGowan looks at Nietzsche‘s affirmative 
freedom in terms of the modernist notion of the individual separating himself from the herd or societal 
values, he associates Nietzsche with ―high modernism‘s goal of separating itself, in the name of purity 
and autonomy, from its surroundings.‖ (McGowan, Postmodernism and its Critics, London, Cornell 
University Press, 1991, p.84) He also notes a passage from Beyond Good and Evil (§284) where 
Nietzsche speaks the modernist language of purity: ―For solitude is with us a virtue: it is a sublime urge 
and inclination for cleanliness which divines that all contact between man and man—‗in society‘—
must inevitably be unclean. All community makes somehow, somewhere, sometime—‗common.‘‖ 
(McGowan, ibid., p.84-85 quoting Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, R.J. Hollingdale (trans.), 
England, Penguin Books, 1973, p.195) McGowan contends that the ability to endure separation is the 
very key to experiencing freedom or affirmation of the real in Nietzsche: ―The ability to endure 
separation is the very key to freedom, since it is our fear of solitude that acts as the strongest reason to 
heed the herd instinct.‖ (ibid., p.85) According to him, the strong individual for Nietzsche must 
disentangle himself from society but ―only to encounter the real, existential, ennobling conflict with a 
tragic universe.‖ (ibid.) He also notes that postmodernists overlook solitude and the realm of the real or 
the existential in Nietzsche, as they claim that one cannot escape ones‘ social or historical determinants. 
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In an essay entitled ‗The Socratic Nietzsche‘, Ran Sigad examines what truth is for 
Nietzsche, and identifies the various human conditions for enabling reality to reveal 
itself. This type of life embraces philosophy as ―love of wisdom‖ and in this sense is 
essentially Socratic, where Nietzsche‘s philosophy is similar to that of the early 
Socrates that of the early dialogues. Sigad notes that for Nietzsche this type of life is 
experienced by the higher type or the noble type, and that suffering and solitude play 
a pivotal role in the realization of the good life. He recognizes Nietzsche‘s 
identification of suffering as a way of life that reveals reality as it is, as a struggle of 
forces which is ―not disguised by any contrivance of reason.‖ (1986: 112)60 Suffering 
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 Sigad outlines in his essay how Nietzsche is critical of the so-called ‗objectivity‘ of human reason. 
―Human reason is not objective, but on the contrary, it is the expression of the interest to eschew 
suffering and achieve security through the knowledge of reality.‖ (Sigad, R., ‗The Socratic Nietzsche,‘ 
In: Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker, Y., Yovel (ed.), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijoff Publishers, 1986, p. 
111) Conceptual knowledge is a ―generalization of similar aspects in the phenomenal world‖ that 
disregards ―everything which is different and incompatible, is an interpretation of reality.‖ (ibid.) Sigad 
goes on to explain that ―although the interpretation is legitimate, reason usually exhibits its 
interpretations as the necessary and only manifestation of truth. Therefore, reason falsifies reality by 
contradicting it, for any interpretation that is only partial exhibits itself as total runs counter to the 
truth.‖ (ibid.) Nietzsche‘s criticism of reason is in terms of its ―pretension to be capable of revealing 
truth‖ (ibid.) Sigad expresses that Nietzsche considers the philosophy of reason to be pretentious: 
―Reason presumes to know what Nietzsche‘s critical speculations show to be impossible to know. In 
fact, the philosophy of reason does not desire truth at all. It does not aim to reveal reality as it is, but 
rather has an interest in imposing the values of reason, i.e. of a certain way of life, upon reality.‖(ibid.) 
The type of truth that Nietzsche advocates is truth that is ―to be identified as a way of life, the ongoing 
activity which consists of self-overcoming; the overcoming of anything that is not total criticism. In 
other words, the love of wisdom, itself, when raised to a way of life constitutes truth.‖ (ibid., p.110) 
Sigad explains that thinking is critical only when its instinctive impulse is ―aiming at the one and total 
truth, which is the disclosing of reality as it is, i.e. as will to power.‖ (ibid., p.112) He goes on to further 
emphasize that reason as rationalization is a falsification of this impulse and it is for this reason that it 
is not critical. Reason is viewed to be erroneous for its pretensions that it can attain total knowledge of 
reality. For Nietzsche, true philosophy consists of the awareness of the impossibility of this knowledge 
and a desire to live in accordance with this understanding, and an ability to withstand the suffering that 
this understanding brings. 
            Sigad also makes the point at the outset of the essay that Nietzsche‘s criticism of reason is not based 
upon personal preference but is ―a true description of reality.‖ (ibid., p.109) Sigad maintains that 
Nietzsche‘s thought is ―above all critical‖ (ibid.), that is, that his instinctive impulse is aiming at the 
disclosure of reality as it is:  
            This entails that his extreme negative attitude towards reason and the 
aspiration for truth is not capricious, but grounded on critical speculations 
that lead to the position where reason is taken to be a falsification of 
reality. Nietzsche‘s underlying attitude, then, is that reality should be 
grasped as it is, hence we should do all that we can not to falsify it. Here 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy is no different from any other. Yet, given 
Nietzsche‘s view of reason as a false method of understanding, this implies 
that there is another way that is superior, that it is possible to grasp reality 
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is useful for Nietzsche only in the sense that it enables the overcoming of ordinary 
utility which is ―the overcoming of the will to find security and resolutions of 
suffering through reason.‖ (1986: 112-113) Sigad maintains that this entails the 
supreme suffering that comes with the realization of the meaninglessness of existence 
and that the true thinker ―sets himself beyond communication and chooses total 
solitude.‖ (1986: 113) Sigad also states that man‘s ―solitary individuality‖ is also his 
redemption. In a section entitled ―The Ecstatic Identification of Man with God‖, Sigad 
maintains that the suffering of solitude can result in ―redemption from falsification 
and openness to the totality of reality.‖ (ibid.) The desire to become one with reality is 
the instinctive desire of the true thinker and is what constitutes the true philosophy as 
love of wisdom or love of truth. Sigad explains that it is only certain kind of 
individual, the noble type that can live according to this desire: ―but living according 
to this desire exclusively constitutes being a different kind of man.‖ (ibid.) He then 
goes on to mention the pivotal role self-overcoming plays in the identification of man 
with reality (God), which shows that not only does Nietzsche have an affinity with 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
as it is without falsifying and Nietzsche undertakes to explicate this 
through his writings. (ibid.) 
            According to Sigad, if Nietzsche‘s philosophy did not grasp reality as it is, it would carry the same 
significance as any other philosophy; he mentions that for Nietzsche ―it would be senseless to dismiss 
reason—any manner of life and thought would be of equal weight and significance. The rejection of 
reason would constitute nothing more than personal preference, as would the adoption of any 
alternative.‖ (ibid.) He claims that Nietzsche is in no way a relativist although he may appear to be one:  
            In fact, Nietzsche himself seems to adopt this relativistic position. He tells 
us that to choose reason as a way of life is possible as well as legitimate, 
for it too expresses the Will to Power in a certain form. But if we take this 
at face value, then Nietzsche‘s preference for a life ruled by instinct and 
desire would merely constitute another form, and his choice would reflect 
personal taste. Nietzsche, however, speaks of a life ruled by instinct and 
desire as a preference that is not falsifying. According to the very nature of 
life there is a preference for instinct over reason, for only the former does 
not falsify reality. Thus, Nietzsche‘s choice is not simply personal, for at 
the same time as it is considered one legitimate alternative among others, it 
is also critical, a true description of reality. (ibid.) 
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metaphysical truth but also that it is through the individual that one enters into an 
oneness with the totality: 
 
             One can raise himself to this point only through overcoming the needs and 
motives of ordinary life, which means self-overcoming. In what follows, 
this particular quality proves to be identical to reality itself, as well as to 
truth. The true thinker stands alone in meaningless reality and has to attach 
a value to it. Hence, he inherits God, for he must give reality a value which 
is at the same time strictly individual and entirely total. The arbitrary 
choice to affix such a value is the desire for truth, for understanding reality 
as it is and not in a partial, one-sided way. Indeed, Nietzsche himself 
admits (Gay Science 344) that he belongs to the cultural tradition as far as 
searching for metaphysical truth is concerned (ibid.). 
61
 
 
         The discovery that one cannot know reality through reason, and the subsequent loss of 
old values based upon it bring with it the suffering of nihilism. However, it is through 
this suffering that the true philosopher can overcome this nihilism, of perceiving 
reality as it is, without meaning or value. There is a certain sense of victory which 
comes with transcendence, what Sigad refers to as ―a most intense feeling of power‖ 
which ―increases proportionally to the difficulty of overcoming.‖ (1986: 114) The 
most supreme sense of power is achieved by overcoming the anthropomorphic notion 
of truth or of grasping reality through reason. Sigad reiterates the importance of self-
overcoming in acquiring wisdom or in generating the true philosopher, as it makes 
him one with the totality of reality: ―Man and God become identical, since self-
overcoming is only achieved if based on a general principle, i.e. total reality that is 
free from inner contradiction that is due to fragmentation.‖ (ibid.) The sources of this 
fragmentation are suffering, solitude and individuation, and in overcoming this 
suffering there no longer resides a tension between man and the totality of reality.  
 
                                                          
61
Sigad uses the following translation of The Gay Science (Nietzsche, F., Kaufmann, W. (trans.), New 
York, Random House, 1974. 
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          Sigad explains that becoming one with reality is the most joyful experience, a 
―Dionysian ecstasy,‖ and he refers to this experience as an objective truth ―in that it is 
without purpose and does not turn into a law which reason imposes on reality.‖ (1986: 
116) The individual creation of a great style is objective only in the sense that it is 
identical with the rhythm of reality itself or ―he exemplifies in his very way of life the 
inner logic of the eternally becoming reality.‖ (ibid.) For Nietzsche, there is an 
existential correspondence between man and reality, an account which replaces the 
old correspondence theory of truth, which falsely assumed that the propositional use 
of language could capture reality. This idea of creating a great style through self-
overcoming is at the same time discovering reality as it is. It is only through a process 
of individuation or of self-overcoming can one come to experience the Absolute. It is 
only through being fully subjective that philosophy can be objective (ibid.) or only if 
―it is motivated by the interest to see reality as it is, devoid of egotistic interests, is it 
objective.‖ (ibid.) The ego that projects its own interests onto reality is not truly 
objective. The type of subjectivity that Nietzsche embraces is one which is ―cleansed 
of all egotistic interests‖ and one which is an overcoming self that ―affirms nothing 
but the power of negating and destroying‖ (ibid.) This negating power or an ability to 
overcome, which negates all that is fixed and is eternally in flux, corresponds to 
reality in its ability to do the same. For Nietzsche, to experience objective truth is a 
form of intoxication; the true philosopher is intoxicated by the power to overcome, 
and comes to experience the whole. Experiencing the new totality comes not in the 
form of knowledge but in the form of feeling (ibid.), a feeling of ‗intoxication‘ or 
‗rapture‘. (EH, ‗Z‘: §3) The experience of Dionysian ecstasy as love of wisdom 
constitutes man‘s desire to experience the whole of reality. Sigad claims that it is in 
the experience of Dionysian ecstasy that we realize that ―truth is located in the very 
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love of man for reality‖ (1986: 116), and looks at the correlation between Nietzsche 
and Spinoza on matters of truth and that ―since man is but a part of reality, we should 
say that truth is the love of reality for itself (as Spinoza has argued).‖ (ibid.) 
 
         Sigad (1986) also makes the important point that the overcoming of old values does 
not imply the creation of new ones in the sense of laws. There is only self-
overcoming, as there are no fixed laws; therefore, the only value is that of self-
overcoming, and the discovery of reality as will to power or as self-overcoming. It is 
the act of overcoming the old values, this self-overcoming which is valued: ―His [true 
thinker] valuating action is no more than refuting the existing values.‖ (ibid.) It is in 
this way that the only new value is ―the discovery of reality as will to power, as self-
overcoming. Since reality is constant overcoming, and since the true thinker identifies 
himself with it in his life and thought, we find that truth too is in his self-overcoming, 
self-negating and self-creating‖ (ibid.) The true thinker‘s truth is in his self-
overcoming, as he can identify himself with reality which is in constant becoming: 
―The understanding of reality is possible only by living in accordance with the process 
of becoming itself. Hence, reason cannot reveal reality. What we find is rather that 
reality is disclosed only to the true philosopher, to the one who loves true reality.‖ 
(1986: 117) For the lover of wisdom, it is ultimately reality that is valued; hence the 
experiences of overcoming in solitude and suffering are in turn valued, as they bring 
one into identification with it. Sigad identifies Nietzsche‘s love of wisdom with ―love 
of truth‖ 
             Love of truth makes the lover totally involved in the results of 
philosophical investigation no matter what they be. Only thus can one be 
God in his conduct while negating everything else in the world. Truth gives 
itself totally to whomever gives himself totally to truth. (ibid.) 
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Redemption, for Nietzsche, is the higher form of Justice as is expressed in ‗On the 
Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life‘; it is experienced at the moment of 
overcoming. This experience of wisdom is similar to the wisdom of Heraclitus who 
recognizes that suffering cannot be overcome by the limited human mind whose 
power is insufficient to see its necessity, its potential and benefit. (PTAG: §7, 61-62) 
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche emphasizes that one liberates oneself from 
suffering by means of its transformation into joy, as the joy of a new life compensates 
for the pain of the pangs of birth. The greatest exercise of will is the transformation of 
the agony of existence into the jubilation of life:  
 
          Creation—that is the great redemption from suffering, and life‘s growing 
light. But that the creator may be, suffering is needed and much change. 
Thus are you advocates and justifiers of all impermanence. To be the child 
who is newly born, the creator must also want to be the mother who gives 
birth and the pangs of the birth-giver. (Z, II: ‗Upon the Blessed Isles‘)            
 
This experience of redemption also includes complete reverence for the self,
62
 as it is 
through ―the inmost centre‖ of the self or what is referred to as the ―Great Reason‖ of 
the body that one experiences the universal. The ―inmost centre‖ of the individual is 
the locus of truth that belongs to the whole; it is the true self as the overcoming self, 
the divine self. The solitude of the highest type as a spiritual condition involves being 
removed from the herd and in turn involves an act of turning away from the herd-
constituted self. The noble type favours his own true self over the socially determined 
self. The self of the aristocrat or the spiritually noble type is an overcoming self that 
identifies with reality as it is. It is in this way that reverence for truth and reverence 
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 Leiter in his work ‗Nietzsche on Morality‘ notes that the higher man, for Nietzsche, has self-
reverence. He explains that there is a connection between reverence and being ―severe and hard‖ (BGE: 
260): ―Self-reverence is not, as it were, a matter of putting oneself on a pedestal; it means being ―severe 
and hard‖ with oneself not out of doubt and self-loathing, but as a result of ―fundamental certainty‖ 
about one‘s own worth and mettle, as someone who is capable of severity and hardness as needed.‖ 
Leiter, B., Nietzsche on Morality, London, Routledge, 2002, p.121. Leiter uses the following translation 
of Beyond Good and Evil (W. Kaufmann trans., New York, Vintage, 1966).  
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for self are one and the same. The self that lives the spiritual condition of solitude is 
the higher self, which belongs to the whole whereby Becoming reveals itself. The 
spiritual condition of solitude does not involve an abstracted conscious ego that is 
closed off from reality. The condition rather involves abstraction from the contingent 
empirical or socially determined self so that the becoming self can be attuned to 
reality. The personal experience of belonging to the whole would be viewed as 
impersonal by the herd or the scholar as it does not relate to what he considers 
‗personal‘ gain or what Nietzsche refers to as the ―real interests‖ of the scholar. (BGE: 
§6) 
 
The spiritual condition of solitude is viewed by Nietzsche as a form of asceticism, 
what he refers to as a higher asceticism: ―The most spiritual men, as the strongest, 
find their happiness where others would find their destruction: in the labyrinth, in 
hardness against themselves and others, in experiments; their joy is self-conquest; 
asceticism becomes in them nature, need, and instinct.‖ (AC: §57) Nietzsche 
considers the philosophical or noble ascetic as not being weak, resentful or cowardly, 
that his renunciation of this-worldly affairs is to be viewed as an act of strength. These 
ascetic tendencies are in the service of the Dionysian faith. The philosophical ascetic 
knows the powers of his instincts and makes their investigation, development and 
sublimation his life‘s work. His sole concern or task is the accumulation and 
channelled release of this energy. Nietzsche himself also acknowledges himself as an 
ascetic, as he expresses in Beyond Good and Evil (§227), ―Let us remain hard, we last 
Stoics!‖ who have been ―spun into a severe yarn and shirt of duties‖ (BGE: §226). 
Nietzsche also mentions that all of his achievements had arisen from a severe 
asceticism or hard discipline; ―asceticism and Puritanism are almost indispensable 
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means for educating and ennobling‖, and asserts in the same passage of Beyond Good 
and Evil that ―the paths to higher spirituality‖ involve testing ―the feelings of great 
self-overcoming, of silence and solitude.‖ (BGE: §61) In a section of The Will to 
Power entitled ―What has been ruined by the church‘s misuse of it‖ (§916), he 
acknowledges the church‘s misuse of asceticism and claims that its true role or ―its 
natural utility‖ is ―its indispensability in the service of the education of the will‖. The 
philosophical type of asceticism allows for greater creativity and spiritualization. The 
true ascetic ideal, the one of the higher sort, for Nietzsche, has been intrinsic to ―the 
lives of all the great, fruitful, inventive spirits,‖ and forms ―the most appropriate and 
natural conditions of their best existence, their fairest fruitfulness.‖ (GM, III: §8) 
Kaufmann (1967) in his introduction to On the Genealogy of Morals, §4 also 
mentions that Nietzsche himself ―was certainly no stranger to ascetic ideals.‖ A higher 
asceticism is required in making the transition from both the camel and lion stages in 
the development of the spirit; Nietzsche ―wants us to climb higher‖ where ―we return 
to the image of pregnancy: the third stage is represented by the child‖ or ―a sacred 
―Yes‖. Kaufmann (1967) outlines that, for Nietzsche, a higher asceticism is required 
in order to overcome the asceticism of bad conscience: ―Without ascetic ideals, 
without self-control and cruel self-discipline, we cannot attain that self-mastery which 
Nietzsche ever praises and admires.‖ (ibid.) For Nietzsche, there is a distinction 
between a life-denying version of the ascetic ideal that is the priestly or Kantian 
‗ascetic ideal‘, and a philosophical or life-affirming version. The experience of 
solitude for the noble type involves the withdrawal from this-worldly affairs, i.e., the 
church, the world of politics, popular culture, and all the benefits associated with 
worldly involvement. In this way, it could be argued that Nietzsche‘s philosophical 
asceticism is an even more radical withdrawal from what is considered the ‗world‘ 
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than the ascetic ideal of the priests. Nietzsche criticizes the ascetic ideal of the priests, 
as their idea of a withdrawal from this-world involves a focus on eternal redemption 
in an ‗other-world‘ as the ‗after-life‘. He not only criticizes it for its focus on 
happiness in the after-life, and its continual deferral, but also because it is not 
knowledge of truth, as it is actually a mere life-denying perspective. Nietzsche comes 
to this conclusion because of Kant‘s claim that knowledge of the noumenal realm is 
impossible, and that according to Kant, the only possible knowledge is mind-
dependent epistemic knowledge, or knowledge of the phenomenal realm.
63
 Both 
ascetic ideals involve a withdrawal from worldly affairs (phenomenal reality); 
however, Nietzsche‘s type involves genuine insight into reality64 as Becoming by a 
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 Nietzsche criticizes the ascetic ideal as a non-perspectival truth or ‗God‘s eye view‘ on the grounds 
that it is not only a contradiction, but also that reason alone, as Kant himself recognizes, cannot capture 
the noumenal realm. However, this does not imply that Nietzsche rejects asceticism entirely, as he is an 
advocate of an asceticism that involves the sublimation of the senses. It also does not imply that 
Nietzsche‘s rejection of non-perspectival truth entails that he does not embrace an asceticism. 
Nietzsche‘s idea of a higher asceticism leads to insight reality in a moment of amor fati or of life-
affirmation.  
 
64
 In his Nietzsche on Morality, Leiter  notes the problem of reconciling Nietzsche‘s perspectivism with 
reality itself or what Kant had originally referred to as the noumenal realm. He explains that Nietzsche 
views Kant as a denier of ―reason‖, as a philosopher who also expresses the ascetic ideal with his 
doctrine of transcendental idealism; the doctrine that the only knowable world as we humans 
experience it, i.e., the phenomenal world, as distinct from the way the world really is in-itself, i.e., the 
noumenal world. (Leiter, B., Nietzsche on Morality, Op. cit., p. 269) In the third essay of On the 
Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche mentions in relation to the ascetic that he is said ――to deny‖ his ―own 
―reality‘‖ by denying not just ―the senses‖ but also denying ―reason‖ itself.‖ (ibid.) Leiter notes that 
Nietzsche paraphrases this ―ascetic self-contempt and self-ridicule of reason‖ as follows: ―‗there is a 
realm of truth and being, but reason is excluded from it!‘ (GM, III: 12)‖ (cited in this form in Leiter, 
ibid.) He also acknowledges that Nietzsche is critical of Kant‘s transcendental idealism on the grounds 
that ―far from vindicating knowledge, actually undermined it by putting the real ―realm of truth and 
being‖ out of bounds.‖ (ibid.) Leiter goes on to explain the Kantian way: ―The Kantian way, of course, 
entails that the really objective world, the noumenal world, is unknown to us humans, but within the 
phenomenal world—the world as we experience it—objectivity is possible insofar as this world 
conforms to categories that the human mind necessarily imposes upon experience. (Nietzsche, 
remember, is supposing, in keeping with his critical view of transcendental idealism, that genuinely 
objective knowledge would involve knowledge of the noumenal world.).‖ (ibid.) It is possible to infer 
from this that Nietzsche actually disagrees with Kant for putting the real ―realm of truth and being‖ 
(GM, III: §12) out of bounds and that genuine objective knowledge would be knowledge of this realm. 
Leiter then recognizes the problem of reconciling the idea of a noumenal realm with Nietzsche‘s 
perspectivism. (Leiter, B., Op. cit., p. 276) He then argues that Nietzsche‘s perspectivism is the only 
alternative knowledge to ‗genuine objective knowledge‘ of the noumenal realm. Leiter‘s objective as it 
is in his essay entitled ‗Perspectivism in Genealogy of Morals‘ is to argue that Nietzsche‘s 
perspectivism does not entail scepticism. He is doing this in order to overturn the postmodern view of 
Nietzsche or what he refers to as the ‗received view‘. (Leiter, B., ‗Perspectivism in Nietzsche‘s 
Genealogy of Morals‘, Op. cit., p. 334) Lampert offers an alternative solution in arguing that tragic 
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certain individual through the ―Great reason‖ of the body or the intelligent drives. 
According to Nietzsche, Kant‘s idea of the ascetic ideal denies the role of the senses 
or pre-conscious activity. (GM, III: §12) This higher asceticism or discipline that is 
characteristic of the most genuine philosophy provides the ideal conditions for 
participating in the truth or belonging to the whole. The asceticism of the individual 
type lies in the pathos of struggle; all genuine striving for truth is the product of the 
struggle of self-overcoming. It is the agonal spirit of the individual type whose love of 
struggle provides the stimulus for self-overcoming, the drive to reach beyond oneself 
so as to achieve excellence. It is through self-overcoming that one can re-emerge 
stronger, as Nietzsche expresses in the maxim in the preface to Twilight of the Idols: 
―The spirits increase, vigour grows through a wound.‖ (TI, Pref.) In The Will To 
Power, Nietzsche refers to the act of self-overcoming as a spiritual process of growth, 
of ―inward change‖ that brings about re-birth: ―The ―Kingdom of Heaven‖ is a 
condition of the heart...it is an ―inward change in the individual‖ it is ―something that 
comes at every moment and at every moment has not yet arrived—‖ (WP: §161) The 
path of self-overcoming is the most difficult one, and it is only undertaken by those 
whose strength and courage allow the transformation of existential pain into spiritual 
pleasure. In a section entitled the ‗Wisdom in Pain‘ of The Gay Science, Nietzsche 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
insight as an interpretation of the world in some way solves the scepticism charge against Nietzsche. 
Tsarina Doyle similarly wishes to argue in her work ‗Nietzsche on Epistemology and Metaphysics‘ that 
Nietzsche‘s perspectivism does not entail scepticism, or the claim that there are no known truths about 
the world. She solves this in arguing that for Nietzsche, there is a mind-independent phenomenal realm 
(Becoming) and that there is perspectival knowledge of it. It is in this way that his perspectivism is not 
sceptical, as it does capture reality. She notes the way in which Nietzsche overturns the idealist 
approach to Kantian phenomenal knowledge. However she does not explore the idea of tragic insight or 
his artist‘s metaphysics. Doyle does introduce the idea of the intrinsicality of force in Nietzsche in 
order to argue that, although forces in reality or the whole are relational, they are the same time 
independent of one another. In this thesis, I will argue that this introduces the idea that there is a higher 
dimension to reality that makes reality real and independent of us.   
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mentions that the individual or ―heroic type‖ finds in his suffering his ―greatest 
moments,‖ a ―Saturnalia‖ of the soul:  
 
There is much wisdom in pain as in pleasure: like pleasure, pain is one of 
the prime species-preserving forces... True, there are people who hear 
exactly the opposite command when great pain approaches and who never 
look as proud, bellicose, and happy as when a storm is nearing—yes, pain 
itself gives them their great moments! They are the heroic human beings, 
the great pain-bringers of humanity, those few or rare ones who need the 
same apology as pain itself—and truly, they should not be denied this! 
They are eminently species-preserving and species-enhancing forces, if 
only because they resist comfort and do not hide their nausea at this type of 
happiness (GS: §318) 
 
Ultimately, for Nietzsche, the strong individual is a product of the struggle with his 
own isolation. This struggle does not take place within the public realm as the most 
worthy struggle occurs within the soul or in the form of self-mastery. As Thiele 
(1990: 47) puts it, ―Ultimately, the strong individual is a product of the struggle with 
his own isolation.... For the worthiest struggle is not waged within the public realm. 
True heroism, according to Nietzsche, slakes its agonal thirst within the soul.‖ In the 
higher man‘s experience of asceticism he removes himself from the public realm or 
that aspect of the world that he refers to as the rabble: ―And some who turned away 
from life only turned away from the rabble: they did not want to share well and flame 
and fruit with the rabble.‖ (Z, II: ‗On the rabble‘) The noble type who has ―turned 
away from life‖ or the rabble, through a form of asceticism, directs his ―will to 
power‖ towards a level of reality, a higher dimension65 or an eternity that is within 
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 This idea of the will to power being directed towards a higher dimension of reality is also reiterated 
by McIntyre in his work ‗The Sovereignty of Joy: Nietzsche‘s Vision of Grand Politics‘. McIntyre 
argues that Nietzsche‘s grand politics flows directly from his philosophy of will to power as an erotic 
force, which directs the philosopher-god to the higher than human realm. McIntyre outlines that the 
vision of the philosopher-statesman presupposes that, first, that he removes himself from the market-
place or city or rebels against the city (in contempt for its values) and ―ascends, through knowledge, to 
the supra-human realm of true being; then, he descends again to the human world and attempts to 
persuade the city to order itself according to the supra-human measure.‖ (McIntyre, A., Op. cit., p. 91) 
It must be noted that this realm for Nietzsche is Becoming, which is mentioned by Mc Intyre in chapter 
six of his work. McIntyre refers to the return to the people (or at least its higher types) in terms of the 
Platonic phrase, the ‗descent of creation‘ (a term McIntyre notes is explored by Voegelin, E., in ‗Plato‘ 
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Becoming which the spiritual pleb has no experience. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
Nietzsche speaks of the higher self who can ―fly‖ to the ―highest spheres‖ the realm of 
the ―well of eternity‖, which is far removed from the rabble.‖ (Z, II: ‗On the Rabble‘) 
The glory of the spiritual aristocrat rests on his spiritual status: ―The ―higher nature‖ 
of the great man lies in being different, in incommunicability, in distance of rank, not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Op. cit., p. 202). The phrase relates to the problem of the philosopher returning to the Cave after the 
ascent of his soul towards the Idea of the Good or the vision of the Agathon, the problem of the 
imposition of Idea on formless Becoming, and of persuading the people of his vision. McIntyre makes 
clear why ‗loving contempt‘ ―constitutes the fundamental experience of the philosopher-statesman, for 
both Nietzsche and Plato as ―the principle of ascent - contempt for the city and love for the higher-than-
human things - eventually becomes the principle of descent whereby the philosopher (and his play of 
creation) brings a higher order down to the human world; his contempt for man is the condition of his 
love and creativity.‖ (McIntyre, A., Op. cit., p.92) According to McIntyre, Plato‘s demiurge like 
Nietzsche‘s philosopher-god is confronted with permanent resistance of becoming to his noetic 
persuasion, and therefore his creativity as law-giver is mediated by the political world. McIntyre also 
notes Michel Haar‘s excellent point that  
 
The Overman is not the fulfilment of humanity, and must be distinguished 
from any form of ‗higher man‘. Radically different from any human type, 
the Overman embodies Nietzsche‘s vision of the ‗more than human‘ which 
will nevertheless exist alongside the all-too-human. The political 
implications of this heterogeneity manifest themselves in terms of ‗a reign 
that is not at all a domination,‘ in which the noble type possesses neither 
political power nor wealth nor any effective governing force. As the 
embodiment of a supra-human affirmation, grand politics can be called a 
nonviolent ‗Caesarism of the Overman.‘ (ibid., p.17)  
 
McIntyre uses the following translation of (Haar, M., ‗Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language,‘ in D.B., 
Allison (ed.), The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation, New York, Dell Publishing, 
1977, p.24, 26). This thesis uses the same translation whereby it is also noted that Haar refers to the 
Overman as the ‗More- than- human‘ or ―the highest form of life and a universal‖ (ibid., p.25) who will 
―flash, in sparse solitude, the ―lightning‖ of the More-than-human.‖ (ibid., p.24)  
 
The Overman‘s love for the More-than-human comes from the erotic force of the will to power being 
directed towards the highest things. In the same way that Nietzsche‘s Overman ascends to the supra-
moral, Plato‘s philosopher ascends towards the Idea of the Good or the beautiful through eros or mania. 
For both Plato and Nietzsche, there is a distinction between the genuine philosophical or noble spirit 
and the tyrannic soul. The Overman views the tyrannic soul as that which he has overcome: ―The eros 
for the higher things must grow out of the affirmation of the ‗lower‘ things, as Nietzsche proposes in 
the notion of amor fati.‖ (McIntyre, A., Op. cit., p.95) The Overman is also to be distinguished from 
the free-spiritedness of Caesar, Borgia, and Napoleon, figures whom Nietzsche only affirms them as 
they emerge in times of moral disintegration whereby the spirit of the philosopher is set free ―and the 
possibility of an ascent to nature is opened‖ (ibid., p.96) Kaufmann also asserts that Nietzsche did not 
consider Napoleon an übermensch, and proclaims that ―tyranny over other is not part of Nietzsche‘s 
vision.‖ (Kaufmann, W., Op. cit., p.315-16) His aspiration to wholeness and the innocence of becoming 
and a going up to nature is to be distinguished from the notion of free will (subjective idealism). The 
ascent to nature is carried out through discipline and asceticism, whereby nature is viewed not in 
primitive terms but as higher reality. McIntyre notes this elsewhere in the same work ―nature is not an 
origin ‗back there‘ to which one ‗returns,‘ but an indeterminate, cultural sovereignty to which one 
aspires and ascends...‖ (McIntyre Op. cit., p.24) The asceticism of the philosopher is what distinguishes 
him from the free-spirit, whose freedom does not involve constraint. 
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in an effect of any kind—even if he made the whole globe tremble.‖ (WP: §876) His 
spiritual status lies in being different from the rabble, which in turn leads to isolation. 
The individual type becomes removed from the rabble in the sense that their unique 
experiences cannot be shared or communicated.
66
 
 
The process of solitude involves a withdrawal from herd-conceptions of self-hood; it 
is a way of being faithful to one‘s true self. The spiritual condition of solitude ties in 
directly with the fulfilment of the maxim ‗Become who you are.‘ (EH, ‗Why I am So 
Clever‘: §9) Although Nietzsche rejects the concept of self as metaphysical subject or 
‗substance‘ as a simple abiding ‗thing‘, he nonetheless believes in some kind of 
‗essential self‘. This type of self is an overcoming self or becoming self and is in no 
way a fixed entity. The role of the process of individuation or the ‗principium 
individuationis‘ (BT: §1) is to make one become more and more removed from one‘s 
empirical contingent self or socially-constituted self so that the self that remains, that 
is the true self, can partake in the tremendous moment of Dionysian rapture or 
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 Thiele in his ‗Friedrich Nietzsche and The Politics of the Soul‘ outlines why Nietzsche claims that it 
cannot be communicated:  
 
Experiences are never truly shared, only their simulacra. This is not simply 
because the written or spoken word is a poor reflection of thought. Thought 
itself is a lame transmitter of experience. Consciousness is deemed an anti-
individualistic development, the effect of a herd existence. It is the 
ultimately futile attempt to turn the individual‘s monopoly of experience 
into common, communicable knowledge... Communication, or the making 
common of what is individually experienced, involves a necessary 
falsification. We can communicate our experiences, but at the cost of 
robbing them of their essential uniqueness. For communication marks a 
threefold corruption. Words never adequately or unequivocally portray 
thought, and thought never fully corresponds to experience. In turn, the 
recipient can only interpret the communication according to his own pool 
of (unique) experiences. (Thiele, L., Op.cit., p. 35-36) 
 
This idea of the incommunicability of the higher type‘s unique experiences has been aforementioned in 
the first chapter of this thesis to establish the inadequacies of language and consciousness in their 
inability to capture reality as it is. It is relevant to this chapter, as it explains not only the uniqueness of 
the higher type‘s experiences and its affinity with reality as it is, but also it explains the reason why the 
higher type becomes removed from the rabble or the herd.    
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intoxication. (EH, ‗Z‘: §3)67 It is this element of the complex self or the ―Great 
reason‖ of the unconscious self as the necessary self, which partakes of eternity or the 
inner logos of Becoming. Although Nietzsche rejects soul atomism, he retains the idea 
of the soul and declares it to be ―only a word for something about the body.‖ (Z, I: 
‗On the Despisers of the Body‘) He then goes on to describe the soul in the same 
passage as the ―Great reason‖ of the body.68 (ibid.) However, Nietzsche maintains that 
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 Leiter in his work entitled ‗Nietzsche on Morality‘ notes that Nietzsche‘s account of the higher man 
is reminiscent of Aristotle‘s notion of megalopsychia in book IV of The Nicomachean Ethics (1123b-
1125a16), which has been translated as ―Greatness of soul‖ or magnanimity (Leiter, B., Op. cit., 
p.121). He also takes note of Kaufmann‘s account of the comparison between Nietzsche and Aristotle, 
and also states that Kaufmann neglects to explore it in any detail. There are various similarities to be 
noted, which is evident from Aristotle‘s passage on magnanimity in terms of his association of solitude, 
independence, graciousness, and love of one enemies with the higher soul: ―a person is considered to 
be magnanimous if he thinks that he is worthy of great things, provided that he is worthy of them‖ 
(1123b); ―honour conferred by ordinary people for trivial reasons he will utterly despise‖ (1124a10); 
―and he cannot bear to live in dependence upon somebody else, except a friend because such conduct is 
servile‖ (1125a); ―He does not nurse resentment, because it is beneath a magnanimous man to 
remember things against people, especially wrongs; it is more like him to overlook them.‖ (1125a); 
―For this reason he is not abusive either, not even of his enemies, unless he intends to be insulting‖ 
(1125a). Kaufmann in his work entitled ‗Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist‘ also notes 
that for Aristotle, the good man is a lover of self: ―So it is right for the good man to be self-loving, 
because then he will both be benefited himself by performing fine actions, and also help others. But it 
is not right for the bad man, because he will injure both himself and his neighbours by giving way to 
base feelings‖ (1169a) (Kaufmann Op. cit., p. 382). Kaufmann also takes note of a passage from The 
Will to Power (§984) where Nietzsche mentions that greatness of soul or spiritual greatness cannot be 
separated from greatness of mind: ―greatness of soul cannot be separated from greatness of mind. For it 
involves independence; and without greatness of mind this should not be permitted, as it causes 
mischief.‖ (WM 984)‖ (ibid., p.384). In a similar vein as Aristotle, Nietzsche associates ultimate 
happiness (eudaimonia) with greatness of soul, which is only represented by ―the fewest‖. (ibid. p. 385) 
Kaufmann notes that for Nietzsche ultimate happiness consists of a state called ―power‖ (ibid.). 
According to Kaufmann, Nietzsche contends that the mediocre lack such power, and therefore cannot 
find such happiness. All references to The Nicomachean Ethics in this thesis are from the following 
translation: J.A.K. Thomson (trans.), London, Penguin Books, 1953. Kaufmann uses the following 
translation of The Will to Power, Kaufmann, W., (trans.), New York, Random House, 1967, and is 
abbreviated as WM.  
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 Fredrick Appel, in his ―Nietzsche‘s Natural Hierarchy‖, discusses Nietzsche‘s distinction between 
the different types of instinct (Appel, F., ―Nietzsche‘s Natural Hierarchy‖, International Studies in 
Philosophy, 29:3, 48-62, 1997) He also emphasizes that Nietzsche repudiates the reason-passion 
dichotomy altogether, as he insists that emotion and practical reason are not mutually exclusive. For 
Nietzsche, there is always an intelligent element to the passions as every passion contains ―its quantum 
of reason‖ (ihr Quantum Vernuft) (WP: 387)‖ (ibid., p. 50). However, it is only the noble type that acts 
on his ‗intelligent‘ impulses:  
Although Nietzsche insists that all of us are driven by visceral, ―animal‖ 
instinct, he also believes that only some of us—a minority—possess noble 
instincts, while the rest embody instincts of a base variety. The key 
difference between finer and baser persons does not therefore lie in the 
former‘s ability to transcend animal instinct. Whereas both types of 
character evince animality, the issue is the type of animality, or (what is for 
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it is only some of us, the individual type that possesses noble instincts or ‗intelligent 
instincts‘ as the ―great reason‖ of the body while the rest, the herd, embody instincts 
of a base variety. It is the distinction in their drives that implies that there is a 
distinction in their relation to reality. It is the ―great reason‖ (Z, I: ‗On the Despisers 
of the Body‘) of the body that enables the higher type to encounter the whole. The 
higher self as an overcoming self finds himself in a struggle with the herd, as the herd 
constantly challenges the philosophical life, the life of solitude and the notion of a true 
self. To separate himself from the herd, his socially-determined or herd self involves 
the ambition to find his true self in his lone ascent to the highest mountain top.
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Nietzsche the same thing) the quality of the desires, passions and drives in 
the individual in question. (ibid.) 
Appel insists that ―what matters for the aristocratic-minded Nietzsche is always the quality of the 
impulse; if it is of an elevated, refined order, it belongs by definition to the elevated, refined sort of 
person, who is justified in following it unhesitating.‖(ibid., p.58) Appel notes Nietzsche‘s identification 
of the ―Great Intelligence‖ of the body (Z, I: ‗ODB‘) as the discerning aspect of the self that 
differentiates the noble type from the base. (ibid., p.49) He also explores the idea for Nietzsche that the 
highest types can create his own meaning and order that they can ―inject a form of willed artifice in 
their lives that is not a pre-given by nature.‖ (ibid., p.52) Appel examines the way in which Nietzsche 
rejects soul as substance or as ―an all powerful entity‖ that is separate from natural things‖ and 
―directing them in light of its own master plan.‖ (ibid., p.53) He also acknowledges that Nietzsche 
retains the notion of Nature: ―Many commentators have also taken Nietzsche‘s rejection of pantheistic, 
teleological conceptions of Nature to entail a refusal to attribute any sort of significance to the concept 
of nature... A close reading of the texts, however, reveals that Nietzsche treats the concept of nature 
with the utmost seriousness.‖ (ibid., p.54) Appel goes on to explain that although Nietzsche‘s new 
philosopher criticizes ―many erroneous ways in which nature has been invoked to justify oppressive, 
dogmatic moralities, religious traditions, political movements, etc.,‖ that this critique is ―mounted from 
the standpoint of ―that eternal basic text‖ that is homo natura.‖ (ibid.) The new philosopher overcomes 
the many interpretations and secondary meanings that have been ―scribbled and daubed over that 
eternal basic text homo natura‖ (BGE: 230, cited in this form in Appel, ibid.). According to Appel, 
Nietzsche views Nature as the ―eternal basic text‖, a text which ―points those of us with insight and 
courage to read it towards a (re) discovery of our highest potential, a realization of the hierarchical 
natural order, and a burning desire to be other than the rest of nature—.i.e., those people and things 
naturally below us.‖ (BGE: 9 cited in this form in Appel, ibid.)  It is only those with a certain ―insight 
and courage‖ can read this ―eternal basic text‖, which in turn coincides with the realization of one‘s 
potential or that one creates order or meaning in one‘s life. The following are texts used by Appel 
(Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, New York, Vintage Books, 1986.) abbreviated as WP (Nietzsche, F., 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra‖, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1972) abbreviated as Z and ―On the Despisers of 
the Body‖ abbreviated as ―ODB‖, (Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 
1990), abbreviated as BGE. 
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 Nietzsche uses the metaphor of the mountain or the climb to express the overcoming nature of Life. 
He also makes clear at various points throughout his works that the true philosophers must have the 
ability to endure high mountains or the ability to overcome. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, he asserts that 
―Life wants to build itself up into the heights with pillars and steps; it wants to look into vast distances 
and out toward stirring beauties: therefore it requires height. And because it requires height, it requires 
steps and contradiction among the steps and the climbers. Life wants to climb and to overcome itself 
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Zarathustra calls upon his listeners, and tells them that the way of solitude is the way 
to yourself:  
 
Is it your wish, my brother, to go into solitude? Is it your wish to seek the 
way to yourself? Then linger a moment, and listen to me. 
 
―He who seeks, easily gets lost. All loneliness is guilt‖—thus speaks the 
herd. And you have long belonged to the herd. The voice of the herd will 
still be audible in you. And when you will say, ―I no longer have a 
common conscience with you,‖ it will be a lament and an agony. Behold, 
this agony itself was born of a common conscience, and the last glimmer of 
that conscience still glows on your affliction. 
 
But do you want to go the way of your affliction, which is the way to 
yourself? Then show me your right and your strength to do so. Are you a 
new strength and a new right? A first movement? A self-propelled wheel? 
Can you compel the very stars to revolve around you? 
 
Alas, there is so much lusting for the heights! (Z, I: ‗On the Way of the 
Creator‘) 
 
Nietzsche expresses the dangers of reaching the summit, the experiences of solitude, 
―silence‖ (BGE: §61), and the growing difficulty of living with the herd, and the way 
in which these experiences are misunderstood by the herd. (Schopenhauer as 
Educator: §3, 139) In The Gay Science, Nietzsche expresses that there are those 
―preparatory human beings‖ who can ―pave the way for a still higher age‖, those who 
live the dangers of the philosophical life, ―human beings who know how to be silent, 
lonely, determined, and satisfied and steadfast in invisible activities; human beings 
profoundly predisposed to look, in all things, for what must be overcome...‖ (GS: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
climbing.‖ (Z, II: ‗On the Tarantulas‘) In the preface to Ecce Homo, Nietzsche also expresses that the 
real measure of value, is to what extent a spirit can endure the truth. The practice of philosophy 
involves the experience of living on high mountains, a metaphor for the experience of enduring reality: 
―Philosophy, as I have so far understood and lived, means living voluntarily among ice and high 
mountains—seeking out everything strange and questionable in existence...‖ (EH, Pref.: §3) To reach 
the peak whereby ―the world is surveyed as from a mountain‖ is to solve ―the great problems‖ of 
existence, which is the definition of ―the pathos of philosophy‖ for Nietzsche. (CW: §1) He also relates 
mountains to the sacred: ―I draw circles around me and sacred boundaries; fewer and fewer men climb 
with me on ever higher mountains: I am building a mountain range out of ever more sacred 
mountains.‖ (Z, III: ‗On Old and New Tablets‘) For Nietzsche, parasites as the lowest species do not 
climb mountains; they are ―creeping, cringing worms‖ who nest on the ―little secret sores‖ of the 
―noble all-too-soft.‖ (ibid.) He then uses the opposing metaphor of the valley, as a flat spatial quality, 
which reflects the levelling and vengeful ideas of those who symbolically inhabit it, i.e., the herd or the 
lowest type.  
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§283) These are human beings, according to Nietzsche, who can, in ―living 
dangerously,‖ encounter the ―greatest fruitfulness of existence‖: ―For—believe me—
the secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest 
enjoyment is—to live dangerously! Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! Send 
your ships into uncharted seas!‖ (ibid.) For Nietzsche, this philosophical existence is 
the most spiritually challenging, and requires the utmost strength, as he expresses in 
Beyond Good and Evil: §39 that ―the strength of a spirit should be measured 
according to how much of the ―truth‖ one could still barely endure—‖.  
 
 
Thiele (1990: 180) notes that, for Nietzsche, the challenge facing the solitary is to 
―see how much truth can be endured, and his truth is none other than his life sentence 
of spiritual solitude‖ and that the ―extent to which he can transform this condemnation 
into a triumphant celebration of the self is the mark of his heroism. He becomes a 
demi-god.‖ The philosopher in giving himself up to truth must experience periods of 
illness (GS, Pref. §2) but in overcoming them by way of compensation rises to the 
―Great health‖ of Dionysian life-affirmation. In the Preface to Human, All Too Human 
(§4), he mentions that from periods of ―morbid isolation‖ can come ―tremendous 
overflowing certainty and health which may not dispense even with wickedness, as a 
means and fish-hook of knowledge, to that mature freedom of spirit which is equally 
self-mastery and discipline of the heart and permits access to ... that superfluity of 
formative, curative, moulding and restorative forces which is precisely the sign of 
great health...‖. The philosopher in giving himself up to truth is the person who goes 
on to encounter the whole or the inner logos of Becoming. This truth-relation to 
reality involves an overturning of the Socratic approach to truth, that ties truth into a 
theoretical framework, a framework that Nietzsche declares falsifies reality. It also 
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involves overcoming the Socratic prejudice against the emotions, and redefining the 
‗standpoint‘ of the most truthful man.  
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Chapter Three 
 
 
Nietzsche on the Sacred Art of Reading &Writing 
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I 
 
The Art of Philology: A Primordial Relation to the Author 
 
The following chapter looks at the ―art of reading well‖ (AC: §52) as a way of 
relating to ―the untimely‖ or Becoming through tragic pathos and the unconscious or 
higher self. It will be argued that Nietzsche‘s art of philology is intended to guard us 
against the falsifying affects of language and conscious thinking. It also examines the 
way Nietzsche prioritizes pathos and unique experience over conscious, linguistic  
thinking in relating to an author primordially. It also looks at ―reading and writing in 
blood‖ (Z, I: §7) as a philosophical condition for the higher type‘s ascent to 
Becoming, which is a pre-requisite stage to him forging the way for a New Dionysian 
Age. The ideal readers for Nietzsche are those who possess the requisite tragic insight 
and pathos, and in bringing this to the text come to a true understanding of his works. 
It is through an understanding of the personal in Nietzsche that one comes to truly 
understand the objective or the universal in his thought. His works are a reflection of 
his personal experiences and unconscious, and it is through an examination of the 
personal that one comes to a true understanding of his writing. His works are not for 
those readers whose ―interests‖ are other than the philosophical or the ‗love for the 
higher-than-human‘.70 Nietzsche criticizes those ―interested‖ readers who do not 
                                                          
70
 This idea of ‗love for the higher than human‘ is explored by Alex McIntyre, as has been 
aforementioned in the previous chapter, in his work ‗The Sovereignty of Joy: Nietzsche‘s Vision of 
Grand Politics‘, Op. cit., p.74-99. This idea of love for something higher than the human world is 
presupposed by education (paideia), which is rethought by Nietzsche as cultivation. This philosophical 
eros or love for things beyond the all-too-human, as the desire for the higher things, is the force behind 
education. Education as cultivation or self-discipline in the form of ‗reading and writing in blood‘ 
enables the overman or the ‗more than human‘ to encounter the highest things. This highest realm is the 
universal in Nietzsche or what could be referred to as  reality or Becoming or more specifically an 
―eternity‖ within Becoming. . It is in this way that philosophical reading involves encountering the 
‗more-than-human‘; however, it also entails encountering the non-anthropomorphic universal or the 
‗more-than-human‘ through relating primordially to the author, and in enabling both the author and text 
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acknowledge the metaphysical independence of the text and the author. (AC: §52) For 
Nietzsche, philosophical reading, as the art of philology or the ―art of reading well‖ 
(AC: §52), an art that has ―the sense for facts‖ (AC: §59) must aim to acknowledge 
the text in its own being, and its relation with the whole or the universal
71
: ―What is 
here meant by philology is, in a very broad sense, the art of reading well—of reading 
facts without falsifying them by interpretation, without losing caution, patience, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to reveal itself. Nietzsche‘s idea of philosophical education of ‗reading and writing in blood‘ provides 
the ideal conditions for encountering the whole or affirming life, such as solitude, discipline and 
isolation. This type of reading and writing in blood engages the whole body, and in turn it involves 
participation within the whole.. It is a type of education that is best expressed by the metaphor of the 
mountain climb, as reading for Nietzsche involves the feeling of vertigo. The metaphor of the tree of 
life is also used by Nietzsche as the paradigm of the new philosopher (GM, preface: §2), which also 
conveys the idea of ‗growing in height‘ (GS: §371)  
 
—for we ourselves keep growing, changing, shedding old hides; we still 
shed our skins every spring; we become interestingly younger, more 
future-oriented, taller, stronger; we drive our roots ever more powerfully 
into the depths—into evil—while at the same time embracing the heavens 
ever more lovingly and broadly, and absorbing their light ever more 
thirstily with all our sprigs and laves. Like trees we grow—it‘s hard to 
understand, like all life!—not in one place, but everywhere; not in one 
direction, but upwards and outwards and inwards and downwards equally; 
our energy drives trunk, branches, and roots all at once; we are no longer 
free to do anything individual, to be anything individual...This is our lot, as 
I have said: we grow in height; and even if this should be our dark fate—
for we dwell ever closer to the lightning!—well, we do not honour it less 
on that account; it remains that which we do not want to share, to impart: 
the dark fate of height, our fate.  
 
71
 Nietzsche advocates the art of philology as the ―art of reading well‖ (AC: §52) in contrast to 
philology in its dogmatic form, as ―reading rightly‖ where there is a single ―true meaning‖ to the text. 
He also rejects the ―bad philology‖ of Christian theologians (BGE: §52), whose dogmatic 
interpretations mask their own interests. This type of philology is allegedly disinterested, but actually 
rather reflects the interests of the philologist. This rejection of philology in its dogmatic form has led to 
what is called perspectival interpretation (interested), and to the unbounded play of textual 
appropriation. Nietzsche considers this the fate of bad philology, a perspectival relativism where the 
text eventually disappears under the interpretation. (See BGE: §38) Nietzsche‘s return in his later 
writings to philology as the ―art of reading well‖ (AC: §52) is actually intended to guard against the 
relativistic tendencies of his perspectivism. He introduces the art of philology as a transvalued notion of 
philology. He claims that the demands of philology require that we keep the text separate from its 
interpretation or that we ―read off a fact without falsifying it by interpretation.‖ (AC: §52) This entails 
that there is truth or a text that is independent of interpretation. This chapter looks at the art of 
philology in terms of taking into account the truth of the text, i.e., the relationship between the text and 
the totality (truth) from which it emerges. It also examines the art of reading as coming into an 
attunement with this totality (musical). This type of reading also involves controlling one‘s social, herd 
or pragmatic interests in order to let the text reveal itself. It is an experience of the ―select few‖. It 
involves relating to him by way of similar experience, the same tragic pathos. His early work, The Birth 
of Tragedy is a model of this new philology. 
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delicacy, in the desire to understand. Philology as ephexis in interpretation—‖ (AC: 
§52) He wishes to guard us against the falsifying crudities of language. The art of 
philology requires an ephexis, the root of the phenomenological epochē, that one 
controls his interests while letting the text reveal itself. 
 
In his essay ‗Perspectivism and Interpretation,‘ Jean Granier indicates that Nietzsche 
recognizes that his perspectivism can lead to the dissolution of the ―text‖ in ―the swirl 
of different interpretations‖ such that he wishes ―to teach philosophers ―the 
inestimable art of reading well,‖ to instruct them in principles of rigorous philology.‖ 
(1977: 195) He claims that Nietzsche ―calls for a return to the book of nature, he seeks 
to reveal ―natural man.‖‖ (ibid.) 
 
To translate man back into nature; to become master over the many vain 
and overly enthusiastic interpretations and connotations that have so far 
been scrawled and painted over that eternal basic text of homo natura; to 
see it that man henceforth stands before man as even today, hardened in the 
discipline of science, he stands before the rest of nature, with intrepid 
Oedipus eyes and sealed Odysseus ears, deaf to the siren songs of the old 
metaphysical bird-catchers.
72
 (BGE: §230, cited in this form in Granier 
1977: 195-96) 
 
In referring to section (§52) of The Antichrist, Granier makes it clear that ―Nietzsche 
demands that the real ―facts‖ be disentangled from ―beliefs,‖ that the text be separated 
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 This quote expresses that Nietzsche wishes to return to ‗Nature‘ ; and in turn overcome or become 
―master of‖ our many anthropomorphic projections onto reality or ―the many vain and overly 
enthusiastic interpretations of reality.‖ (BGE: §230) Karl Jaspers also looks at how the text or Nature 
for Nietzsche can become ―almost non-existent‖ because of a ―multiplicity of meanings‖: ―When seen 
in these connections, the text, precisely because of its multiplicity of meanings, is almost non-existent, 
and thus there is a tendency to lose sight of it as the standard for the truth of the interpretation.‖ 
(Jaspers, K., Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of his Philosophical Activity, Charles, F., 
Wallraff & F.R., Schmitz (trans.), London, The John Hopkins University Press, 1997, p.290) He then 
goes on to state that ―in another connection, Nietzsche insists all the more that the genuine text must be 
preserved from contamination by mistaken exegesis. In this vein he asks that man be sent back into 
nature.‖ (ibid.) In referencing Nietzsche, he also states that we must overcome or ―become master of 
the many vain and fanciful constructions and secondary meanings that up to the present have been 
scribbled and painted over the eternal, basic text homo natura.‖ (Jaspers ibid. p. 290 citing BGE: §230) 
Nietzsche asserts that the genuine philosopher overcomes anthropomorphic or human truths that are 
projected onto reality or ―the eternal, basic text homo natura.‖ (BGE: §230) 
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from the interpretations that obscure its original meaning.‖73 (Granier 1977: 196) He 
also notes that in section (§47) of The Antichrist, that for Nietzsche, this approach in 
philology of recognizing the metaphysical independence of the text, or of reality, as 
the ―seriousness for true things‖, which rests upon ―the instinct for reality‖ ―is 
completely lacking in Christianity.‖ (Granier 1977: 196) He states that for Nietzsche, 
 
A religion like Christianity, which is at no point in contact with actuality, 
which crumbles away as soon as actuality comes into its own at any point 
whatever, must naturally be a mortal enemy of the ―wisdom of the world,‖ 
that is to say of science... Paul wants to confound the ―wisdom of the 
world‖: his enemies are the good philologists of the Alexandrian school—
upon them he makes war. In fact, one is not philologist and physician 
without also being at the same time anti-Christian. (AC: §47, cited in this 
form in Granier 177: 196)  
 
He also examines an underlying antinomy that disturbs Nietzsche‘s whole reflection. 
He contends that Nietzsche seems to oscillate between   
 
 ... a wholly perspectivist phenomenalism—which results in identifying 
truth with value, and, ultimately, abolishes the very notion of ―text‖—and a 
definition of authentic knowledge as strict ―philology,‖ which, taken 
literally, risks issuing into dogmatism. Sometimes the text becomes 
exhausted by a multitude of interpretations, each claiming to justify itself 
according to some criterion of ―vital utility‖ (i.e., ―value‖). Sometimes the 
text seems to recover complete independence from its interpretations and 
to attain a univocal sense; the task of the good philologist would be to 
restore this sense to its original truth.‖ (Granier 1977: 197)  
 
 
Granier claims that Nietzsche ―overcomes this antinomy between relativism and 
dogmatism on the basis of his intuition of Being as interpreted Being.‖ (ibid.)74 
                                                          
73
 Granier uses the following translation of the quotation from The Antichrist (§52): ―Here, philology 
should be understood, in a very general sense, as the art of reading well—being able to pluck out the 
facts without falsifying them by interpretation, without losing caution, patience, subtlety in the search 
for understanding‖. (Cited in this form in Granier, J., ‗Perspectivism and Interpretation‘, In: D.B., 
Allison (trans.), The New Nietzsche, London, The MIT Press, 1977, p.196). 
 
74
 Schrift in his ‗Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation‖ also notes this antinomy that is 
recognized by Granier in his work ‗Le problѐme de la Vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche‘ as a 
――radical ontological problematic.‖‖ (Schrift, A., Op. cit., p.167) Schrift‘s reference to this problematic 
is from Granier, J., Le problѐme de la Vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 
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Granier argues that the art of philology is not a form of dogmatism, as he recognizes 
that Nietzsche in a letter to Fuchs (26 August 1888) insists upon the impossibility of a 
definitive interpretation. (1977: 197) He recognizes that there are interpretations, that 
Being is ―interpreted Being‖ but reality or Being itself cannot be reduced to a 
perspective. For Granier, Nietzsche is to be understood as holding that ―we do not 
have the right to spirit away the text and substitute the idea of a fundamental chaos—
...The text is, it has its own subsistence, and all perspectives on it are not equally 
legitimate.‖ (1977: 197-198)  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1966, p.325. He claims that according to Granier, ―Nietzsche‘s rigorous philological method proposes 
the epochē of our anthropomorphic perspectives in order to facilitate our reading the primordial ―text‖ 
of interpreted-Being honestly and justly.‖ (Schrift, A., Op.cit., p.167) Schrift references from ‗Le 
problѐme de la Vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche‘ what Granier considers Nietzsche‘s passion for 
knowledge to consist of: ―The passion for knowledge is the manifestation of that intransigent 
intellectual probity which forbids us to interpret Being as a function of our needs and wishes, that is, in 
an anthropomorphic manner, and which commands us to have absolute respect for the ―text.‖‖ (cited in 
this form in Schrift, ibid., p.167) (Schrift‘s reference to Granier asking us to have absolute respect for 
the text is from: Granier, J., Le Problème de la vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche, Op. cit., p.501-
2) Schrift offers an alternative view to Granier given by Sarah Kofman, a follower of Derrida, who 
wrote a review of Granier appended to her work ‗Nietzsche et la métaphore‘. In this review, she 
criticizes Granier‘s ―ontologization‖ of Nietzsche for remaining within the Heidegerrian problematic of 
the question of Being. Kofman rather looks at Nietzsche as a genealogist rather than as a philosopher of 
Being. 
 
Whereas the task of philology, for Granier‘s Nietzsche, is to decipher 
Being as that which constitutes perspectival interpretations, Kofman‘s 
Nietzsche views ―Being‖ itself as a text constituted by the primary 
interpretations of the spontaneous instinctual evaluations which need to 
make life intelligible. (ibid., p.167) (Schrift‘s reference to Kofman is from 
Kofman, S., Nietzsche and Metaphor, Paris, Payot, 1972, p.201)  
 
Kofman accuses Granier of dogmatism that to have ―absolute respect for the text‖ is to have a dogmatic 
viewpoint, and not recognize an interpretation as interpretation. In ‗Perspectivism and Interpretation‘ it 
is possible to consider Granier rather arguing against the idea of dogmatism in Nietzsche, in claiming 
that Nietzsche resists the idea of one correct definitive interpretation of the text. See Granier, J., 
Perspectivism and Interpretation, Op. cit., p.197. Granier rather claims that Nietzsche argues for the 
metaphysical independence of Being or of the text from interpretation, and that Being is always open to 
interpretation (ibid.). He claims that Being is always interpreted Being but at the same time he contends 
that there is a more fundamental relation to the text than a utility perspective.  Schrift who also follows 
the same line of argument as Kofman reduces reality and the text to interpretation, ―the interpretation is 
the text,‖ which could be argued to be a postmodern approach to interpretation in Nietzsche. (Schrift, 
A., Op. cit., p.196) 
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The original antinomy between relativism and dogmatism, according to Granier, has 
been congealed into independent poles, when the limits of Nietzsche‘s thought should 
be viewed with more flexibility. (Granier 1977: 198) It seems that Granier is claiming 
that there are varying degrees of appearance in interpretation; that the more pragmatic 
the interpretation the more apparent it is, but the art of philology demands that one 
recognize what is real, the text that is. He refers to Jaspers on this point,  
 
... Nietzsche‘s contradictions show us what he is driving at. Existence both 
provides and is a product of exegesis. It is regarded as a circle that renews 
itself constantly while seeming to annul itself. It is now objectivity and 
now subjectivity; it appears first as substance and then as constantly 
annulled substance; though unquestionably there, it is constantly 
questioning and questionable; it is both being and not-being, the real and 
the apparent. (Granier 1977: 198, quoting Jaspers 1969:290)  
 
Granier mentions that these ―limits‖ ―mark the double gradient of Nietzsche‘s 
meditations.‖ (1977: 198):  
 
On the one hand, by accentuating the creative, dominating, and Caesarian 
aspects in the notion of interpretation, one is led to the doctrine of 
perspectivist pragmatism, according to which ―to know‖ means ―to 
introduce sense into the world‖—thus bending the latter to one‘s own vital 
interests. Here, knowledge is annexation, effort of appropriation, will to 
dominate reality. Consequently, insofar as it renders as much violence to 
reality as does every center of Will to Power, a perspectivist pragmatist 
interpretation is necessarily a ―falsification.‖ On the other hand, if one is 
concerned with the objective side of interpretation—that is, with the text 
that bears each of the interpretations—one is led to contest the ultimate 
validity of the criterion itself (vital utility) and to deny that any 
interpretation is admissible as soon as it favors the expansion of one type 
or another of Will to Power. (Granier 1977: 199)  
 
Granier mentions that ―the rules of true philology require that we sacrifice interest and 
utility for the demands of a textual understanding, one that would restore, to the extent 
to which it is possible, the original meaning of the text.‖ (ibid.) He goes on to state 
that for Nietzsche, ―The text is not a plaything of human subjectivity; ―basically there 
is within us, way ‗down below,‘ something unteachable—a granite of spiritual fate.‖ 
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(ibid.)
75
 Here we must set out to discover this primordial ground, upon which every 
interpretation grows.‖ (ibid.) It seems that Granier wishes to argue that primordial 
reading as presuppositionless reading does not involve utility perspectives; it must 
arise from a primordial ground that is way ‗down below‘, which can be argued to be 
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 This quotation is a reference made by Granier to Beyond Good and Evil (§231), which alludes to the 
idea of the metaphysical independence of the soul from interpretation or empirical data. (Granier, J., 
Op. cit., p.199) It is also noted by Jaspers in his ‗Nietzsche: An introduction to the Understanding of 
His Philosophical Activity‘ where he claims that, for Nietzsche there is an unchanging ‗that is I‘ or 
what is referred to in this thesis as the higher self, the ―Great reason of the Body‖ or the ‗inmost centre‘ 
(Letter to Carl Fuchs dec.14
th
, 1887), which, like the text, exists independent of interpretation:  
 
... although the text to be read is both outside of me and within me and I 
myself am indeed only the text that I can read, still Nietzsche points out a 
possible boundary. The process does not proceed ad infinitum: although I 
constantly undergo change as I provide exegeses, I do eventually strike 
bedrock. There is something firm and constant that is not resolved into 
interpretation and is not even touched by it. (Jaspers, K., Op. cit., p.291)  
 
He also goes on to make a reference to Beyond Good and Evil (§231),  
 
Basically there is within us, way ‗down below,‘ something unteachable—a 
granite of spiritual fate.... In connection with every cardinal problem, an 
unchanging ‗that is I‘ speaks. .... At times one finds certain solutions of 
problems .... perhaps one calls them his ‗convictions.‘ Later on he sees in 
them only… road signs pointing to the problem that we are—more 
correctly, to the great stupidity that we are, and to our spiritual fate and our 
incorrigibility way ‗down deep.‘ (BGE: §231, cited in this form in Jaspers, 
Op. cit., p.291)  
 
 
Graham Parkes also examines this image of the soul captured by Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil 
(§231) in his work ‗Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche‘s Psychology‘ in a section entitled 
‗Earth, Rock and Stone‘. In examining Nietzsche‘s conception of the soul, he identifies its background 
with Schopenhauer: ―The immediate background to this idea of an immutable foundation to the human 
psyche is provided by Schopenhauer, who argued that the empirical character is unalterable on the 
grounds that it is the unfolding of an act of the will, which stands outside time altogether.‖ Parkes, G., 
Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche‘s Psychology, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994, 
p.135 This is a reference made by Parkes to The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer, A., 
1:55, trans. E.F.J. Payne, New York, 1966. Parkes also claims that ―Nietzsche alludes to this idea in his 
essay on Schopenhauer when he writes that a person‘s true educators and formative teachers (Bildner) 
―show the true primal sense and basic material of your being, something absolutely ineducable and 
unmalleable [unbildbar], but in any case difficult to get to, bound and paralyzed‖ (SE 1).‖ (Cited in this 
form in Parkes, G., Op. cit., p.135) This Schopenhauerian idea of the soul standing outside of time, 
which influenced Nietzsche, is viewed in this thesis as the necessary self, the higher self that 
participates within the ‗untimely‘‘.  In the third section of this thesis, this ―granite‖ (BGE: §231) or 
―basic material‖ (Schopenhauer as Educator: §1) of one‘s being will be viewed in relation to 
education, and the role of the educator as liberator in Nietzsche. Parkes also states that it is such ―a 
fitting image for the very bottom of the soul, for that in us that we cannot change, a fate of which we 
are innocently unconscious—and which we become aware of only slowly and with difficulty, if at all. 
It constitutes the core of our being, which reaches back down through the deepest strata of history.‖ 
(Parkes, Op. cit., p. 136) It is this ‗I‘ that withholds an untimely relation to reality, and enables an 
untimely education to take place. 
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the higher self in Nietzsche, or one‘s unconscious more specifically the ―Great Reason 
of the Body‖.76 The most presuppositionless standpoint from which interpretations 
can take place is an unconscious horizon that belongs to the whole; it is an impersonal 
self. Granier claims that there is one voice which reveals truth ―much louder‖ than 
through one‘s vital interests:  
 
For the noblest and most courageous spirits, one voice speaks louder than 
that of their own vital interests, commanding us to do justice to nature, to 
reveal things as they are in their own being. Philological probity cannot 
accommodate itself to the falsifications of a biased biology; rather it 
animates an authentic ―passion to know,‖ attached to reality itself, 
preferring dispiriting truth to fallacious ideals. (1977: 199) 
 
Philology, for Nietzsche, in demanding that the reader ―be able to read off a text as a 
text without interposing an interpretation,‖ (WP: §479) implies that not only is there a 
text that is metaphysically independent of interpretation but also that there is an 
approach to the text that does not falsify it. Nietzsche asks of the reader to suspend all 
presuppositions such as theoretical constructions or conscious or utility perspectival 
points of view in order to attain a primordial relation with the text. Those ‗interested‘ 
readers who project their own subjective perspectives or interests onto the text, fail to 
communicate with Nietzsche, as genuine communication operates at a level prior to  
conscious or linguistic interests. It rather operates at the level of spiritual pathos (non-
linguistic) through which a reader brings similar experiences to the text as the author; 
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 This ‗granite of spiritual fatum‘ (BGE: §231) that both Granier and Jaspers refers to above is what is 
referred to in this thesis as the higher self, or what Nietzsche refers to as one‘s ipsissimosity (HH, II, 
pref.: §2), a becoming self or an unconscious horizon that enables interpretation to take place. This has 
already been expressed in chapter one, sec.5. This idea of the self is that which is one‘s closest relation 
to  reality in Nietzsche; it is the realm of the ―unsaid‖, of silence or of pathos. In this chapter it will be 
argued that in order to enter into a primordial relation with Nietzsche, the author, it requires of the 
reader to be able to share the same pathos, and in turn the same soul. This primordial relation is the 
most presuppositionless position, as it the ‗ground‘ of one‘s being, and does not withhold any 
conscious, social or herd interests. It is this ‗I‘ that is referred to in Beyond Good and Evil (§231) which 
is the self that can be attuned to  reality in the experience of amor fati. It is from this presuppositionless 
position that Nietzsche‘s writings flow, from ‗deep down,‘ from his ―granite of spiritual fatum‖ (BGE: 
§231), which is in turn in attunement with reality. This in turn further compounds the argument that 
Nietzsche‘s style emerges from his metaphysics of Becoming. 
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and it is at this level that the reader does not falsify the text. The goal of philosophical 
reading is not to discern the ‗opinions‘ of the author but rather to come to a deeper 
understanding of an author through relating to his personal style, as the 
communication of a tragic pathos, or through thinking about those essential questions, 
―the great problems‖ (The Case of Wagner: §1), the deepest existential ones which 
Nietzsche himself thought about. In collecting various ‗opinions‘ on an author it can 
culminate in what is supposedly referred to as a ‗philosophical education‘, which 
consists of mere accounts of what the philosophers have said. Philosophical education 
or cultivation rather involves entering into the blood of an author or recognizing the 
life-experiences that is brought to writings, experiences that are closest to or 
approximate towards  ‗Life‘.77 In the final aphorism of Beyond Good and Evil (§296), 
Nietzsche shows that the immortality of writing lies in its untimely relation to the 
whole such that writings are an expression of the unconscious and in turn the silent 
logos. Nietzsche refers to this life-experience that approximates towards Becoming  as 
insight, as ―rapture‖ or ―inspiration‖ (EH, ‗Z‘: §3), and sees it as a form of silent 
revelation (non-linguistic). In Ecce Homo, he notes that this revelation as an 
experience that comes closest to reality is one that ―merely describes the facts‖ (ibid.) 
or things as they are themselves.  
 
It is when a reader fails to take into account  the whole  that reading results in a 
collection of bloodless concepts and mere authors‘ opinions. For those readers who 
                                                          
 
77
 This experience shows that his writing style is an expression of ―overpowering forces‖ (EH, ‗Z‘: §3) 
or of reality itself.. It is in this way that it can be further argued that Nietzsche‘s style emerges from his 
metaphysics. His style for this reason  flows from ‗inspiration‘ , which is in turn an expression of the 
whole. In being an expression of truth, Nietzsche‘s writings cannot be argued to fall victim to the 
acclaimed problem of self-referentiality, or what is referred to as ‗the Liar‘s paradox‘, a paradox that 
claims that his writings in being mere perspectives bears no relation to truth, and therefore lose their 
metaphysical credibility.     
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put all the emphasis on words and concepts, philosophy degenerates into endless 
interpretations which offer only superficial or surface readings of Nietzsche. The 
genuine reader of Nietzsche must aim to see behind the words of the author, and 
identify the true meaning of the text with the author‘s life experiences, a form of silent 
revelation in the case of Nietzsche
78
 or in the self-reflection that underlies the works 
themselves. On the one hand, philosophical reading entails taking into account the 
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 This thesis examines Nietzsche‘s most fundamental relation to ‗things as they are‘, and  argues that it 
is through silent tragic insight, pathos or revelation that one is closest to things themselves. Derrida‘s 
critique of logocentrism or phonocentrism (voice had received privileged status by the western 
rationalist tradition whereby it was viewed as a medium for gaining direct access to things themselves 
or reality) implies that he emphasises the written word, and subordinates speech to writing. In this 
chapter, it will be maintained that Nietzsche rather subordinates writing to speech and in turn he makes 
the transition to subordinating speech to silence. It is also important to note that Derrida falsely 
associates Plato with speech; Plato is rather an advocate of a silent approach to things as they are, and 
in taking this point into account it is possible to identify a connection between Nietzsche and Plato. For 
a criticism of Derrida‘s interpretation of Plato, see Rosen, S., ‗Platonic Reconstruction‘, In: 
Hermeneutics as Politics, New York, Oxford University Press, 1987 where Rosen claims that ―In the 
Platonic dialogues, there is again no ontology (no discursive logos of Being). Socrates encourages the 
madness of a silent and direct approach to the Ideas; indeed, he refers to this erotic ascent as ―divine 
madness‖‖ (ibid., p.53) Rosen also hopes in the same essay ―to show that Derrida‘s central insight into 
Plato is also a profound (and therefore fruitful) misunderstanding. ... ‖ (ibid., p.54) He then goes on to 
explain that 
 
To anticipate, Derrida is quite mistaken to associate speech in Plato with a 
metaphysics of presence and to infer from this association an ontological 
meaning in Socrates‘ criticism of writing. Speech, more specifically human 
speech, is as much a mark of absence as is writing. Derrida fails to 
appreciate the significance of the fact that logos means neither speech nor 
writing in Plato‘s vocabulary and hence that is can be used in a secondary 
sense for either the one or the other. The distinction between speech and 
writing that Derrida finds in Plato ... is imposed onto the text by a 
contemporary or post-Kantian incapacity to detach oneself from language, 
from the sign as signifier, not of a being (to say nothing of Being), but of 
another signifier. (ibid.)   
 
 
Rosen notes that Derrida overlooks Plato‘s subordination of speech to silence: ―Derrida never sees this, 
because for him, the primordial nature of writing makes silence impossible. And this why there can be 
no difference in Derrida between reading and writing. Derrida cannot read at all, because reading 
requires a moment of silence in which we see the text. For Derrida, however, seeing is already writing; 
hence reading is a displacing or rendering absent of the text.‖  (ibid., p.77) Rosen claims that the 
―Derridean soul‖ is ―neither erotic nor mantic. His madness (if that is the right term) is postmodern, 
hence neither divine nor human.‖ (ibid.) The free play of the signifier be it in the form of language or 
conscious interpretation implies that it cannot capture the signified (text or reality). The signified as the 
thing-in-itself cannot be accessed (Kantian prohibition against the accessibility of reality). However, it 
can be argued that reality can be accessed through tragic pathos that is non-linguistic, the realm of 
silence. Nietzsche does reject the ‗in-itself‘ in the after-worldly sense but this does not imply that he 
rejects reality or its accessibility. 
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metaphysically independent author; the ideal reader of Nietzsche enters into a 
primordial relation with the text in sharing a similar pathos. On the other hand, 
philosophical reading requires that the reader develop his higher self, which highlights 
its educative aspect. The type of reading Nietzsche advocates is one which disciplines 
one towards the whole or attunes one towards  reality in the experience of amor fati.   
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II 
Nietzsche on Writing as the Cultivation of a Higher Self & 
 Reading as the Exploration of the Autobiographical Nature of his Works 
 
 
Philosophical reading requires taking into account the existential character of 
Nietzsche‘s philosophical activity. It is for this reason that Nietzsche always takes his 
‗self‘ into consideration in highlighting its connection with the philosophical activity 
of participating within the whole. Nietzsche refers to himself with the prolific use of 
the word ‗I‘ as he recognizes how inseparable his ‗inmost being‘ or unconscious is 
from Becoming.
79
 The higher self or the ―Great reason of the Body‖ is the necessary 
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 Karl Jaspers explains that, for Nietzsche, the source of philosophical knowledge ―is not to be found 
in thinking about mere objects or in investigating mere facts but rather in the unity of thought and life, 
so that thinking grows out of the provocation and agitation of the whole man, —all this constitutes for 
Nietzsche‘s self-consciousness the real character of his truth: ―I have always composed my writings 
with my whole body and life‖; ―All truths are bloody truths to me.‖ ―I do not simply present mental 
processes, I only speak of experienced things.‖‖ (Jaspers, K., Op. cit., p.386, quoting Nietzsche). 
Beatrice Han also notes that Nietzsche wrote with his whole body and life: ―Thought has to its non-
theoretical meaning by being linked anew to the life of the thinker...Theoretical comprehension must be 
rooted in existential experience: understanding something means living it, ‗I have always written my 
writings with my whole body and life. I do not know what purely intellectual problems are‘. (Han, B., 
‗Nietzsche and the ‗Masters of Truth‘, In, Nietzsche and the Divine, John Lippit and Jim Urpeth (eds.), 
Manchester, Clinamen Press, 2000, p.129, quoting Nietzsche) Jaspers emphasizes that true 
philosophical thinking or ―truly knowledgeable thinking‖ arises from a subjectivity that belongs to the 
whole or takes place within ―the subjectivity of a life that enters existence and the world, and that itself 
is all of this. ―We belong to the character of the world. …We have no access to it except through 
ourselves.‖‖ (Jaspers, K., Op.cit., p.386-387) He goes on to explain that ―thinking with the ―whole 
body and life‖—is at the same time the way to the complete man who, as such, becomes really aware of 
the character of the world. Such a one ―conceives reality as it is, ...is not estranged from or transported 
out of it...for he is reality itself.‖‖ (ibid., p.387) For Nietzsche, his life serves as the basis of 
philosophical knowledge, it is for this reason that he brings his life experiences to the writing of his 
works, and he also asserts that those who truly ‗know‘ him bring similar life-experiences to the text. 
Nietzsche proclaims that through reading and writing in blood or with one‘s whole body, ones‘ 
intuitive self that one participates within the whole. Jaspers claims that for Nietzsche there is a 
distinction between truly philosophical knowledge and knowledge of things. It is in this way that 
Nietzsche as a psychologist is not an empirical observer ―seeking to grasp his facts ...with a view to 
causal explanation; rather his psychology consists in a philosophical illumination of Existenz.‖ The 
type of psychology that illumines Existenz is self-understanding as opposed to self-observation where 
self-observation relates to empirical existence or the observation of one‘s self as an object. According 
to Jaspers, Nietzsche maintains that self-understanding takes place through self-reflection rather than 
self-observation:  
 
 
 
In contrast to the misunderstood ways of psychological self-observation 
and endless self-reflection stands self-understanding as illumination 
through the inner activity of philosophizing. This involves not merely my 
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self and is opposed to the contingent empirical self. It should be noted that by certain 
commentators the idea of the unconscious and its relation to reality is overlooked and, 
in turn, the idea of the author is also rejected. There are commentators who reject the 
presence of the author as a result of their rejection of the transcendental signified as a 
stable substance, which has culminated in what is referred to as the death of the 
author.
80
   
 
This chapter will explore not only the role of the author and to acknowledge his 
independence from interpretation but also to argue that the true meaning and value of 
a text is in the self-reflection that underlies it. The philosophical meaning of reading 
and writing lies in its relation to the development of the philosophical self or the 
higher self, and in turn its relation to Becoming. Nietzsche uses the metaphor of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
individual existence (subjectivity), and not merely affairs that concern men 
generally (objectivity), but Existenz which is inherent in both. Existenz is 
the self-being that I alone am, in that I am in the world, have to deal with 
many things, and live within the whole. Self-understanding relates to the 
individual who, as possible Existenz, is what he is through the manner in 
which being shows itself to him. Thus, within self-being, self-
understanding touches upon something general or something exceptional 
but still generally essential. Nietzsche‘s thinking is, in large part, a self-
understanding by way of specific contents which, as such, he again 
understands within the whole. As a young man he wrote: ―I am trying to 
discover in what respect my misery is general, and I shun any opportunity 
to become personal‖ (to Rohde, May, ‗74) (ibid., p. 385) 
 
Jaspers uses the following reference for Letters to Rohde: Friedrich Nietzsches Gesammelte Briefe 
(Friedrich Nietzsche‘s Collected Letters), Leipzig, Inselverlag, vol. II: Nietzsche‘s correspondence with 
E. Rohde; 2
nd
 ed.  
 
80
 Sean Burke in his ‗The Ethics of Writing: Authorship & Legacy‘ points out the two postmodern 
authors who uphold this position as Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault, and references their works as 
follows: Roland Barthes, ‗The Death of the Author,‘ In: Stephen Heath (trans. & ed.), Image-Music-
Text, London, Fontana,1977, pp. 42-48 and Michel Foucault, ‗What is an Author?,‘ In: D., Bouchard 
and Sherry Simon (trans. & eds.), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays & 
Interviews, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1977, pp. 113-38, 138. Burke mentions that 
Foucault upholds the poststructuralist view of writing as the radical dispossession of authorship 
whereby writing is free to roam about the place, in the absence of its father or author. (Burke, S., The 
Ethics of Writing: Authorship and Legacy in Plato and Nietzsche, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University 
Press, 2008 p.36) He also expresses that postmodernists reject authorship as a logocentric category, as a 
transcendental signified within a metaphysics of presence, rested upon a counterintuitive association of 
‗authorship‘  with presence metonymically registered as ‗voice‘.‖ (ibid. p.37-38) According to Burke, 
Derrida assumes that authority, for Plato, is invested in the idea of speech as presence, and expresses 
that this is a misreading of Plato. (ibid.,  p. 37)  
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tree of life to express that there is a necessary connection between the life of a writer 
and his work, and that there is in turn a necessary link between the work and the 
oneness of Becoming; both the life and work of an author is an expression of the 
whole:  
We have no right to isolated acts of any kind: we may not make isolated 
errors or hit upon isolated truths. Rather do our ideas, our values, our yeas 
and nays, our ifs and buts grow out of us with the necessity which a tree 
bears fruit—related and each with an affinity to each, and evidence of one 
will, one health, one soil, one sun. (GM, Preface: §2)    
 
In viewing the author as belonging to the total union of Being, Nietzsche advocates its 
immortality:    
 
That author has drawn the happiest lot who as an old man can say that all 
of life-engendering, strengthening, elevating, enlightening thought and 
feeling that was in him lives on in his writings, and that he himself is 
nothing but the grey ashes, while the fire has everywhere been rescued and 
borne forward.—If one now goes on to consider that, not only a book, but 
every action performed by a human being becomes in some way the cause 
of other actions, decisions, thoughts, that everything that happens is 
inextricably knotted to everything that will happen, one comes to recognize 
the existence of an actual immortality, that of motion: what has once 
moved is enclosed and eternalized in the total union of all being like an 
insect in amber. (HH, I: §208) 
 
All philosophical works are a reflection of the personal nature of the philosopher and 
it is through the personal or the subjective that one encounters the realm of Becoming 
as objective reality. The philosophical self, for Nietzsche, is oriented to one thing 
alone and that is to truth, something universal; it is the site of belonging to truth. It is 
from this universal position that Nietzsche writes his works; and it is in this way that 
they transcend the ‗human, all-too-human‘.   
 
—Shall my experience—the history of an illness and recovery, for a 
recovery, was what eventuated—have been my personal experience alone? 
And only my ‗human, all-too-human‘? Today I would like to believe the 
reverse; again and again I feel sure that my travel books were not written 
solely for myself, as sometimes seems to be the case—. (HH, II, Preface: 
§6)  
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In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche reflects upon one of his untimely meditations, 
Schopenhauer as Educator and expresses that the goal of philosophical education lies 
in the development or realization of one‘s true self or higher self, or in what draws the 
soul upward or ―immeasurably high above.‖ (§1) This idea of the soul being drawn 
upward is reminiscent of the soul being in attunement with the ‗more than human 
realm‘ or reality. The meditation on Schopenhauer is thus introduced as Nietzsche‘s 
attempt to discover his own true self. In Ecce Homo, he refers to himself as ‗Nietzsche 
as Educator‘ the opposite of ‗Schopenhauer as Educator,‘ where he recognizes the 
role of Schopenhauer in his own becoming, and concedes that he was ―many things 
and in many places in order to be able to become one thing—to be able to attain one 
thing,‖ (EH, ‗Why I Write Such Good Books‘, ‗U‘: §3) that is his task or his higher 
self. He is also critical of the scholar or what he refers to as ―academic ―ruminants‖‖, 
and contrasts them with what he understands the philosopher to be, ―a terrible 
explosive.‖81 However, he at the same time recognizes that he himself had been a 
scholar, and that it was a necessary stage in his own self-development. Nietzsche 
notes the role writing plays in his own self-development through the sublimation of 
his most painful experiences, and through the discipline it instils in him as a writer. 
This relates to the idea of philosophy as autobiography or as life-writing that an 
author writes from his life experience (HH, I: §208) where writing is not only an 
expression of his unconscious activity but of his ―ipsissimosity,‖ an impersonal 
horizon that is open-ended to the future (HH, II, Preface: §1) In Beyond Good and 
Evil (§6), Nietzsche examines the connection between the personal and the universal, 
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 In Schopenhauer as Educator (§8), Nietzsche again criticizes academic philosophy, and rather 
advocates philosophy that is ―dangerous‖ or ―hurtful‖. The following section will explore what 
Nietzsche means by philosophy being ―explosive‖ or ―hurtful‖; it will argue that he views reading as a 
‗warlike‘ process in terms of the acquisition of wisdom.    
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and argues that philosophy cannot be disconnected from the personal: ―every great 
philosophy so far has been ... the personal confession of its author and a kind of 
involuntary and unconscious memoir.‖ This type of writing is also not only an 
expression of present experiences but also of layers of experiences that run deeper 
than those of the individual. In the preface to Daybreak, Nietzsche mentions how an 
author‘s writing speaks from the depths of history or tradition.82 He writes that 
philosophers with ―the conscience of artists‖ are ―heirs‖ of a tradition of millennia‖ 
(§4); their works are an expression of the tradition or the whole. In terms of being 
educated by previous philosophers in his own self-development, Nietzsche 
participates within this whole. In reading the works of others, he experiences ―literary 
wounding‖; he shares in the blood of another, and it is in this way that he proclaims 
that he is ―every name in history.‖83 (Letter to Jakob Burckhardt, Jan 6th, 1889) 
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 In the introduction to his work ‗Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche‘s Psychology,‘ Graham 
Parkes, in a section entitled ‗Philosophy as Autobiography,‘ also notes that when Nietzsche‘s ―writing 
speaks from his experience, it is not only that the life writes itself (enacting the parts of ―auto-bio-
graphy‖); such writing is written also from other, earlier experiences, from layers of life deeper than the 
particular person‘s.‖ (Parkes, Op. cit., p.9) It is in this way that Parkes is examining the relation 
between the personal, and the impersonal in terms of Nietzsche‘s view of philosophy as autobiography. 
Parkes then goes on to pose the question: ―Supposing one accepts Nietzsche‘s invitation to regard 
philosophy as autobiography, as a writing of the life of the self, the question arises: the life of which 
self? of the same self as is writing?‖ (ibid.) In addressing the various possibilities he poses the ultimate 
possibility: ―Or is it after all some impersonal self or selves, though they may speak through many 
masks (personae) of the personality, do so from some locus higher or deeper than the perspective of the 
personal and from a time more distant than the present?‖ (ibid.) The answer to the above, according to 
Parkes is in the form of a yes, that that the philosopher must transcend ―the personal, all too personal‖ 
or the ―human, all too human.‖ (HH, II, Preface: §6, cited in this form in Parkes, ibid., p.9) The idea of 
an impersonal self is referred to in this thesis as a self that belongs to truth or a universal. Parkes notes 
that he ―goes on to recommend his ―travel books‖ (Wanderbücher, chronicles of journeys to foreign 
climes of the soul) to those who are afflicted with any kind of ―past‖—a recommendation that remains 
enigmatic until we appreciate the sense in which Nietzsche regards us as heirs of a long tradition and 
better understand the relations between the personal and the impersonal.‖ (Parkes, Op. cit., p.11) The 
reader of Nietzsche must recognize that his personal experiences are an expression of the impersonal or 
of ―a long tradition‖ (ibid.) 
   
83
 D. B., Allison also notes in his introduction to ‗The New Nietzsche‘ that Nietzsche‘s innermost self 
must be understood as ―having its genesis in conditions outside himself.‖ (D.B. Allison, Op. cit. p. xiii) 
Nietzsche‘s texts in being an expression of the personal are at the same time an expression of the 
universal:  
 
The texture of the text, therefore, is itself woven from ―the hieroglyphic 
chains‖ of these universal conditions or forms of existence. Indeed, it is in 
this sense that Nietzsche will repeatedly criticize the very notion of a 
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Nietzsche in this way recognizes how previous philosophers played an important role 
in enabling him to accede to his true nature or in realizing his higher self. Nietzsche 
acknowledges the role that those various ―types‖ of human being played in shaping 
and forming him, and as a sign of gratitude, he associates them forever with his 
immortality. In the introduction to Ecce Homo, Kaufmann expresses the gratitude that 
Nietzsche feels that is encapsulated in the experience of amor fati: 
 
   For all that, is Wagner represented in a Manichaean spirit, as the force of 
evil, as a dragon? On the contrary, the portrait is imbued with gratitude and 
love—with amor fati, love of fate. There is no ―if only‖ in this 
autobiography, and there are no excuses. A man who is in physical agony 
much of his adult life and warned by his doctors not to read or write much 
lest he strain his half-blind eyes, does not once complain. He is thankful for 
his illness and tells us how it made his life better. (EH, Editor‘s 
Introduction: §2)  
 
Nietzsche expresses the role of intuition in shaping his thought, life and works; it is 
for this reason he is ―self-consciously autobiographical‖, as he is aware of the 
unconscious origins of his works.
84
 Nietzsche makes explicit the autobiographical 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
personal self or ego as being a ―grammatical fiction,‖ or state that the 
individual consciousness is merely ―surface phenomena‖ of unconscious 
forces and drives—and in the same breath claim, ―I am every name in 
history.‖ (ibid.)   
 
84
 Parkes also contends that Nietzsche is aware of the unconscious origin of his works or that his own 
philosophy is an ―unconscious memoir‖ (BGE: §6) such that this implies that Nietzsche is ―self-
consciously autobiographical.‖ (Parkes, Op. cit., p.10) He also cites the first section of Beyond Good 
and Evil (§6) ―On the Prejudices of the Philosophers‖ where Nietzsche attacks the idea that philosophy 
as an objective enterprise has nothing to do with the personal. Parkes asserts that it is in this way that, 
for Nietzsche, the philosopher needs to be a psychologist as well: ―If philosophy is motivated 
unconsciously by the basic drives of human nature, the good philosopher will need to become familiar 
with those drives—and especially with the way they play through his own life and thought.‖ (ibid.) He 
also notes that ―at the time of Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche‘s writing takes an explicitly 
autobiographical turn as he goes back to several of his earlier works (The Birth of Tragedy, the two 
volumes of Human, All Too Human, Dawn of Morning, and The Joyful Science) and writes prefaces for 
them that emphasize their depth psychological dimensions.‖ (ibid., p.11) This term ―depth psychology‖ 
comes from Nietzsche‘s conclusion to the first section of Beyond Good and Evil where he calls for 
psychology to dare finally to ―descend into the depths‖ (BGE: §23, cited in this form in Parkes, Op. 
cit., p.11) Parkes also states that in the preface to Dawn of Morning that Nietzsche ―refers to the author 
of the text as an ―underground man,‖ one who ―bores, mines, and undermines‖ as he undertakes ―work 
in the depths.‖ (ibid.) He also expresses that Nietzsche in ―anticipating similar claims by Freud and 
Jung‖ goes on to claim: ―At that time I undertook something that not everyone may undertake: I 
descended into the depths, I bored into the foundations.‖ (DM, P2, cited in this form in Parkes Op. cit., 
p.11) 
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nature of his works in the prefaces to such works as Human, All Too Human II, 
Daybreak, and The Gay Science. He emphasizes that these books are an expression of 
his unconscious self, or his ―inmost being‖. He mentions how his ill-health led to 
periods of convalescence.
85
 Although writing for Nietzsche is an expression of his 
self-overcoming or of ‗digested‘ experience, the act of writing itself can also be a 
form of self-overcoming or of self-victory. 
 
Writing and the desire for victory.—Writing ought always to advertise a 
victory— or an overcoming of oneself which has to be communicated for 
the benefits of others; but there are dyspeptic authors who write only when 
they cannot digest something, indeed when it is still stuck in their teeth: 
they involuntarily seek to transfer their own annoyance to the reader and in 
this way exercise power over him: that is to say, they too desire victory, 
but over others. (HH, II: §152)  
 
Nietzsche self-overcomes through writing; it is in this way that in a letter to his friend 
Rohde, July 15
th
 1882 he refers to his writings as ―home-brewed medicine‖. He 
speaks in this letter about having written for himself
86
 and that his writings are a cure 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
85
 Parkes also notes this point in examining the preface to Human, All Too Human II (ibid., p.11). He 
observes that Nietzsche in the preface speaks as an author who has overcome ill-health, and looks at it 
as a gift: ―the author expresses ill health for preventing him from drifting away from his task in life 
(4)... Illness alienates us from our everyday existence, while recovery allows us to return to ourselves 
with a completely new perspective on our lives... On recovering, we return to life not only wiser but 
also grateful for the enhancement that our experience has undergone, enormously grateful for ―the 
smallest, tenderest, most fleeting gifts‖ life gives us. (ibid.) 
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 Horst Hutter also cites this passage in his work ‗Shaping the Future: Nietzsche‘s New Regime of the 
Soul & its Ascetic Practices‘. (Hutter, H., Op. cit., p.124) He notes that the phrase ‗Mihi ipsi scripsi‘ 
which translates as ―I have written for myself‖ sums up Nietzsche‘s first part of his task as an author, 
that is to write for himself. However, Hutter contends that the other half of Nietzsche‘s task is to write 
for others that is, his ―writing for the future‖ (ibid.) His ambition is to ―become the authority of a new 
spiritual and political dispensation. He wishes to found new houses of being, as it were, within which 
future philosophical legislators will create the codes of conduct for new political regimes of both soul 
and city.‖ (ibid., p.125) He writes for the few not the many, as he is aware that the many will follow the 
few in their efforts at self-creating. Hutter claims that in this way his works reflect an ―aristocratic 
radicalism.‖ (ibid.) It is in this way that there is a link between Nietzsche‘s spiritual hierarchy and his 
account of education or the ability to self-fashion through reading.  
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for his own depression, where he becomes an advocate of writing as therapy. He 
states that  
 
This is actually my only excuse for the kind of things which I have been 
writing since 1876; it is my prescription and my home-brewed medicine 
against weariness with life. What years! What wearisome pain! What inner 
disturbances, revolutions, solitudes! Who has endured as much as I 
have?—certainly not Leopardi. And if I stand above all that, with the 
joyousness of a victor and fraught with difficult new plans—and, knowing 
myself, with the prospect of new, more difficult, and even more inwardly 
profound sufferings and tragedies and with the courage to face them!—
then nobody should be annoyed with me for having a good opinion of my 
medicine. Mihi ipsi scripsi— [―I have written for myself‖] and there it 
stands; and thus everyone should do for himself his best in his own way—
that is my morality, the only remaining morality for me. If even my 
physical health reappears, whom have I to thank for that? I was in all 
respects my own doctor; and as a person in whom nothing stands separate, 
I have had to treat soul, mind, and body all at once and with the same 
remedies. (Letter to Rohde, July 15
th
, 1882)  
 
Written words, for Nietzsche, mark the victories of inner struggles that make way for 
new growth, self-renewal and transfiguration. An author‘s spiritual journey involves 
the introspective examination of life experiences, channelling those experiences into 
writing, and overcoming them through the discipline of writing itself. Nietzsche often 
observes the level of suffering involved in the production of philosophical works, and 
he always views this kind of discipline as directed towards compensation, overcoming 
and transfiguration. Nietzsche also claims that in overcoming illness one can raise 
oneself to a higher level of existence through the realization of a higher self in the 
experience of ―Great health‖ (GS: §382). For Nietzsche, there is a connection between 
sickness and creativity, as he maintains that the best works can only be produced 
under conditions of ill-health. In Ecce Homo he speaks of the conditions of ill-health 
under which he wrote Daybreak: 
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The following winter, my first one in Genoa, that sweetening and 
spiritualization which is almost inseparably connected with an extreme 
poverty of blood and muscle, produced The Dawn. The perfect brightness 
and cheerfulness, even exuberance of the spirit, reflected in this work, is 
compatible in my case not only with the most profound physiological 
weakness, but even with an excess of pain. (EH, ‗Why I Am So Wise‘: §1) 
 
In Ecce Homo, he explains the function of forms of rebirth and the spiritual 
transfiguration that his perfect readers can experience; such as those of internal 
renewal, overcoming of illness and loss of self. Philosophical education can enable 
the ideal reader to overcome this sense of loss of self or self-rejection in the 
cultivation of a higher self. Nietzsche speaks of Zarathustra as representative of the 
―air of the heights‖ or the highest reality, and it rewards those who ―hear‖ it aright, 
those who are also capable of reaching the ―heights‖: 
 
 
Among my writings my Zarathustra stands to mind by itself. With that I 
have given mankind the greatest present that has ever been made to it so 
far. This book, with a voice bridging centuries, is not only the highest book 
there is, the book that is truly characterized by the air of the heights—the 
whole fact of man lies beneath it at a tremendous distance—it is also the 
deepest, born out of the innermost wealth of truth, an inexhaustible well to 
which no pail descends without coming up again filled with gold and 
goodness... Above all, one must hear aright the tone that comes from this 
mouth, the halcyon tone, lest one should do wretched injustice to the 
meaning of its wisdom. (EH, Preface: §4) 
 
Nietzsche explains how he, as an author, and his readers can experience stages of 
decay or death, such as those born out of the ―spirit of gravity‖ and then those 
expressive of energy, renewal, growth and spiritual rebirth. His style embodies the life 
force of nature with its organic cyclical changes. Nietzsche, in speaking about The 
Gay Science, mentions how it represented those moments of resurrection within his 
own soul. In the preface, he mentions that he has been ―resurrected.‖ (GS: Pref.: §1) 
Nietzsche overcomes through his writing, and these changes in his thinking are one 
and the same as the changes in the cycles of the seasons those of life and death. He 
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also in the same preface expresses the importance of sharing similar experiences to 
the author: 
 
This book might need more than one preface: and in the end there would 
still be room for doubting whether someone who has not experienced 
something similar could, by means of prefaces, be brought closer to the 
experiences of this book. It seems to be written in the language of the wind 
that brings a thaw: it contains high spirits, unrest, contradiction, and April 
weather, so that one is constantly reminded of winter‘s nearness as well as 
the triumph over winter that is coming, must come, perhaps has already 
come... Gratitude flows forth incessantly, as if that which was most 
unexpected had just happened—the gratitude of a convalescent—for 
recovery was what was the most unexpected. ‗Gay Science‘: this signifies 
the saturnalia of a mind that has patiently resisted a terrible long 
pressure—patiently, severely, coldly, without yielding, but also without 
hope—and is now all of a sudden attacked by hope, by hope for health, by 
the intoxication of recovery… This entire book is really nothing but an 
amusement after long privation and powerlessness, the jubilation of 
returning strength, of a reawakened faith in tomorrow, of a sudden sense 
and anticipation of a future, of impending adventures, of reopened seas, of 
goals that are permitted and believed again. (GS, Preface: §1) 
  
For Nietzsche, readers should investigate the life influences of a writer, the instincts 
or drives, and the life experiences that constitute the writer‘s philosophical eros of the 
will to power. Nietzsche argues that philosophical thought can be born out of pain, as 
the writer‘s internal condition can be transformed into spiritual form or channelled 
into creativity. (GS, Preface: §3)  
 
Nietzsche‘s writings represent a will to power that aspires to the ‗heights‘, a 
philosophical eros or love for the ‗more-than-human‘, which signifies a life-
affirmative culture that is in an ascendant state of the will to power.
87
 For Nietzsche, 
philosophical writings portray the state of the creator‘s soul; they are representative of 
an inner spiritual struggle, as they are the excrement of digested experience. In the 
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 Philosophical works can signify decadence or a decline in the will to power of the writer himself, 
which is also symptomatic of the cultural conditions in which the philosopher lives. Texts can be 
indicative of the type of culture that the philosopher is writing in or can signify the type of culture that 
is to come, a higher dancing culture (HH, I: §278), as in Nietzsche‘s case. Nietzsche‘s writings as an 
expression of the logos are an expression of culture or reality that is beyond the human realm. 
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Preface to Human, All Too Human II, Nietzsche states that his works always speak of 
something he has overcome: ―But it has always required time, recovery, distancing, 
before the desire awoke within me to skin, exploit, expose, ‗exhibit‘ (or whatever one 
wants to call it) for the sake of knowledge something I had experienced and survived, 
some fact or fate of my life.‖ (HH, II, Pref.: §1) According to Nietzsche, the 
philosopher‘s writings and his experiences are one and the same, and he makes the 
important point that readers cannot understand him unless they have experience of the 
Dionysian. In this way, the reader must gain spiritual insight into the author, and also 
the reader must be familiar with her own emotional experiences, life cycles, and 
ascending and descending patterns of the will to power. 
 
The best kind of reading or writing must be the product of the right kind of life 
experience. Nietzsche outlines how an ideal reader is the person who shares an 
author‘s experiences or who takes into account an author‘s unconscious, or the pathos 
of his works. Nietzsche requires of his readers that they go beyond any surface level 
of meaning to the level of feeling, of unconscious states, and of mood such that they 
recognize the will to power of the text, that it is expressive of ―the air of the heights.‖ 
(EH, Pref.: §4) Reading, as Nietzsche suggests, is never simply about conveying an 
opinion or uncovering a hidden meaning; it is about identifying with the pathos of the 
text. Nietzsche proclaims that those related to him in the desire to cultivate a higher 
self will experience the ecstasy associative of philosophical education:  
 
But whoever is related to me in the height of his aspirations will experience 
veritable ecstasies of learning; I know abysses into which no foot ever 
strayed. (EH, ‗Why I Write Such Good Books‘: §3) 
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Nietzsche often claims that there are necessary preconditions for an understanding of 
his Thus Spoke Zarathustra, one of which is the necessity to have gone through the 
same experiences that his works are based on. In speaking of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
he expresses the need to have had similar experiences as him as an author: ―But for 
others to feel this will require whole generations to catch up with the inner 
experiences from which that work could arise.‖ (Letter to Karl Knortz, June 21, 1888) 
Nietzsche in many of his letters expresses his personal connection to the work 
Zarathustra in particular. The work is not only an expression of his philosophy but 
also an expression of his deeply personal experiences as well as the overcoming of 
these painful experiences. It is in this way that his works are a reflection not just of his 
philosophy but also of his life and his development and self-overcoming: 
 
When Dr. Heinrich von Stein once complained very honestly that he didn‘t 
understand a word of my Zarathustra, I told him that this was perfectly in 
order: having understood six sentences from it—that is, to have really have 
experienced them—would raise one to a higher level of existence than 
―modern‖ men could attain. Given this feeling of distance, how could I 
possibly wish to be read by those ―moderns‖ whom I know!  (EH, ‗Why I 
Write Such Good Books‘: §1) 
 
Many of Nietzsche‘s works illustrate that he worked out of himself or that he 
sublimated his own painful experiences through his writing. He also claims that this is 
how the philosopher is to work:  
 
The lack of personality always takes its revenge: a weakened, thin, 
extinguished personality, one that denies itself and its own existence, is no 
longer good for anything good—least of all for philosophy. ‗Selflessness‘ 
has no value in heaven or on earth; all great problems demand great love, 
and only strong, round, secure minds who have a firm grip on themselves 
are capable of that. It makes the most telling difference whether a thinker 
has a personal relationship to his problems and finds in them a destiny, his 
distress, and his greatest happiness, or an ‗impersonal‘ one, meaning he is 
only able to touch and grasp them with the antennae of cold, curious 
thought. In the latter case nothing will come of it, that much can be 
promised... (GS: §345) 
 
177 
    
It is in this way that Nietzsche is an existential thinker, as he brings his own 
experiences to his works such that his life experiences are closely related to his 
thinking. For Nietzsche, personality or one‘s unconscious is more fundamental than 
‗pure philosophy‘ or any particular intellectual position. It also follows from this that 
he advocates the development of one‘s higher self toward one‘s goal. In doing so, one 
can affirm one‘s life or encounter reality as it is, where one reaches the ―heights.‖ 
(WP: §512-513)  
 
It is only those in tune with themselves and who have had similar life experiences to 
Nietzsche will be able to explore appropriately the autobiographical nature of his 
writings. It is only those who also view the connection between his life and his works 
that are best prepared for understanding the Dionysian.
88
 Nietzsche contends that style 
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 Nietzsche notes the importance of the reader‘s state of soul as an important element to his indirect, 
stylistic communication of personal experience. The reader can only connect with Nietzsche if he also 
has experience of the Dionysian in such a way that he can identify emotional states, life-patterns and 
life-cycles in his life. The reader is motivated to self-examine in order to re-encounter the Dionysian; to 
overcome self-rejection and to encounter the ‗more-than-human‘ or reach the ―air of the heights.‖ (EH, 
Preface: §4) Nietzsche looks at ways in which the reader can use his life course with its patterns and 
cycles as a ―means of knowledge‖: ―your desiring with all your strength to see ahead how the knot of 
the future is going to be tied, you own life will acquire the value of an instrument and means of 
knowledge.‖ (HH, I: §292) In order for the stylistic communication of personal experience to succeed, 
it can only do so with those individuals who already share similar experiences as the author. The 
identification of such experiences and the motivation to understand them creates an ideal relation 
between the experience of the reader and the style used by the author or the instinctual pathos that is 
deployed. For Nietzsche, the reader must have past experiences out of which equip her in her 
understanding of the communicative act that the book represents. According to Nietzsche, the reader‘s 
Dionysian experiences make her responsive to the text as Kathleen Higgins puts it in her article entitled 
‗Nietzsche‘s View of Philosophical Style‘ that the reader ―at the time of reading might have had 
experiences that make his less-than-conscious inner being responsive‖ (Higgins, K., Op.cit., p.74)  
These Dionysian experiences, like those of ritual form in Greek tragedy that are expressed in The Birth 
of Tragedy, are those that constitute a reversal ―from sorrow to joy, from darkness and sights of 
inexplicable terror to light and the discovery of the reborn God Dionysus‖ (Harrison, J., Themis: A 
Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion, London, Merlin Press, 1989, p.342). The Greek God is 
explained by Harrison to represent ―the drama of the Death and Rebirth of the Year Spirit‖ (ibid.), the 
year spirit or ‗eniautos-daimon‘ was also ascribed to the primitive dithyramb which involved ―a contest 
between the year spirit and its enemy, and proceeded through the sacrificial death of the spirit to its 
glorious resurrection or epiphany—the whole ritual symbolizing the cyclic death and rebirth of Nature‖ 
(M.S. Silk & J.P. Stern, Nietzsche on Tragedy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.143). 
The Dionysian wisdom that Nietzsche himself encounters alongside his ideal reader has its origin in the 
experience of the ultimate unity of things, a Dionysian oneness that involves overcoming the spell of 
individuation as the source of one‘s suffering. The God Dionysus is reinvented in the mature 
philosophy and becomes the paradigm of his life-affirmative philosophy as the God of cosmic energy 
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is ultimately a communication of an inward state and the reflection of an inward state: 
―Good is any style that really communicates an inward state.‖ (EH, ‗Why I Write 
Such Good Books‘: §4) It is for this reason that one can understand Nietzsche only 
through understanding the pathos of his works. Nietzsche asserts that the best style 
finds ―expression for the most desirable state of mind, the state, that is to say, which it 
is most desirable should be communicated and conveyed: that of the spiritually joyful, 
luminous and honest man who has overcome his passions.‖ (HH, II: ‗The Wanderer 
and his Shadow‘: §88) Nietzsche expresses how his writings convey his own inward 
state by showing how his account of tragedy serves as an exemplum or parable of his 
own inward experience of the Dionysian. (EH, ‗Why I Write Such Good Books,‘ BT: 
§2) 
 
Nietzsche recognizes that writing is a direct reflection of who one is and is an 
expression of one‘s heart, life and blood; and for this reason he maintains that to write 
about one‘s life is to write about one‘s works. It is in this way that Ecce Homo, 
Nietzsche‘s autobiography, is a work about his writings; it is in this work that he is at 
his most self-consciously autobiographical.
89
 It is also for this reason that Nietzsche‘s 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
renewal and dancing. The concept of the ‗Year Spirit‘ can be viewed in light of the reader‘s life 
patterns and cycles; it also correlates with the ―great year of Being or eternity‖ (GS: §276), the 
experience of necessity in the amor fati moment.  
 
89
 Horst Hutter states that Nietzsche, in being self-consciously autobiographical, was able to realize his 
―life-task.‖ (EH, ‗Why I Am So Clever‘: §9) Nietzsche is self-consciously autobiographical or practices 
what Hutter refers to as ―writing the self‖ in the sense that he is aware of the impact writing has on his 
unconscious. This awareness entails mentally focusing upon the impact writing has on his unconscious, 
in this way mentations are self-reflective. (Hutter, H., Op. cit., p.114) Hutter further on in his work 
‗Shaping the Future: Nietzsche‘s New Regime of the Soul and its Ascetic Practices‘ maintains that for 
Nietzsche this awareness involves engaging the ―transcendental mind.‖ (ibid., p.171) In this way it is 
possible to infer that this idea of a transcendental mind is a revaluation of the Cartesian self-reflective 
ego, which is a mode of consciousness that reflects upon itself. It is non-solipsistic as writing the self 
for Nietzsche enables the philosophical type to encounter reality as it is. Hutter maintains that for 
Nietzsche, this involves engaging the ―transcendental mind‖ (Hutter, H., Op. cit., p.171) or the self-
reflective ego, which is a mode of consciousness that reflects upon itself. The transcendental mind is 
that which enables the writer to gain indirect insight into his unconscious, and in turn the writer may 
get in touch with the ―Great Reason of the Body‖ or with one‘s ―life task.‖ (ibid.) It is in this way that 
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Ecce Homo represents the ―high point‖ in his life; he is at his highest point where he 
realizes his life ―task‖ as a prophet or foreseer of humanity reaching its own ―high 
point‖. It is in this work that Nietzsche is most aware of the role reading and writing 
played in the realization of his higher self, or in the restoration of himself to a unified 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Nietzsche got in touch with his life-task. The mental focus upon the impact of writing on his 
unconscious not only led him to become more attuned to his body, but it also enabled him to form a 
higher self. The impact on the unconscious itself enables the ―Great Reason of the Body‖ to develop a 
higher self or restore the self to a unity, and in turn to the Whole. Hutter explores the way in which 
writing the self led to the formation of a new self in great detail. Writing, for Nietzsche provided the 
―eye of the other‖ in his moments of solitude; it enabled him to observe himself. Hutter argues that in 
this way that Nietzsche is a Christian; ―he follows the well-established Christian practice of the 
examination of conscience which already in late antiquity had been linked with a practice of 
autobiographical writing.‖ (ibid., p.114) Hutter notes that writing provided moments of intense self-
awareness, which have been linked to spiritual development in some pagan philosophical schools, 
notably the stoics. (ibid.) He claims that for Nietzsche, writing creates a logistikon,  
 
... the act of mental focusing gathers together the ―quanta of reason‖ of the 
different drives, thereby purifies them and makes them more intelligent. It 
helps each drive participate in the inner parliament of voices, thereby 
creating an autonomy of thinking in which each drive engages in 
conversation with all other drives and thus creates, as it were, a 
constitution of the psychic regime. It helps to build what in Plato is called 
the logistikon, meant to be the ruling portion of the whole soul. Writing 
provides a recorded memory of the development of this logistikon, in 
which the automatically proceeding mentations become self-reflective. 
Thereby the animal mind acquires a transcendental cast which in turn 
increases inner freedom.‖ (ibid.)  
 
According to Hutter, writing the self, for Nietzsche, ―the ―sibi scribere‖, increases the mirroring of 
consciousness by consciousness, which in that act provides the center of the development of a self.‖ 
(ibid.) He maintains that as writing provides self-observation, it in turn is a form of opposition, or inner 
opposition to be more precise. (HH, II: Vorrede 1, cited in this form in Hutter, ibid., p.115) As a result, 
the ―original and narcissistic identification of the human soul with all mental acts occurring in it, called 
―love‖ by Nietzsche, is thus broken and refracted. This broken love, the nucleus of the developing 
logistikon, involves a subtle form of ―enmity‖ and cruelty toward oneself.‖ (ibid.) Hutter maintains that 
reading Christian written dogma led to the formation of the Christian self, a self linked to self-hatred. 
This type of self that has the ultimate internal split or conflict is what Nietzsche refers to as a 
―consciousness-vivisection.‖ (WP: §295, cited in this form in Hutter, ibid., p.114) This form of self 
cruelty enables the development of the ―inner phenomenal world‖, which in turn enables the formation 
of a self. (Hutter, H., Op. cit., p.114) Hutter identifies this cruelty with Christian asceticism, a ―second 
nature‖ that Nietzsche inherited from the Christian tradition; and it is only through writing that 
Nietzsche can overcome this morality: ―It is the writing in which he destroyed his Christian identity, 
but was sufficiently snake to shed his acquired second natures as outworn skins, so as to find his path, 
quite uncertain ever to reach it, ―to the self-overcoming of morality.‖ (Daybreak, Pref.: §1, cited in this 
form in Hutter, ibid., p.124) Writing led to the formation of the Christian self, and it is through a 
different type of writing that will lead to the formation of a new self, a truly philosophical one. For 
Nietzsche, the former is a necessary prerequisite to the formation of the latter. Reading Nietzsche‘s 
writings also involve ‗an internal split‘ or inner struggle within the reader, a true asceticism that enables 
the overcoming of the old ascetic ideal. In the following section, it will be discussed as a form of 
asceticism that enables the reader to encounter reality or the whole. Nietzsche refers to a certain type of 
reader that is capable of overcoming through reading as the warrior noble. (GM, III: §6-10) See Owen, 
D., Nietzsche‘s Genealogy of Morality, Stocksfield, Acumen, 2007, p.113-114 for a discussion of 
Nietzsche‘s distinction between the two types of asceticism.  
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subjectivity.
90
 Nietzsche was ―many things and in many places‖ (EH, ‗Why I Write 
Such Good Books‘, ‗U‘: §3) before becoming Nietzsche himself. It is as ―Nietzsche‖ 
that he realizes what he refers to as his ―involuntary mission.‖ In rejecting claims 
about his ―eccentricities‖ or madness, in a letter to Carl Fuchs Dec 14th 1887, he 
writes that this misunderstanding arises as ―people do not know where my centre is, 
they will find it hard to know for certain where and when I have till now been 
―eccentric‖—for example, being a classical philologist; this was being outside my 
centre (which fortunately, does not mean that I was a bad classical philologist)‖. 
(Letter to Carl Fuchs, Dec 14
th
 1887) Nietzsche recognizes the role discipline plays in 
restoring him to unity. In the same letter to Carl Fuchs, he states that  
 
Likewise today it seems to me an eccentricity that I should have been a 
Wagnerite. It was an inordinately dangerous experiment; now that I know 
that it did not ruin me, I know also what meaning it has had for me—it was 
the strongest test of my character. To be sure, one‘s inmost being gradually 
disciplines one back to unity; that passion, to which no name can be put for 
a long time, rescues us from all digressions and dispersions, that task of 
which one is the involuntary missionary. (ibid.) 
 
In describing how he ―becomes himself,‖ Nietzsche refers to metaphors used in 
Schopenhauer as Educator, those of ―the road‖, of ―the ladder‖, a ladder that is to be 
climbed in order to reach a ―self,‖ that unity of self that grows in his unconscious but 
is not buried away in his depths but situated above him, and brings him to the ―highest 
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 Thiele in his ‗Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul‘ notes that, for Nietzsche, the higher 
man has an overwhelming project to unify a multiple soul. ―This effort to ―impose upon becoming the 
character of being‖ is the mark of the supreme will to power.‖‖ (WP: §330, cited in this form in Thiele, 
Op. cit., p.212) Thiele notes that ―The higher man‘s self-appointed destiny is to make a cosmos of his 
chaotic inheritance.‖ (Thiele, L., Op. cit. p.212) He maintains that Nietzsche‘s emphasis on the higher 
man‘s ability to unify his subjectivity is disregarded by deconstructionist literature: ―Much of the recent 
(deconstructionist) writing on Nietzsche is occupied with his diffusion, dispersion, fragmentation, or 
the destruction of the subject or self. In disregarding his eulogies of and proposals for its creative 
unification, however, these commentaries fail to take into account for Nietzsche‘s primary concern as 
an educator, a philosopher, and an aesthetic stylist.‖ (ibid. p.212n3) The role education plays in the 
creation of a higher self or in the unification of a self or its attunement to reality will be explored in the 
following section.  
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point‖ in his life. Nietzsche states that there are ―revered objects‖ that have ―drawn 
the soul aloft...‖, and he requests us to ―Compare these objects one with another, see 
how one completes, expands, surpasses, transfigures another, how they constitute a 
stepladder upon which you have clambered up to yourself as you are now.‖ 
(Schopenhauer as Educator: §1) In Ecce Homo, he engages in language that is 
expressive of the height he has reached, the language of lightning bolts. (EH, ‗The 
Untimely Ones‘: §3) This is the height of the ‗more-than-human,‘ where he speaks 
with bolts of lightning; he speaks as a soothsayer and apocalyptic thinker who stands 
―between past and future‖ where he is ―prepared for lightning and the redemptive 
flash, pregnant with lightning bolts that say Yes and laugh Yes.‖ (Z, III: §16) It is this 
language that he characterizes as Dionysian in the section he devotes to On the 
Genealogy of Morals in Ecce Homo; he refers to his aphorisms as ―gruesome 
detonations‖ that bring with them ―the creation of new truth.‖ (EH, ‗Why I Write 
Such Good Books‘: ‗GM‘) In using the language of lightning bolts and detonations as 
characteristic of the Dionysian, he suggests that it is accessible only to those who like 
him are ―Hyperboreans.‖ (AC: §1) He asserts that his ideal readers are those that are 
made for the ―heights‖, the ‗more-than-human‘, reality or the ‗heavenly.‘91 ―Those 
                                                          
91
 In this thesis I am arguing that it is in the experience of amor fati that the philosophical type 
experiences the ―heavenly‖; it is the feeling of eternity or the ―Kingdom of Heaven that is within you‖ 
(AC: §34), it is ―a state of the heart‖. It is through the personal that one comes into attunement with 
Being. Jaspers identifies in Nietzsche the three types of awareness of being, which results from the 
development of Nietzsche‘s own experience of being. Subsequently three stages can be discerned: (1) 
contemplative vision; (2) mystical oneness with being, and (3) Dionysian intoxication. (K., Jaspers, Op. 
cit., p. 345) The first stage of the awareness of being as contemplative vision is encountered on ‗high 
mountains‘ in the ‗air of the heights‘. Jaspers asserts that ―in contemplative vision the truthful man 
experiences what he himself is and what being is as ―the great enlightenment about existence‖: 
―Something inexpressible, of which happiness and truth are mere idol-like copies, comes over him, the 
earth loses its weight, the events and forces of the earth becomes dreamlike. ...The visionary feels as 
though he were just awakening. ...‖ (ibid.) He arrives ―in the pure air of alps and ice, where beclouding 
and veiling no longer exist and where the basic constitution of things is expressed roughly and rigidly 
but with unmistakable clarity!‖ (ibid.) In this experience ―one‘s view extends ―over the immense 
hieroglyphics of existence, over the petrified doctrine of becoming.‖ (ibid.) Jaspers claims that 
according to Nietzsche the soul in this experience is transformed: ―The soul, thinking of it, grows 
lonely and boundless; ...its state ...this new and enigmatic agitation without excitement‖ ... spreads over 
existence ―as a glowing, red-colored light inundating the world.‖ (ibid.) Jaspers claims that in this state 
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who can breathe the air of my writings know that it is an air of the heights, a strong 
air. One must be made for it. Otherwise there is no small danger that one may catch a 
cold in it. The ice is near, the solitude tremendous—but how calmly all things lie in 
the light! How freely one breathes! How much one feels beneath oneself!‖ (EH, 
Preface: §3) Nietzsche‘s works are a reflection of who he is, as they are written out of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of soul, it is as ―though one tried to resist the tremendous experience through which alone he becomes 
truly human.‖ (ibid.) According to Jaspers, the state of contemplative vision contains the germ of his 
later awareness of being, and as a contemplative state it is what Nietzsche considers the ―ultimate 
revelation of being.‖   
 
It can also be inferred from Jasper‘s account of the contemplative vision that there is a similarity 
between Plato and Nietzsche on matters of contemplation. For both Nietzsche and Plato the 
philosopher‘s education (paideia) must involve a ―turning around of the soul‖ or what is referred to as 
the periagoge in Plato‘s parable of the cave. (Voegelin, E., Op. cit., p.115) Voegelin notes that 
according to Plato, it is erroneous of such thinkers as Protagoras to claim that true knowledge or 
episteme can be put into the soul (The Republic: 518b-c): ―For the kind of vision (opsis) that enables a 
man to see the Agathon must exist in a soul, as a man must have eyes to see (518c). The educator can 
do no more than turn this organ of vision, if it exists in the soul of a man, around from the realm of 
becoming toward being and the brightest realm of being—―and that, we say, is the Agathon‖ (518c) 
Hence, Paideia (518b) is ―the art of turning around [periagoge]‖ (518d).‖ (ibid.) The apprehension of 
the idea of the Agathon is referred to as a ―divine contemplation‖ (517d) or a state of Eudaimonia (ibid. 
p.116). Similarly, for Nietzsche, the educator can only enable the ‗turning around of the soul‘ or what is 
referred to in this thesis as the liberation of the essential self toward the realm of Being. In 
Schopenhauer as Educator (§1), Nietzsche outlines the means of coming to know oneself or fulfilling 
the dictum ‗know thyself‘, and claims that to discover how one truly becomes oneself, one must pose 
the question, ―what have you truly loved up to know, what has drawn your soul aloft, what has 
mastered it and at the same time blessed it?‖. He claims that the ―revered objects‖ that enables the soul 
to be drawn aloft are what ―give you a law, the fundamental law of your own true self‖ (§1). He also 
claims that one‘s true self, ―the true, original meaning and basic stuff of your nature is something 
completely incapable of being educated or formed and is in any case something difficult of access, 
bound and paralysed.‖ (§1) In the same way that Plato claims that the ―organ of vision‖ must exist 
already in the soul, and the educator can only turn this ―organ of vision‖ if it exists in ―the soul of man, 
around from the realm of becoming toward being...‖, Nietzsche also maintains in Schopenhauer as 
Educator that one‘s true self or the true meaning of one‘s nature cannot be taught, that it already resides 
with you and that ―your educators can be only your liberators.‖ (§1) The educator for both Plato and 
Nietzsche can only liberate the soul or turn the soul around, but only in those who already have a soul. 
Although Nietzsche and Plato differ on what they consider education to consist of, both of these 
thinkers hold the similar view that education is cultivation towards the whole. Plato associates the 
acquisition of education with the soul as the ―organ of vision‖, whereas Nietzsche associates it with the 
soul as heart, as the ―genius of the heart.‖ (BGE: §295) This idea of the ―organ of vision‖ relates to an 
ocular-centrism of the metaphysical tradition which Nietzsche wishes to overturn, that the ‗image‘ of 
reality exists in the ‗mind‘s eye‘. In this tradition the reality of entities becomes equated with their 
image. The phenomenal realm or the realm of appearance is the mind, and is in a dualistic relation with 
reality. 
 
Jaspers then goes on to mention that the next stage of the awareness of being, for Nietzsche is a 
mystical union with being, and relates to the ‗Nietzsche‘ of the Zarathustra period. It is uttered in songs 
such as ―Homecoming,‖ ―The Seven Seals,‖ and ―The Drunken Song.‖ (K., Jaspers, Op. cit., p. 346) 
The final stage of experiencing being is referred to as the ―Dionysian‖ for Nietzsche; it is state of life-
affirmation where one reaches the most sublime heights and encounters the highest spirituality (ibid., p. 
347). 
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his experiences, out of which he developed his sense of commitment to himself, a 
faith in his own self.  
 
Nietzsche speaks of the man who has not acceded to the development of his higher 
self, who is still undetermined and unformed, as ―un-form, a material, an ugly stone 
that needs a sculptor.‖ (EH, ‗Z‘: §8) Nietzsche himself, as an ―ugly stone,‖ required a 
sculptor in order that his divine self, his necessary or essential self be ‗carved‘ out to 
the point of hardness. Nietzsche‘s use of ―granite words‖ at the end of the third book 
of Thus Spoke Zarathustra represents the formulation of a destiny. (EH, ‗GS‘) In Ecce 
Homo he erects himself as a sculpted stone like ―a powerful pyramidal rock not far 
from Surlei.‖92 (EH, ‗Z‘: §1) This stone compares with what he describes as the 
―diamond beauty of the first words of Zarathustra‖ (EH, ‗GS‘); a book that is also to 
be reckoned as music, where the ―rebirth of the art of hearing was among its 
preconditions‖ (EH, ‗Z‘: §1) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
92 This is the place where Nietzsche was first struck with the idea of the eternal recurrence where the 
stone represented for him the divine moment of the realization of his fate, his destiny. In realizing 
himself as a prophet, he views himself as the destroyer of old resentful values and the creator of new 
ones. He lives at a pivotal apocalyptic moment where he refers to himself as ―a force majeure, a 
destiny—[who] breaks the history of mankind in two. One lives before him, or one lives after him.‖ 
(EH, ‗Why I Am A Destiny‘: §8) His life was also then at a pivotal moment, the ‗great noon‘: ―My task 
of preparing the moment of the highest self-examination for humanity, a great noon when it looks back 
and far forward, when it emerges from the dominion of accidents and priests and for the first time 
poses, as a whole, the question of Why? and For What?‖ (EH, ‗Dawn‘: §2) He also suggests that as a 
destiny he experiences ‗god-like‘ states, those that are of the highest points in his life: ――God‖ as the 
moment of culmination: existence an eternal deifying and un-deifying. But is that not a high point of 
value, but a high point of power.‖ (WP: §712) This idea of Nietzsche erecting himself like a powerful 
pyramidal rock is also reminiscent of the image of the very bottom of the soul, the ―granite of spiritual 
fate‖ (BGE: §231), one‘s necessary self, which becomes attuned to reality in the experience of amor 
fati.  
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III 
 
Nietzsche on Reading in Blood: Cultivation of a Higher Self & Entering into the Silent 
Logos of an Author  
 
 
A philosophical reading of Nietzsche is one which brings one‘s higher self or 
unconscious self to the text and in this way brings to light the most fundamental 
relation with him as an author.
93
 It involves bringing one‘s ‗innermost self‘ (HH, II, 
Preface: §1) into view with that of Nietzsche, or reading him from one‘s unconscious 
horizon. The importance of coming to know oneself and self-reflection is expressed in 
the preface to On the Genealogy of Morals. In that preface he also expresses the 
essential role self-reflection plays in reading him as an author. This evokes a parallel 
between the preface to Plato‘s Phaedrus and the preface to On the Genealogy of 
Morals where both philosophers begin their prefaces by raising the question of self-
knowledge and end them with a discussion of reading. In the preface, Nietzsche 
criticizes these ―men of knowledge,‖ (GM, Preface: §1) the scholar and the scientist, 
as they overlook the importance of the self in relating to the whole. His concern is 
with the way in which these men are focusing too much on the object of knowledge 
for self-knowledge to take place:  
We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge—and with good 
reason. We have never sought ourselves—how could it ever happen that 
we should ever find ourselves? It has been rightly said: ―Where your 
treasure is, there will your heart be also‖; ... there is one thing we really 
care about from the heart—―bringing something home.‖ (ibid.)  
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 A philosophical reading of Nietzsche is one which involves the most fundamental way of relating to 
him as an author. This relation involves taking a primordial standpoint to the text. This type of relation 
to the objective, metaphysically independent text, as an inter-subjective relation is one of pathos.  It is 
through one‘s unconscious that ideal the reader enters into the most fundamental relation to the author. 
It involves the reader entering into the realm of the ―unsaid‖ or silence through bringing a similar 
pathos to the text. Nietzsche warns us not to confuse the self with thingness. This relates to 
Wittgenstein‘s argument for the existence of the metaphysical ego; one cannot view oneself as an 
object within one‘s own visual field, as one cannot step outside oneself (see footnote no.37, chapter 
one, section IV).  
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Nietzsche tries to overturn a theoretical approach to knowing reality and rather 
advocates an existential relation of participating within the whole as this is argued to 
be more fundamental. It is through the self rather than through abstract knowledge 
that one comes into correspondence with reality.. Nietzsche argues that philosophical 
eros or love for  reality compels the philosopher ―to think back to the self‖94 (UDH: 
§10) in order to create a higher self. However, this philosophical passion presupposes 
both a self-dissatisfaction and a love for the self in order to improve itself; therefore, 
the desire for self-knowledge involves both a self-rejection and a love for a higher 
self.
95
 The cultivation of a higher self requires education in the form of ‗reading in 
blood‘ (Z, I: ‗On Reading & Writing‘) where the reader can sublimate painful 
experiences, or self-overcome, through reading in order that the self can improve 
itself. In the last section of the preface to On the Genealogy of Morals (§8) Nietzsche 
refers to the type of reading as ―rumination‖, and he also mentions that it is removed 
from ―modern man‖. The last section of the preface is intimately connected with the 
first section where the importance of self-knowledge is outlined. This is the type of 
reading that enables the cultivation of the higher self; it is reading with one‘s whole 
body and life where one participates within reality as it is or the whole. On the one 
hand, reading as rumination provides the conditions for attunement towards the whole 
                                                          
94
 Alex McIntyre discusses the relationship between the love for something higher than the human, as 
philosophical eros or will to power and self-knowledge, that the eros or passion compels one to think 
back to the self (McIntyre, A., Op. cit., p.79). The realization of a higher self can only occur if the 
philosophical type not only desires a higher self, but also experiences self-contempt, as this provides 
the stimulus or self-overcoming that enables its cultivation. This experience of both self-love and self-
contempt is referred to as ‗loving contempt‘ by McIntyre (ibid.); contempt for the all-too-human 
emerges from the desire for the higher than human realm, which in turn impels the desire for a higher 
self. This thesis will explore the concept of ‗loving contempt‘ in the following chapter in relation to the 
idea of a redeemer (GM, II: §24), a ―redeeming man of great love and contempt‖ whose isolation is 
―his absorption, immersion penetration into reality,‖ and who emerges once again and ―brings home the 
redemption of this reality‖. This redeemer out of love for higher reality overcomes the old ascetic ideal 
and the ensuing nihilism that came with its collapse. 
 
95
 See McIntyre on the idea that philosophic passion (eros) or love for something higher than the 
human world presupposes both a self-dissatisfaction and a love for the self in order to improve itself 
(ibid.). 
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or leads to the amor fati moment, and on the other hand, reading as rumination or 
reading with one‘s whole body is reading as participation within the whole. This type 
of reading engages in the universal or the objective realm through engaging in the 
subjective or personal, the unconscious of the reader. Reading enables one to cultivate 
one‘s higher self and in turn encounter the whole or the ‗more-than-human,‘96 through 
the discipline,
97
 isolation and self-overcoming it provides.  
                                                          
96
 This idea of the ‗more-than-human‘ is explored by Michel Haar in his essay ‗Nietzsche and 
Metaphysical Language‘ in terms of the type of man that can affirm life by encountering the universal. 
This idea has been aforementioned in chapter 2, and has been already noted by Alex McIntyre (ibid., 
p.17).  
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 Thiele in his work ―Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul‖  examines  Nietzsche‘s notion 
of the educator from a passage of The Will to Power, and notes the educator‘s role in disciplining his 
student in order that his soul be driven ―toward the heights‖ (WP §512-513) Thiele cites the passage 
from The Will to Power as follows: ―An educator never says what he himself thinks, but always only 
what he thinks of a thing in relation to the requirements of those he educates... He must be capable of 
employing every means of discipline: some he can drive toward the heights only with whips of scorn; 
others, who are sluggish, irresolute, cowardly, vain perhaps only with exaggerated praise. (WP 512-
513)‖ (Cited in this form in Thiele, Op.cit., p.170). He then compares this to Socrates of the Republic: 
―Like Socrates of the Republic, the educator stokes or dampens the passions of his disciples the better 
to pursue justice in the human soul.‖ (ibid., p.170) According to Thiele, there is an individualistic 
notion to education, which is ―a consequence of the educator‘s need to reveal himself selectively, 
according to the needs of his students.‖ (ibid.) This individualism in education entails that there is a 
―personalized form of discipline‖ (ibid.) He maintains that, according to Nietzsche,  
 
Education, in effect, is a protracted discipline (BGE 92-94). It has little to 
do with the accumulation of knowledge and much to do with the learning 
of self-control. The understanding is that eventually the student will 
internalize the force of education, coming to discipline himself. He will, in 
effect, learn to be the master, or perhaps better said, the coordinator, of his 
instincts. (Cited in this form in Thiele, ibid., p.171) 
 
It is in this way that it is being argued in this thesis that Nietzsche looks at reading as a form of self-
overcoming at the level of the drives or that reading has an impact on the drives. It is in this way that 
Nietzsche works on the drives of the reader; he works on them indirectly. Thiele claims that for 
Nietzsche, ―the task of the educator, then, is to prune the instincts of his students, cutting some back in 
order that others might receive more light and nourishment.‖ (ibid.) He summarizes what the main role 
of the educator is, for Nietzsche: ―In sum, the educator trains his student in the art of arranging the soul, 
and training always involves authority and discipline.‖ (ibid.) He expresses that for Nietzsche, 
education‘s main role is in ordering the soul or in terms of pursuing justice within it. In this thesis, 
education or ‗reading in blood‘ is being argued to imply for Nietzsche that through this ordering of the 
soul entails that the soul is in turn enabled to encounter the whole or reality. He also argues that 
education, for Nietzsche is not to be viewed in terms of the accumulation of facts but as ―the 
transmission of passion and will from teacher to student... what the teacher has to teach is simply not 
transmissible to a crowd. He is not a purveyor of knowledge, a talking book, but a purveyor of 
personality, a model of an ordered soul.‖ (ibid., p. 172) In referring to the third essay of the Untimely 
Meditations entitled Schopenhauer as Educator, Thiele examines what Nietzsche considers the teacher 
to be, the ―revered object‖ that prompts the student to discover his own laws and ideals.‖ (ibid.) He 
contends that for Nietzsche, ―The educator is effectively a catalyst that allows the student to achieve the 
hierarchy of instinct that most enhances his power.‖ (ibid.) He then cites the following passage from 
Schopenhauer as Educator, a passage already referred to in this chapter:  
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Nietzsche uses the metaphor of rumination in order to convey that reading is an 
activity that is analogous to ―digestion‖ or ―metabolization‖ or the creation of new 
forces at a bodily level.  Reading takes the form of digestion or bodily self-
transformation; one is transformed at an instinctual level through self-overcoming. 
Nietzsche associates the mind‘s power to assimilate material with the power of 
digestion and, in drawing a comparison between mind and stomach, Zarathustra states 
that the mind works in the same way as a ‗digestive system.‘ (Z, I: ‗On Old & New 
Tablets‘: §16) 
 
 
Nietzsche‘s use of such metaphors as ―digestion‖ and ―metabolization‖ evoke the idea 
that the text can be a form of nutrition for the body. Nietzsche‘s ―life-texts‖ as 
embodiments of the philosophical eros of the will to power are to be ―digested‖ by 
those readers capable of reaching the ―heights‖ where they can have a transformative 
impact upon the body and can lay the ground for periods of health, growth and self-
enhancement. Nietzsche‘s texts can be internalised, transformed and metabolized into 
―thoughts,‖ where the soul as body takes in that which is most useful for the spirit or 
what the body requires for such enhancement or growth to take place:  
The choice of nutrition; the choice of climate and place: the third point at 
which one must not commit a blunder at any price is the choice of one‘s 
kind of recreation. Here, too, depending on the degree to which a spirit is 
sui generis, the limits of what is permitted to him, that is, profitable for 
him, are narrow, quite narrow... Reading is precisely my recreation from 
my own seriousness. (EH, ‗Why I Am So Clever‘: §3)  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
Your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably 
high above you, or at least above that which you usually take yourself to 
be. Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the true 
basic material of your being is, something in itself ineducable and in any 
case difficult of access, bound and paralyzed: your educators can only be 
your liberators (UM 129) (Cited in this form in Thiele, ibid., p.172 ) 
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Horst Hutter, in his work Shaping the Future: Nietzsche‘s New Regime of the Soul 
and its Ascetic Practices, notes that, for Nietzsche, ―The act of reading is an act of 
interpretation in which a given ―food,‖ prepared by an other, a ―friend,‖ is taken in, 
transformed, and metabolized into ―thoughts.‖ It is a form of learning that changes us 
just as all other feeding does.‖ (2006: 169) He also contends that for Nietzsche, the act 
of reading ―belongs to a form of relaxation in which a spirit that is sui generis is 
allowed to take in only that which is useful for this spirit...‖ (ibid.) He claims that, for 
Nietzsche, reading is analogous to eating, ―for eating is followed by a period of 
fullness and a period of digestion which then issues in excretion and the 
transformation of substances into agencies of maintenance and growth of ―foods for 
other beings.‖‖ (EH, ‗Why I Am So Clever‘: §3, cited in this form in Hutter 2006: 
169) In the chapter, ‗Nutrition and the Casuistry of Selfishness‘, Hutter examines the 
virtues of Nietzsche‘s art of reading, one of which is that the art of reading must 
involve ―an incorporation of appropriately nutritious substances into one‘s own being. 
Everything read has to be integrated and made one‘s own thinking in which the 
thought products of others sustain and increase one‘s own meditation. Reading that 
does not issue in thinking may actually be harmful and dangerous, if it is not merely 
useless.‖98 (Hutter 2006: 169) 
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 Hutter maintains that for Nietzsche it is serious reading that leads to thinking. Serious reading is 
reading that instils self-overcoming in Nietzsche‘s readers. It is in this way that for Nietzsche writing 
implies a responsibility to the future, as Hutter mentions the importance of the role of the author: 
―Someone wishing to become an author thereby indicates his wish to be an authority, a name-giver and 
a leader of souls.‖ (Hutter, H., Op. cit., p.109). Serious reading comes with the disciplined labour that 
goes into learning how to think: ―Serious writing is done for serious readers who may learn to think by 
their efforts of exegesis, that is to say, to dance with concepts‖. (Z, I, ‗On Reading & Writing‘; TI, 
‗What the Germans Lack‘, cited in this form in Hutter, Op. cit., p.109) Hutter explains that Nietzsche 
uses the metaphor of the dance to describe accomplished thinking (ibid., p.110): Just as the seeming 
ease of professional dancing, the fluidity of movements—and their gravity—defying grace are the 
result of much hard labor and long enslavements to self-discipline, so the freedom of graceful thinking 
results from the similar enslavements to the discipline of learning it as a craft.‖ (ibid.) Hutter reiterates 
that Nietzsche‘s responsibility to the future is in his ability to teach his readers ―the dangerous ability of 
how to think.‖ (ibid.) This ability to teach readers how to think ensures the ―avoidance of what is aptly 
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The form of spiritual nutrition that Nietzsche discusses, reading as rumination, has 
many implications on how he wishes that his books be read. He advocates the art of 
slow reading, and asserts that it is only within the slow reader that self-transformation 
can take place. In the Preface to Daybreak, he mentions that the tempo of his writing 
is at a slow rate, as he wishes to obviate those modern readers who read large 
quantities of books at rapid speed, which has led to inadequate bodily growth or 
transformation.
99
 Nietzsche recommends an art of exegesis that teaches ―slow 
reading‖: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
dubbed logorrhoea, that is to say, the rather mindless production of great quantities of ―texts‖ whose 
authors frequently are celebrated as culture cardinals on the basis of the number of pages involved. The 
larger the number of pages, the scantier often appears to be their mental content. No struggle, no effort 
of thinking seems to be involved in so many of modern books, especially academic ones.‖ (ibid.) Hutter 
maintains that Nietzsche ―counters the tendency to this kind of literature, prevalent already in his 
lifetime, by using his writings to express his efforts at self-struggle.‖ (ibid.) In this thesis, it is being 
argued that Nietzsche‘s role as a writer and prophet is to initiate struggles of self-overcoming in his 
free-spirited readers. He wishes to assist in the formation or development of his readers‘ soul and in 
turn to prepare those select readers for the initiation of the millennial Kingdom or the ―Zarathustra 
Kingdom of a thousand Years‖ (Z, IV: ‗The Honey Sacrifice‘) See Robert Wiley, The Bible and 
Christian Traditions: Keys to Understanding the Allegorical Subplot of Nietzsche‘s Zarathustra, for a 
comparison of Nietzsche‘s idea of the Zarathustra Kingdom to the Millennial Kingdom of the Book of 
Revelation (New York, P. Lang, 1990, p. 302).  
 
99
 Hutter also notes that reading at speed is characteristic of modern readers, readers who read fast as to 
read more (Hutter, H., Op. cit., p.170). It is in this way that these readers ―tend to read with less 
understanding and also think less profoundly and become ever more superficial. They are able to 
chatter about many things, pretend ―knowledge‖ about things of which they do not even grasp 
shadows.‖ (ibid.) In this thesis it is being argued that this type of superficial reading does not involve 
reflecting upon the ―truly great problems and question marks‖ (GS: §373), or it does not wish to come 
close to grasping reality as it is. Slow reading takes into account the author‘s intention; it involves the 
task of becoming wholeheartedly engaged in understanding his writings and then having to apply them 
to oneself (Hutter, H., Op. cit., p.110). Reading must be slow as to accommodate reflection upon one‘s 
own life experiences, prior to bringing them to the text. Hutter argues that reading at speed that is 
prevalent in the modern academic world results in the ―production of ever larger numbers of books and 
articles, with judgements of quality based entirely on criteria of quantity of materials read and 
written.‖; and in the ―production of vast amounts of culture barf‖ they are ―the results of logorrhoea 
which are presented for the consumption at ever lower levels of redigestibility.‖ (ibid., p.170) Hutter 
also notes the affects that reading at speed has on the body:  
 
It is as if people were exhorted to eat ever larger amounts of foods at ever 
increasing speeds, resulting in ever larger and more rapidly accumulating 
amounts of excretions. The result is, indeed, serious mental and spiritual 
intellectual entrails, which seem to measure the current trends to obesity 
and the functional malnutrition observable among people of plenty. And all  
of it is called ―higher education.‖ (ibid.)   
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Nowadays it is not only my habit, it is also to my taste—a malicious taste, 
perhaps?—no longer to write anything which does not reduce to despair 
every sort of man who is ‗in a hurry‘. For philology is that venerable art 
which demands of its votaries one thing above all: to go aside, to take time, 
to become still, to become slow—it is a goldsmith‘s art and 
connoisseurship of the word which has nothing but delicate, cautious work 
to do and achieves nothing if it does not achieve it lento. But for precisely 
this reason it is more necessary than ever today, by precisely this means 
does it entice and enchant us the most, in the midst of an age of ‗work‘, 
that is to say, of hurry, of indecent and perspiring haste, which wants to 
‗get everything done‘ at once, including every old and new book:—this art 
does not so easily get anything done, it teaches to read well, that is to say, 
to read slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, with reservations, 
with doors left open, with delicate eyes and fingers... My patient friends, 
this book desires for itself only perfect readers and philologists: learn to 
read well!—  (Daybreak, Pref.: §5) 
 
 
Reading as ―rumination‖ or as ―digestion‖ does not necessarily imply making the text 
one‘s own, in terms of breaking it down into one‘s own liking. It rather includes the 
art of exegesis where reading ruminatively involves making an effort to focus on what 
the author‘s intention may be or what is being said by the text.100 This type of reading 
requires intense mental focus on the text, which in turn has an impact on the body. It 
is this impact on the body that is reading as rumination. However, it is only in the 
context of focusing on the author‘s intention that rumination takes place. For 
Nietzsche, right reading must include the art of exegesis or the attempt to grasp the 
author‘s intention or to take the metaphysical independence of both author and text 
                                                          
100 Hutter reveals that Nietzsche has mistakenly been related to the denial of authorial meaning and as a 
result he has become ―a legitimating voice for ―creative misreading‖ where a ―critic asks neither the 
author nor the text about their intentions but simply beats the text into a shape that will serve his 
purpose. He does this by imposing a ―grid,‖ in Foucault‘s terminology, ――on the text which may have 
nothing to do with any vocabulary used in the text or by its author.‖‖ (ibid., p. 171) Hutter also makes 
the point that Foucault‘s own use of ―grids‖ ―always remained faithful to the meanings inherent in 
these texts, only stretching them so as legitimately to incorporate his own times and experiences. These 
grids thus remained entirely within the parameters and strictures of a Nietzschean exegesis.‖ (ibid.) He 
claims that for Nietzsche that ―creative misreading‖ has resulted from ―modern culture‖ and is ―proof 
of a serious decline in the art of reading that Nietzsche would be the author invoked as an authority for 
a manner of ―reading‖ a text that denies the very existence of any authorial intention.‖ (ibid.) He 
contends that this ―creative misreading‖ is part of the postmodern trend, and acknowledges Nietzsche‘s 
own words on this issue: ――The worst readers are those who proceed like plundering: they take things 
out for themselves which they can use, dirty, and confuse the text and bewitch the whole.‖‖ (Assorted 
Opinions & Maxims: §137 cited in this form in Hutter, ibid., p.172) He claims that these ―methods of 
interpretation‖ are far removed from ―any serious exegesis which always honours the work as a whole, 
tries to understand it as well as the author‘s intent, and only then applies the meaning thus gained to the 
different life circumstances of the reader.‖ (ibid.) 
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into account. It is this attempt that requires exhaustive efforts all of which have an 
impact on the reader‘s unconscious. 
 
An Aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not been ―deciphered‖ 
when it has been simply read; rather, one has then to begin its exegesis, for 
which is required an art of exegesis. To be sure, one thing is necessary 
above all if one is to practice reading as an art in this way, something that 
has been unlearned most thoroughly nowadays—and therefore it will be 
some time before my writings are ―readable‖—something for which one 
has almost to be a cow and in any case not a ―modern man‖: rumination.  
(GM, Preface: §8)  
 
Hutter (2006) argues that, for Nietzsche, the art of exegesis must take into account the 
intention of the author and in doing so, the reader must move between two poles:  
 
In exegesis a text is made one‘s own and becomes a permanent property of 
one‘s own being. Exegesis moves between two poles: on the one hand, 
what an author intends to say has to be grasped as closely as possible. It 
may be impossible ever to approximate the intention of an author, but if the 
effort is not made, then it would seem unnecessary to read anything at all. 
A written text is a form of communication across an expanse of time in 
which the writer is the (silent) ―friend‖ and the reader his partner in 
dialogue. The other pole of exegesis requires that the intention of the 
author, once grasped (with due allowance being made for the elusiveness 
of all texts), be brought into context with the object of the text as it is 
filtered through the experience of the reader. (Hutter 2006: 170-171) 
 
 Hutter suggests that the reader must take into account the truth validity of the text or 
its relation to reality:  (2006: 171) 
 
The art of reading must begin with focusing on the written word; the reader must 
focus on the written word or on what is being said by the author in order that the 
author‘s intention can be grasped.101 It is in the process of grasping the meaning of the 
                                                          
101
 In this thesis, it is being argued that the meaning of Nietzsche‘s works lie in his ipsissimosity (HH, 
II: Preface, §1), his higher unconscious self, and pathos and in turn in their relation to reality. It does 
not lie ‗in‘ in the words of his works. Hutter holds a similar contention; however, he argues that the 
reader must begin to focus on the written word with the intention of grasping the meaning of his works, 
and this mental focus instigates creative acts of self-shaping. These acts lead to the development of the 
reader‘s higher self through the ―Great reason of the Body‖, and in turn educate or discipline the reader 
to the whole or reality (untimely). The reader in self-overcoming at an unconscious level is 
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text that one must concentrate and focus on what is being said. However, the reader 
must also mentally focus on the impact the text has on his unconscious. Reading 
ruminatively ―forces a concentration and a focusing of the conscious mind on both 
what is being said and the impact of what is said on oneself via a selective judgement 
about its validity.‖ (Hutter 2006: 171)102 It is in this way that good reading is slow; for 
Nietzsche, the art of reading like a cow that is ruminatively involves reading ―slowly, 
deeply, looking backwards and forwards with afterthoughts and doors left open, with 
tender fingers and eyes.‖ (D, Preface: §5, cited in this form in Hutter 2006: 171) 
Hutter claims that reading in this manner ―irrespective of which profound text is being 
read, is as such already a spiritual exercise.‖ (ibid.) The reader who examines the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
experiencing an untimely relation to an author. In bringing a similar pathos to Nietzsche‘s works, he in 
turn relates to Nietzsche at the most truthful level. 
 
On the one hand, philosophical reading requires grasping the objective meaning of the text, which in 
this thesis is being argued to be Nietzsche‘s ipsissimosity; the meaning of his works lies in his ‗blood‘ 
or pathos. On the other hand, philosophical reading, for Nietzsche enables the reader to return to his 
self, and to encounter reality as it is in the moment of amor fati where Becoming reveals itself. This 
type of reading as a discipline is a form of self-overcoming; it enables the reader to form a new self. 
This discipline has an impact on the unconscious. It is through the transcendental mind that the reader 
focuses upon the impact the text has on his unconscious, which will be discussed next in this section; it 
is a mode of consciousness that is reflective upon itself, the self-reflective ego. (Hutter, H., Op. cit., 
p.173) It is referred to by Hutter as the reading self or the writing self. This is another aspect to the 
higher self; it is a principle of philosophical thinking that enables self-knowledge to take place. It is a 
new ‗metaphysical‘ ego that is non-solipsistic and that cannot be viewed in terms of substance, or 
Descartes‘ cogito. At a subjective level, in terms of the reader‘s self-overcoming through reading and 
then focusing upon its impact on the unconscious, Nietzsche as an author is concealed. Nietzsche 
reveals himself as an author in his ‗ipsissimosity‘ or in is his inmost being, his tragic pathos that is the 
meaning of his works. It is then in bringing a similar pathos to the text that the reader enters into the 
most fundamental relation with him as an author. It is for this reason that there are moments of 
revealing (indigestion) and concealing (digestion) when it comes to reading Nietzsche as an author. 
    
102
 Hutter elaborates on the notion of self-overcoming through mental focus in chapter four of his work 
entitled ‗Writing the Future/Reading the Self‘; he states that in the process of fully understanding 
Nietzsche, the reader undergoes a series of inner struggles. He also claims that because Nietzsche 
―eschews a technical  philosophical vocabulary and uses different modes of describing the same or 
similar phenomena, reading him requires the utmost concentration and a constant mental attention, not 
to the words used, but to the phenomena designated by the words.‖ (ibid., p.110) It is in this way that 
according to Hutter, Nietzsche ―transmits the labor of mental concentration that has gone into his art of 
writing to his readers.‖ (ibid.) Hutter asserts that Nietzsche‘s affinity with his readers and his ability to 
make them work hard is reminiscent of Plato: ―Of both Nietzsche and Plato it may be said that their 
writings are extremely difficult to access, and deliberately so. Both aim to shape their readers by 
making them work hard, requiring intensive mental focus as well as attention and memory and thereby 
inducing processes of self-transformation in their readers‘ souls.‖ (ibid., p.112) Hutter claims that 
neither Plato nor Nietzsche wishes to impart doctrines, and as a result ―they do next to nothing for their 
readers.‖ (ibid.) 
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impact a text has on his unconscious sharpens his mental focus, and in turn, it 
strengthens and nourishes the transcendental mind of the reader.
103
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 Hutter outlines elsewhere the reason why, for Nietzsche, the reader must strengthen his 
transcendental mind. The reader must do so in order to get in touch with the ―Great reason of the 
Body,‖ and in turn one‘s ―life-task‖. Hutter discusses that Nietzsche requires of his readers ―to pay 
attention to the very important notion of the ―life-task‖ that dwells unconsciously in each individual 
body and that needs to be awakened for someone to become who he or she is.‖ (Hutter, H., ibid.,  
p.135) He mentions the consequences, according to Nietzsche, of failing to recognize one‘s life-task: 
―Failure to become aware of this life-task is a failure to achieve the place allotted to an individual by 
his fate. This life task need not be equally lofty or grand for everyone, as it was for Nietzsche, but 
missing it is missing one‘s highest joy.‖ (ibid.) This life-task is also viewed in terms of the ―organizing 
idea‖ that is in the depths of the reader. (EH, ‗Why I Am So Clever‘: §9) According to Nietzsche, this 
idea that grows in the depths cannot be consciously willed: ―It is given to each individual as a deep 
potentiality that may be missed‖ (Hutter, H., Op. cit., p.135) In Ecce Homo, he claims that his task 
guided him unconsciously before revealing itself: ―My memory lacks any kind of awareness of 
struggling; of ―waiting,‖ of ―striving,‖ envisioning a ‗wish‘—all of these I do not know from 
experience.‖ (EH, ‗Why I Am So Clever‘: §9, cited in this form in Hutter, ibid., p.135-136) Nietzsche 
did not force himself into anything but just let himself be, or let his unconscious task eventually come 
to reveal itself. (ibid., p.136) According to Hutter, Nietzsche views conscious thinking as ―only a small 
and fragmentary portion of the whole of mentations by which the body conquers its future‖, and is to be 
contrasted with the unconscious. (ibid., p.134) The intelligence ruling the whole of the human being is 
vastly superior to conscious thinking; it is what Nietzsche refers to as the ―Great Reason of the Body.‖  
He maintains that Nietzsche wishes for the reader to understand his unconscious and to get in touch 
with the great reason of the body. This can only be done indirectly through examining the mood 
patterns of the body, as they are a manifestation of unconscious activity, and an examination of them 
gives us indirect insight into the unconscious: ―Moods and feelings are hence prime parts of the text of 
our bodies that we need to read. Pleasure and displeasure indicate growth and diminution of power, 
respectively.‖ (ibid.) It is important to get in touch with the great reason of the body, as one may miss 
one‘s task or one‘s guiding principle. It is for this reason Nietzsche maintains that the reader should 
examine one‘s life, its patterns and cycles and in doing so, one may discover this organizing ―idea‖. 
Also through autobiographical thinking or writing the self, where the writer views his writings as an 
expression of his unconscious, he can indirectly gain insight into his unconscious. Hutter maintains that 
the aim of Nietzschean askesis or of a spiritual working on oneself is to ―harmonize our conscious 
willing with our unconsciously guiding ―idea in the depths.‖‖ (ibid., p.136) This is to be carried out 
through ―chosen solitudes, cultivation of enmity-friendships, nutritional care, and using reading and 
writings as ways to write oneself‖ and in doing so ―we strive to harmonize our ―minds‖ with our 
―bodies.‖ (ibid.) Hutter refers to the mind that examines the unconscious indirectly as the 
transcendental mind. He ascertains that in examining the unconscious indirectly that it is a form of self-
awareness and self-reflection. It is through this type of self-reflection that the human mind acquires a 
transcendental cast. It is similar to Husserl‘s idea of the Epoche, the horizon from which self-reflection 
is carried out by the transcendental ego, where the unconscious is only attainable through interpretation 
or translation. The transcendental ego or self-reflective ego is a mode of consciousness that reflects 
upon itself. It is through the transcendental mind being sharpened in its focus that it ensures that one 
may not miss one‘s ―life task‖. The transcendental mind or self-reflective ego that reads the self or 
focuses upon the impact reading has on the self is expressive of the link Nietzsche emphasizes between 
self-knowledge and reading (GM, Preface: §1). In getting in touch with one‘s life-task, through the 
transcendental mind that one in turn acquires self-knowledge. The self that knows in this sense is not 
the self as object, but rather the metaphysical self that cannot be referred to as an object (the self cannot 
be viewed within its own visual field); it is in this way that self-knowledge is not knowledge of an 
object. Wright in her work entitled ‗The Philosopher‘s ―I‖: Autobiography and the Search for the Self‘ 
notes that when it comes to obeying the Delphic oracle ‗Know thyself,‘ the self cannot be referred to as 
an object. (Wright, J.L., New York, State University of New York Press, 2006, p.28 She draws a 
distinction between the rhetorical self, the self as referent of particular statements, and the ontological 
self or inner self, the self as active creator of one‘s statements. (ibid., p.5) The ontological self is the 
writing self and the rhetorical self is the author-subject both coincide to form a higher form of self-
unification. (ibid., p.28)   
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Right reading, for Nietzsche, not only requires grasping the author‘s intention, it also, 
at a subjective level, involves the development of the reader‘s higher self. The art of 
exegesis involves the aphorism having an impact on the unconscious of the reader, 
and in turn, it enables the development of a higher self through the ―Great Reason‖ of 
the body. (Z, I: ‗On the Despisers of the Body‘) The art of exegesis not only requires 
that the reader grasp the meaning of the text but also that he focus upon the impact it 
has on his unconscious. Reading, for Nietzsche, makes possible the formation of a 
new self through enabling the reader to overcome his Christian self; it enables the 
development of a higher self, one that can be attuned to reality. The aphorism plays an 
important role in instigating a series of thoughts in the reader, and in turn in forming a 
new self for the reader. Hutter notes that the genre chosen by Nietzsche for expressing 
his philosophy, the aphorism, ―is a form of writing peculiarly designed to initiate 
sequences of thinking in its readers.‖ (2006: 139) On the one hand, the reader self-
overcomes through the discipline of reading; on the other hand, Nietzsche‘s writings 
themselves enable the reader to overcome through changing his ways of thinking. It is 
in this way that reading as rumination, or ―reading in blood‖ (Z, I: §7) is a form of 
asceticism, a true asceticism, a higher spirituality that enables the reader to encounter 
the whole. Nietzsche‘s ideal readers, the select few are ―tall and lofty‖ in stature with 
a philosophical eros or desire for the highest things or the ‗more-than-human‘; their 
reading requires leaps, strength, and self-overcoming: ―In the mountains the shortest 
way is from peak to peak: but for that one must have long legs. Aphorisms should be 
peaks—and those who are addressed tall and lofty.‖ (Z, I: §7)  He writes elsewhere, 
―In the mountains of truth you will never climb in vain: either you will get up higher 
195 
    
today or you will exercise your strength so as to be able to get up higher tomorrow.‖ 
(HH, II: §358)  
 
The aphorism, for Nietzsche, is open-ended to the future and needs to be completed in 
the acts of reading, and in this way the reader has to finish ―writing‖ the aphorism104 
(Hutter 2006: 139). The first step to ―writing‖ the aphorism is undoing one‘s Christian 
self:  
                                                          
104
 Hutter explains how Nietzsche can enable his readers to self-create as his works are ―open-ended to 
the future‖; they aim to create. It is for this reason that Nietzsche‘s works are non-dogmatic and do not 
withhold doctrines. Hutter also notes that Plato‘s writings are also non-dogmatic, and open-ended: 
―Plato‘s writings seem like invitations to his readers to create for themselves ―invisible cities‖ in their 
souls‖ (Hutter, H., Op. cit., p.116) Hutter earlier notes that there is a distinction to be drawn between 
Plato and Platonisms, the latter adopted Plato to their own liking such as in the case of the Christian 
Platonists, and hence rendered Plato a dogmatic. (ibid.) As Nietzsche‘s writings are open-ended to the 
future, ―his manner of writing is hence oriented entirely to being the founding legislator of the invisible 
cities of the souls of free-spirits who venture to freely create themselves in experimental modes of 
living.‖ (ibid., p.125) It is due to the open-endedness of his works, that they ―require readers who 
―write‖ themselves in their acts reading‖ (ibid.) It also implies that they are in a way ―unfinished and 
cannot be finished in mere acts of reading and new writing, no matter how profound and philological. 
They can only be completed in acts of creative living, to which reading and writing are necessary 
stimuli.‖ (ibid.) It is in this way that Nietzsche‘s readers must ―finish‖ his writings in their creative 
efforts of self-shaping. In ―finishing‖ his writing, and creating a higher self, the reader in turn relates to 
truth. 
 
Hutter notes a similarity between Nietzsche and Plato on matters of self-fashioning through reading 
philosophical texts. He expresses that Plato is the only thinker before Nietzsche to have ―thought and 
wrote with comparable intensity and lucidity about the philosophical significance of the literary form 
chosen to express and transmit a form of self-fashioning and moulding of cities of the soul.‖ (ibid.) He 
claims that Plato‘s dialogues are also open-ended to the future and do not aim to transmit ―true‖ 
doctrines. (ibid.) They rather involve the creation of ―truths‖ in acts of creative and philosophical 
reading, each of which results in a Platonism of the soul that shapes a way of living‖ (ibid., p.126) 
Similar to Nietzsche, Plato‘s dialogues are addressed to the few who in turn inspire the many to acts of 
self-shaping. (ibid.) According to Hutter, Nietzsche has chosen a particular mode of writing that is 
open-ended to the future and hence instigates self-shaping in his readers. It is ―writing in blood‖ or 
writing in aphorisms. (ibid.) The aphorism of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is also a replacement for the 
Platonic dialogues and Christian Gospels; it is what Hutter refers to as a ―new gospel‖ or ―fifth gospel‖ 
(ibid.) 
 
Hutter also notes that there are many distinctions between Plato and Nietzsche, one of which is in their 
style of writing: ―One absolutely striking difference between Plato‘s and Nietzsche‘s styles of writings 
is that Plato‘s dialogues are completely impersonal, whereas Nietzsche‘s aphorisms are entirely 
personal.‖ (ibid., p.126) In referring to the preface of Human, All Too Human II, Hutter writes that 
―Nietzsche in his aphoristic writings is present everywhere; they begin in his life, write of his ways of 
life that have been overcome, and always point to himself, to his ―ipsissimosity.‖‖ (ibid.) Hutter also 
explains that in spite of the very personal nature of Nietzsche‘s aphoristic style, his writings are still 
open-ended to the future, they aim to create. ―Nietzsche‘s aphoristic writings thus reflect his 
movements away from his innermost self (ego ipsissimus) toward his innermost self (ego ipsissimum).‖ 
(ibid.) His writings reflect a movement away from writing for himself, his very own self to writing for 
others; they are in this way impersonal. 
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An attentive reader is led by the aphorism first to deconstruct the habits 
and ways of thinking established in the soul in the form of the culturally 
transmitted center of thinking, the logistikon. All heirs of Christian and 
Platonic culture have a more or less strongly developed, automatically 
functioning logistikon. Nietzsche partially conceives his task to lie in 
providing the impetus to undo these habits of thinking which, it must be 
remembered, are also habits of valuation. The undoing of one‘s logistikon 
at least partially, is the first step taken by an attentive reader in finishing 
the writing of an aphorism. (Hutter 2006: 139)  
 
The aphorism, for Nietzsche is designed to ―effect changes,‖ to instigate change in the 
reader: ―Aphorisms are thus almost irresistible temptations to change oneself and 
one‘s habits of mind and heart.‖ (Hutter 2006: 140) It only instils change in those 
select few who can undertake the arduous challenge of reading the aphorism, and of 
subsequently undoing oneself. It in this way requires excess time and otium. In the 
preface to Human, All Too Human, I (§8), Nietzsche speaks of the demands the book 
puts on the reader: ―It demands too much! It is addressed to human beings without the 
pressure of rough duties, it demands refined and sophisticated sensibilities, it needs 
superfluity, excess time, brightness of heart and heaven, otium in the most daring 
sense—all good things which we Germans today do not have and hence cannot give.‖ 
(HH, I: §8 cited in this form in Hutter 2006: 140) Hutter mentions that the excess time 
required to rewrite oneself is reiterated by Nietzsche when he demonstrates how the 
aphorism prefixed to the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morals requires the entire 
third essay for its interpretation.
105
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 Hutter seems to be claiming that aphorisms, for Nietzsche, require exhaustive interpretation such 
that the reader self-overcomes through reading them. Then he goes on to state that Nietzsche himself is 
doing a written interpretation of an aphorism, which is prefixed to the third book of On the Genealogy 
of Morals. This is Nietzsche offering us an example of what is actually involved in interpreting an 
aphorism. Nietzsche suggests at the end of the preface to On the Genealogy of Morals that the third 
essay of the book is a lesson in reading. He tells the reader that he is offering an ―example‖ of what he 
regards as ―exegesis,‖ an aphorism is prefixed to the third essay, ―the essay itself is a commentary on 
it.‖ (GM, Preface: §8) The essay itself is entitled ‗What Is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?‘, and the 
aphorism to which Nietzsche is referring to is as follows: ―Unconcerned, mocking, violent—thus 
wisdom wants us: she is a woman and always loves only a warrior.‖ It is from a section entitled ‗On 
Reading & Writing‘ of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. He mentions that he is offering an example in the same 
passage where he discusses the ―art of exegesis‖: ―An aphorism, properly stamped and molded, has not 
been ―deciphered‖ when it has been simply read; rather, one has then to begin its exegesis, for which is 
required an art of exegesis.‖ Hutter seems to look at the third essay as an example that is offered by 
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The second stage in a reader‘s completion of the aphorism lies in the formation of a 
new self: Nietzsche as educator appeals to the inner voice of the reader, to the ―idea‖ 
at work in his depths or his unconscious; he wishes to enable the reader to realize his 
―life-task.‖ (EH, ‗Why I Am So Clever‘: §9) Nietzsche offers us the metaphor of 
―wounding‖106 in a passage entitled ‗On Reading & Writing‘ of Thus Spoke 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Nietzsche that shows the level of interpretation required to interpret an aphorism. Hutter does not 
discuss the aphorism itself directly, which itself happens to be about reading and writing. Many 
commentators have examined the relationship between the aphorism and the essay, and what it tells us 
about the art of exegesis. See Jill Marsden ‗Nietzsche and the art of aphorism‘, In: A Companion to 
Nietzsche, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006, 22-37 and John T. Wilcox, ‗What Aphorism Does 
Nietzsche Explicate in Genealogy of Morals, essay III?‘, Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 35, 
no.4, Oct 1997, pp. 593-610). Their concern is with whether or not the essay is an interpretation of the 
aphorism; Marsden argues that it is an interpretation of the aphorism whereas Wilcox argues the 
contrary. Hutter seems to look at the third essay as a written commentary of the aphorism. The 
exhaustive levels of interpretation lead to creative acts of self-fashioning, and the development of a 
higher self, which is a necessary part of the art of exegesis. 
 
The third essay as a written commentary on the aphorism does offer us insight into the aphorism, which 
itself is about reading and writing. It is an aphorism that expresses the nature of aphorisms themselves, 
as it expresses their wounding nature. The reader must be a warrior who can endure the spiritual 
wounding that Nietzsche instils in reading him; the reader as warrior is then, therefore enabled to 
overcome the old ascetic ideal. Nietzsche‘s use of the aphoristic style of language ―works‖ upon the 
unconscious of the reader, and in turn, it enables the reader to overcome old values or ways of thinking. 
The reader also is a warrior in overcoming through the discipline of reading itself. It is in this way that 
―reading in blood‖ is a true asceticism, according to Nietzsche, as it enables the reader to overcome his 
life-denying values and affirm his life in amor fati. The reader who is a warrior then loves wisdom, as 
reading can attune him to the most truthful relation to reality through the development of his essential 
self. The distinction between the two types of asceticism is mentioned in the second essay, and is 
explored further in the third essay. In the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morals, the asceticism of 
the warrior noble is referred to as ―self-discipline,‖ ―self-surveillance,‖ and ―self-overcoming.‖ (GM, 
III: §16) The asceticism of the warrior noble relates to mastering the expression of the instincts, 
through their intelligence or the ―Great Reason of the Body,‖ which in turn enables the higher, essential 
self to encounter reality as it is. On the one hand, as Hutter states aphorisms are to be written about, as 
the third essay is a written commentary of the aphorism prefixed to the essay. The exhaustive process 
can indirectly have an impact on the reader‘s unconscious. On the other hand, aphorisms have a ‗direct‘ 
impact on the reader‘s unconscious, as they overturn a reader‘s ways of thinking.  
 
106
 Walter Kaufmann, in his Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, also notes the 
metaphorical use of the word ‗warrior‘ or ‗war‘. He does so in examining a different passage from Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra entitled ―On War and Warriors‖. He claims that Nietzsche‘s use of the word must be 
viewed in metaphorical terms and that ―Nietzsche is not speaking of soldiers‖ (Kaufmann, W., Op. cit., 
p.386). Kaufmann declares that a more literal interpretation has led to fascist interpretations of 
Nietzsche, which is false: ―Nietzsche, however, is surely not speaking of ―war‖ in the literal sense any 
more than he is speaking of soldiers. It is the quest for Knowledge that he discusses, and he evidently 
believes that it need not be an entirely private affair: it can be a contest, as it was in Socrates‘ day; and 
the goal might be truth rather than winning an argument.‖ (ibid.) Kaufmann in this way suggests that 
the warrior is the person who is a seeker of knowledge, as the passage from ―On Reading & Writing‖ 
suggests, he is a lover of wisdom. This wisdom lies in the existential experience of amor fati or in 
relating to reality at the most fundamental level. The warrior or noble reader of Nietzsche can engage 
through reading in a personal agon or an internal struggle, in overcoming old values and forming a new 
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Zarathustra, a metaphor that stands for the pain that comes with self-overcoming 
through ―reading and writing in blood‖. Hutter reiterates the wounding nature of 
reading Nietzsche as follows:  
 
Nietzsche at work on oneself involves frequently a wounding as well as a 
being delighted, as he himself is very much aware. The wounding comes 
from losing old habits of the mind and the heart which, even though they 
were based on lies and illusions, nevertheless were lies to which one may 
have become fondly attached. In this way, wrong habits of mind, soul, and 
body, established in us for centuries, may be, as it were, forms of badness 
that no longer appear as bad because of their antiquity and because of 
human flexibility. (Hutter 2006: 141) 
 
However, this wounding is a necessary prerequisite to the joy of creating a new self, 
of coming to realize one‘s inner life-task:  
 
If the wounding leaves a reader on the road to convalescence, delight arises 
at the experience of freedom, once one‘s inner guiding spirit shows the 
way to a new way of life. The gradual unveiling of one‘s ―idea in the 
depths‖ then may lead to the ability to freely use the material provided by 
Nietzsche for the construction of a new logistikon. This would be each 
reader‘s own and ―inimitable song of necessity.‖ (ibid.)       
 
Reading, as a form of therapy or spiritual working on oneself, enables the reader to 
identify a disease within his soul and initiate its overcoming by which self-
transformation through the text can take place. In the Preface to Assorted Opinions & 
Maxims, Nietzsche refers to the therapeutic nature of the book; he refers to it as a 
―sharp-pointed and ticklish work‖ where his most painful experiences are impaled 
with the ―point of a needle‖ into the reader ―where a certain amount of blood 
occasionally flows.‖ (HH, II, Preface: §2) Nietzsche himself refers to ―Assorted 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
self. This idea of a spiritual agon can occur between both author and reader, as Nietzsche‘s aphorisms 
can be said to ―wound‖ its reader. It is in this way that Nietzsche indirectly works on the unconscious 
of the reader. The wounding occurs in overcoming old habits of thought. In Twilight of the Idols, in a 
passage entitled ‗Morality as Anti-Nature‘ Nietzsche discusses ―the spiritualization of hostility‖, that ―it 
consists in a profound appreciation of the value of having enemies‖ and he also expresses the value and 
―fruitfulness‖ of the ――internal enemy.‖‖ (TI, V: §3) 
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Opinions and Maxims‖ and ―The Wanderer and his Shadow‖ as ―a continuation and 
redoubling of a spiritual cure, namely of the anti-romantic self-treatment that my still 
healthy instinct had itself discovered and prescribed for me against a temporary attack 
of the most dangerous form of romanticism.‖ (ibid.) He also in the Preface to Assorted 
Opinions and Maxims refers to the various aphorisms of the book as ―precepts of 
health that may be recommended to the more spiritual natures of the generation just 
coming up as a disciplina voluntis [discipline of the will].‖ (HH, vol. II, Pref.: §2) 
Nietzsche speaks of that reader who calls a book ―harmful‖ or ―dangerous‖ that 
―perhaps one day he will admit to himself that this same book has done him a great 
service by bringing out the hidden sickness of his heart and making it visible.—‖ 
(HH, vol. II, ‗Assorted Opinions & Maxims‘: §58) This point is clearly expressed by 
Danto (1986: 5) when he suggests that for Nietzsche, the aphorism ―attacks‖ a reader 
in cutting into the reader‘s soul, such that the reader can dispense with his diseased 
self, the self that encompasses the ascetic ideal. Danto (1986: 4) states that the 
language of the aphorism is ―used in a way as to bypass the faculties used ordinarily 
in reading‖. Danto maintains, while quoting Nietzsche‘s On the Genealogy of Morals, 
that the aphorism for Nietzsche ―when properly stamped and molded, has not been 
‗deciphered‘ when it has simply been read.‖ (Danto 1986: 4, citing GM, preface: §8)  
The aphorism ―implants‖ itself in the reader, and it transforms the reader ―into a 
different type of person—the sort of person the philosopher requires the reader to be if 
the philosophy is to reach him. So we have to realize that in reading Nietzsche we are 
being attacked...‖ (Danto 1986: 5) This ―wounding‖ leads the reader to form a new 
self, whereby the reader becomes aware of his ―life-task‖, a task that originally grew 
in the unconscious of the reader. 
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The act of overcoming through reading is represented by the reader experiencing pain 
through the lodgement of aphorisms, and in turn overcoming the ascetic ideal.  This 
reiterates the therapeutic nature of reading Nietzsche‘s works whereby the reader can 
overcome a disease, which is the ascetic ideal in his case. The therapeutic force of 
aphorisms as noble pieces of writing or peaks, as the embodiment of noble thought, 
which are above ―the cloud‖ of ―blackness and gravity‖ (Z, I: ‗On Reading & 
Writing‘) can be experienced by the philosophical type. Those who ―digest‖ or 
metabolize the aphorisms can transcend the ascetic ideal or the ―spirit of gravity‖ and 
raise their souls to noble forms of laughter and dancing. Zarathustra himself believes 
only in a god who dances: ―Now I am light, now I fly, now I see myself beneath 
myself, now a god dances through me.‖ (Z, I: ‗On Reading & Writing‘) Nietzsche 
speaks out against those who ―chew and digest everything‖; he acclaims those who 
have selective tastes with ―choosy tongues and stomachs, which have learned to say 
―I‖ and ―yes‖ and ―no‖.‖ (Z, III, ‗On the Spirit of Gravity‘: §2) These higher types of 
human being are selective in the choice of material that they read. The clouds become 
―tragic plays and tragic seriousness‖ (Z, I: ‗On Reading & Writing‘); however, those 
who are elevated to nobility and see from above are able to laugh a laughter which 
destroys the ―spirit of gravity‖: ―Not by wrath does one kill but by laughter. Come, let 
us kill the spirit of gravity!‖ (ibid.) This elevation to nobility consists of a love for ‗the 
more-than-human‘, of philosophical truth, the desire for something higher than the 
human world.
107
 Love of ―the highest things‖ or philosophical eros, for Nietzsche, is 
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 According to Lampert, those addressed in the passage entitled ―On Reading & Writing‖ (Z, I) are 
―taught to harden their hearts against what lies beneath them‖ (Lampert, L., Nietzsche‘s Teaching: An 
Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, London, Yale University Press, 1986, p.44) In his notes, he 
mentions that the achievement of this state can also be noted in the Bible (see Ps. 95:8, Matt. 19:8; 
Mark 10:5; 16:14; Heb. 3:8) (ibid. p.318). He maintains that in order to reach what is higher those who 
Nietzsche addresses must be pitiless: ―In refusing to look down, in looking only upward to what is 
higher, Zarathustra‘s followers are to become fearless and to feel themselves exempt from what befalls 
others‖ (ibid. p.45) Through the process of ―reading in blood‖, the reader can experience ‗spiritual 
wounding‘, as the author lodges the aphorisms in his heart. He asserts that for Nietzsche, aphorisms are 
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the medium of self-elevation to nobility, or is the means to self-knowledge, a view 
which emphasizes the role love plays in philosophical education.
108
 Through reading 
Nietzsche, the reader comes to realize his higher self or his ―organizing idea‖ in the 
depths (EH, ‗Why I Am So Clever‘: §9), and comes to realize that his goal is ―to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
aimed at those ―fit by nature for the spiritual warfare to which Zarathustra attracts‖ they are aimed at 
the ―proper readers‖, the ―worthy few‖ (ibid.)  
Lampert notes that Nietzsche‘s art of writing is similar to Plato‘s writing in that it is not for the 
common, ―the literary form of aphorism, avoids what is shameful in writing and what corrupts spirit by 
turning it into something common... just as Platonic writing modelled on Socratic speaking plants its 
seeds ... only in carefully prepared ground. (ibid., p.46) In his notes, he mentions the passages of the 
Phaedrus 258d, 273d, 274b-278b, which reiterate this point. (ibid., p.318) He also states that there are 
other remarkable similarities between chapters ‗On Reading & Writing,‘ ‗On the Tree on the 
Mountainside‖ (Z, I: §7, §8) and the Phaedrus. Lampert informs us of Socrates‘ conversation in the 
Phaedrus with one young man, which takes place under a very tall tree outside the city and concerns 
what moves one beyond the city. The aim of the conversation is for Socrates to draw the young man 
―away from a passion that holds him down.‖ (ibid., p.318) They rather ―speak of love, the passion that 
leads the soul upward‖ (ibid.), whereby the soul flies with divine madness, the gift of Dionysus, the 
dancing god, ―the god of purifications who releases the dancer from what weighs him down by dancing 
through him.‖ (ibid.) McIntyre also draws upon this similarity between Plato and Nietzsche in terms of 
what Nietzsche refers to as ‗loving contempt,‘ a contempt for the city or the human realm and love for 
the ‗more-than-human‘: ―...‗loving contempt‘ constitutes the fundamental experience of the 
philosopher-statesman, for both Nietzsche and Plato: the principle of ascent—contempt for the city and 
love for the higher-than-human things—eventually becomes the principle of descent whereby the 
philosopher (and his play of creation) brings a higher order down to the human world; his contempt for 
man is the condition of his love and creativity.‖ (McIntyre, A., Op. cit., p.92) 
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 McIntyre explores in great detail this notion of eros or ―the love for something higher than the 
human world‖, and claims that for both Plato and Nietzsche that this mysterious force is at the heart of 
philosophy. (ibid., p.78) He examines the link between the desire for self-knowledge and love of the 
more than human: ―The essential manifestation of the erotic lies in the passion for the higher things, 
which compels him to think back to himself (cf. UDH, 10)‖ (Cited in this form in McIntyre, ibid., p.79) 
To think back to the self, or the desire for self-knowledge is thus to think and cultivate a higher self, to 
create beyond oneself (ibid.)  It is the nature of the self to create beyond itself or self-overcome because 
it is driven by the will to power, the erotic passion of life to transcend itself. McIntyre notes that this 
self-overcoming is not only the nature of the self but also of culture. He then cites a passage from 
Schopenhauer as Educator (§6), which not only highlights that self-overcoming is the nature of culture, 
the common life of all human beings but that love of the higher than human is behind the desire for a 
higher self:  
By coming to this resolve he places himself within the circle of culture; for 
culture is the child of each individual‘s self-knowledge and dissatisfaction 
with himself. Anyone who believes in culture is thereby saying: ‗I see 
above me something higher and more human than I am;...‘ It is hard to 
create in anyone this condition of intrepid self-knowledge because it is 
impossible to teach love; for it is love alone that can bestow on the soul, 
not only a clear, discriminating and self-contemptuous view of itself, but 
also the desire to look beyond itself and to seek with all its might for a 
higher self as yet still concealed from it. (SE, 6) (Cited in this form in 
McIntyre, ibid., p.79) 
It is erotic power of the noble soul that enables him to ‗build beyond himself‘, and in turn to elevate 
himself toward Nature or the experience of joy in the actual. 
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become a necessary chain of rings of culture and from this necessity to recognize the 
necessity inherent in the course of culture in general.‖ (HH, I: §292) The realization of 
the inner necessity of the self and of reality itself not only involves forgiveness for 
what one has become but a climb upwards to the higher self: 
 
Forward.—And with that, forward on the path of wisdom with a bold step 
and full of confidence! However you may be, serve yourself as your own 
source of experience! Throw off discontent with your nature, forgive 
yourself your own ego, for in any event you possess in yourself a ladder 
with a hundred rungs upon which you can climb to knowledge. (ibid.) 
 
The art of philological reading requires not only that the reader takes into account the 
reality from which his style flows but also that he must relate to this reality in the 
same way that the text does. The meaning of Nietzsche‘s texts lies in his blood, 
unconscious and the tragic pathos from which his works fundamentally arose. The 
ideal reader not only takes the author into account but also associates the meaning of 
his text with Nietzsche‘s own experience of existential truth. He must take into 
account the reality from which Nietzsche‘s writings flow, and in turn attunes himself 
to this reality through a certain type of reading. In reading with ears, one attunes 
oneself to the musical whole from which Nietzsche‘s writings flow.109 This idea of 
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 Nietzsche‘s musical use of language stands in a closer relation to reality than the ordinary use of 
language, which he argues rather falsifies reality. Kathleen Higgins in her article ‗Nietzsche on Music‘ 
outlines with reference to The Birth of Tragedy that for Nietzsche, ―Music is closer to the source of 
Dionysian insight than words, for music ――speaks‖‖ from ――the heart of the world‖‖ (Cited in this form 
in Higgins, Nietzsche on Music, Op. cit., p.669) In her article, she argues that, for Nietzsche, there is the 
notion of a ―universal ground of the world‖ (ibid., p.665) or ―ground of being‖ (ibid., p.670-71), and 
that music is a direct expression of this reality. In this thesis, it is argued that Nietzsche‘s style, in being 
musical, is a direct expression of reality. Higgins notes that Nietzsche‘s idea of the oneness of the 
universe, or the universal ground of being, is indebted to Schopenhauer‘s idea of the will. 
Schopenhauer in a similar vein to Nietzsche adheres to the idea that music bypasses the phenomenal 
world and ―appeals to the will directly‖ (cited in this form in Higgins, p.668 with reference to Arthur 
Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 2vols., E.F.J. Payne (trans.), New York, vol. 1,  
p.257). Higgins also makes reference to Nietzsche‘s work ―On Music and Words‖ where Nietzsche 
refers to universal ground of the world as the ―tonal subsoil,‖ ―comprehensible beyond the difference of 
language.‖ (Cited in this form in Higgins p.665) (Nietzsche, F., ‗On Music and Words,‘ in The 
Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. Oscar Levy, vol.2, Early Greek Philosophy and Other 
Essays, Maximilian A. Muegge (trans.), London, 1911, 31-32.)    
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reading with ears relates to what Nietzsche considers the relationship between speech 
and writing to be. He claims that writing is based upon live speech, which is in turn 
based upon the rhythmic movements of an author‘s creative thinking. Nietzsche does 
not follow the postmodern trend of rejecting speech as live presence, a trend which 
prioritizes writing over speech. He rather acknowledges that writing itself is based 
upon the oral voice, and is in this way subordinate to speech.
110
 It is writings that are 
created taking into account the priority of speech over writing and, in turn make the 
transition to prioritizing silence over speech engage in what he refers to as the grand 
style. For Nietzsche, it is this type of writing that takes into account the superiority of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Liébert, Georges in his work ‗Nietzsche and Music‘ mentions that we find in Nietzsche ―a recurring 
aspiration to song, to speech that has been born out of music‖, all of which finds ―free expression in 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra and in his poetry‖ (Liébert, G., Nietzsche and Music, Parkes, G., & D. Pellauer 
(trans), London, The University of Chicago Press, 2004, p.4) He notes that Nietzsche‘s view of music 
as a metaphor of Life ties in with his criticism of language; he contends that, as a composer, Nietzsche 
confides that ――sounds allowed him to say certain things that words were incapable of 
expressing.‖‖(cited in this form in Liébert, ibid,. p.4) In a section referred to as ―To Read is to Listen‖ 
of his chapter entitled ―Without Music Life would be an Error‖, he notes that Nietzsche compares his 
works to compositions, that he speaks of The Genealogy of Morals as a sonata in three movements, and 
he speaks of Thus Spoke Zarathustra as a ―symphony‖ (cited in this form in Liébert, ibid., p.5) He 
mentions that the ―musical kind of reading that Nietzsche practices and recommends is a privileged 
means of comprehension.‖ (ibid. p.5) It is only ―A refined auditory awareness will easily perceive the 
inner movements of works, their tempo that conveys their key‖ (ibid.) Liébert‘s chapter title is a 
reference to Nietzsche‘s quote ―Without Music Life would be an Error‖, and is also noted by Higgins 
in her article ‗Nietzsche on Music‘ (Kathleen, Higgins, Op. cit., p.669) where she refers to the original 
Nietzsche reference (Letter to Peter Gast, Jan. 15, 1888). For a detailed discussion of the musical 
structure of Thus Spoke Zarathustra see also Graham Parkes, ‗The Symphonic Structure of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra: A Preliminary Outline‘, in  Nietzsche‘s Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Before Sunrise, James 
Luchte (ed.), London, Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008. 
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 For a detailed discussion of Nietzsche‘s Thus Spoke Zarathustra and its affinity with logoi or 
speeches see Graham Parkes‘ essay ‗The Dance from Mouth to Hand (Speaking Zarathustra‘s Write 
Foot Foreword)‘, in Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra, Op. cit., pp. 127-141). In the 
introduction to the book ‗Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra‘, Koelb notes that Parkes 
calls into question the idea of Nietzsche as a postmodern writer, as he examines Nietzsche‘s 
Zarathustra, a book ―so full of directly quoted speeches.‖ (ibid., p.13) Koelb mentions that for Parkes, 
―Nietzsche‘s Zarathustra often resembles Plato‘s Socrates (―he who does not write‖) more than he does 
a postmodern grammatologist...‖ (ibid.) However, for all the speechmaking that takes place in 
Zarathustra, there is, according to Parkes, a shift from speech to singing, and in turn from singing to 
writing as dancing. Koelb notes that for Parkes, ―The act of writing is, like dancing, ―a divine affair 
which requires an inversion of the natural attitude: standing on one‘s head, one‘s ear to the ground, 
keep‘s one‘s feet pointed towards heaven.‖ (ibid.) He asserts that for Parkes ―This sort of writing, then, 
involves the whole body in a continuous process of response to the ―music‖ of becoming. It is not a 
secondary activity parasitic upon ―living‖ speech but instead the result of a total commitment of the 
resources of life.‖ (ibid.) Nietzsche‘s writing style is rather based on the oral or singing voice than 
dialogue; it is a dancing style that is in attunement with a musical whole that is closest to reality itself.     
 
204 
    
the oral voice that is an expression of a musical whole or unity. It is the reader with a 
―third ear‖ who reads the written word taking into consideration its oral basis. This 
reader is in a harmony with the musical whole out of which Nietzsche‘s writings are 
an expression. To read with an understanding of the ‗truth‘ of Nietzsche‘s works, the 
reader must grasp the rhythm of the written text, which imitates the rhythmic 
movement of the spoken word and in turn the silent logos of his thought.
111
 This 
implies that the philologist can perceive the inaudible, the most silent words, the 
―stillest words ... Thoughts that come on doves‘ feet‖ (Z, II: ‗The Stillest Hour‘), for 
the world ―revolves inaudibly‖ (Z, II: ‗On Great Events‘).112 It is those readers with 
―delicate ears‖ that are made aware of the world becoming silent, the ―eve of a 
seventh day ... at noon‖ (Z, IV, ‗At Noon‘) and of the ―good tidings‖ that ―the earth 
shall yet become a site of recovery‖ (Z, I, ‗On the Gift-Giving Virtue‘: §2) where the 
―Zarathustra‘s Kingdom of a thousand years‖ will come into realization. 
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 In this thesis, it is being argued that to enter into the silent logos of an author is the most truthful 
standpoint towards an author, that silence is the most fundamental disposition towards reality; it is the 
site of Being revealing itself. Nietzsche‘s works are based upon his most fundamental self, his 
ipsissimosity (unconscious), or the Great reason of the Body which is the realm of the ‗unsaid,‘ of 
pathos the most fundamental realm. The reader who enters into the silent logos of an author brings his 
most fundamental self to the text. It is in this way that author and reader share the same souls or the 
same selves.  
 
112
 For a discussion of Nietzsche‘s art of silence see Claudia Crawford, ‗Nietzsche‘s Dionysian Arts: 
dance, song, and silence,‘ in Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts, S. Kemal, I. Gaskell, and Daniel W. 
Conway (eds.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 310-341. In this chapter, Crawford 
identifies a hierarchy of types of silence: conscious use of silence, silence in which the Self speaks to 
one, and silence as the non-expression of the highest experience of humans, a realization of the 
perfection of oneself and humans. (ibid., p.338) She also makes reference to the passage entitled ―The 
Stillest Hour,‖ which she claims ―presents us with an example of how the Self reveals its uniqueness to 
us, if we listen.‖ (ibid.) Nietzsche emphasizes in many places that ―the greatest events—they are not 
our loudest but our stillest hours. Not around the inventors of new noise, but around the inventors of 
new values does the world revolve; it revolves inaudibly‖. (Z, II: ‗On Great Events‘) The third and 
highest level of silence is the mystical perfect silence, which occurs in the experience of ―Dionysian 
Power and Yes to life‖. (ibid., p.339) This type of silence is best expressed in the passage entitled ―At 
Noon‖ of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. According to Crawford, the votaries of Dionysus in the experience 
of silence, that ―when they say ―I,‖ they are the ―moving centre of the world—‖ their selves are ―not 
the same as that of the waking empirically real men, but the only truly existent and eternal self resting 
at the basis of things‖ (BT 5)‖ (Cited in this form in Crawford, ibid., p.339) This seems to imply that 
there is a distinction between the empirical self and the essential self, a distinction that is explored in 
this thesis. This experience involves reaching the highest spheres, a silence that does not last: ―Instead 
of sinking into the well of eternity, of flying away from earth and earthly things‖ that the higher men 
must rise up and teach their descendents of entering into ―the eternal round of sacred Dionysian dance, 
song and silence‖ (ibid.) 
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It becomes more evident what is meant by Nietzsche‘s style as the communication of 
an inward state, an inward tension of pathos of sublime superhuman passion, when 
one considers the art of reading with ears. To read with ears also calls upon us to read 
aloud; it requires the physiological acts of breathing, swelling and coming down 
within the breath of a period such as those performed by classical orators like 
Demosthenes and Cicero. In bringing musical rhythm and tone back into language, he 
returns passion and pathos to the art of communication. (BGE: §247) His 
communication engages unconscious musical rhythms, the tempo of that music and 
the art of unconscious bodily gestures, which requires ‗a finer ear‘ (BGE: §10) or 
‗more subtle ears‘ (BGE: §54); in speaking of the Zarathustrian speeches he states that 
―an infinite abundance of light and depth of happiness falls drop upon drop, word 
upon word‖ and that ―the tempo of these speeches is a tender adagio‖ where ―Such 
things reach the most select. It is a privilege without equal to be a listener here. 
Nobody is free to have ears for Zarathustra.‖ (EH, Preface: §4) The true philologist 
must not only be a reader, but above all be a ‗fine ear,‘ a musician. Nietzsche‘s style 
as a tension of pathos has a seductive quality; his style consists of the art of seduction, 
in his Attempt at Self-Criticism, he refers to it as a ―contrapuntal vocal art and 
seduction of the ear‖ (§7).113 In this section, Nietzsche refers to himself as a ―pied-
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 Claudia Crawford in her article entitled ‗Nietzsche‘s Great Style: Educator of the Ears and of the 
Heart‘ (Nietzsche-Studien, 20, 1991, pp.219-37) discusses the seductive nature of Nietzsche‘s style 
that entices the reader to listen. (ibid., p.212) She contends that Nietzsche‘s style, entails that 
communication can only take place where the two or more participants (communia) already share a 
common sympathy. She then refers to Nietzsche‘s older notes entitled ‗On Reading and Writing‘ to 
reiterate this point:  
 
Language is at base a question of one‘s fellow human, whether he shares 
the same soul with me; the oldest sentences appear to me to be questions, 
and in their intonation I suspect the echo of that oldest question of the soul 
to itself, but in another abode, do you recognize yourself once again?—this 
feeling accompanies every stance of the speaker; he attempts a monologue 
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piper‖ that emanates sounds for young ―ears‖ and ―hearts‖, he also in Ecce Homo 
refers to himself as the ―pied-piper‖ of the Genius of the Heart who, as an old 
psychologist, seduces his readers ―to follow him even more inwardly and thoroughly‖ 
teaching the reader to listen. (EH, ‗Why I Write Such Good Books‘: §6) He 
emphasizes that his style communicates an inward pathos that a reader must share 
with an author, that this communication can only ideally take place with a reader who 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and conversation with himself. (cited in this form in Crawford, ibid., 
p.212) 
 
In her essay, she expresses how Nietzsche wishes to return to language its ability to express feelings or 
tone, which she argues for Nietzsche is a direct ‗unmediated‘ expression of the will. (ibid., p.215) The 
―greatest measure of the feelings cannot be expressed through words‖ but rather through music (ibid., 
p.216). She contends that Nietzsche breaks from the metaphysical basis of his theory of language and 
music that he comes to the conclusion that it does not speak of the will. (ibid. p.216) In this thesis, it is 
being argued, on the contrary, that Nietzsche in his later philosophy still upholds that music is a direct 
expression of reality. Higgins in her article ‗Nietzsche and Music‘ suggests that in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche expresses that in the Dionysian Dithyramb, the body becomes subordinate to a 
Dionysian unity (Higgins, K., Op. cit., p.670), and she also refers to a passage entitled ‗The Tomb 
Song‘ from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which expresses that Nietzsche takes the dance to be the parable 
of the highest things ―Only in the dance do I know how to tell the parable of the highest things‖ (Z, II, 
§11, cited in this form in Higgins, ibid., p.670) This reference suggests that Nietzsche relates the dance 
to the realm of the ‗more-than-human,‘ or what McIntyre refers to as the realm of the highest things or 
of ultimate reality. (McIntyre, A., Op. cit., pp.74-99) In this way, it can be inferred that Nietzsche‘s 
later philosophy not only has an even stronger affinity with music and dance, and that he views it in 
terms of a relation to an Absolute. Despite Crawford‘s failure to take into account the connection 
between music and reality in Nietzsche‘s later philosophy, her essay is very insightful in her 
exploration of Nietzsche‘s style, and its relation to music. She emphasizes that Nietzsche‘s style wishes 
to reach the reader‘s heart:  
 
When in Ecce Homo Nietzsche stresses rhythm, tempo and gesture he is 
describing a style which, by putting the tone, the music back into written 
language, returns feeling, passion and pathos to the art of communication 
allowing us to see how that style teaches us to listen, how it educates our 
ears in order to reach our hearts. (Crawford, C., Op. cit., p.219-20)  
 
She also explores Nietzsche‘s song entitled ‗The Seven Seals or The Yes and Amen Song‘ in terms of its 
use of periods, rhythm which impels his use of superlatives, heightening of tension, exaggerated 
climax, and then his use of tone or melody, gesture, and harmony. She also mentions that his style in 
this song is a ―musical, choral-dance style.‖ (ibid., p.237) It is an harmonious song where the reader is 
transfigured along with the lyric singer of the dithyramb in an ―ultimate epiphany.‖ (ibid., p.236) She 
also refers to it as a ―pledge song in which the voice of the reader joins in the choric refrain, is seduced 
into becoming one with the singer and the God.‖ (ibid.) Harmony is a transcendent experience whereby 
the reader becomes the very dance and melody of the song and experiences the loss of individuation. 
Crawford outlines that through harmony the most fundamental form of communication can take place: 
―Words, rhythm, melody attempt to sing the meaning, the intellect (both conscious and unconscious) of 
the communication... But harmony ties these together, and a communication of a more fundamental 
sense takes place.‖ (ibid.) She goes on to claim that ―Harmony, through the heightened pathos, 
intensifies the other arts of the stanza, tempo, rhythm, melody into the pure tone and measured dance 
beat of ―Denn ich liebe dich, oh Ewigkeit.‖ (cited in this form in Crawford, ibid., p.237) This translates 
as ―For I love you, O eternity‖ (Z, III: ‗The Seven Seals (Or: The Yes and Amen song‘))   
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shares similar experiences, who is also a ―genius of the heart.‖ (BGE: §295) The ideal 
reader is for Nietzsche, the reader with a ―soul flute‖ (EH: ‗Why I Write Such Good 
Books‘: §4), a musical soul that is in tune with the unconscious of Nietzsche‘s style. 
In Beyond Good and Evil (§246), Nietzsche discusses the art of listening: 
 
That one must not be in doubt about the rhythmically decisive syllables, 
that one experiences the break with any excessively severe symmetry as 
deliberate and attractive, that one lends a patient and subtle ear to every 
staccato and every rubato, that one figures out the meaning in the sequence 
of vowels and diphthongs and how delicately and richly they can be 
coloured  and change colours as they follow each other—who among 
book-reading Germans has enough good will to acknowledge such duties 
and demands and to listen to that much art and purpose in language? In the 
end one simply does not have ―the ear for that‖; and thus the strongest 
contrasts of style go unheard, and the subtlest artistry is wasted as on the 
deaf. (BGE: §246) 
 
In sharing the same pathos as Nietzsche
114
, or the same self, ones‘ innermost being, 
one also relates to the reality that his works belong to. This type of reading involves 
examining the autobiographical nature of his works; the existential experience behind 
his writings, in particular his experience of illness and pain. The reader must firstly, 
however, focus on the written word before making the transition to reading with ears, 
and then, in turn, entering into the silent logos of the text.
115
  
 
The meaning of his works is not ‗in‘ the words of the text but in their relationship 
with reality. The objective meaning of Nietzsche‘s writings lies in their relation to 
                                                          
114
 See EH, ‗Why I Write Such Good Books‘: §1: ―Ultimately, nobody can get more out of things, 
including books, than he already knows. For what one lacks from experience one will have no ear.‖ See 
also chapter one, section V above, where this quote is also referred to. 
 
115
 Hutter also maintains that for Nietzsche, writing is subordinate to speech, and as a result, Nietzsche 
is an advocate of reading with ears. He stresses the importance of this distinction and that it ―tends to 
be effaced in postmodern interpretations of Nietzsche.‖ (Hutter, H., Op. cit., p.3) He also stresses that 
Nietzsche‘s works contain ―frequent injunctions to his readers to translate the written logos into the 
silent logos of thinking via the oral logos.‖ (ibid., p.3) He makes further reference to it in his work with 
regard to the art of philological reading, that it requires for Nietzsche that ―one translate the written text 
into the oral voice that is its basis, and this voice in turn into the thinking which a past author thus 
aimed to immortalize in writing.‖ (ibid., p.173) 
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truth or reality, which is in their dancing-musical rhythms and tragic pathos. 
Therefore, the ideal reader must read with ears in order to be attuned to the musical 
totality that his works belong to.  Nietzsche wishes to attune his ideal readers to 
reality; the goal of reading is not to find some ‗objective meaning‘ in the words. In 
this way Nietzsche values reading, as a form of self-overcoming, as it enables the 
reader to cultivate a higher self, and in turn to enter into the most primordial relation 
to reality. The reader can only self-overcome through reading by way of focusing on 
the word; therefore it is one of the necessary stages to the ―art of reading well‖. It is 
through the cultivation of one‘s unconscious self that one encounters reality as it is  in 
amor fati. This implies that ―reading and writing in blood‖ enables the higher type to 
be ―warrior-like‖, and overcome and in turn acquire insight into reality or tragic 
wisdom in the form of entering into a dancing oneness with reality. (Z, I: §7) It is 
through tragic pathos or one‘s unconscious,  that one enters into the silent logos of an 
author and of Becoming. To participate in this silence is to enter into the realm of 
Becoming, that is the metaphysically independent author and text. (AC: §52) It is 
through the art of reading that one can cultivate oneself towards the ―more than 
human‖, which is what renders it one of the most spiritual exercises for Nietzsche. 
The following chapter further explores what reality is for Nietzsche and illustrates that 
it is through pathos and the unconscious that one experiences the ―untimely‖ or an 
―eternity‖ within Becoming.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Nietzsche on the Eternal Recurrence and the Innocence of all Becoming 
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I 
Nietzsche‘s Quest for a New ‗Yes-Saying‘ Totality 
 
The following section explores Nietzsche‘s metaphysics of Becoming where his 
refutation of the Christian moral God lays open the way for a new Divine God. This 
section maintains that the main impetus behind Nietzsche‘s yearning for a new 
totality, as a ―Yes-saying‖ one is the death of God. The effect of the death of God, and 
the deep feeling of his loss, is best expressed in the madman passage of The Gay 
Science (§125).  
 
The madman. –Haven‘t you heard of that madman who in the bright 
morning lit a lantern and ran around the marketplace crying incessantly, 
‗I‘m looking for God! I‘m looking for God!‘ Since many of those who did 
not believe in God were standing around together just then, he caused great 
laughter. Has he been lost, then? asked one. Did he lose his way like a 
child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone to 
sea? Emigrated? –Thus they shouted and laughed, one interrupting the 
other. The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his 
eyes. ‗Where is God?‘ he cried; ‗I‘ll tell you! We have killed him—you and 
I! We are all his murderers...God is dead! God remains dead! And we have 
killed him! How can we console ourselves, the murderers of all murderers! 
The holiest and mightiest thing the world has ever possessed has bled to 
death under our knives: who will wipe this blood from us?...What festivals 
of atonement, what holy games will we have to invent for ourselves? Is the 
magnitude of this deed not too great for us? Do we not ourselves have to 
become gods merely to appear worthy of it? There was never a greater 
deed—and whoever is born after us will on account of this deed belong to 
a higher history than all history up to now!‘ Here the madman fell silent 
and looked again at his listeners; they too were silent and looked at him 
disconcertedly. Finally he threw his lantern on the ground so that it broke 
into pieces and went out. ‗I come too early‘, he then said; ‗my time is not 
yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, wandering; it has not yet 
reached the ears of men.  Lightning and thunder need time; the light of the 
stars needs time; deeds need time, even after they are done... 
 
When Nietzsche proclaims that ―god is dead‖ he is rejecting a particular conception of 
God, the Christian moral conception of God or the God that has been metaphysically 
determined as causa sui. Nietzsche‘s cry in the madman passage is to be distinguished 
from those of the marketplace. Nietzsche cries incessantly: ―I‘m looking for God!‖ 
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this is a man who separates himself from those of the marketplace, those who do not 
believe in God. They do not feel the loss of God to the same extent as Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche‘s cry ―I‘m looking for God!‘ does not imply a plea to return to a faith in the 
old God, which is no longer believed in but it rather implies that he feels deeply its 
loss. In his essay entitled ‗The Death of God and The Revaluation‘ Kaufmann 
expresses that the death of god parable is not just a proclamation of the death of God 
but is also an experience. In comparing Nietzsche to the Old Testament prophets, 
Kaufmann observes the felt experience of Nietzsche: 
 
Sometimes prophecy seems to consist in man‘s ability to experience his 
own wretched fate so deeply that it becomes a symbol of something larger. 
It is in this sense that one can compare Nietzsche with the ancient prophets. 
He felt the agony, the suffering, and the misery of a godless world so 
intensely, at a time when others were yet blind to its tremendous 
consequence, that he was able to experience in advance, as it were, the fate 
of a coming generation. (1980: 11) 
 
 
The death of God re-opens the search for a new ―God‖, not the Christian God, the 
God of Judgement that demands prayer and repentance but rather a new divine God 
that of ―Dionysus‖ of the early Greek tragedies or of ―God‖ as eternal return of the 
same. This is not God as an object of worship or God as causa sui or ―cause‖ of all 
existence, which is actually a human category projected onto God. Nietzsche rejects 
God whereby one projects onto it human categories or attributes.
116
 If there is a new 
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 Schacht, R., in his work ‗Nietzsche‘ argues that not only is Nietzsche‘s death of God proclamation a 
diagnosis of culture, such that he is very interested in the psychological consequences of the death of 
God (cultural and social) but also that Nietzsche clearly repudiates the existence of a transcendent 
deity. (Schacht, R., Nietzsche, London, Routledge, 1983, p.120) Schacht cites The Gay Science (§343) 
that ―‗the belief in a Christian God has become unbelievable‘‖ it is a belief that we no longer may 
suppose to be tenable. (ibid.p.121) He also argues that God is rejected by Nietzsche in terms of the 
projection theory, ―one sets up one‘s own type as the measure of value in general; one projects it into 
things, behind things, behind the fate of things—as God‖ (Schacht, R., p.125 citing WP: §205) In spite 
of Schacht‘s argument that Nietzsche rejects God and the way in which human beings project their own 
attributes onto God, there are commentators such as Lampert who claim that Nietzsche recognizes what 
is referred to as the ―god-creating instinct‖ (Lampert, L., Nietzsche‘s Philosophy & True Religion, In 
212 
    
God in Nietzsche, such as a life-affirmative one, this in turn raises questions as to 
whether this God again is a representation of the human? or is there a ―God‖ as a 
reality that is irreducible to the human? There are commentators who argue that in 
spite of Nietzsche‘s rejection of God in the monotheistic sense that perhaps Nietzsche 
is embracing God in the pantheistic sense. This is the idea of God as a new totality of 
―power‖ or ―energy‖ not moral power, and in turn relates to his notion of time. He 
advocates that one worships oneself not God that one withholds reverence for the self 
in overcoming life‘s most difficult challenges and experiencing amor fati. It is an 
experience whereby one becomes ―god-like‖ in encountering a superabundance of 
―joy‖ or ―power‖, whereby one encounters eternity in eternal return of the same. 
Nietzsche‘s rejection of the Christian moral absolute, as a ―No-saying‖ totality is 
replaced by a new one that of the Innocence of Becoming, a ―Yes-saying‖ totality as 
the ―eternity‖ within Becoming. In this way the death of God slogan expresses an 
event, a transitional phase such that the destruction of the old world shaped by an old 
absolute makes possible the creation of a new world. Nietzsche could possibly be 
argued to be a foreseer of a new Dionysian age whereby ―eternity‖ becomes manifest 
in the world. This type of eternity does not take the form of a transcendent static realm 
set apart from the world but is rather one that manifests itself in the world. This also 
raises the complex question of how Nietzsche connects the temporal with his notion 
of ―eternity‖. In spite of Nietzsche‘s rejection of the Christian tradition of life-denying 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
K.A. Pearson (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, p.144) that 
humans by nature raise what they passionately desire to the highest plane.‖ (ibid.) As a result of gods 
reflecting human passions there is for this reason both healthy and unhealthy gods. Lampert notes that 
Nietzsche labels the gods of Platonism as unhealthy, ―punitive gods serving fear and vengeance by re-
inforcing the fiction of cosmic moral order‖ such that Platonism was the ―home of a punitive 
monotheism‖ (ibid.) He also suggests that for Nietzsche, ―that now that God is dead thanks to the long 
fight against him, the spiritual warfare between science and religion purposely set in motion by modern 
philosophers like Bacon and Descartes. The preface to Beyond and Good ends suggesting that the goal 
now is a new philosophy plus its popularization as the next great event in our history.‖ (ibid., p.145) 
Lampert contends that the book ends with the return of Dionysus and Ariadne, gods of healthy life-
affirmation and of the whole. If there is a new God to be embraced it is only in the form of a this-
worldly eternity or in terms of a ‗yes-saying‘ totality. 
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values that ties in with a concept of ―eternity‖ as a transcendent static realm that he 
ironically embraces a Christian idea of the immanence of eternity or the fullness of 
the moment. 
 
It is in The Madman passage that Nietzsche expresses his feeling of loss of belief in 
the old totality, a loss that he deeply agonized, as it culminated in a nihilistic 
relativism. However, he wishes to overturn this nihilistic relativism through 
rediscovering a new one. Nietzsche‘s death of God proclamation does not imply the 
complete rejection of a totality but only  in its Christian guise. For Nietzsche, it entails 
the rediscovery of the genuine ‗Yes-saying‘ or life-affirmative one. He rejects human 
considerations of God where human values are in turn projected on to it; it is in this 
way not a genuine absolute but rather a human anthropomorphism. The Christian idea 
of God comes under attack not just as a human consideration of an absolute, but in 
that it represents life-denying values. In The Antichrist (§47) Nietzsche exhorts that he 
does not deny God as such but rather the Christian conception of God: 
 
That we find no God—either in history or in nature or behind nature—is 
not what differentiates us, but that we experience what has been revered as 
God, not as ―godlike‖ but as miserable, as absurd, as harmful, not merely 
as an error but as a crime against life. We deny God as God. If one were to 
prove this God of the Christians to us, we should be even less able to 
believe in him. In a formula: dues, qualem, Paulus creavit, dei negatio.
117 
 
The Christian God as a life-denying God is rejected on the grounds that it is a ―crime 
against life.‖ (ibid.) His rejection of the Christian God does not imply a rejection of 
God per se, as Nietzsche embraces a new totality in its Dionysian form, as a ―Yes-
saying God‖ that of Dionysus or as a life-affirmative one. He repudiates God as a 
                                                          
117
Kaufmann offers the following translation of the above Latin quote ―God, as Paul created him, is the 
negation of God.‖ (Nietzsche, The Antichrist, The Portable Nietzsche, W. Kaufmann (trans.), Penguin 
Books, New York, 1976, p. 627)  
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Feuerbachian projection of human consciousness, as human consciousness and the 
world is presupposed by the will to power. In The Will to Power Nietzsche‘s God is 
characterized: ―God the supreme power—that suffices! Everything follows from it; 
―the world‖ follows from it.‖ (WP: §1037)  
 
The section next looks at the relationship between reality and a new value-system, 
which is non-nihilistic. Nietzsche is an advocate of an eternity within Becoming, a 
―Yes-saying‖ totality  which is irreducible human thought. Nietzsche can be argued to 
view reality in terms of Becoming, a realm that can be accessed through Dionysian 
insight, or transfiguration.
118
 Nietzsche recognizes that with the death of God, there is 
                                                          
118Tyler T. Roberts in his work ‗Contesting Spirit: Nietzsche, Affirmation, Religion‘ notes what 
Nietzsche means by transfiguration, that it is the affirmative self that takes shape in a ―transfiguration‖ 
or ―spiritualization‖ of the religious self. (Roberts, T.T., Contesting Spirit: Nietzsche, Affirmation, 
Religion, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1998, p.67) This term ―transfiguration‖ refers to 
Nietzsche‘s description of philosophy as a practice of creative spiritualization: ―A philosopher who has 
passed through many kinds of health, and keeps passing through them again and again, has passed 
through an equal number of philosophies; he simply cannot but translate his state every time into the 
most spiritual form and distance—this art of transfiguration just is philosophy.‖ (GS, Preface: §3, cited 
in this form by Roberts, ibid., p. 67) Roberts mentions that for Nietzsche the philosopher artist‘s ―body 
transfigures into spirit‖, and then as spirit shines forth in idealized form; he is an expression of reality 
in perfected form. (ibid.) Nietzsche‘s idea of transfiguration expresses a recapitulation of the spirit-
body relationship, where body and spirit are to be viewed as modulations of one another. Roberts also 
looks at the way Nietzsche‘s idea of transfiguration was influenced by the episode of ―The 
Transfiguration‖ in the New Testament. He then explains the episode as follows: ―There, Jesus ascends 
a mountain, talks with Moses and Elijah, and is ―transfigured‖ so that ―his face shone like the sun and 
his garments became white as light.‖ (Matthew 17: 1-8, cited in this form by Roberts, ibid., p.68) In 
theological terms, Roberts claims that this epiphany ―echoes the baptism of Jesus and foreshadows both 
the Passion and Parousia.‖ (ibid., p.68) He then explains that in German, this episode ―is generally 
referred to as die Verklärung‖ and that ―beyond its specifically Christian use, Verklärung means 
―glorification,‖ and as a verb (verklären), it means to rise above the earthly or to appear in clear light.‖ 
(ibid.) Although it is most often associated with religious phenomena, it is used in the context of art, for 
Nietzsche. According to Roberts, ―in The Birth of Tragedy, for instance, he writes of the 
―Verklärungschein of art‖‖ (BT: 143, cited in this form by Roberts p.68) Roberts then refers to the 
Kaufmann translation as ―transfiguring illusion,‖ and that Kaufmann mentions in a footnote that 
―Verklärungshein‖ might also be translated as ―transfiguring halo‖ (BT: 143, n.2 cited in this form by 
Roberts, ibid.) Roberts also notes Nietzsche‘s use of the term ‗transfiguration‘ in The Gay Science, and 
that it is rarely used in German, and only refers to the transfiguration of Christ. (ibid., p.68) Nietzsche‘s 
use of the term tells us something not only about the way he considers philosophy, but also the way in 
which he views the relation between body and spirit; that their relation is not fundamentally 
hierarchical. Roberts maintains that ―in the biblical transfiguration, the spirit of Jesus does not leave the 
body; instead, he—body and soul—shines ...for Nietzsche spirit is not something opposed to body, but 
an aura or a shining, or raiment, by which the body and one‘s whole being is glorified.‖ (ibid., p.69)He 
then highlights that the term is in general used in relation to Nietzsche notion of artistic idealization, 
which for him is the ―function of art—the clearest expression of affirmation.‖ (ibid.) The Dionysian 
artist‘s relation to reality is the most fundamental representation of reality, and can be argued to be the 
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the loss of the value-system that it embodied, and as a result there is the need to 
replace the loss of this value-system. Nietzsche in this way offers a new centre of 
valuation of life-affirmation, whereby the genuine philosopher encounters reality as it 
is. In engaging reality as it is, the philosopher can affirm his life. For Nietzsche, in 
this way life-affirmation and the new totality are interlinked. The new measure of 
value is reality ―the more-than-human‖, and that which in turn enables the individual 
to attune himself to  the whole such as solitude, suffering, self-overcoming, and 
―reading and writing in blood.‖ (Z, I: §7) This experience is one of amor fati, and 
includes life and the self becoming the new ‗centre‘ of valuation: ―reverence for 
oneself; love of oneself‖ go hand and hand with Nietzsche‘s ―revaluation of all 
values‖ (AC: Preface). 
 
In being attuned to Becoming, the philosophical type affirms his life, and in turn he 
experiences redemption; the Dionysian totality in Nietzsche is therefore intimately 
connected to his idea of redemption. The Christian ―No-saying‖ totality and 
Nietzsche‘s new one are both related to this concept in different ways. In a similar 
vein the Christian totality is supposedly redemptive in nature; however, its redemptive 
capacity is oriented to a beyond, and is therefore life-denying. Nietzsche‘s idea of 
redemption is Dionysian in nature and is best expressed by the term ―transfiguration‖, 
which is to experience ―the heavenly‖ on earth, to experience reality as it is on earth. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
―lightest shade of appearance‖ (BGE: §34) or ―reality once more‖ (TI, ‗Reason‘: §6, cited in this form 
by Roberts, T.T., Ecstatic Philosophy, in Nietzsche and the Divine, J. Lippitt & J. Urpeth (eds), 
Manchester, Clinamen Press, 2000, p.216) This idea of the varying shades of appearance will be 
discussed later in this chapter, in terms of the human subject‘s relation to reality, and in terms of the 
varying shades or dimensions of reality itself. This idea of the philosopher artist or Nietzsche as a 
‗writer in blood‘ will be mentioned in the final section as the most truthful standpoint to reality, the 
experience of transfiguration, is an experience of feeling eternity, or glimpsing the ‗eternity‘ within 
Becoming, an eternity that has become manifest in the world. This however is not to be misunderstood 
as after-worldly joy. This touches upon the transfiguring capacity of ‗writing in blood‘ for Nietzsche, 
which has been discussed in chapter three and will also be explored later in this chapter in terms of an 
artist‘s metaphysics.  
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The quest for a new totality in Nietzsche is completely driven by the metaphysical 
need for redemption, and truth, as tragic insight into reality for Nietzsche has this 
redemptive quality which he seeks. The redemptive nature of the new totality is 
genuine as it not only involves life-affirmation and the justification of one‘s life, but 
also because it is irreducible to human thought. 
 
The distinction between Nietzsche‘s totality and the Christian one relates to the 
distinction between the God of Jesus and the God of the Church or the Christian 
God.
119
 Although Nietzsche offers a scathing critique of Christianity in The Antichrist, 
as the subtitle of this work suggests ―an attempt at a critique of Christianity, he draws 
a distinction between Christ and Christianity: ―The very word ―Christianity‖ is a 
misunderstanding: in truth, there was only one Christian, and he died on the 
cross...only Christian practice, a life such as he lived who died on the cross, is 
Christian‖ (AC: §39) For Nietzsche, Christian dogma and faith is a gross 
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 Altizer in his work The New Gospel of Christian Atheism notes how Nietzsche is similar to both 
Blake and Kierkegaard with regard to this distinction. Christ is to be associated with life-affirmation or 
―Yes-saying‖ to life, whereas Christianity embodies the very opposite; it denies life. 
 
Blake and Nietzsche, above all others, even including Kierkegaard, 
profoundly know historical Christianity as an absolute reversal of Jesus. 
Each could know the uniquely Christian God as the pure opposite of that 
ultimate life which Jesus enacted, as most clearly manifest in the absolute 
transcendence of that God, a transcendence reversing the primal words and 
praxis of Jesus. Thus the Yes-saying of Jesus becomes an absolute No-
saying in Christianity, the forgiveness which he embodied is reversed into 
an absolute guilt, and the joy which he enacted is transformed into an 
ultimate impotence.(Thomas, J.J. Altizer, The New Gospel of Christian 
Atheism, Aurora, The Davies Group Publishers, 2002, p.94) 
 
See the following essays for a further discussion of the distinction between Christ and Christianity, 
which also include discussions of Nietzsche‘s affinity with Christ: W. Kaufmann, Nietzsche‘s 
Repudiation of Christ, In, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1974, pp.337-390; Evans, J.C., Nietzsche on Christ Vs Christianity, Soundings 78: 
571-88, 1995; Biser, E., Nietzsche‘s Relation to Jesus: A Literary and Psychological Comparison, In 
Nietzsche and Christianity, Geffré, C., J.P., Jossua and M Lefébure (eds.), Edinburgh, T& T Clark, 
1981;Thomas, J..J., Altizer, Nietzsche and Biblical Nihilism, In Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism: 
Essays on Language and Politics, T. Darby, B. Egyed, B. Jones (eds), Canada, Carleton University 
Press, 1989, pp.37-44. 
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misunderstanding of the original teachings of Christ.
120
 Nietzsche‘s new ―Yes-saying‖ 
totality parallels the God of Jesus and has the same redemptive quality. Roberts 
(1998: 69) too notes the distinction between the God of Jesus and that of the Church, 
the ―Christian‖ God: ―The latter is ―God degenerated to the contradiction of life, 
instead of being its transfiguration (Verklärung) and eternal Yes!‖‖ (AC: §18, cited in 
this form in Roberts 1998: 69) The God of Jesus as a totality is redemptive in the 
same way as Nietzsche‘s one that is life-affirmative. Nietzsche‘s redemptive act of 
transfiguration is also used in his discussion of Jesus in The Antichrist. The 
blessedness that Jesus refers to is, according to Nietzsche, the ―transfiguration of all 
things‖. (Roberts 1998: 68) Blessedness or transfiguration, for Jesus is a ―state of the 
heart‖ (AC: §34); it is a state that is made possible by the practice of a divine life here 
and now: 
The life of the redeemer was nothing other than this practice—nor was his 
death anything else. He no longer required any formulas, any rites for his 
intercourse with God—not even prayer...he knows that it is only in the 
practice of life that one feels ―divine,‖ ―blessed,‖ ―evangelical,‖ at all 
times a ―child of God.‖ Not ―repentance,‖ not ―prayer for forgiveness,‖ are 
the ways to God: only the evangelical practice leads to God, indeed, it is 
―God‖! (AC: §33) 
 
This type of redemption that Nietzsche has an affinity with is a blessedness that is to 
be found in Jesus; it is to feel oneself ―in heaven‖, it is ―the feeling of eternity‖, on 
earth and it is to experience the Kingdom of God that is within you. (AC: §33-§34) 
This touches upon the radical distinction between Christian dogma and Christian 
praxis. 
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 Nietzsche in The Antichrist claims that the original teachings of Christ were mistranslated by the 
church (AC: §34) in particular his teaching of the Kingdom of God. In the Sermon on the Mount 
(Matthew 5-7), Jesus is more explicit about what he means by the Kingdom, the Kingdom is of the 
earth, and refers to the fulfilment of bodily needs; the Kingdom revolves around concrete, personal and 
earthly things. The keys of the Kingdom are forgiveness (Matthew 16:19), the achievement of 
perfection, love of one‘s enemies (Matthew 5: 38-48), the experience of the heart (Matthew 6:21), and 
the feeling of joy, glory, and eternity. 
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The deep instinct for how one must live, in order to feel oneself ―in 
heaven,‖ to feel ―eternal,‖ while in all other behaviour one decidedly does 
not feel oneself ―in heaven‖—this alone is the psychological reality of 
―redemption.‖ A new way of life, not a new faith. (AC: §33) 
 
This feeling of eternity correlates with Nietzsche‘s idea of amor fati. As Roberts 
(1998: 201) states, ―Divinity, for Nietzsche, is realized in the affirmative human 
being, in the transfiguration of reality accomplished in and through the reality of an 
affirmative life, in a love that reaches beyond, beneath the self and turns even the 
encounter with the demonic into a declaration of the divine.‖ He also argues that 
―Nietzsche‘s reflection on Jesus applies equally to his affirmer.‖ (ibid.) According to 
Nietzsche, the notion of ―the innermost‖ and its relation to reality, as the most 
fundamental relation to reality, is also emphasized by Jesus. In a similar vein to 
Nietzsche, Jesus‘ emphasis on the ―innermost‖ is to be contrasted with the fixity or 
―solidity‖ of language:  
 
Using the expression somewhat tolerantly, one could call Jesus a ―free 
spirit‖—he does not care for anything solid: the word kills, all that is solid 
kills. The concept, the experience of ―life‖ in the only way he knows it, 
resists any kind of word, formula, law, faith, dogma. He speaks only of the 
innermost: ―life‖ or ―truth‖ or ―light‖ is his word for the innermost—all the 
rest, the whole of reality, the whole of nature, language itself, has for him 
only the value of a sign, a simile. (AC: §32) 
 
For Nietzsche, what is of essential importance is the manner in which Jesus lived. In 
Nietzsche‘s reconstruction of the psychology of the redeemer type (AC: §29), this 
type of person does not care about words, ideas or doctrines, but only immediate, 
inward states. Like Jesus, Nietzsche repudiates the idea of redemption that is linked 
with faith, the forgiveness of sins or with doctrine. He also associates it with the direct 
consequence of a pathological inability to bear even the most minute pain, and a 
refusal to love one‘s enemies. It is in Nietzsche‘s terminology decadent; that is, a 
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symptom of declining, waning life. Nietzsche‘s approach to redemption is in terms of 
the psychological; he calls it, true to his ―bodily‖ or ―physiological‖ approach. 
 
World redemption for Nietzsche is the world reaching its highest state whereby 
eternity becomes manifest in the world. The Kingdom of God as eternal recurrence or 
as a reversal of the church implies that eternity is immanent in the world. The 
Kingdom of God as Eternal Recurrence is only a comparison that can be inferred 
through the distinction between Christ and Christianity. Altizer in his essay entitled 
‗Nietzsche and Apocalypse‘ discusses the relationship between eternity and the world 
in Nietzsche. He notes that the previous notion of eternity of the Christian Godhead is 
one that is ―absolutely beyond the world and time‖ (Altizer 2000-2001: 10), and that 
the apocalyptic Godhead in the thought of Nietzsche relates to the ―forward 
movement of eternity‖; it is one ―embodying rather than disembodying time and the 
world.‖ (ibid.) In this way, eternal recurrence involves ―ushering in an absolutely new 
totality which is the total embodiment of time and the world.‖ (ibid.) 
 
Now if it is possible to understand that Christianity has truly and absolutely 
reversed Jesus‘ enactment of the Kingdom of God, and that the uniquely 
Christian God is the absolute reversal of that Kingdom, then it is possible 
to understand that Nietzsche‘s enactment of Eternal Recurrence is a 
genuine renewal of the Kingdom of God. Thereby a backward movement 
to eternity is purely and totally reversed into a forward movement to 
eternity, a primordial totality or Godhead is reversed into an apocalyptic 
Godhead or totality, and it is time and the world that are now eternity itself. 
(Altizer 2000-2001: 10-11) 
 
The immanence of eternity brings about world redemption, a Kingdom of Heaven on 
earth or the Millennial Kingdom or what Nietzsche refers to as the ―Zarathustra 
kingdom of a thousand years‖ (Z, IV: ‗The Honey Sacrifice‘) or the ―seventh day.‖121 
                                                          
121
Nietzsche relates woman to the seventh day of creation where the figure seven is symbolic of the 
notion of completeness: ―The complete woman of every era is the idleness of the creator on that 
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This new epoch where the world or the earth reaches its highest state, in an ascending 
stage of the will to power is what is referred to as a Dionysian apocalypse.
122
 It is in 
this way that Nietzsche is a foreseer of world redemption, the bringer of the ―glad 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
seventh day in the creation of culture, the repose of the artist in his work.‖ (HH, II: §274) In the Book 
of Revelation, the figure seven refers to the seal of creation; it is the Sabbath rest of the Millennial 
Kingdom that is ―the thousand years‖ (Rev. 20: 7-10), which is comparable to Nietzsche‘s idea of ―the 
Zarathustra kingdom of a thousand years.‖ (Z, IV: ‗The Honey Sacrifice‘) The perfect woman is 
complete like the world on the seventh day; she is what is complete in the creator, and she is the ―great 
victory; seventh day; the leisure of a god…‖ (EH, ‗How One Philosophizes with a Hammer‘: §3) 
122
Altizer in his The New Gospel of Christian Atheism explores the apocalyptic notion of the Eternal 
Recurrence in Nietzsche. Altizer notes that in Ecce Homo Nietzsche affirms Thus Spoke Zarathustra as 
the consequence of ―the most ultimate revelation that has ever occurred‖ and that although its intention 
is to ―be an absolute reversal of Christianity, it embodies a new and apocalyptic redemption from the 
uniquely Christian God.‖ (Thomas, J.J. Altizer, The New Gospel of Christian Atheism, Op. cit.,  p.67) 
Altizer also contends that it is ―our only major modern work that is written in the genre of the original 
gospels‖ and that the new redeemer as Zarathustra comes to reverse the old Persian Zarathustra, a 
figure who ―was the very origin of our history, an origin that the new Zarathustra came to reverse, and 
to reverse by an ultimate enactment of the death of God.‖ (ibid.) Altizer argues that Nietzsche 
advocates the eternal recurrence as the Kingdom of God that is the absolute opposite to the Christian 
God. Nietzsche associates the Christian God with an Absolute No-saying, however as Altizer argues 
this No-Saying is inextricably linked to an absolute Yes-saying, which shows that Christianity is  a 
necessary prerequisite evil to a new era:  
 
Both Nietzsche and Blake could celebrate that absolute novum with a total 
Yes, but this is a Yes inseparable from an absolute No, an absolute No that 
is an absolute self-emptying. This is the apocalyptic Yes that Blake 
celebrates as the apocalyptic Jesus or the New Jerusalem, but is this the 
Yes that Nietzsche names as Dionysus and Zarathustra, and is Zarathustra 
Nietzsche‘s name of the apocalyptic Jesus? Certainly not if we know Jesus 
as he has ever been known before, but if that Jesus has truly disappeared, 
this could make possible an absolutely new Jesus who is the embodiment 
of a new humanity and a new world. (ibid., p.69) 
 
This relates to the apocalyptic notion that the death of God is a transitional phase whereby the 
annihilation of the old epoch embodied by the Christian absolute is to be replaced by a new one, one 
embodied by an absolute Yes-saying. In this way the death of God implies the overcoming of nihilism:  
 
Just as Nietzsche knows nihilism more profoundly than any other thinker, 
this is a nihilism that he knows as a fully dawning historical actuality, one 
that he foresees as being fully incarnate in our world. If that world 
embodies an ultimate ending, it embodies an ultimate beginning as well, an 
absolute beginning that is inseparable from an absolute ending, and yet an 
absolute beginning that is a pure and total grace. (ibid., p.119) 
 
 Altizer refers to the Eternal Recurrence ―as an eternally predestined Yes-saying‖ which can be enacted 
with the death of God: (ibid., p.120) 
 
If only the death of God makes possible this enactment...the enactment of 
Eternal Recurrence is not only possible but inevitable, and inevitable as an 
absolutely necessary transfiguration of that absolute nothingness that the 
death of God releases. That transfiguration embodies an absolute joy, and a 
joy only possible by way of a transfiguration of this nothingness, so that an 
absolute nothingness is essential to this absolute joy, just as an absolute 
evil is essential to a uniquely Christian redemption. (ibid.) 
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tidings‖ (AC: §33, §41), and is in turn is a prophet of a redeemer, of the ―second 
coming of Christ.‖123 This redeemer is a Zarathustra-like figure who represents the 
epoch to come, and is the first and most ideal incarnation of life-affirmation. Life-
affirmation involves saying-yes to the earth, and as the earth becomes the new ‗centre‘ 
of valuation, this enables the earth to be raised to the highest level. In this experience 
of amor fati, the highest type glimpses an ―eternity‖ within Becoming or an eternity 
that is immanent in the world. The glad tidings are on a par with the teachings of 
Christ, which imply the elimination of any distance between God and man. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
123This could possibly be argued to be a feminine figure, as the ―Bride of Christ‖ who in the Bible is 
representative of the Millennial Kingdom. There is the apocalyptic idea of ―the interruption of history 
by Christ and his bride ... ‖ (Toole, D., Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo Reflections on Nihilism, Tragedy 
& Apocalypse, Colorado, Westview Press,1998, p. 206) and the figure of the bride stands for ―Our 
Lady‖. This figure of the bride is a metaphor for Christ‘s apocalyptic partner who brings about world-
redemption. 
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II 
 
The Eternal Return of the Same: Nietzsche on an ―eternity‖ within Becoming 
 
 
This section explores further Nietzsche‘s metaphysics of the later period that of 
Becoming focusing in particular on Nietzsche‘s notion of eternal return of the same. 
The eternal return requires a Dionysian attitude to ‗Life‘ that the most painful 
experiences can be affirmed in a rapturous moment of life-affirmation. This existential 
attitude towards reality in the experience of eternal return is first mentioned in a 
passage from The Gay Science (§341) entitled ―The Heaviest Weight.‖ In this passage 
the eternal return can be perceived either as a burden or as a god. It is those who 
perceive it as a god who can embrace it: ―You are a god, and never have I heard 
anything more divine.‖ It is referred to as the ―ultimate eternal confirmation and seal.‖ 
(GS: §341) The reality that is affirmed in the experience of eternal return is expressed 
in his early writings such as Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks as Becoming.  
Nietzsche views the existential relation to this reality, as the experience of 
transfiguration. He himself refers to his experience of the Eternal Return as being 
―reborn‖; it involves a rediscovery of the self in the highest affirmation of ‗Life‘ itself. 
In Ecce Homo, he mentions that he had an experience of that kind in 1881, which he 
associates with that of his friend Peter Gast, ―who was also reborn.‖124 (EH, Z: §1) In 
the same year Nietzsche discovers the idea of eternal return, ―the highest formula of 
affirmation that is at all attainable, belongs in August 1881: it was penned on a sheet 
                                                          
124Alistair Kee in his work entitled ‗Nietzsche against the Crucified‘ also notes this reference in Ecce 
Homo, and examines its relation to the idea of rebirth in the Bible. He mentions what the New 
Testament means by ―repentance‖ (metanoia or change of mind): it refers to a new understanding of 
the self, of the world. (Kee, Alistair, Nietzsche against the Crucified, London, SCM Press, 1999, p.130) 
The idea of a new understanding of the self entails affirmation of life, which for Nietzsche is the ―real‖ 
life (WP:§170), the ―true life‖ and ―Eternal life, the eternal return of life‖ (TI, X: §4) 
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with the notation underneath ―6,000 feet beyond man and time.‖ (ibid.) However, for 
Nietzsche, the flux of Becoming and the Eternal Return are not equivalent. The 
Eternal Return introduces the notion of ―eternity‖ and raises the question of how this 
term fits with reality as the flux of Becoming. The idea of Eternal Return arises in 
Nietzsche‘s later philosophy, and he considers the problem of how ―Becoming‖, a 
reality that is in continual flux is actually to be affirmed. In The Birth of Tragedy, the 
reality to be affirmed as the ―Primal One‖ is a reality that is ‗behind‘ the Apollonian 
world of appearance. In his later period he is apprehensive about this, as is evident by 
the way he dropped the term and his criticism of his early work in his ―Attempt at 
Self-Criticism‖ (1886). He therefore tries to find another solution to affirming a 
reality that is constantly in flux. The flux of Becoming can only be affirmed as a 
reality through willing the eternal return of the same. Becoming as a reality is 
guaranteed by the constant return of the self-same that is that something is attained at 
every moment and is always of the same. It is because there is something to be 
attained in every moment and always of the same that there is a reality to be affirmed. 
It guarantees the ‗isness‘ of Becoming, which in turn raises the ontological status of 
Becoming. Reality, for Nietzsche is no longer to be viewed as the flux of Becoming 
but rather in terms of an ―eternity‖ that is within Becoming. In this way, Nietzsche 
affirms some kind of eternity but that is neither ―another-world‖ nor a ―primal one‖; 
he advocates strictly an immanent this-worldly eternity. The ontological status of 
Becoming is raised when all past moments and all future moments not flow from each 
other in endless contradiction but link up in the ‗ring‘ of eternal return. In this 
experience of the same one is released into the enigma of the ring of Dionysus or the 
―well of Eternity‖. The eternal return has a redemptive aspect that as a mystery, it is to 
be experienced in ―a tremendous moment‖ (GS: §341), or in what Nietzsche calls 
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―Noon‖. It is possible to argue that eternal return doesn‘t necessarily imply the eternal 
repetition of all events within history, but as Kaufmann (1974) rather states it rather 
involves the ―supreme exaltation of the moment.‖125 The ring of eternal return is not a 
ring of endless repetition but relates to the whole; it is ―the wedding rings of rings‖ 
that Zarathustra places on the finger of eternity. (Z, III: ‗The Song of Yes and Amen‘) 
This idea of whole involves a conjoining of all opposites in the innocence of all 
Becoming. It is the ring that links up all events both past and future into one. This 
section will refer to Jaspers‘ (1997) discussion of the term ―being‖ as the concept of 
―eternity‖ in Nietzsche, an eternity that is within Becoming. It also includes an 
account of Altizer‘s (1977) discussion of the idea of an immanent eternity in 
Nietzsche that is the ―being that is in the now‖ which is drawn from the animal 
song
126
 of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The section also includes Stambaugh‘s (1972) 
discussion of Nietzsche‘s idea of the Eternal Return of the Same where she contends 
that in the Innocence of Becoming, the Eternal Return as ‗the Ring' is the highest form 
                                                          
125
 Kaufmann in his ‗Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist‘ also emphasizes that the eternal 
recurrence involves the ―supreme exaltation of the moment‖, and for Nietzsche is to be experienced by 
the overman. (Kaufmann, W., Op. cit., p.321)  He mentions that by the second meditation, Nietzsche 
repudiated the idea of the eternal recurrence in its Pythagorean form, ―we find that the point of his 
critique was merely that events do not, and cannot recur within the span of known history—and about 
this he never changed his mind.‖ (ibid. p.319) He declares that this however doesn‘t imply that 
Nietzsche rejects the necessity of the course of events within history. Kaufmann argues that the supra-
historical represents the later doctrine of eternal recurrence, which includes the idea that the world is 
finished in every moment and its end attained. (ibid.) As the section infolds it will become apparent that 
this is something similar to Jaspers (1997) and Stambaugh‘s (1972) argument. The ultimate apotheosis 
of the supra-historical outlook is the ―supreme exaltation of the moment.‖ (ibid., p.321) 
 
126
 In spite of Altizer‘s reference to the animal song from ‗The Convalescent‘ passage in order to argue 
that for Nietzsche ‗Being or God is the centre that is everywhere‘ or that there is an immanent eternity 
in Nietzsche, it must be acknowledged that in this chapter of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra 
suggests that the animals have made a ‗hurdy-gurdy‘ song of eternal return. The redemption of the 
animals is to be distinguished from that of Zarathustra. Lampert in his work ‗Nietzsche‘s Teaching: An 
Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra‘ examines this distinction. (Lampert, L., New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1986, p.214) The specifics of the distinction will be mentioned further on in the 
section, and also that Lampert does claim that in spite of these distinctions that redemption of the 
animals is not entirely removed from that of Zarathustra. Altizer‘s interpretation of the animal song 
explores the idea of the immanence of eternity in Nietzsche whereas Lampert discusses the animals‘ 
song in terms of their relation to the temporal and becoming. Lampert in spite of his assertion that there 
is life-affirmative gods in Nietzsche, he would not explore the idea of ―God as the centre that is 
everywhere‖ in Nietzsche.  
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of affirmation. She also argues that Eternal Return is not to be wrongfully conflated 
with the flux of Becoming (time as duration).
127
 This also ties in with what she refers 
to as Nietzsche‘s pantheism the idea that ‗God is in every moment‘, the relationship in 
turn between God and the temporal. This in turn overturns any nihilistic 
considerations of the Eternal Return. Nietzsche‘s view of the Innocence of Becoming 
implies that all determinateness and space itself is absorbed by time, the Moment that 
continually ends into eternity. This consideration of time is what is referred to as ―the 
untimely,‖ as it is not in opposition to eternity.  
 
In a section entitled ―The Affirmation of the Concept of Being‖ in his Nietzsche: An 
Introduction to an Understanding of his Philosophical Activity, Jaspers notes the 
distinction between endless Becoming and what Being is for Nietzsche. He begins by 
explaining that although Becoming cannot be intelligibly grasped, ―philosophizing‖ 
                                                          
127 Joan Stambaugh refers to reality for Nietzsche as the Innocence of Becoming in her work The 
Problem of Time in Nietzsche. (Stambaugh, J., London, Bucknell University Press, 1987, p.184) In this 
thesis it is referred to as the ‗inner logos‘ of Becoming. The reality that is to be affirmed as the 
innocence of Becoming is not to be confused with the mere ―flux‖ of Becoming. In her work 
Nietzsche‘s Thought of Eternal Return she notes Nietzsche‘s very important question: to which reality 
do we belong?: ―Where, where do we belong?‖ (Stambaugh., J., The John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore & London, 1972, p.35 citing Nachlass (Kroner ed.), vol. 83, p.401; See footnote no.137 of 
this section where she argues that, for Nietzsche, it is Eternity, Eternal Return of the Same as God and 
not the mere flux of Becoming. However, she contends that Nietzsche considers the Eternal Return of 
the Same as the innocence of Becoming. Therefore, the question arises that there must be a distinction 
between the Innocence of becoming and the mere flux of becoming. Stambaugh notes this distinction, 
and argues that Nietzsche rejects the flux under two considerations 1) in terms of it as the emancipation 
from being in The Birth of Tragedy 2) The past as the decisive factor of Becoming. (Stambaugh, J., The 
Problem of Time in Nietzsche, p. 38-42) Stambaugh argues that Becoming as the emancipation from 
Being is to be identified in The Birth of Tragedy, that Becoming as eternal individuation and 
contradiction continually rebels against the primal unity, which is a causal ground (being); it 
emancipates itself from Being. (ibid., p.39-40) In this thesis, I am claiming that Nietzsche rejects the 
flux of becoming as the emancipation from being in the philosophy of Anaximander. Nietzsche‘s 
rejection of the flux as the emancipation from being is to be noted in his early work Philosophy in the 
Tragic Age of the Greeks; ―coming-to-be [becoming] is an illegitimate emancipation from being.‖ 
(PTAG: §4, 46) 
Stambaugh notes a second consideration of Nietzsche‘s rejection of the flux as the past (time as 
duration), which is also noted in this section in a discussion of the passage ‗On Redemption‘ from Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra. Therefore, in this thesis it is being maintained that the Becoming that Nietzsche 
embraces is not Becoming 1) as emancipation from Being 2) as flux or time as duration. 
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can still take place when Becoming approaches or approximates Being. Jaspers firstly 
outlines in a section entitled ―The transcending restitution of being in the philosophy 
of becoming‖ the most important references made by Nietzsche on the relation 
between Being and Becoming as follows: ―The fact that everything recurs is the 
closest approach of the world of becoming to that of being‖, and Jaspers notes that 
this thought originated in Nietzsche‘s own vital philosophizing: ―To imprint the 
character of being upon becoming—that is the highest will to power.‖ (WP: §617, 
cited in this form in Jaspers 1997: 351)
128
 These references show that Being is 
restored again—as the eternal recurrence. He notes that for Nietzsche there is a 
distinction between this Being which, for ―philosophically transcending thinking,‖ 
proceeds from becoming, and being which ―derives from the will to power as it firstly 
establishes what is intelligible for it, and in doing so, provides a knowledge of things 
in the world‖. (1997: 351) He explains that, for Nietzsche, when it comes to 
knowledge of beings, absolute Being disappears; it disappears ―as an object of 
thought.‖ (ibid.)  Jaspers maintains that for Nietzsche Being ―is eternity as the source 
and boundary of all objectivity and all existence.‖ (ibid.) Jaspers (1997: 352) notes 
how the eternal recurrence for Nietzsche is set against the threat of relativism 
associated with ―the senseless futility of mere becoming‖ 
 
When the present age with its complete dissolution of principles and its 
relativizing of all being and all values becomes ―the image of universal 
existence‖ and when, as a consequence, the negation of life, born of 
aversion to the senseless futility of mere becoming, begins to threaten, 
Nietzsche seizes upon his thought, so to speak, as a means to salvation.―I 
set eternal recurrence against the paralyzing sense of universal dissolution 
and incompletion.‖ (Jaspers 1997: 352 citing Nietzsche) 
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Jaspers does not provide a reference for the above quotation. It comes from section (§617) of The 
Will to Power. This thesis offers the following translation: ―To impose upon becoming the character of 
being—that is the supreme will to power...That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a 
world of becoming to a world of being:–high point of the meditation.‖ (WP: §617)  
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For Nietzsche, the basic thought of amor fati is introduced against the nihilism of 
viewing one‘s existence in relation to ―aimless Becoming‖:  
 
When indifference to one‘s own existence arises as a result of the vision 
of aimless becoming and the dissipation of being into the boundless, then 
the obsession with becoming turns into the yea-saying assimilation of the 
present: the basic thought of amor fati. (ibid.) 
 
Nietzsche‘s own experience of eternal recurrence is the source of his thought. This 
source is not ―a playful intellectual reflection‖ but, as Jaspers states, ―the experience 
of being in a moment that itself received decisive metaphysical significance from the 
very thought to which it gave rise.‖ (1997: 357) Nietzsche‘s own experience of eternal 
recurrence has both existential and historical significance. He contends that the eternal 
recurrence is to be viewed in terms of the ―significance‖ which ―the moment attains 
through its philosophical substance.‖ (Jaspers 1997: 358) He emphasizes that the 
eternal recurrence involves the revelation of Being: ―If the moment is at once 
revelation of being and, in this sense, eternity, then recurrence is merely a symbol for 
this eternity.‖ (ibid.) It is through the eradication of time that Being reveals itself ―(in 
the flash) of the moment.‖ (ibid.)129 The revelation of Being in the lightning flash of 
the moment occurs at ―the perfect noon hour‖130:  
                                                          
129
The connection between timelessness and eternal recurrence will be explored later in the section. It is 
the fullness of time; it is not time as duration or succession. Time is not to be viewed in opposition to 
eternity. Jaspers notes the similarity between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in terms of the relation 
between the moment and eternity or of conceiving the moment in relation to eternity. Kierkegaard, in a 
similar vein to Nietzsche distinguishes between three ways of conceiving the moment in relation to 
eternity. Jaspers firstly poses the question what does the eternal mean for Nietzsche: ―Even in one word 
this meaning is constantly present: Nietzsche does not say ―endless recurrence‖ but ―eternal 
recurrence.‖ What does ―eternal‖ mean?‖ (Jaspers, Op. cit., p.366) The answer lies in the correlation 
between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche on the eternal. Kierkegaard distinguishes three ways of conceiving 
the moment in relation to eternity. The first way is as follows: ―If the moment is not essential, then 
eternity appears from the rear, as the past (just as the path of a man who walks without direction and 
goal appears only behind him, as the distance covered).‖ (ibid.) The second way is ―If the moment is 
essential, but merely as a decision, then the future is eternity.‖(ibid.) But finally ―if the moment itself is 
eternity, then eternity is ―the future returning as the past.‖ (Jaspers, K., ibid., p.366 citing Kierkegaard) 
According to Jaspers ―This last concept is, for Kierkegaard, the Christian one: ―The concept around 
which all Christianity revolves...is the fullness of time; it is however the moment as eternity, and yet 
this eternity is at once the future and the past.‖(Jaspers, K., p 366 citing Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard‘s 
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Still! Still! Did not the world become perfect just now? ...What happened 
to me? Listen! Did time perhaps fly away? Do I not fall? Did time perhaps 
fly away? Do I not fall? Did I not fall—listen!—into the well of eternity? 
(Z, IV: ‗At Noon‘)  
 
Noon symbolizes for Nietzsche ―the world-historical moment,‖ the moment where he 
begets the thought of eternal recurrence. It is in this moment that Nietzsche is not only 
―the historical Existenz of an individual‖ or the ―one who creates decisively for the 
history of a whole people and of all humanity‖ but most importantly he is ―the entire 
axis of all being.‖ (Jaspers 1997: 358) The world-historical moment is an apocalyptic 
one where Nietzsche as a prophet stands ―between past and future.‖ (Z, III: ‗The 
Seven Seals‘) This implies that humanity is entering into the fullness of time as a 
result of his thought; he marks the beginning of a new era of relating to eternity.  
 
The highest affirmation of life which the thought of eternal return brings forth has, 
according to Nietzsche, a redeeming character. The eternal return is not simply a 
concept to be grasped and subsequently accepted, it must be lived, experienced in a 
moment of rapturous affirmation. It must emerge from the torments of nihilism, 
allowing the ultimate redemption from the greatest affliction. Nietzsche advocates that 
all of existence is inextricably linked, or that ―all is One.‖ (PTAG: §3), (Z, II: ‗On 
Redemption‘) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Works, trans. Schrempf, vol.87) It is the final way of conceiving eternity that is an approximation to 
Nietzsche. 
 
130
 Jaspers on the one hand refers to the Noon period as a ―world-historical moment‖, and on the other 
hand he refers to passages where Nietzsche uses the phrase ―the hour‖. He himself does not note this 
distinction. In this section ―the untimely‖ is referred to as the moment, but it must be noted that he 
refers to it also as the hour. Both the hour and the moment can be argued to refer to ―the untimely.‖  
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Have you ever said Yes to a single joy? O my friends, then you said Yes 
too to all woe. All things are entangled, ensnared, enamored; if ever you 
wanted one thing twice, if ever you said, ―You please me, happiness! 
Abide, moment!‖ then you wanted all back. All anew, all eternally, all 
entangled, ensnared, enamored—oh, then you loved the world. Eternal 
ones, love it eternally and evermore; and to woe too, you say: go, but 
return! For all joy wants—eternity. (Z, IV: ‗The Drunken Song‘ §10) 
 
Nietzsche uses the expression amor fati to refer to the affirmation of eternity that is at 
the same time an affirmation of the being of one‘s own existence. Jaspers notes that 
there is a distinction between ―being dissipated in a great affirmation of all being‖ and 
returning from this extreme ―to the present historicity of my existence in this actual 
world and am, through this historicity, at one with being itself.‖ (1997: 367) Jaspers, 
in drawing upon Nietzsche‘s emphasis on the moment, notes that once ―one becomes 
conscious of its Existenz in this moment, of its ―curious existence in this specific 
Now,‖ life can no longer find its significance in complete assimilation to some 
general class or other.‖ (Jaspers 1997: 368) This highlights the inadequacy of 
intellectual thinking when it comes to addressing the ―truly great problems and 
question marks‖ (GS: §373) of existence or to living one‘s existence in its most bare 
form, in its most fundamental relation to eternity. This also shows that human systems 
have intellectually distracted us from finding our true selves and from feeling being 
itself. (ibid.) Jaspers claims that in order to cross the ―river of life‖ to one‘s true self 
and a genuine encounter with being that is within becoming, one must firstly descend 
into the depths of existence. (ibid.) The being or eternity within becoming that 
Nietzsche expresses as the eternity of recurrence, is, according to Jaspers, to be 
viewed as the very demand for this descent:  
 
In becoming, everything is hollow, illusory, flat ... The riddle which man 
must solve can be solved only through being, a being that is just what it is 
and cannot perish. Man is now beginning to gauge the depth of his fusion 
with becoming and with being. (Jaspers 1997: 368 citing Nietzsche)  
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Being can only be reached through ―a loving embrace of truly present existence, 
through amor fati which finds the way from the stream of mere becoming to the 
historicity of the presently fulfilled Existenz and seizes being within becoming.‖ 
(Jaspers 1997: 368) For Nietzsche, amor fati is the affirmation of necessity itself, ―it 
amounts to the unity of becoming and being in the destiny of the individual within his 
world.‖ (Jaspers 1997: 369)  
 
The doctrine of the eternal recurrence involves this necessity entitled fate; it is this 
necessity that claims that if everything happens necessarily, then ―it is apparent that I 
myself am a link in the chain of necessity—am myself a part of fate.‖(ibid.) It is only 
when the true necessity of fate transcends any definite category,
131
 can amor fati then 
be reached. In this thesis, it will be maintained that redemption forms the basis of 
Nietzsche‘s conception of amor fati; fate becomes a sort of providence for those 
capable of transforming accident into necessity. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche first 
introduced the term amor fati as something yet unachieved: 
 
I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as 
what is beautiful in them—thus I will be one of those who make things 
beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love from now on! … And, all in all 
and on the whole: someday I want only to be a Yes-sayer! (GS: §276) 
 
The extent to which one embraces the amor fati principle reveals one‘s affinity with 
reality: 
My formula for greatness in a human  being is amor fati: that one wants 
nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not 
merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it—all idealism is 
mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary— but love it. (EH, II: §10)  
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Jaspers firstly outlines that the type of necessity that Nietzsche rejects. This type of necessity which 
Nietzsche rejects is the category of necessity that applies to causal processes subsumed under natural 
laws and pertaining to mechanism. Necessity as a human category is to be distinguished from Fatum. 
(Jaspers, Op. cit., p.369) 
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Nietzsche‘s desire for amor fati is an expression of his inmost self, as Jaspers states 
―What Nietzsche desires first of all, he will soon express as his essence‖ (Jaspers 
1997: 370): ―what is necessary does not hurt me; amor fati is my inmost nature.‖ (EH, 
‗The Case of Wagner‘: §4) 
 
Nietzsche expresses the Dionysian attitude towards eternity in the affirmation of one‘s 
existence. Amor fati is the ―highest state‖ attainable to man, constituting a ―Dionysian 
relationship to existence.‖ (WP: §1041) Fate can in no way be equated with the 
category of necessity conceived of as a natural law or of any intelligible order. Fate 
actually resists any attempts to understand it; it is the ―transcending expression of the 
essence of being that cannot be categorized.‖ (Jaspers 1997: 370) In this way 
―Nietzsche‘s fatalism, like the Christian lack of free will before God, does not express 
passivity but rather the impetus to authentic noble activity that can transcend any 
recognizable necessity in the world because it faces a necessity of a different kind.‖ 
(ibid.) Jaspers (1997: 370) notes that Nietzsche actually hailed ‗being‘, that is an 
eternity within Becoming like a deity in a Dionysian Dithyramb entitled ‗Fame and 
Eternity‘. It is a dithyramb that marks Zarathustra‘s journey to full enlightenment: 
              Oh night, oh silence, oh deadly still noise! ... 
              I see a sign,— 
              from farthest regions 
              a stellar shape sinks slowly sparkling towards me ... 
              Highest star of being!  
                                                   With eternal shapes engraved! 
              You come to me?— 
              Shield of necessity! 
              Highest star of being 
              —by no wish attained,    
              by No never sullied, 
              eternal Yes of being, 
              eternally am I your Yes:                   
              for I love you, oh eternity!
132
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Jaspers does not reference the above quotation. He is actually referring to one of Nietzsche‘s 
Dionysian Dithyrambs entitled ‗Fame & Eternity.‘ For an alternative translation which is also bilingual 
see Nietzsche, F., Dithyrambs of Dionysus, R.J. Hollingdale (trans.), London, Anvil Press Poetry, 1984, 
p. 71. Hollingdale‘s translation also offers notes on this Dithyramb. He mentions that it originally was 
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Jaspers notes the divine nature of experiencing everything as interlinked for 
Nietzsche. He sates quoting Nietzsche that ―Where I feel everything as necessarily 
connected, I experience every being as divine.‖ (Jaspers 1997: 360, citing 
Nietzsche)
133
 Jaspers claims that in the affirmation of all being is implied the idea that 
―within the process of becoming, something is attained in every single one of its 
moments,‖ and ―always the same thing‖. The something cannot be expressed as ―a 
generality,‖ ―as transcendence‖ or ―even as anything capable of being defined.‖ 
(Jaspers 1997: 360) The truth of being cannot be defined: ―inexhaustible in its endless 
definable aspects, it is pure immanence.‖ (ibid.) For Nietzsche, ―every moment of 
becoming is justified (or escapes evaluation—and this amounts to the same thing),‖ 
then it follows that ―the present is not to be justified for the sake of the future nor the 
past for the sake of the present.‖(ibid.) 
 
Nietzsche‘s ontological claim that ―all is One‖ (Z, II, ‗On Redemption‘), (Z, III, ‗On 
Old & New Tablets‘: §3), (PTAG: §3) implies that past, present and future are 
interconnected; they belong to eternity. It is in this way that the Yes of eternal 
recurrence implies the redemption of all that is past. Zarathustra addresses this matter 
in a section entitled ―On Redemption‖: ―To redeem those who lived in the past and to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
intended to be a poetic epilogue to the autobiography Ecce Homo, which he considers ―would have 
been sensible, since this miniature poetic cycle is itself autobiographical.‖ (ibid., p.93) The reason for 
this is, according to Hollingdale that the poem records the four stages of Zarathustra‘s enlightenment: 
part one is ―ferociously depressive,‖ truth arises in the thunderstorm, as flashes of lightning. (ibid.) He 
summarizes part two as follows that it appears to repudiate ―fame,‖ that it ―actually repudiates the 
purchase of fame by the substitution of virtue for truth—the trimming of truth to the world‘s moral 
demands.‖ (ibid.,  p.94) He notes that the third and fourth parts ―transport us to the end of Part Three of 
Zarathustra, the ecstatic conclusion of Zarathustra‘s spiritual odyssey and his attainment of full 
enlightenment.‖ (ibid.) Finally, Hollingdale outlines that the key to unlocking the poem is in a passage 
from Ecce Homo, which has been already mentioned above: ―My formula for greatness in a human 
being is amor fati...Not merely to endure what happens of necessity—but love it‖(EH, II: §10) In this 
way, enlightenment can be argued to be amor fati as a feeling of necessity, of Eternity. 
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Jaspers offers no reference for the above Nietzschean quotation. 
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re-create all ‗it was‘ into ‗thus I willed it‘—that alone I call redemption.‖ (Z, II: ‗On 
Redemption‘) The will being impotent regarding the past is wrathful and full of 
vengeance.
134
 Nietzsche takes revenge to be the ill will against past time: ―Thus the 
will, the liberator, took to hurting; and on all who can suffer he wreaks revenge for his 
inability to go backwards. This, indeed this alone is what revenge is: the will‘s ill will 
against time and its ‗it was.‘‖ (ibid.) Everything past is fragment and accident and the 
will looking backwards in despair encounters revulsion against time and ‗it was‘. It is 
through the eternal recurrence that the will to power as the will to joy and 
overabundance reaches its most potent expression. It is through eternal recurrence 
where all is carried together into ―One what is fragment and riddle and dreadful 
accident‖ (ibid.) that the will is redeemed. The will to power in its creative aspect 
does not simply say ―‗But thus I willed it.‘‖ It also says ―But thus do I will it; thus 
shall I will it.‘‖ (ibid.) The creative will takes possession of the past but also it wills 
that the past return as the future, within the cycle of things. The will to power as will 
to joy makes possible the eternal return as ―intense joyful affirmation‖135 as ―...joy 
wants eternity. Joy wants the eternity of all things, wants deep, wants deep eternity.‖ 
(Z, IV: ‗The Drunken Song‘, §11) It is the will to power in its life-affirmative capacity 
that is no longer vengeful towards the past or all that was. It is in this way that there is 
a link between the Oneness of reality and a new conception of time, of eternity that is 
the Now. It is through reconciliation with time that the will is transformed into a will 
that is a ―redeemer and joy-bringer.‖ (Z, II: ‗On Redemption‘) The will is reconciled 
                                                          
134
See Joan Stambaugh in her Nietzsche‘s Thought of Eternal Return for an explanation of what 
Nietzsche means by revenge: ―Nietzsche does not simply mean a subjective, ―human‖ emotion. The 
latter would correspond to Nietzsche‘s concept of ressentiment. Revenge is an ontological concept, 
which means it is a possibility—according to Nietzsche, the exclusively dominating actuality of Life 
itself up to now.‖(Stambaugh, J., Nietzsche‘s Thought of Eternal Return, Op.cit., p.10) She also 
mentions that the will of the ―On Redemption‖ passage is comparable to the Schopenhauerian will 
(ibid., p.78) 
 
135
See Joan Stambaugh in her work entitled ‗Nietzsche‘s Thought of Eternal Return‘ where she  
discusses the link between the will to power and eternal return (ibid., p.16) 
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in being redeemed from revenge; it is reconciled with time, it is something higher than 
any reconciliation: ―For that will which is the will to power must will something 
higher than any reconciliation‖. The will in being reconciled with time is a life-
affirmative will; it is redeemed from the sheer flux of things (mere becoming) and 
from the ―punishment called existence.‖ (ibid.) The will no longer feels separated 
from time but rather loses itself in the moment or in eternity that is the Now. It is in 
this way that there is a link between the redemptive ‗One‘ and the ‗Now‘ that is 
eternity or ―Being‖ that is in the Now. This connection is explored in a passage 
entitled ‗The Convalescent‘ in Thus Spoke Zarathustra; it is also the passage which 
shows that there is the idea of the immanence of eternity in Nietzsche: 
 
―O Zarathustra,‖ the animals said, ―to those who think as we do... 
Everything goes, everything comes back; eternally rolls the wheel of being. 
Everything dies, everything blossoms again; eternally runs the year of 
being. Everything breaks, everything is joined anew; eternally the same 
house of being is built. Everything parts, everything greets every other 
thing again; eternally the ring of being remains faithful to itself. In every 
Now, being begins; round every Here rolls the sphere There. The centre is 
everywhere. Bent is the path of eternity.‖ (Z, III: ‗The Convalescent‘, §2) 
 
Altizer (1977) in his essay entitled ‗Eternal Recurrence & Kingdom of God‘, 
Nietzsche expresses that the eternal recurrence is a celebration of the wheel of 
―Being‖. The wheel of ―Being‖ is the ―Dionysian symbol of Eternal Recurrence 
which reflects the ultimate reality of things themselves.‖ (Altizer 1977: 242) The 
image of the wheel parallels with the image of the Ring, the Circle or a Cycle; it is 
used to convey the Oneness of all things. The word ‗faithful‘ in the above passage 
suggests ‗loyalty‘ to the cycle of Being, that all pain is transformed into ―a feeling of 
necessity‖ or ―into the highest order of perfection‖ which is best symbolized by the 
circle. (Altizer 1977: 243) Altizer explores the above passage entitled ‗The 
Convalescent‘ from Thus Spoke Zarathustra. He examines the passage in particular its 
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last three lines which he declares are the most important lines Nietzsche ever wrote
136
: 
―Being begins in every Now.‖ (ibid.) He then goes on to say that the death of God for 
Nietzsche as an ending is an eschatological one, such that it is a ―radical new 
beginning‖. (ibid.) The death of God, Altizer explains brings an end to the 
transcendence of the beyondness of eternity, which makes Being manifest in every 
Now. This entails that Being takes on a new meaning, and is no longer eternal; rather, 
it begins or dawns in every actual moment: ―When life or existence is most deeply 
affirmed, Being becomes identical with the Now: the actual moment of existence 
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 In spite of Altizer making the claim that these lines or what is referred to as the ―animal song‖ are 
the most important that Nietzsche ever wrote, these lines that speak of the eternal recurrence are 
dismissed by Zarathustra. He states that they have made ―a hurdy-gurdy song‖ of it. This suggests that 
there is a distinction between the animal song and Zarathustra‘s song of ―Yes and Amen‖. Lampert in 
his ‗Nietzsche‘s Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra‘ outlines this distinction. The 
question can then be posed is the animal song inadequate? Altizer‘s discussion of the song is being 
introduced in this thesis not to stress that Nietzsche is a metaphysician of ‗Being‘ but rather to stress 
that there is the idea of the immanence of eternity within Nietzsche‘s philosophy. Lampert teases out 
the distinction while at the same time arguing that the animal song is not so inadequate. He notes that 
the animals contradict what Zarathustra says, ―...for in response to his claim to ―dance away over all 
things‖ they say that ―all things themselves are dancing.‖‖ (Lampert, L., London, Yale University 
Press, 1986, p.214) There is a distinction between Zarathustra and the animal in that Zarathustra 
actually experiences the redemption of eternal recurrence whereas they only speak of it. According to 
Lampert, the animals ―belong to the dancing things; they do not fly over them as he does, and in this 
way Lampert notes that Zarathustra calls the song ――a lyre-song‖, a ditty, trivializing thing.‖ (ibid., 
p.214) He also stresses that although their song cannot be Zarathustra‘s, ―it is not for that reason simply 
false or simply trivial‖. (ibid.) He also criticizes Heidegger for maintaining so, who takes ―the animals 
to be like the Dwarf, symbolic of inattentive humanity blameable for not grasping the essential matter 
in eternal return.‖ (ibid.) Lampert goes on to state that ―It would hardly be fitting at the climax of the 
book to record a beautiful song by the honoured animals and mean it to say nothing at all about the 
teaching for which the book exists. Moreover, what the animals say is close to what Zarathustra said in 
his vision and what he will say in the next chapter; to speak of redemption as willing the past is quite in 
keeping with the animals‘ interpretation of a joyful recurrence.‖ (ibid.) It seems like Zarathustra 
experiences the redemption of eternal recurrence whereas the animals don‘t experience it, and is 
trivialized by Zarathustra for this reason. The difference between Zarathustra and the animals is one of 
perspective according to Lampert, the perspective gained by Zarathustra is singular, ―the action of the 
most spirited of beings, while the perspective sung by the animals is general, the response of beings to 
the most spiritual blessing on mortal things.‖ (ibid.) Lampert also outlines the animals‘ relation to the 
term ‗Being‘, Zarathustra encounters the whole whereas the animals speak freely about the whole, in 
speaking freely of being, they transform the whole of being into becoming, as Zarathustra himself had 
done.‖ (Lampert, ibid. p.215 citing Z, III: 9) He states that the animal song is for Nietzsche 
―metaphysical poetry‖, which ―celebrates time and becoming; it is praise and justification of the 
transitory.‖ (ibid. p.215) Lampert, like Altizer above stresses that the animals celebrate ―an endless 
joyful ring in which all things dance‖ (ibid.) However, Altizer emphasizes that the line ―Being is in the 
every Now‖ implies the immanence of eternity. Eternity and the temporal become one such that 
eternity becomes immanent in the world, however, as is clear from Lampert any form of redemption is 
not experienced by the animals but only by Zarathustra. Zarathustra‘s songs are more expressive of the 
experience of redemption whereas the animal song is more expressive of reality as becoming and of 
time. 
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becomes Being. The act, the affirmation, the willing of the moment is the eternal 
creation and recreation of everything. (ibid.) Altizer next considers the phrase: ―the 
world of There revolves about every Here.‖ For him this means that if every moment 
is Being itself, then all moments of being are equivalent, because every moment must 
coincide with every other: The idea that all things flow into one another and are 
interlinked refers to the idea that all things form part of the whole or ―all is One‖ (Z, 
III: ‗The Yes & Amen Song‘) which expresses what he means by redemption. In this 
passage of the ―Yes & Amen Song‖ he refers to the whole; it is ―the blend-mug in 
which all things are well-blended.‖ (ibid.), there is the redeeming salt which ―makes 
all things blend well in the blend-mug.‖ (ibid.) It is through the eternal recurrence that 
the veil of Being is dissolved, which brings an end to all those worlds and eternities 
created by man, the realm of appearance. (Altizer 1977: 243) 
 
Within Nietzsche there is the prophetic idea of a new historical destiny (a new 
Dionysian existence), a reversal of no-saying, and this idea of a new Dionysian life 
wants all things, and wants them eternally the same and to truly know the sameness of 
the same is to know that ―the centre is everywhere‖. Altizer (1977) notes that the 
phrase ―the centre is everywhere‖ involves the dissipation of the ―here‖ and ―there‖ of 
things, such that every unique, singular and absolute centre disappears and with that 
disappearance, all hierarchical judgement becomes impossible. The traditional symbol 
of the centre is meaningful only when a chasm between it and the void is assumed. 
However, that chasm disappears when God is dead, and with it disappears every 
chasm or ultimate distance whatsoever. In this way, all transcendent centres pass into 
total immanence, and ―centre‖ as such ceases to be singular or distinct. For Nietzsche, 
the idea of any real distinction becomes impossible; it is no longer possible to place 
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boundaries between things, to know a ―this‖ which is ―other‖ than a ―that‖. In this 
sense, all things are firmly bound together, no lines or limits are possible, and all 
things spontaneously flow into each other. Now everything is a centre, because the 
centre is everywhere. For Altizer, it is possible that for Nietzsche, God is the Centre 
that is everywhere, but only when God in the absolute sense is dead, only when the 
negation of his sovereignty and transcendence invests every point and moment with 
the totality of Being. Stambaugh (1972: 101) defines Nietzsche‘s pantheism as the 
revelation that the world is complete and fulfilled in every moment that God is in 
every moment. This makes clear what Nietzsche means by the glad tidings of the 
symbolic teachings of Jesus, which imply the elimination of any distance between God 
and man. (AC: §33, §41) 
 
Altizer states that the final phrase ―Bent is the path of eternity‖, reveals that the way of 
eternity is not only curved or bowed, it is also crooked and circuitous and that ―there is 
no logos of eternity when its path is both curved and crooked, both circular and 
circuitous.‖ (1977: 244) In Zarathustra‘s drunken midnight song, he sings:  
 
Woe implores: Go! But all joy wants eternity—Wants deep, wants deep 
Eternity.‖ Zarathustra himself interprets these words: ―joy, however, does 
not want heirs, or children—joy wants itself, wants eternity, wants 
recurrence, wants everything eternally the same. (Z, IV: §19, cited in this 
form in Altizer 1977: 244) 
 
Altizer (1977: 245) claims that this affirmation or yes-saying refutes the very 
possibility of theoretical or cosmological understanding: ―No metaphysical cosmology 
lies here at hand, nor even an ―idea‖ of Eternal Recurrence, but rather a total existence 
in the present Now, a now that is here and there, a centre that is everywhere.‖ He 
explains that Zarathustra‘s symbol of Eternal Recurrence is radically distinguished 
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from the historical language of Christianity. He maintains that a decisive consequence 
of Christianity‘s loss of its original eschatological symbol of the Kingdom of God was 
that it was thereby led into an apprehension of pure and total love as being ―other‖ 
than the world. In this respect, historical Christianity, apart from its radical apocalyptic 
seers, was distantly removed from the proclamation of Jesus, for his ―glad tidings‖ 
were a proclamation of the advent here and now of the Kingdom of God. 
  
In her work Nietzsche‘s Thought of Eternal Return, Joan Stambaugh explores the idea 
that ―the centre is in every moment‖, that is the Eternal Return of the Same as 
Nietzsche‘s notion of God. She also argues that the Eternal Return of the Same as the 
highest form of affirmation is not to be wrongfully conflated with the flux of 
Becoming.
137In a section entitled ―Nihilism and the Thought of Eternal Return: The 
                                                          
137She argues that in light of Nietzsche‘s rejection of the traditional metaphysical idea of a causal 
ground to the world, ―one is inclined to take his thought of eternal return to mean a world of endless 
Becoming in which a finite part is allotted to man.‖ (Stambaugh, J., Op. cit., p.35) She contends that 
Eternal return as ―vision and enigma‖ is an answer to Nietzsche‘s tremendous question: ―Where, where 
do we belong?‖ (Stambaugh, J., Op. cit., p.35 citing Nachlass (Kroner ed.), vol.83, p.401) She argues 
that Nietzsche‘s answer to this question is that the Self enters the abyss of Eternity or belongs to 
Eternity, which will be discussed further on in the section. She firstly discusses the passage ―On the 
Vision and the Riddle‖ of Zarathustra not only to elaborate on what Nietzsche means by the moment 
but also to argue that for Nietzsche, it is the Self that experiences Eternity, which is the non-spatial and 
not the flux. It is referred to as ―The Gateway‖ in the passage. The moment itself is spatial: ―It has 
nothing to do with the past or the future, or for that matter with the present: it simply lets the flux of 
time roll through it.‖ (Stambaugh, J., Op. cit., p.39) However, ―the meeting of past and future in the 
moment is not spatial‖. (ibid., p.40) This implies that eternity is not spatial, and that it is objective 
reality. (See Moles, A., Nietzsche‘s Philosophy of Nature and Cosmology, Peter Lang, New York, 
1990, p. 247-258 for a discussion of Nietzsche‘s argument that space is not objective reality) 
Stambaugh holds a similar contention where she mentions Nietzsche‘s critique of the traditional 
metaphysics of space and substance. (Stambaugh, J., Op. cit., p.70) She also claims earlier in the same 
work that eternity for Nietzsche is not spatial. (ibid., p.21) She then mentions that Nietzsche‘s use of 
the word ―contradiction‖ of the two paths of past and future in the same passage implies that the 
individual is forced into the moment itself. (ibid., p.40) The flux of time cannot produce a 
contradiction. It is that element of time which is a hindrance to eternity, which is mentioned in the ―On 
Redemption‖ passage. (Z, II: ‗On Redemption‘) A contradiction can only occur in the moment. Past 
and future meet in the moment and nowhere else. Past and future, and thus all time, thus the eternal 
return itself, are in the moment. (ibid., p.41) When the contradiction is resolved, past and future form a 
circle. (ibid. p.38) Robin Small mentions in his ‗Zarathustra‘s Four Ways‘ that ―The Hour‖ (Z, III: ‗The 
Wanderer‘) draws the past and future into itself, whereby they no longer contradict one another as in 
―The Moment.‖ The ―Hour‖ will be discussed in the final section; it is the homecoming for the 
dispersed self (Small, R., Zarathustra‘s Four Ways: Structures of Becoming in Nietzsche‘s Thought, 
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 9: 1, 83-107, 2001, p.104.) The homecoming involves 
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Eternal Return of the Same as the Most Extreme Nihilism‖ of the same work, 
Stambaugh outlines Nietzsche‘s account of the two extreme possibilities of his 
thought with reference to a passage from The Will to Power: §55. (Stambaugh 1972: 
16, citing WP: §55) It is either firstly, the most extreme form of nihilism or secondly, 
the self-attainment of the Same in every moment. The eternal recurrence in its 
nihilistic form is viewed as ―duration with an ―in vain,‖ without goal or purpose, is a 
most paralyzing thought.‖ (WP: §55) Its other extreme consideration is eternal return 
as the ―Ring‖ as the highest form of affirmation; ―something is attained in every 
moment‖ (WP: §55), which relates to Nietzsche‘s new pantheism that is non-static 
and non-moralistic. (Stambaugh 1972:19) In arguing that Nietzsche adheres to the 
latter consideration, she then goes on to ask important questions on how Nietzsche 
relates that ―timeless moment‖ to the rest of time: ―...how is one to think the relation 
of that one ―isolated‖ moment to the rest of time, especially if there is no static 
eternity sitting off somewhere apart from time?‖ (Stambaugh 1972: 7) She states that 
Nietzsche attacks the idea of the moment being opposed to the rest of time or to the 
continuous flux or extension (duration). (ibid.) The term ―in every moment‖ is not to 
be viewed as the flux of time as duration. She again raises the question ―what is the 
relation of the moment to the ―in every moment‖? ... The moment and the ―in every 
moment‖ seem to be incompatible. If the moment is a unique state, then the ―in every 
moment‖ lies outside that state as the endless flux of time which cannot be contracted 
into the moment along with it and to annihilate its standing by forcing it to flow on.‖ 
(Stambaugh 1972: 25) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
overcoming homelessness or nihilism with the death of God, and it is also argued in this thesis to 
involve an encounter with the non-spatial, objective reality that is eternity, as the ―heavenly.‖ 
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However, she maintains that Nietzsche rather set the phrase ―in every moment‖ 
against duration, that the term ―in every moment‖ does not imply the flux as duration. 
This is the Eternal Return of the Same in its nihilistic form. She then claims ―if 
something were attained in every moment and if the individual were to experience this 
as his own being, he could triumphantly affirm all existence in every moment.‖ (ibid.) 
In this way the phrase ―in every moment‖ emphasizes the absolute lack of any kind of 
duration in the universe. She then references a passage from Nietzsche‘s Nachlass: 
 
But then it [the individual] discovers that it is itself something changing 
and has a changing taste. It discovers in its freedom the mystery that there 
is no individual, that in the smallest moment it is something other than in 
the next moment...the infinitely small moment is the higher reality and truth 
is the lightning flash out of the eternal flux. (Nachlass, XII: 45, cited in this 
form in Stambaugh 1972: 25) 
 
She later in the same work extrapolates the relation between the phrase ―in every 
moment‖ and ―The Moment‖:  
 
The Moment is not an isolated instant somehow lifted out of the chain of 
temporal succession. The question of how the moment is related to the rest 
of time is a spurious one. Only what is extended also in the sense of 
enduring and remaining, can be ―related‖ as one thing is to another. The 
moment does not relate to the rest of time, because the rest of time never is 
in the sense of persistence. The moment ―relates‖ to every moment in such 
a way that one moment is every moment...something can be attained at 
every moment—and always the Same. (Stambaugh 1972: 107-108) 
 
 
In this way there is no distinction between the phrase ―in every moment‖ and the 
moment; and it is for this reason that eternity and time do not stand in opposition to 
one another, and the phrase ―in every moment‖ is not to be looked at as duration. 
Nietzsche‘s concept of eternity does not present itself as something that stands in 
opposition to time, but rather as a dimension of time itself: the ground is removed for 
such an opposition, and ―eternity brightens at noon‖. (Stambaugh 1987: 184) 
Stambaugh again notes the passage from The Will to Power (§55) where Nietzsche 
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overturns the nihilistic consideration of eternal return: ―Can we remove the idea of a 
goal from the process and then affirm the process in spite of this?—This would be the 
case if something were attained at every moment within this process—and always the 
same.‖138 (Stambaugh 1972: 108) This notion that something is attained in every 
moment relates to Nietzsche‘s notion of God:  
 
The dichotomy between ―one‖ and ―every‖ disappears because it is 
precisely the ―no end‖ quality of one moment which allows every moment 
to arise and allows the world to be ―the attained release of God in every 
moment.‖ (BT, ‗Attempt at Self-Criticism,‘ §5, cited in this form in 
Stambaugh 1972: 114)  
 
Thus Nietzsche can speak of the ―absolute instantaneity of the Will to Power‖ 
(Nachlass, XII: 62, cited in this form in Stambaugh 1972: 114) and can say that 
―every power draws its ultimate consequences in every moment.‖ (WP: §634, cited in 
this form in Stambaugh 1972: 114) 
 
In the same work, Stambaugh explores this idea of the ―circle‖ as the highest form of 
affirmation, and relates it to the eternal return as the ring of rings, and in turn to 
Nietzsche‘s idea of God. It is in the phenomenon of power that the non-moral 
affirmation of ―God‖ is to be found: ―The only possibility of maintaining a meaning 
for the concept ―God‖ would be: God not as driving force, but God as maximal state, 
as an epoch.‖ (WP: §639)  Stambaugh notes that with the word ―epoch‖ Nietzsche 
defines power as a ―holding to itself,‖ a ―checking itself.‖ (Stambaugh 1972: 100) 
This checking is not related to any kind of external hindrance blocking the Will to 
Power. It is a self-checking, a self-ruling. It is in this way that God is not to be thought 
of as initiator of the world or as its driving force, but rather God as the maximal state 
                                                          
138
 See also Stambaugh‘s later work The Problem of Time in Nietzsche, Op.cit., p.184. 
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or, as expressed in another passage, as the moment of culmination. Stambaugh 
contends that for Nietzsche ―God‖ as moment of culmination implies that existence is 
an eternal becoming and disappearance of the godlike: ――God‖ as the moment of 
culmination: existence an eternal deifying and un-deifying. But in that not a high 
point of value, but a high point of power.‖ (WP: §712, cited in this form in Stambaugh 
1972: 100) She also notes the passage from The Will to Power (§1037) where 
Nietzsche mentions that the world ―follows‖ from God. (Stambaugh 1972: 100) She 
then argues that he characterizes the word ―follows‖ as ―around‖: ―Around the hero 
everything becomes tragedy, around the demi-god everything becomes satyr-play; and 
around God everything becomes—what? perhaps ‗world‘?‖ (BGE: §150, cited in this 
form in Stambaugh 1972: 100) This passage suggests the image of a centre of power 
from which the world radiates. It seeks to describe the ―ring of rings‖ in its aspect of 
power and what follows from that power. (Stambaugh 1972: 100) It is also 
reminiscent of the ―wheel rolling out itself‖ (Z, III: ‗The Convalescent‘), and the ring 
that is referred to as the blend-mug.
139
 (Z, III: ‗The Seven Seals‘) 
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Alan White in his work Within Nietzsche‘s Labyrinth examines what the ring means for Nietzsche. In 
the ―Seven Seals‖ this ring is described as the ―wedding ring of rings,‖ it is a ring of ―high time,‖ and at 
the end of each of the seals Zarathustra proclaims: ―Oh, how should I not lust after eternity and after the 
nuptial ring of rings, the ring of recurrence?‖ (Z, III: §16) This idea of ―high time,‖ like the ring, is 
closely linked with the doctrine of return. White notes that ―long before Zarathustra confronts the 
thought of the return, he knows that it is ―high time‖ (Z, II: §18; Z, III: §3) for him to do so.‖ (White, 
A., Within Nietzsche‘s Labyrinth, London, Routledge, 1990, p.98) At his ―highest time,‖ Zarathustra 
affirms the ―ring of return‖ as the ring that binds future to past, joy to pain and even noble to base. 
White makes a reference to the fourth of the Seven Seals, entitled ―Of the Ring of Rings‖ in Nietzsche‘s 
fair copy of the manuscript, which clearly reveals that the function of the ―ring of rings‖ is the 
conjoining of opposites. In the fourth seal, Nietzsche praises the whole or the One, with all its 
conflicting and contradictory parts, with reference to the ―blend mug in which all things are well 
blended.‖ (Z, III: §16.4) White explains that the ring of return praised in ―The Seven Seals,‖ is not a 
ring that rolls; as understood by the dwarf and by Zarathustra‘s animals, it is not a ring that rolls, it is 
not a ring of repetition, but rather of unification. White acknowledges that the idea of ―eternal return,‖ 
has been interpreted as ―hypothesis, as perspective, and as challenge,‖ and as ―endless sequential 
repetition;‖ (White, A., Op. cit., p.69) however, he also wishes to consider another sense of ―eternal 
return‖ (ibid., p.70) that of the ring of return that severs Zarathustra‘s ―deep, deep, eternity‖ from any 
state of mindless oblivion or repetition. 
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Stambaugh maintains that in spite of Nietzsche‘s denial that there is a causal ground 
to the world, affirmation is possible; something is attained in that process in every 
moment, and it is always the Same. She explains that the attainment of the Same in 
every moment is what he calls a God beyond good and evil. (Stambaugh 1972: 101) 
This link between power and God relates to what Nietzsche calls his kind of 
pantheism:  
 
Nietzsche‘s pantheism does not say ―God is everywhere‖ or ―God is 
everything‖; rather, it emphasizes that God is in every moment. This is a 
―temporal‖ determination of God, or power, temporal not in the sense of 
making God finite but as a way of thinking that is not spatial.‖ (ibid.) 
 
This way of thinking that is not spatial is what Nietzsche refers to as thought, which is 
to be distinguished from factual thinking.
140
 Eternal return is to be regarded as a 
thought, not as a fact: ―The fundamental meaning of the word ―thought‖ here is not 
that of an idea about something existent. ―Thought‖ points to the possibility of 
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Stambaugh mentions that the Will to Power relates to the ―what‖ of the world or the ―last facts‖ at 
which we can arrive. The will to power is the givenness of the world, in the sense of what is there, than 
to its essence, or what is there. She also states that ―If the Will to Power is in any sense the ―what‖ of 
the world, it is the ―what‖ in that it is the last fact at which we can arrive.‖ (Stambaugh, Op.cit., p.101 
quoting Nachlass Krӧner ed., vol. 83, p.288) This consideration of the will to power relating to the 
what of the world reveals that Stambaugh was influenced by Heidegger, and his account of the will to 
power in his work ‗Nietzsche vol. III‘ (Heidegger, N., Nietzsche III, J. Stambaugh D.F., Krell & F.A., 
Capuzzi (trans.), New York, Harper One, 1991) Stambaugh actually notes Heidegger‘s interpretation of 
Nietzsche as ―the last thinker of Western Metaphysics‖ in terms of the essence/existence distinction 
(what/how distinction of the world) of traditional metaphysics. (Stambaugh, J., Op. cit., p.94) In spite 
of this consideration of the will to power, she also mentions that it is not simply a natural force: ―In its 
fully developed form it includes the ―higher‖ manifestations of consciousness. The living being does 
not strive for happiness; it strives for power, for the More in power. Joy is a symptom of power.‖ (ibid., 
p.81) Stambaugh is referring to passage (§688) of The Will to Power with regard to Nietzsche‘s notion 
of ―becoming more.‖ The higher manifestation of consciousness is not the mere conscious ego but 
insight that can glimpse Eternity. The More is the Eternal Return of the Same as God or Power. In this 
way it can be inferred that the higher type becomes god-like in his striving for Power, a power that it 
ultimately manifests itself in joy.  
 
In this thesis I am claiming that the will to power is a ―philosophical eros‖ in light of Alex Mc Intyre‘s 
work ‗The Sovereignty of Joy‘. It is an eros that attunes the higher self to reality; it brings one to the 
limit, which points to an Ultimate or a Beyond (God). It is being argued in a similar vein to Stambaugh 
that the self in its experience of eternal return is transformed through ―root awareness‖ or the most 
fundamental thought. (ibid., p.101) It is an experience of a dimension that is non-spatial, of objective 
reality or which is being argued in this thesis to be eternity.  
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transformation through root awareness.‖ (ibid.) Eternal return offers the possibility of 
a joyous affirmation of the ―Same‖ in the world. This ―same‖ is, according to 
Stambaugh, Nietzsche‘s experience of the Self: ―It is the meeting of ―my own return‖ 
with ―the ring of rings.‖‖(1972: 102) 
 
Who are you, my soul?... oh, heaven above me, ... when will you drink this 
strange soul—when, well of eternity! You serene, awesome abyss of 
midday! When will you drink my soul back into yourself? (Z, III: 
‗Midday‘, cited in this form in Stambaugh 1972: 102) 
 
This experience of the self negates time as succession; it involves the experience of 
timelessness. In two chapters of Zarathustra, ―Midday‖ and ―The Drunken Song,‖ 
Nietzsche describes Zarathustra‘s experience of ―no time.‖141 In both chapters the 
                                                          
141Nietzsche‘s experience of ―no time‖ does not imply a complete rejection of time as duration. 
Stambaugh mentions that Nietzsche doesn‘t deny duration, but only denies the eternal recurrence 
viewed in terms of duration, which is eternal return viewed in its nihilistic form. According to 
Stambaugh, this would involve an overly simplistic interpretation of Nietzsche‘s thought of eternal 
return: ―everything, including man, is born, lives its life, dies, and in some unfathomable way is reborn. 
Time moves in continuous cycles, bringing everything back again in repetition.‖ (Stambaugh, J., Op. 
cit., p.104-105) It is possible to argue that Nietzsche does not deny duration but that he contends that 
eternal return and duration should not be wrongfully conflated. Stambaugh then poses the question: 
―What would happen to the thought of eternal return if one took away this framework of time?‖ 
(Stambaugh, J., Op. cit., p.105) This framework of time (duration), if it were removed, ―Recurrence,‖ 
or return, would take place in an instant, in every instant‖ (ibid.)  
 
It seems that Stambaugh is arguing that time as duration is necessarily experienced by man throughout 
his life from birth to death, but that ―momentarily‖ man experiences eternal return as ―no time‖ or 
timelessness. Her point may require further extrapolation, which is as follows: this experience only has 
meaning because of the experience of time as duration. There are, for Nietzsche rather different 
dimensions of time, and when it comes to experiencing the eternal return, time as duration is negated. 
Time as duration, as the flux is no longer experienced by man, in glimpsing Eternity as the Eternal 
Return of the Same. It is only in this sense that time as duration is rejected, as the source of truth. 
Stambaugh does not use the term ―negate‖ but rather states in another of her works entitled ‗The 
Problem of Time in Nietzsche‘ that ―the structure of time changes...‖ (Stambaugh, J., Op. cit., p.183) 
Stambaugh claims that The Moment that is experienced is not to be viewed as existing ―outside‖ time 
as duration, as the term ―outside‖ is a spatial category. The Eternal Return of the Same Moment is 
rather a different structure of time from time as duration. For Stambaugh‘s argument that the moment 
does not arise out of the flux, or exists alongside the flux (simultaneously) see her other work entitled 
‗The Problem of Time in Nietzsche‘ (ibid.,p.184) It is only those who self-overcome go on to 
experience this kind of time. In The Will to Power, Nietzsche mentions that ―The Kingdom of Heaven 
is a condition of the heart...it is... something that comes at every moment and at every moment has not 
yet arrived—‖ (WP: §161) It may come at every moment but may not be experienced as The Moment 
until a certain point in one‘s life. For Stambaugh, Nietzsche‘s experience of eternal return or of ―no 
time‖ involves ―fragmentary, momentary insights‖; it is the ―stroke of lightning.‖ She then refers to a 
passage from his Nachlass:  
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―well of eternity‖ is referred to, which relates to an experience of ―eternity‖ that has 
nothing to do with endless persistence in some transcendent realm. Nietzsche uses the 
metaphor of the well to express what he means by eternity; it is used to convey the 
purely vertical experience of vertigo when released from horizontal or successive 
time. Both ―midday‖ and ―midnight‖ are the ―same:‖ ―Midday emphasizes the 
blinding flash of lightning striking consciousness; midnight emphasizes the dark, deep 
well reabsorbing consciousness.‖ (Stambaugh 1972: 106) Eternity as the ring of rings 
has no teleology in the mechanistic sense. It is not causally or mechanistically 
determined, it rather circles back into itself; its whole being is return. (Stambaugh 
1972: 107) It is for this reason there is no ―God‖ as substance in the Christian sense. 
There is God only as the highest power from which follows the world. Eternity, for 
Nietzsche is not static persistence, but rather sheer activity:  
Nietzsche was able to glimpse eternity as sheer occurrence, not as static 
persistence. Eternity is eternal return of the Same. The Same is not a thing or 
a person recurring in endless cycles of absolute time. The Same is return. 
Return can ―occur‖ only in the moment. It can never be constituted by 
durational cycles, for these cycles never meet, never produce a return; they 
are only endless, meaningless recurrence.
142
(ibid.) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
You think you have a long rest until rebirth—but do not fool yourselves! 
Between the last moment of consciousness and the first appearance of new 
life lies ―no time‖—it passes by like a stroke of lightning, even if living 
creatures measure it in terms of billions of years or could not measure it at 
all. Timelessness and succession are compatible as soon as the intellect is 
gone. (Stambaugh, p.106 citing Nietzsche, Nachlass (Krӧner ed.), vol. 83, 
no.1341) 
 
The disappearance of the intellect occurs in such chapters as ―At Noon‖ and ―The Drunken Song.‖ (Z, 
IV, At Noon; Z, IV: ‗The Drunken Song‘) She makes reference to the Nachlass where Nietzsche 
speaks of the experience of the Same by the Self, and states that it involves the pledge of one‘s own 
return to ―the ring of rings‖, and a release into the enigma of Dionysus. (Stambaugh, p.106 quoting 
Nietzsche, Nachlass, XVI: 315) She notes that this release into the enigma is not an intellectual 
disposition. In being released (in the sense of solvere) into the enigma of Dionysus one is pledging 
oneself to the ring of rings through pledging one‘s return not to ―the world of endlessly repeated cycles, 
but into the abyss of ―eternity,‖ which is the ring of rings. (Stambaugh, J., Op. cit., p.107) In her The 
Problem of Time in Nietzsche she states that he who does not believe in the ―doctrine,‖ ―has a fleeting 
life in consciousness. He experiences ―time‖ as the flux of becoming. (Stambaugh, J., Op.cit., p.184) 
 
142
This relates to Stambaugh‘s earlier argument that the relation between the phrase “in every moment‖ 
(WP: §55) and The moment is a spurious one in ‗Nietzsche Thought of Eternal Return.‘ It relates to the 
notion that God as the highest power is in every moment. (Stambaugh, J., Op. cit., p.107/114) It is also 
relates to the instantaneity of the moment, which is one of the characteristics of time. (ibid., p.11. The 
vertical notion of eternity is a spatial concept; however, eternity itself is non-spatial, for Nietzsche. As 
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In the passage from Zarathustra cited above from ―Midday‖ or ―At Noon‖, there is 
reference to the experience of falling into the well of eternity, a metaphor for the 
vertical nature of time, which is to encounter the heavenly. Zarathustra speaks to the 
strange soul who sighs, ―O heaven over me!‖ It is the strange soul that drinks of the 
well of eternity; Zarathustra asks of the heavenly ―when will you drink this drop of 
dew which has fallen upon all earthly things?‖ or ―When will you drink my soul back 
into yourself?‖ (Z, IV: ‗At Noon‘) The earthly like the worldly is an expression of 
God, the world or earth radiates from the ―Supreme Power.‖ (WP: §1037) The 
experience of being released into the well of eternity is an un-worldly experience; it is 
an experience of the heavenly (eternity) on earth or in this life. The experience of the 
non-spatial can be argued to be comparable to Christ‘s experience of the ―feeling of 
eternity‖ (AC: §34) an experience Nietzsche declares that presupposes a distinction 
between Christ and Christianity. For Nietzsche, objective reality is not spatial or to be 
viewed as external reality; therefore the experience of the objective must be through 
the subjective or is within you. This is comparable to what Christ means by the 
Kingdom of God (eternity/objective) that is within you. (AC: §33-34) This is not to 
deny objective reality but to contend that it is not to be wrongfully conflated with 
space or what is humanly perceived as external reality. 
 
Nietzsche‘s idea of God as Eternity that is in every moment relates to the idea of God 
as the Ultimate.
143
 Eternity as the Ultimate is a kind of ―absolute‖ in terms of being 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Stambaugh explains that the spatial concept of the vertex is used only to show that Nietzsche has 
strayed from traditional (horizontal) time. (ibid.) 
 
143Nietzsche‘s notion of God as Eternity that is in every moment does not imply that God is reducible to 
time. Stambaugh maintains that Eternity is irreducible to time. She notes that Nietzsche did not uphold 
the traditional distinction between eternity and time; however, this does not mean that he simply 
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―released‖ from the world. However, Nietzsche‘s consideration of the absolute as 
temporal implies that it must be distinguished from traditional conceptions of the 
absolute. There is a parallel between Nietzsche‘s Ultimate as God and Anselm‘s God 
as Beyond.
144
 Stambaugh also notes this similarity in her work Nietzsche‘s Thought of 
Eternal Return: ―Transferring the general formulation of Anselm‘s argument to the 
setting of Nietzsche‘s thought, that beyond which it is impossible to go (an expression 
of the highest transcendence) might become that after which nothing more can come: 
the Ultimate.‖ (Stambaugh 1972: 124) She then examines these two phrases: ―unable 
to go beyond‖ and ―nothing more can come‖, and the way in which they differ. She 
looks at the second phrase firstly: ―First of all, the second phrase lacks an explicit 
emphasis on thought. This is in keeping with Nietzsche‘s rejection of the cogito (and 
thus indirectly of Anselm‘s quo maius cogitari nihil possit) and his avoidance of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
equated them. The strict ―immanence‖ of Nietzsche‘s thought does not reduce eternity to the level of 
time. (ibid., p.5)  
 
144
Anselm in The Proslogion II outlines an argument for the existence of God as ―something-than-
which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought.‖ For an outline of the argument see Brecher, R., Anselm‘s 
argument: The Logic of Divine Existence, Vermont, Gower Publishing Company, 1985, p.36. 
Descartes‘ formulation of the argument is known to be an ontological one. Kant criticizes the argument 
for being ontological in the sense that it conforms to a subjective idealism (God as concept exists in the 
mind therefore God exists in reality), and also argues that existence cannot be a predicate, where the 
predicate ―perfect‖ is assigned to God or existence. Existence, like ―Being‖ (God) is not a thing which 
has a predicate. Existence is not a property; it is rather a metaphysically necessary condition for the 
instantiation of any properties. Anscombe (a student of Wittgenstein) reformulates the argument (anti-
cartesian) and argues that for Anselm, God is Being and not a mental representation. For a discussion 
of Anscombe on Anselm see Hopkins, J., A New, Interpretative Translation of St. Anselm‘s 
Monologion and Proslogion, Minneapolis, The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1986. There is in this way a 
similarity between Kant, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein on Being as God.  
 
Stambaugh also sums up Anselm‘s argument in her ‗Nietzsche‘s Thought of Eternal Return‘ as follows:  
 
Anselm, for instance, defined God as that than which nothing greater can 
be thought. In contrast to Descartes, who subsequently turned Anselm‘s 
―than which nothing greater can be thought‖ into the highest being, 
Anselm preserved the element of an absolute transcendence of God. 
Whereas for Descartes God is the highest being reached by thought, for 
Anselm God is always still beyond thought, no matter how far thought 
transcends the world. One could formulate Anselm‘s idea in a more 
general fashion and say that God is that which thought cannot go beyond, 
which implies also that thought cannot actually attain God, for what has 
been attained is at the same time in a certain sense transcended. 
(Stambaugh, J., Op. cit., p.123-124)  
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later development of that cogito as transcendental reflection.‖ (ibid.) Secondly, the 
first phrase ―unable to go beyond‖ (in thought) becomes: ―nothing more can come.‖ 
For Stambaugh, ―The first phrase expresses the absolute limit of transcendence. The 
second phrase expresses the absolute ending of occurrence.‖ 145 (ibid.) She explains 
that the shift from the first to the second phrase represents the difference between the 
transcending movement of thought (going beyond finite things) and the ending 
movement of time as sheer occurrence, which encompasses possibilities of thought 
and ―being.‖(ibid.) She then explains the difference between transcending and ending: 
―Transcendence ―climbs over‖ things, leaving them behind in order to approach 
something which it can no longer transcend. Standing on the foundation of 
transcended finite things, thought stops short before an absolute limit which it cannot 
transcend.‖ (ibid.) Transcendence shows the inadequacy of human thinking or mere 
conscious thinking in the face of an absolute. There is only a certain type of 
awareness and insight that can glimpse the absolute and that is philosophical 
transcending thinking. It is in this way that philosophical transcending thinking is 
opposed to intellectual thinking, which knows ―beings‖ or things; the former kind of 
thinking is the most fundamental, and in turn, it allows the Ultimate to reveal itself. 
 
Stambaugh then explains what is meant by ending, and the way in which it is opposed 
to transcendence; ending ―is the self-release of the moment. It is not an end or a limit 
which must be transcended. An end or a limit closes something off, sets its 
boundaries...ending as the self-release of the moment neither closes something off nor 
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Stambaugh explains what is meant by eternity as the absolute ending of occurrence (ibid., p125) 
Eternity is that in which occurrence ends. Occurrence or time ending into eternity implies that nothing 
is ―left over‖, which necessitates further occurrence or repetition. (ibid.) At a human level, one is 
constantly repeating actions or events, whereas with eternity there is no repetition or re-occurrence at 
this level. In this way ―in eternity a finality is attained which we normally associate with the past...The 
condition of that finality is the absence of something...Eternity, however, can never be past, because it 
is never ―in time.‖ Eternity preserves this element of finality in presence.‖(ibid.) 
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leaves anything behind, but rather allows things to be.‖ (ibid.) It relates to the 
instantaneity of time, there is a constant release of the moment or ending into eternity. 
Things can only be the product of such activity: ―Only the self-release of the moment 
makes the unobstructed being of things possible.‖ (Stambaugh 1972: 125) It is 
because eternity is the absolute ending of occurrence, that there is a finality attained in 
it, which is ―a finality in presence.‖ (ibid.) Eternity is not some changeless static 
absolute having nothing to do with time or occurrence; it is ―changeless‖ only in the 
sense that what is attained can never be lost, because nothing can come after it. (ibid.) 
Eternity is neither ―in time‖ nor out of time in the sense of being the changeless 
absolute that excludes it. Eternity is not the changeless absolute, but rather the 
absolving (ab-solvere) of time. (Stambaugh 1972: 126) She explains that time as the 
instantaneous again and again of the moment ends into eternity; it is in this way that 
eternity is the absolving of time. Eternity is not the instantaneous again and again of 
the moment, it is rather the ―absolved never again.‖ (ibid.) She also mentions that 
―eternity is not the ‗goal‘ of time in the sense that it could be attained by a directed 
process. Instantaneous time lacks the continuity to build up such a cumulative 
process. It does not accumulate processually. It culminates into the extreme ultimate.‖ 
(ibid.) This culmination into the extreme ultimate
146
 is what is referred to as ―God.‖  
 
                                                          
146Stambaugh earlier in her work ‗Nietzsche‘s Thought of Eternal Return‘ criticizes eternity as the 
general whole. She ascertains that God as Power is a ―More‖, and as a growing tension (the true whole) 
differs from endless Becoming, that which endures or persists. The extreme ultimate is not to be 
confused with the old absolute. She contends that ―Power as More is not a universal, general whole 
which subsumes and includes the sum of manifold things in the world.‖ (ibid., p.20) According to 
Stambaugh, if it was the case that Power was a universal generic present at all times, it would make, for 
Nietzsche existence into a monstrosity. (ibid.) It would also imply that time would not have a reality of 
its own, and time and eternity would be mutually exclusive of one another. (ibid.) This however is not 
the case: ―The ―absolute‖ quality of eternity is not an unapproachable freedom (absolute); it is rather a 
freeing (ab-solvere). (ibid.) Stambaugh also claims that in opposition to the traditional absolute, 
eternity can have no relation to extension or space. (ibid.) 
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The eternal return is not only expressed in The Gay Science (§341) and in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra but also in Beyond Good and Evil. In part three of Beyond Good and Evil 
entitled ‗What is religious‘, Nietzsche rather ambiguously suggests that eternal return 
could be God, ―circulus vitiosus deus‖ or the ring of eternal return. The passage that 
Nietzsche expresses the eternal return as ―circulus vitiosus deus‖ is as follows: 
 
Whoever has endeavoured with some enigmatic longing, as I have, to think 
pessimism through to its depths and to liberate it from the half-German 
narrowness and simplicity in which it has finally presented itself to our 
century, namely, in the form of Schopenhauer‘s philosophy; whoever has 
really, with an Asiatic and supra-Asiatic eye, looked into, down into the 
most world-denying of all possible ways of thinking—beyond good and 
evil and no longer, like Buddha and Schopenhauer, under the spell and 
delusion of morality—may just thereby, without really meaning to do so, 
have opened his eyes to the opposite ideal: the ideal of the most high-
spirited, alive and world-affirming human being who has not only come to 
terms and learned to get along with whatever was and is, but who wants to 
have what was and is repeated into all eternity, shouting insatiably da 
capo—not only to himself but to the whole play and spectacle, and not 
only to a spectacle but at bottom to him who needs precisely this 
spectacle—and who makes it necessary because again and again he needs 
himself—and makes himself necessary—What? And this wouldn‘t be—
circulus vitiosus deus? (BGE: §56) 
 
 
 
It is clear from this passage that Nietzsche embraces some sort of new ideal, a new 
one that is life-affirmative whereby one enters into an ideal relation with reality as 
eternal return of the same. This new ideal is identified with redemption, with one who 
has ―made his peace‖ with whatever was, and who ―makes himself necessary.‖ (BGE: 
§56) This ―ideal‖ is referred to as the ―opposite ideal‖; it is the attainable ideal. In 
spite of Nietzsche‘s many references where he rejects God, that is in the Christian and 
moral sense, the question does arise again from this passage, could Nietzsche be 
advocating a God? If so, it is only in the strict sense of God as the ring of eternal 
return. This is God in the pantheistic sense where God and world are one, that this is 
God as ―circulus vitiosus deus‖. The attainable ideal as amor fati, for Nietzsche is the 
experience of the glimpse into eternity.  
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Lampert in his work ―Nietzsche‘s Task‖ also comments on the passage from Beyond 
Good and Evil (§56), which shows the necessary connection between the will to 
power and eternal return. He states that Nietzsche in the same passage hints ―that it is 
a vindication of God to see the world from the inside as will to power and nothing 
else, he allows his new ideal
147
 to be glimpsed in a different way—appropriately 
enough in the chapter on religion‖. (Lampert 2001: 255) He stresses that for Nietzsche 
religious cruelty has sacrificed God for ―the stone, stupidity, gravity, fate, the 
nothing;‖ (Lampert 2001: 255 citing BGE: §55) and that, ―all of us already know 
something of this‖ cruelty of honest nihilism. (ibid.) Lampert also makes the very 
important point that for Nietzsche, the sacrifice of God and the culminating nihilism 
can be lived through:  
 
But the one who has thought it through to its depths ―may just thereby, 
without really meaning to do so, have opened his eyes‖ (56) on the ideal 
opposite to the old ideal of renunciation and sacrifice, the new ideal of the 
saint of eternal return who does not merely resign himself to ―whatever 
was and is‖ but shouts insatiably, ―Once more,‖ to the whole marvellous 
spectacle of which he himself is a part. (Lampert 2001: 255) 
 
He then notes that Nietzsche asserts a possible objection: ―What? And would this not 
be circulus vitiosus deus?‖, and in doing so, he introduces a playful ambiguity to his 
thought. He states that the above passage prompts the question: ―—Is the circle of 
eternal return a refutation or a vindication of God?‖ for Nietzsche. The ambiguity here 
is also stressed more intensely, according to Lampert ―in Nietzsche‘s first report of his 
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 This new ideal of glimpsing eternity as the most life-affirmative and earthly experience is argued by 
Lampert to be an interpretation of the world. Although Lampert looks at Nietzsche as a philosopher of 
Truth with a capital ‗T‘ that is of Becoming in his ‗Nietzsche‘s Task‘, he argues that the new ideal in 
Nietzsche is an interpretation of the world. There are also commentators like Sadler who argue to the 
contrary that there is a distinction for Nietzsche between tragic insight and a conscious perspective  that 
the latter belongs to Nietzsche‘s epistemology, that is conscious knowledge of things, and is ultimately 
a falsification of reality (GS: §354) 
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thought of eternal return, for there the one who hears the thought is either crushed by 
its demonic gravity or moved to say to the one who brings the thought: ―You are a 
god and never have I heard anything so divine‖ (GS 341)‖ (Lampert 2001: 255 citing 
GS: §341) In his essay ‗Nietzsche‘s Philosophy and True Religion‘ (2006), Lampert 
claims that this aphorism of Beyond Good and Evil (§56) echoes a previous one, 
aphorism (§37) in asking the question ―What? And this wouldn‘t be—circulus 
vitiosus deus?‖ Is the new deal just a vicious circle made god? This time we have to 
add ―On the contrary! On the contrary!‖ where the contrary is the virtuous circle, the 
circle of life, made god.‖ (Lampert 2006: 143)  He contends that for Nietzsche, new 
gods are necessary but ones that are strictly life-affirmative. The God of tradition, the 
supernatural God is to be seen as ―an all powerful tyrant who set the world under a 
curse, assigning it to the Prince of the world, the so-called Devil.‖ (2006: 139) This 
idea of a supernatural God rendered nature the devil‘s work, which Nietzsche wishes 
to overturn: ―what was once seen as the Devil‘s is vindicated as divine.‖ (2006: 140) 
He also asserts in making reference to ―Before Sunrise‖ of Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
that Nietzsche‘s idea of a new ideal that is life-affirmative includes the possibility of a 
new Good.  (2006: 137, 142) 
  
If eternal return is to be vindicated as a God then the release into God as ―circulus 
vitiosus deus‖ is a feeling of eternity on earth; it is eternity in the immanent sense. It 
is the higher self that reaches the heights, an eternity within Becoming which is 
reminiscent of Plato‘s vision of the Good, the Agathon.148 Both thinkers affirm a 
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Although Nietzsche and Plato embrace a reality higher than the human, they differ on the human 
being‘s most fundamental relation to that reality. For Nietzsche, it is rapture or vision; it involves the 
―Great Reason of the body‖ whereas, for Plato, it involves the mind. See also footnote no. 91 of chapter 
II where it is mentioned that Nietzsche wishes to overturn the ocular-centrism of the metaphysical 
tradition. It must also be mentioned that Nietzsche‘s association of the pursuit of Truth with the 
mountain climb is not entirely similar to Plato‘s. Although both Plato‘s and Nietzsche‘s philosophers 
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reality higher than the human, the realm of Being for Plato, and Becoming for 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche embraces a new ideal, a life-affirmative one, of amor fati, which 
is ―this-worldly‖, as it affirms an ―Eternity‖ that is within Becoming. The only type of 
ideal Nietzsche embraces is one that is attainable such an attainable ideal Nietzsche 
recognizes in Plato in the first stage of ‗How the ‗True World‘ finally became a fable‘. 
This is a stage where Plato‘s philosophy is not yet anything Platonic or Christian, in 
the sense of an ethic that is life-denying. Being, for Plato (not Platonism), and 
Becoming for Nietzsche, is not a ―Beyond‖ in the sense that knowledge of it is an 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
descend to man, the earth after experiencing knowledge of the highest things, it must however be noted 
that there is a distinction between Plato and Zarathustra‘s cave. This distinction has been overlooked by 
McIntyre. See footnote no. 65 of chapter II where there is an outline of Alex Mc Intyre‘s discussion of 
the ―descent of creation‖ in Nietzsche or the philosopher‘s return to man after his ascent to the vision of 
the Good. Plato‘s philosopher‘s descent to man involves a return to the cave, which represents earth, 
whereas Nietzsche‘s philosopher‘s descent is from the cave to man. Plato‘s cave is a place of complete 
darkness, whereas Nietzsche‘s cave is high in the mountains, full of light and clarity; it is a place of 
enlightenment, and self-reflection. The cave for Nietzsche is on top of a mountain, a metaphor for the 
climb or the struggle of overcoming, and is the site of solitude, and wisdom. However, for Plato the 
cave is a place where all men reside, it is not a place of solitude. This solitude involves intense self-
examination, or self-reflection that in turn leads to self-redemption. The cave for Nietzsche, is ‗inward‘, 
it is a ―labyrinth of the heart.‖ (Schopenhauer as Educator: §3) Nietzsche unlike Plato emphasizes the 
role isolation plays in encountering the highest things. He proclaims that Zarathustra ―...left his home 
and the lake of his home and went into the mountains. Here he enjoyed his spirit and his solitude, and 
for ten years did not tire of it.... ―For ten years you have climbed to my cave...‖ (Z, Prologue: §1) 
Nietzsche refers to the mountain climber as ―The wanderer‖ (Z, III: §1) as the person who descends 
into his own pain, the highest climb involves the deepest pain: ―To you I must now go down! Before 
my highest mountain I stand and before my longest wondering; to that end I must first go down deeper 
than I ever descended—deeper into pain than ever I descended, down into its blackest flood. Thus my 
destiny wants it. Well, I am ready.‖ (ibid.) Then there comes the day that Zarathustra decides to 
descend to man, and in overflowing with wisdom he desires to give men a gift. ――For that I must 
descend to the depths...I must go under—go down, as is said by man, to whom I want to 
descend...Bless the cup that wants to overflow, that the water may flow from it golden and carry 
everywhere the reflections of your delight....―I love man.‖...I bring men a gift.‖ (Z, Prologue: §1-2) 
Zarathustra wishes that man experience the joy that he feels and he professes his wisdom to a select 
few, those who will listen, whereas Plato‘s Philosopher (Socrates) persuades all to leave the cave. Each 
time Zarathustra returns to his cave, the growth of his wisdom causes him pain, and he decides to 
descend again. ―Then Zarathustra returned again to the mountains and to the solitude of his cave and 
withdrew from men...But his soul grew full of impatience and desire for those whom he loved, because 
he still had much to give them...Thus months and years passed for the solitary; but his wisdom grew 
and caused him pain with its fullness.‖ (Z, II: ‗The Child with Mirror‘)  
 
To encounter truth as an experience of the deepest joy does not occur on the mountain but rather when 
the self returns home to itself. (Z, III: ‗The Wanderer‘) The mountain climb represents the struggle on 
the way to Truth; one must make the transition to the way of greatness in order to encounter Truth. 
Nietzsche‘s cave is to be contrasted with the cave of Christ‘s resurrection that is upheld by Christian 
dogma, where the soul is viewed in terms of atomism or substance, and resurrection is viewed in literal 
terms. The cave of Nietzsche‘s philosopher is the site of resurrection as rebirth (GS, Preface: §3-4), a 
second innocence, to be born a new after illness. It enables the philosopher to experience amor fati; it 
enables the soul to enter into the Ultimate or God as Eternal Return of the Same.  
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unattainable ideal. This comparison between Nietzsche and Plato can only be properly 
understood when one takes into account the distinction between Plato and Platonism. 
Nietzsche is similar to Plato on the question of Being as reality, but radically different 
from Platonism (Kantian and Christian) conception of the ―true world‖ which is 
divorced from us as human beings through the moral ascetic ideal. This distinction 
can be noted in relation to the first stage of ‗How the ‗True World‘ Finally Became a 
Fable: the history of an Error.‘ (TI: §4) In the first stage, the ―true world‖ is not yet 
anything ―Platonic,‖ that is, not something unattainable (moral ascetic ideal). The true 
world here does not relate to the Christian or Kantian ethic of reward, of happiness as 
an unattainable ideal in a ―beyond‖ (Platonism), which is life-denying. It seems that 
the fact that the ―true world‖ is unattainable is what renders it a ―beyond.‖ It can be 
argued that Plato‘s Being is to be distinguished from Platonism that he saw that Plato 
embraces some sort of wisdom that is attainable that does not relate to a ―beyond‖. In 
relation to the first stage of ‗How the ‗True World‘ finally became a fable‘, Nietzsche 
adds the following commentary in parentheses:  
 
The true world—attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he 
lives in it, he is it. (The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, 
and persuasive. A circumlocution for the sentence, ―I. Plato, am the 
truth.‖).  
 
 
For both thinkers, knowledge of reality can be attained through insight, therefore it is 
attainable on earth. It is in this way that Nietzsche is an advocate of the immanence of 
eternity; it can be felt by man in this life. The extent to which the philosophical type 
ascends to reality is determined by the extent to which this type withdraws from 
―worldly‖ opinions, engaging in a reality of mere things. This withdrawal is therefore 
other-worldly only in this sense. Zarathustra‘s pursuit of truth implies that he must 
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embrace solitude and turn his back on the ―way of the world.‖ (Z, I: ‗On the Flies of 
the Marketplace‘) This way is the way of actors, of mere opinions or shadows. 
(Zuckert 1985: 23) 
 
  
Nietzsche‘s Zarathustra experiences the deepest joy after ascending to or encountering 
the innocence of all Becoming, he reaches ―the way to greatness‖ (Z, III: ‗The 
Wanderer‘) and wishes to descend to the earth, to man in order to impart his 
knowledge of the highest things, as he wishes for man to experience the joy he feels. It 
is in this way that the overman or the ―more than human‖ is the ―meaning of the earth‖ 
(Z, P: §3); he embodies life-affirmation and glimpses eternity on earth. It is ―this-
worldly‖ joy and not after-worldly joy that Nietzsche affirms, a joy experienced in this 
life is to be affirmed. In a passage entitled ‗On the After-worldly‘, Nietzsche rejects 
―the heavenly‖ in its relation to a joy that can never be attained, and asserts that an 
ascetic ideal (Kantian) that removes reality from us ―it is a world concealed from 
humans.‖ (Z, I: §3) However, in a passage entitled ―Before Sunrise‖, Nietzsche speaks 
of ―the heavenly‖ that can be accessed through dancing: ―O heaven over me, pure and 
high! ...you are to me a dance floor for divine accidents...‖ (Z, III: §4) Nietzsche also 
speaks of the ―heavenly need that constrains even accidents to dance star-dances...‖ (Z, 
III: ‗The Yes & Amen Song‘) What was once thought of as heavenly in the after-
worldly sense is to be reversed, as the ―heavenly‖ joy is now to be experienced as 
earthly. This dancing-joy that Nietzsche refers to is earthly joy, which coincides with 
taking a Dionysian attitude that is life-affirmative. This attitude in turn implies that 
Nietzsche‘s idea of the ―higher type‖ is loyal to the earth, as Zarathustra proclaims in 
the prologue ―remain faithful to the earth‖ (Z, P: §3). This loyalty to the earth also 
involves the earth becoming the sole source of value, and in turn enables the earth to 
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be raised to the highest level. For Nietzsche, it is in this way that dancing is the highest 
order of rank, and is also characteristic of what Nietzsche foresees as the New 
Dionysian Age to come. As Zarathustra proclaims that, it is the alpha and omega, ―that 
is that all that is heavy and grave should become light; all that is body, dancer; all that 
is spirit, bird—‖ (Z, III: §16) 
 
Nietzsche wishes to replace an old totality of ‗No-Saying‘ that of the Christian or 
Platonic conception of Being, the after-worldly with a new totality of ‗Yes-Saying‘, a 
Dionysian reality of Becoming. He also in turn wishes to replace Christian life-
denying or ‗No-saying‘ values with a mysticism that comprises of a Dionysian life-
affirmative philosophy. As Lampert (2001: 256) states that ―the songs of Zarathustra‘s 
soul will bring the return of the earthly religion of Dionysos, which celebrates the 
divinity of earthly things.‖, and that ―Through the philosopher Zarathustra, the religion 
of Dionysos triumphs over the vengeful religion of the Father Sky who wills that 
Mother Earth be other than she is...‖ The teaching of eternal return is the focal point of 
the new ―faith and love‖ which comprises of love of life and loyalty to the earth and 
takes ―overcoming‖ as the new measure of all things. (Lampert 2001: 257 citing Z, I: 
‗On the Thousand and One Goals‘)  
 
Nietzsche is an apocalyptic foreseer of the emergence of the few who address the 
―truly great problems and question marks‖ (GS: §373), who can encounter reality as it 
is, and experience the fullness of time as the ‗untimely‘. For Nietzsche, to experience 
the fullness of time is to experience redemption; it is reconciliation with one‘s past 
moments and a learning to affirm what was formerly negated. To experience the 
fullness of time is to experience a higher justice; it is an experience of the heart, 
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whereby all events flow into one another and form part of the ―One‖. (Z, II: ‗On 
Redemption‘) It is the experience of encountering God as Eternal Return of the Same 
and experiencing the redemptive nature of the ‗untimely.‘ Nietzsche as a visionary of 
the noon period communicates the apocalyptic message that the world is entering into 
the fullness of time, that the Noon or ―Epoch‖ period is imminent, the world 
―culminates into God‖ (WP: §712), or what he refers to as god or the maximal state of 
the universe, an epoch in its evolution (WP: §639). This Noon period also refers to the 
radical idea of a new Dionysian existence or the Zarathustra kingdom of a thousand 
years. (Z, IV: §1) In From High Mountains Nietzsche employs the apocalyptic style 
and in doing so he refers to the noon in relation to the words ―wedding‖ and ―feast‖. 
This is reminiscent of Christ‘s parable of the Wedding Feast (Matthew 22), which is a 
symbol of the millennial kingdom of a thousand years: 
 
O noon of life! Our second youthful state! 
O Summer garden! 
Restlessly happy and expectant, standing,… 
 
This song is over—longing‘s dulcet cry 
Died in my mouth: 
A wizard did it, friend in time of drought, 
The friend of noon—no, do not ask me who— 
At noon it was that one turned into two— 
 
Sure of our victory we celebrate 
The feast of feasts: 
Friend Zarathustra came, the guests of guests! 
The world now laughs, rent are the drapes of fright, 
The wedding is at hand of dark and light— 
                                                                             
                                                                                                      (BGE: ‗From High Mountains: After-song‘) 
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III 
Metaphysical Homelessness & The Return Home to the True Self 
 
In this section there is an outline of Nietzsche‘s notion of the homecoming or the 
―return home‖ of the self to itself in ―the widest circle‖, as Becoming (Z, III: ‗On Old 
& New Tablets‘: §19). The section examines the homecoming experience of section 
III of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. It also includes an exploration of the notion of tragic 
insight in this later work, and that the reality to be affirmed, for Nietzsche is an 
―eternity‖ within Becoming. The homecoming is experienced by ―the wanderer‖, after 
his ―great longing‖; he is on his ―way to greatness,‖ whereby he enters into an oneness 
with the whole.  It involves the ―most comprehensive soul‖ (Z, III: ‗On Old & New 
Tablets‘: §19) glimpsing eternity in ―deep wells.‖ (Z, III: ―Before Sunrise‖) The main 
aim of this section is to maintain that, for Nietzsche there is a  reality (non-spatial), and 
that the higher self belongs to it. This homecoming experience as a glimpse into 
eternity implies that eternity and the world are one. This redemptive experience is 
expressed by Nietzsche in such passages as ―Before Sunrise‖ but climaxes in ―Yes & 
Amen‖ in the form of ―bird-wisdom‖. Eternity becomes one with the earth, and 
Nietzsche is a foreseer of the earth becoming divine. He refers to it as an apocalyptic 
event in ‗On Great Events‘ (Z, II: §18). He speaks of the Hour as ―the Stillest Hour‖ or 
―the Hour of Noon‖ in referring to the noon period of the coming of a redeemer, and 
the onset of a New Dionysian Age, which is comparable to the Biblical idea of ―The 
Second Coming‖ as the figure marking the initiation of the Millennial Kingdom:  
And in every ring of human existence, there is always an hour when the 
most powerful thought, the thought of the eternal return of all things, 
appears first to one, then to many, then to all—each time, it is the hour of 
noon for humanity.
149
 
                                                          
149
Small, R., notes this in his article ―Zarathustra‘s Four Ways: Structures of Becoming in Nietzsche‘s 
Thought‖ see footnote no.73 of the article where he cites this quote from KGW V/2, 396 Nietzsche, 
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In ―The Wanderer‖ passage of Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche mentions that the 
next stage on the path to redemption is the ―Way of Greatness.‖: ――Only now are you 
going your way to greatness! Peak and abyss—they are now joined together.‖ (Z, III: 
‗The Wanderer‘)  It is this next stage beyond the mountaintop that is to be undertaken 
by ―The Wanderer‖ or ―The Convalescent,‖ the person longing ―to return home.‖ For 
Nietzsche, what returns home is the self, and this occurs within the hour: ―What 
returns, what finally comes home to me, is my own self and what of myself has long 
been in strange lands and scattered among all things and accidents.‖ (Z, III: ‗The 
Wanderer‘) The self that belongs to the whole realizes the necessity of its existence in 
amor fati. It is the mountain climber that is the wanderer, he must overcome, which 
includes the coming of a ―destiny and experience.‖ (ibid) In wandering the self is 
scattered; however, ―in the end, one experiences only oneself.‖ (ibid) The return home 
to the self is to experience the necessity of one‘s existence and as a result to overcome 
a state of homelessness.
150
 It involves transcending a nihilistic existence of viewing the 
self as a mere accident, and in turn entering into union with Becoming. In The Gay 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Kristische Gesamtausgabe: Werke, G. Collli & M. Montinari (eds.), Berlin, De Gruyter, 1973. (Small, 
R., citing Nietzsche Op. cit., p.101) 
 
150Nietzsche‘s idea of the scattered self returning to itself and in turn entering into union with reality is 
similar to Gabriel Marcel‘s idea of recollection or secondary reflection. This experience involves for 
Nietzsche the ‗self‘ becoming one with Becoming, whereas for Marcel, the self is restored to or 
becomes one with Being. . Marcel claims that secondary reflection is to be contrasted with primary 
reflection, thinking that that involves engaging in empirical or scientific data or problem solving. He 
notes that the self becomes ‗lost‘ or scattered through primary reflection, and only it is only through 
secondary reflection that one can encounter a unity with Being. The self that encounters Being is not 
the self as object; for Marcel,  one is not a disincarnate observer of one‘s body, one is incarnation, as 
Nietzsche says in describing his experience of inspiration in Ecce Homo. (EH, ‗Z‘: §3) See Cain, S., 
Gabriel Marcel, London, Bowes & Bowes, 1963, p.88 for a discussion of Marcel on religion ―as an 
ontological ―participation‖, and entering in and opening-up to  reality, involving ―incarnation‖‖ and as 
the relation of the human being in his wholeness to ultimate or transcendent reality. In recollection, 
Marcel argues that the scattered self can be restored to itself in a personal unity with Being; it involves 
a withdrawal from ordinary experience. The clearest example of secondary reflection is contemplation, 
and is similar to Nietzsche‘s experience of amor fati where the self becomes one with  reality. See 
Keen, S., Gabriel Marcel, Virginia, John Knox Press, 1967, p.23 for a discussion of Marcel on 
contemplation. See Jaspers, K., Op.cit., p.283 and p.345 who notes Nietzsche‘s relation to matters of 
contemplation.  
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Science (§377) Nietzsche describes nihilism as a state of homelessness (―We who are 
homeless‖), a state that he refers to as ―The Seventh Solitude.‖ (GS: §285 & §309) 
This state of homelessness results from the death of God, and the loss of the old 
ascetic ideal. The wanderer must now undertake ―his loneliest walk‖ as the way of 
greatness in order to experience ―The Hour.‖ This experience is for one only, and 
could be argued to be the experience of the redeemer. Nietzsche foresees the coming 
of a redeemer who is ―victor‖ over the God of Christian morality and nihilism.  
 
Is this even possible today?—But some day, in a stronger age than 
this decaying, self-doubting present, he must yet come to us, the 
redeeming man of great love and contempt, the creative spirit whose 
compelling strength will not let him rest in any aloofness or any 
beyond, whose isolation is misunderstood by the people as if it were 
a flight from reality—while it is only his absorption, immersion, 
penetration into reality, so that, when he one day emerges again into 
the light, he may bring home the redemption of this reality: its 
redemption from the curse that the hitherto reigning ideal has laid 
upon it. This man of the future, who will redeem us not only from 
the hitherto reigning ideal but also from that which was bound to 
grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism; 
this bell-stroke of noon and of the great decision that liberates the 
will again and restores its goal to the earth and his hope to man; the 
Antichrist and antinihilist; this victor over God and nothingness—he 
must come one day.— (GM, II: §24) 
 
The redeemer is the person who encompasses a spiritual pathos which Nietzsche refers 
to as ―loving contempt‖;151 contempt for the all-too-human, and love for the highest 
things or reality. The will to power of the redeemer or the philosophical type is 
comparable to the philosophical eros referred to by Plato; it is a mania that turns the 
                                                          
 
151
 Nietzsche‘s idea of ―loving contempt‖ is best explored by Alex Mc Intyre in his work ‗The 
Sovereignty of Joy: Nietzsche‘s Vision of Grand Politics‘ chapter 4 entitled ‗Hierarchy and the 
Overman.‘ See chapter II of this thesis for an extrapolation of this chapter. For other references to 
―loving contempt‖ see in ‗On Virtue that Makes Small‘ (Z, III) where Zarathustra mentions ‗loving 
contempt‘ in opposition to the dictum ‗love thy neighbour.‘ In the Prologue, Zarathustra also mentions 
―the hour of the great contempt‖ after his descent into the cave from man: ――Verily a polluted stream is 
man. One must be a sea to be able to receive a polluted stream without becoming unclean. Behold, I 
teach you the overman: he is this sea; in him your great contempt can go under.‖ ( Z, Prologue: §3) The 
overman as the ‗more-than-human‘ is the meaning of the earth. He reaches the highest realm, and he 
imparts his insight into Becoming to man. He in this way becomes ―the meaning of the earth‖ (ibid.) 
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soul towards the beautiful, the realm of polity or of Becoming, for Nietzsche. .
152
It is 
in this way that Nietzsche views himself as a foreseer of ―great politics,‖ (EH, ‗Why I 
am a Destiny‘: 1) of the subordination of politics to polity, of the mere empirical as 
law and opinion to the realm of the supra-human, of Becoming or of culture.
153
 
 
In ―The Return Home‖ passage Nietzsche refers to ―home‖ as ―solitude,‖ a state that in 
no way relates to loneliness, but is rather a state of rapture: ―O solitude! O my home, 
solitude! Too long have I lived wildly in wild strange places not to return home to you 
in tears.‖ (Z, III: ‗The Return Home‘) This state of solitude is not just one of rapturous 
insight into reality but is also one of silence. In a rapturous state of life-affirmation, the 
higher self is surrounded by silence, a silence that ―draws deep breaths of clean air!‖ 
(Z, III: ‗The Return Home‘) It is the self that in its silence is removed from ―down 
there,‖ ―the marketplace‖ from the uncleanliness of the rabble. Nietzsche‘s association 
of redemption with cleanliness and a withdrawal from the market-place is reminiscent 
of Plato‘s idea that philosophy is purification of the soul. (Phaedo: 67c & Phaedrus: 
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See footnote no.45 of chapter II for a discussion of Alex Mc Intyre‘s distinction between politics and 
polity in Plato and Nietzsche. Mc Intyre also notes that it is in the Phaedrus that Plato tries to make 
Becoming coeternal with Being; therefore it is the Plato of this work that is comparable to Nietzsche. 
Although Mc Intyre draws a comparison between Nietzsche and Plato on the ‗descent of creation‘, that 
is the higher soul ascending to Being, he however goes on in chapter six of his work to emphasize 
Becoming as reality, for Nietzsche as opposed to Being.   
 
153Jaspers outlines what Nietzsche means by ―great politics‖ that it is embodied by the autonomous 
ones who have achieved self-mastery. They are not rulers over others but self-rulers. They experience 
both self-mastery and insight. ―The ―great politics‖ no longer expresses any will to rule, but its thinking 
purports to be that which does rule in the end.‖ (Jaspers, K., Op.cit., p.283) He goes on to extrapolate 
what Nietzsche means by ―grand politics‖ that it is linked to self-control and creativity: ―To Nietzsche, 
the creative philosophers are the mightiest of all, not as a result of any power over their contemporaries, 
but because of the way they control themselves and, through the consequences of their thinking, 
eventually move the world: ―The great moral natures arise as self-restrainers...during times of 
disintegration. They are governing natures (Heraclitus, Plato) in a transformed world where they only 
have to rule themselves.‖‖ (ibid.) Nietzsche‘s ―great politics‖ is not ―prompted by a feeling of humanity 
which accords to each man inalienable rights...he expressly rejects this notion and believes instead that 
the individual as such is the final source of all creation and, in its creativity, the sole manifestation of 
being that he can love and respect.‖ (ibid.) It is the individual who encounters reality that is to be 
respected.   
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243a)
154
 Both Nietzsche and Plato affirm a realm that is higher than the human, the 
highest realm, Being for Plato and Becoming or more specifically an ―eternity‖ within 
Becoming, for Nietzsche. This realm can only be experienced by the few, those who 
withdraw from ―the dirt of what is human, all too human‖ (BGE: §271), that is the 
realm of anthropomorphic truths, laws and opinions. This withdrawal is also a form of 
asceticism; it is a cleanliness that leads the soul higher (eros) towards Becoming.
155
 
This asceticism, for Nietzsche, takes the form of self-overcoming, discipline, and 
isolation. In this way, there is a connection for Nietzsche between cleanliness and the 
most joyous experience of entering into the highest realm in this life. He uses the 
metaphor of ―the well‖ to describe ―the highest spheres.‖ (Z, II: ‗On the Rabble‘) It is 
the pure person who drinks from the ―well of life,‖ to which life gives back, which is 
to be distinguished from the rabble‘s relation to the well.156 
 
 
                                                          
154
See Plato: Complete Works, Edited with an introduction and Notes by John M. Cooper, & D.S. 
Hutchinson, (Associate ed.), Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, 1997, p.58 for a reference to 
Plato on Philosophy as purification.  
 
155
Although it can be argued that both Plato and Nietzsche affirm a realm higher than the human, 
Nietzsche is to be distinguished from Platonism, an emphasis on another world (after-world). See 
Zuckert, C., Postmodern Platos, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p.25 where she mentions this 
distinction between Plato and Platonism or Plato‘s followers. She states that Nietzsche considers that 
―Plato understood the tremendously self-affirmative character of philosophic activity. In explaining 
―How the true world finally became a fable‖ in the Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche summarized the 
first stage: ―I, Plato am the truth.‖ Plato did not really teach the existence of another world; so much as 
he affirmed his own existence. ―The true world—attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he 
lives in it, he is it.‖ (Zuckert, ibid., p.25 citing TI, ‗How the ‗True World‘ Finally Became a Fable‘) 
Nietzsche‘s asceticism is to be distinguished from the asceticism of Christianity, Platonism or the 
Kantian moral ethic, a human anthropomorphic value that is not actually based upon insight into 
reality; it is the unattainable ideal as a reward in the afterlife.  Nietzsche affirms objective reality in the 
here and now, as he foresees the earth will encounter the eternal (eternity in the immanent sense).  
 
156
For Nietzsche, the pure person not only withdraws from the ―human, all-too-human‖, that of 
anthropomorphic laws and opinions, and removes himself from the herd; he also has a unique relation 
to the well of life or joy. Life is a fountain of pleasure and as a flowing it is inexhaustible. It is only the 
pure person, the person who wants nothing, that life as the well flows violently back at him with its 
purity. It is the person who asks for nothing that life gives back to, whereas the impure person (rabble) 
with his thirst for pleasure all that is reflected back to him is his own thirst. It is in this way that the 
well of life reflects back to you only yourself. What is received from the well of life depends upon who 
looks at it. 
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Life is a well of joy; but where the rabble drinks too, all wells are 
poisoned. I am fond of all that is clean, but I have no wish to see grinning 
snouts and the thirst of the unclean. They cast their eye into the well: now 
their revolting smile shines up out of the well. They have poisoned the holy 
water with their lustfulness; and when they called their dirty dreams 
―pleasure,‖ they poisoned the language too...  
 
.... How did I fly to the height where no rabble sits by the well? Was it my 
nausea itself which created wings for me and water-divining powers? 
Verily, I had to fly to the highest spheres that I might find the fount of 
pleasure again.  
 
      Oh, I found it, my brothers! Here, in the highest spheres, the fount of 
pleasure wells up for me! And here is a life of which the rabble does not 
drink. (Z, II: ‗On the Rabble‘) 
 
The convalescent or the wanderer is the person longing to ―become who he is‖ or to 
return to his self that belongs to the whole. In ―On the Great Longing‖ after 
Zarathustra‘s conversation with the animals and men, he is now returning home to 
himself. In the same chapter Zarathustra finds himself alone in intimate conversation 
with his soul:
157
  ―And verily. O my soul, who could see your smile and not be melted 
by your tears? The angels themselves are melted by tears because of the over-
graciousness of your smile.‖ (Z, III: ‗On the Great Longing‘) 
 
In ―On the Great Longing‖ Zarathustra‘s soul continues to speak to itself and asks of 
itself: ―O my soul, now there is not a soul anywhere that would be more loving and 
comprehending and comprehensive. Where would future and past dwell closer 
together than in you?‖ (ibid.) According to Small, the term ―dwelling‖ expresses a 
                                                          
157
Higgins in her essay ―Nietzsche‘s View of Philosophical Style‖ mentions that private conversation, 
for Nietzsche appears as the ―most perfect means of attaining an understanding of oneself‖ in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra. (Higgins, K., Op. cit., p.76) She refers to it as ―the unmediated encounter of oneself 
with oneself.‖ (ibid.) She claims that it is during periods of solitude that Zarathustra ―comes to an 
understanding that is not pressured by the considerations of adapting his discourse to other 
individuals.‖ (ibid.) She discusses this in relation to the distinction between Zarathustra and the 
Magician of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The magician is ―unavoidably confused as to what sort of person 
he really is...‖ (ibid., p.75) He is the ―paradigm example of the person whose self-understanding is so 
dominated by socially imposed categories that his conscious awareness is out of touch with the 
unconscious majority of his ―self.‖ (ibid., p.75-6) She also stresses the relationship between Nietzsche‘s 
style as the communication of tragic pathos and the reader attaining self-knowledge. The ideal reader, 
for Nietzsche is one who is in touch with his unconscious, and the impact that reading has on this 
aspect of the self.  
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feature of the ―way of greatness.‖ In ―The Wanderer‖ Zarathustra speaks of the 
hour
158
which tells him that he is on the way to greatness. The way of greatness is to be 
distinguished from the two lanes
159
 that meet at ―The Gateway‖ (Z, III: ‗On the Vision 
& the Riddle‘), which are ―permanent thoroughfares, established for public use.‖ 
(Small 2001: 96) He argues that the mountain path is there for other climbers, and that 
the way of greatness is not to be shared even to this extent: ―The lanes are for 
everyone, the mountain path for some, the way of greatness for one only.‖ (ibid.) 
Small explains that ―instead of excluding past and future, the hour draws them into 
                                                          
158
 Small in his article ―Zarathustra‘s Four Ways: Structures of Becoming in Nietzsche‘s Thought‖ 
mentions the other references to the Hour in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. It features in the ―Stillest Hour‖ 
or the ―Blessed Hour.‖ (Small, R., p.101 citing Z, III: ‗The Stillest Hour‘ & ‗On Involuntary Bliss) He 
also notes that Noon and Midnight are important hours, often referred to in the work. Small mentions 
that the ―‗hour of noon‘ also suggests Zarathustra‘s ‗great noon,‘ which ‗has its own time and its own 
destiny.‘‖ (Small, R., p.101 citing Z, III: ‗On Passing By‘) He also argues that the hour is a ―living 
present, not an instant.‖ (ibid., p.101) He states that ―Hours do not pass by in the twinkling of an eye 
they are time within which reflections, conversations, and other events can take place.‖ (ibid.) In 
referring to the hour as having intervals, he cites Franz Rosenweig who looks at the hour as the ―circle 
returning upon itself.‖ (The Star of Redemption, W.H. Hallo (trans.), London, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1971)  
 
159
Small outlines earlier in his article that in the chapter ‗On the Vision and the Riddle‘ Zarathustra is 
climbing a steep and dangerous path weighed down by the ‗spirit of gravity,‘ who draws him 
downward into the abyss. Zarathustra then finds himself at a gateway which stands between two lanes, 
the gateway is called ‗Moment‘ (Small, R., Op. cit., p.85) Small also notes that the two lanes contradict 
one another. (ibid) The lanes stand for infinite time, time as extension—extended into the past or the 
future whereas the gateway is the indivisible present. Small notes Aristotle‘s argument in Physics (VI.2 
233b-4a) that the indivisible present is that which makes possible the past and the future (divisible) in 
that they can be distinguished from the present. It is because of the indivisible present (cannot be 
broken down into segments of time) that past and future can be divided or segmented against the 
indivisible present. The lanes are a metaphor for time as extension. The kind of human activity that 
correlates with the lanes, is walking or running. Small also notes that Nietzsche engages the metaphor 
of the mountain for time as duration, and the type of human activity that correlates with this is 
climbing. Nietzsche uses various other metaphors for climbing such as the ladder and steps (Small, R., 
Op. cit., p.93 citing SE: §1; Z‘ On the thousand & One Goals‘, ‗On Old & New Tablets‘: §19) 
Stambaugh also notes this contradiction in ―The Moment‖ (Z, III: ‗On the Vision & the Riddle‘) as 
discussed earlier; she argues that the philosopher is forced to enter the moment because of the 
contradiction between the lanes. Both Stambaugh and Small note ―the untimely‖ in Nietzsche, 
however, for Small it occurs within ―The Hour‖ whereas for Stambaugh as well as Jaspers,  it occurs 
within ―The Moment.‖ The contradiction that occurs between the lanes creates the moment. This 
contradiction is resolved in the hour, according to Small, both the past and future ―dwell together‖ in 
the self. This ―dwelling‖ period prevents the experience of ―the untimely‖ being reduced to the 
instantaneity of the moment. In the hour ―past and future exert no power over the present.‖ (Small, R., 
Op. cit., p.105) It could be maintained that the moment is correctly ―a glimpse into reality‖ experience 
for the few whereas the hour is an experience of ―the untimely‖ for one only. It could be argued that the 
mountain-climber or the wanderer not only experiences the moment but then goes on to experience the 
hour.  Both the collision of past and future (the moment) and the dwelling of past and future (the hour) 
can both be argued to be ―the untimely‖. 
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itself, so that they no longer oppose each other as in the gateway ―Moment,‖ but rather 
―dwell together.‖ He explains ―dwelling together‖ as a ―homecoming‖ experience: 
―The absorption of past and future within the present hour is a homecoming for the 
dispersed self.‖ (Small 2001: 104) In this thesis, it is argued that the homecoming of 
the scattered self is a return to the self that occurs within the hour. It is the higher self, 
―the Great of the Body‖ (Z, I; §7) that becomes one with objective reality as 
Becoming. It is also very important to note that Nietzsche rejects the concept of self as 
metaphysical ―subject‖ or as ―substance‖ that is a thing or soul monad. In taking into 
account Nietzsche‘s dictum ‗to become who you are‘ it is possible to argue that in 
spite of his rejection of the metaphysical self as subject, he however embraces some 
sort of higher self, which it is possible ―to become‖ or ―return home to". The only kind 
of soul that Nietzsche embraces is ―mortal soul,‖ ―soul as subjective multiplicity‖, 
―soul as social structure of the drives and affects‖ (BGE: §12) Nietzsche‘s main 
criticism that he levels against the Christian conception of soul is its fixity, that it stays 
the same one‘s whole life. However, for Nietzsche the ‗soul‘ or what might be better 
referred to as ―the Great reason of the Body‖ is a project or task which is continual 
throughout one‘s life, or is in a process of becoming. Nietzsche is in this way an 
advocate of overcoming, the creation of a ―self‖ is a process not a given. The question 
then arises is the ―self‖ that is becoming or in perpetual strife a continual overcoming 
self or is there an aspect to the self that experiences a necessity to its existence? It is 
possible to argue that this homecoming experience involves the experience of this 
necessity; the self is no longer scattered among accidents, it becomes one with reality. 
For Nietzsche, the higher self is outside space; there is an aspect to the self that is 
extensionless.
160
 Small argues similarly that there is no space inside my body: ―For 
                                                          
160This idea of the higher self in Nietzsche is similar to Wittgenstein‘s notion of the transcendental ‗I‘ 
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other people, the space occupied by my body is like any other space. But in so far as 
every part of my own body is immediately present for me, there is, in a certain way no 
space inside my body.‖ (Small 2001: 105) The immediate self-presence of the ‗I,‘ or 
the body, is not an ―object‖ in space.161 In this thesis, it is being argued that the 
necessary or higher self that occupies no space, is the self that experiences ―the 
untimely‖162 or an ―eternity‖ within Becoming. It is an experience that Nietzsche 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
or the metaphysical self. See chapter one, section v, footnote no. 37 for a discussion of Stenius on 
Wittgenstein‘s ‗Transcendental Lingualism‘ in The Tractatus. The metaphysical ego, which relates to 
what cannot be said or referred to, it is the realm of the unsaid (‗it is like the eye in relation to the field 
of sight; the eye cannot see itself‘ (5.633-6.331); ‗it does not belong to the world but is a limit of the 
world‘ (5.632) The metaphysical ego in being transcendental implies that the ego shrinks to an 
extension-less point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it. (Stenius., Op. cit., p. 222 citing 
The Tractatus (5.64)) In this way, it can be argued that for Nietzsche, the higher self as an 
―extensionless point‖ is to use Wittgenstein‘s phrase ―co-ordinated‖ with reality. Elsewhere in The 
Tractatus, he states that as for the immortality of the soul, ―the solution of the riddle of life in space and 
time lies outside space and time‖ (6.4312) Wittgenstein, like Nietzsche claims that the real significance 
of life is in the realm of the noumenal (‗The sense of the world must lie outside of the world‘ (Magee, 
B., The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983, p.292 citing The 
Tractatus 6.41) See Magee also for an examination of Schopenhauer‘s influence on Wittgenstein on the 
transcendental ‗I‘ being a limit of the world. Magee also states that this ‗I‘ being an extensionless point 
does not imply that Wittgenstein or Schopenhauer were solipsists. (ibid.) For references to Nietzsche‘s 
critique of the oldest appearance that is absolute space being made into a metaphysics see Nachlass, 
XIV: 20 cited by Stambaugh, Nietzsche‘s Thought of Eternal Return, Op., cit., p.70; KSA III: 19 [140] 
cited by Han, B., In Nietzsche‘s Metaphysics in The Birth of Tragedy, European Journal of Philosophy 
14 (3): 2006, in her footnote no.45, p.24; and also in The Birth of Tragedy where he admires ―the 
extraordinary wisdom of Kant and Schopenhauer‖ who show that time, space and causality are human 
categories, and are critical of these categories being viewed as ―unconditional laws of the most 
universal validity,‖ by earlier metaphysicians. Kant showed that this approach to metaphysics ―really 
served only to elevate the mere phenomenon, the work of māyā to the position of the sole and highest 
reality‖ thus making impossible any knowledge of the innermost and true essence of things. (§18) 
 
161
Small refers to the body. This thesis does take into account Nietzsche‘s emphasis on the body, but 
only in relation to what he refers to as ―The Great Reason of the Body.‖ (Z, I: ‗On the Despisers of the 
Body‘) In his essay ‗Zarathustra‘s Four Ways‘ Small mentions that in the homecoming experience, the 
self is reunited with Becoming, and in his work ‗Time and Becoming in Nietzsche‘s Thought‘ he 
emphasises this reality as the ‗innocence of Becoming‘. (Small, R., London, Continuum International 
Publishing, 2010, p.168) Small seems to suggest that space is external reality and doesn‘t extrapolate 
the distinction between space and Becoming or more specifically the ―eternity‖ within Becoming. In 
his essay, he also claims that the overman is undergoing a series of stages or successive stages of 
development, which culminate in dancing and flying or the achievement of ―bird-wisdom‖ (Z, III: ‗The 
Seven Seals‘: §7). The type of human activity that the overman experiences in ―the hour‖ or ―the 
untimely‖ is dancing or flying: ―And above all I learned to stand and walk and run and jump and climb 
and dance. This, however, is my doctrine: he would learn to fly one day must first learn to stand and 
walk and run and climb and dance: one cannot fly into flying.‖ (Z, III: ‗On the Spirit of Gravity‘) 
 
162
 The experience of ―the untimely‖ is not the time that is a human category such as time as extension 
that is time ‗broken up‘ into segments (past, present, and future) by the perspectival activity of the 
mind, as this is time as duration. This type of time is to be distinguished from the ―untimely,‖ ‗The 
Moment, or the Eternal Return of the Same. See Stambaugh in her work ―Nietzsche‘s Thought of 
Eternal Return‖ (Stambaugh, J., Op. cit., p.6-7) Objective reality is outside space and time; in this way 
the impersonal self (not conscious ego)  must encompass space and time (time as extension). However, 
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refers to as intoxication, of the high feeling of spiritual joy as power where there is 
―the retardation of the feelings of time and space.‖ (WP: §799) It is in this way that the 
higher self is an impersonal ego
163
, it belongs to the universal or the whole; it is 
through the higher self (subjective) that one experiences reality (non-spatial). The 
higher self reaches ―the way of greatness‖, and in doing so withholds what Nietzsche 
refers to as ―Bird-Wisdom‖: ―Behold, there is no above, no below!‖ (Z, III: ‗The 
Seven Seals‘: §7) This Dionysian wisdom implies that the higher self is not 
determined by the directionality of space. It is this divine self that encompasses space 
and time: ―For me—how should there be any outside-myself?‖ There is no outside. 
But all sounds make us forget this; how lovely it is we forget.‖ (Z, III: ‗The 
Convalescent‘) Nietzsche uses a variety of metaphors to describe the self as the 
outermost boundary of all things, in speaking to his own soul, Zarathustra refers to it 
as ―destiny,‖ the ―circumference of circumferences‖ and ―azure bell‖ (Z, III: ‗On the 
Great Longing‘ & ‗Before Sunrise‘)—a  reference to ―the heavens‖, the dome of the 
sky. (Moles 1990: 304) The soul is the ―umbilical cord of time‖ (Z, III: ‗On the Great 
Longing‘); it is where past and future ―dwell together‖ (ibid.) The self, for Nietzsche 
always returns to itself, it leads us back from ―side roads and wrong roads‖, it can be 
restored to the whole. (EH, ‗Why I am So Clever‘: §9) It is ―the most comprehensive 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
objects in space and time are mind-independent, see T., Doyle‘s ‗Nietzsche on Epistemology & 
Metaphysics‘ for her argument that objects ‗intrinsic natures‘ imply that they are metaphysically 
independent or irreducible to the human mind. These objects are known through consciousness, and 
this type of knowledge is a falsification of reality. 
 
163
It is the impersonal ego that belongs to reality. It is through the self that one encounters reality. It is 
in this way that Nietzsche‘s notion of selfishness. His advocacy of selfishness as virtue is expressed in 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra (‗On the Three Evils‘). He proclaims that selfishness is ―blessed‖ that ―wells 
from a powerful soul...around which everything becomes a mirror—the supple, persuasive body, the 
dancer whose parable and epitome is the self-enjoying soul.‖ He also states that whoever proclaims 
―the ego wholesome and holy, and selfishness blessed‖ he will also speak of the nearness of ―the great 
noon.‖ (ibid.) This touches upon Stambaugh‘s proclamation that the Eternal Return of the Same is 
Nietzsche‘s experience of the Self in Nietzsche‘s Thought of the Eternal Return; it is this Self that 
belongs to the universal (Objective reality), as the Self enters the abyss of Eternity.  (Stambaugh, J., 
Op. cit., p.102/106)  
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soul‖ or ―the most necessary soul‖ that ―catches up with itself in the widest circle‖; the 
self becomes one with eternity, or the Circle. (Z, III: ‗On Old & New Tablets‘: 
§19)Nietzsche also depicts this soul as ―the genius of the heart‖ in Beyond Good and 
Evil (§295). 
 
What is the highest species of all being and what is the lowest? The 
parasite is the lowest species; but whoever is of the highest species will 
nourish the most parasites. For the soul that has the longest ladder and 
reaches down deepest—how should the most parasites not sit on that? The 
most comprehensive soul, which can run and stray and roam farthest 
within itself; the most necessary soul, which out of sheer joy plunges itself 
into chance; the soul which having being, dives into becoming; the soul 
which has, but wants to want and will; the soul which flees itself and 
catches up with itself in the widest circle; the wisest soul, which folly 
exhorts most sweetly; the soul which loves itself most, in which all things 
have their sweep and countersweep and ebb and flood— (Z, III: ‗On Old & 
New Tablets‘: §19) 
 
For Nietzsche, the experience of the non-spatial is best expressed by the metaphor of 
―the well;‖ it involves the experience of the ―untimely.‖ (Z, IV: ‗At Noon‘) This 
metaphor features in such chapters as ―At Noon,‖ ―The Drunken Song,‖ and ―Before 
Sunrise‖ of Thus Spoke Zarathustra and is referred to as the ―well of eternity.‖ The 
return home to the self involves the experience of the ‗more-than-human‘ or higher 
reality, and is best portrayed in the chapter entitled ―Before Sunrise.‖ (Z, III: §4) The 
self that feels eternity or ―the heavenly‖ is referred to as the ―azure bell.‖ This self 
experiences the blessedness of going beyond good and evil, as the blessedness and 
affirmation of all things in Yes and Amen. In this chapter Zarathustra speaks to the 
heavens, to the ―pure and light, you abyss of light.‖ (Z, III: §4) He had to learn to 
reach out beyond himself or mount above himself in order to reach himself, through 
wandering and mountain-climbing.  
Are you not the light for my fire? Have you not the sister soul to my insight? 
Together we have learned everything; together we have learned to ascend 
over ourselves to ourselves and to smile cloudlessly—to smile down 
cloudlessly from bright eyes and from a vast distance when constraint and 
contrivance and guilt steam beneath us like rain. (ibid.) 
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In overcoming ―contrivance and guilt‖ his soul wants only to fly into the heavens. The 
unbounded saying of Yes and Amen to all things is common both to the heavens and 
to Zarathustra; it is a bright heaven that just escapes being stained by ―drifting clouds‖ 
(ibid.) The passing clouds or shadows are metaphors for all the anthropocentric values 
including ―good and evil,‖ and ―guilt.‖ (ibid.) Zarathustra‘s experience of ―the 
heavenly‖ or the ―well of eternity‖ involves the transcendence of such anthropocentric 
value-systems. The heavens represent, for Nietzsche, the ‗more-than-human‘ and the 
blessedness of all things in Yes and Amen. In this way Zarathustra goes on to affirm 
and to bless by learning to stand above all things as their own heaven. In going 
beyond good and evil, the passing clouds can no longer rob Zarathustra of the 
heaven‘s Yes and Amen or rob the heavens of Zarathustra‘s Yes and Amen. Both 
Zarathustra‘s and the heaven‘s yes-saying are freed for each other. The ―well of 
eternity‖ stands for the blessedness of all things and for Zarathustra to experience this 
blessedness is to ―stand over every single thing as its own heaven‖ (ibid.); it is to 
experience belonging to the whole or enter into the innocence of Becoming.  
 
But I am one who can bless and say Yes, if only you are about me, pure and 
light, you abyss of light; then I carry the blessings of my Yes into all 
abysses. I have become one who blesses and says Yes; and I fought for that 
and was a fighter that I might one day get my hands free to bless. But this is 
my blessing: to stand over every single thing as its own heaven, as its round 
roof, its azure bell, and eternal security; and blessed is he who blesses thus.  
 
For all things have been baptized in the well of eternity and are beyond good 
and evil; and good and evil themselves are but intervening shadows and 
damp depressions and drifting clouds. 
 
Verily, it is a blessing and not a blasphemy when I teach. ―Over all things 
stand the heaven Accident, the heaven Innocence, the heaven Chance, the 
heaven Prankishness.‖ (ibid.) 
 
270 
    
In his essay ―Nature and the human ‗redivinised‘‖ Graham Parkes also explores the 
chapter entitled ―Before Sunrise‖ of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. He notes that there is a 
distinction between the pre-dawn heavens and the sun; the heavens before dawn are 
―an expanse of pure openness that illuminates everything evenly, without bias or 
slant‖ whereas ―the sun‘s illumination which always comes from a particular 
direction, casting shade and shadows.‖ (Parkes 2000: 192) It is in this way that this 
passage is of utmost importance as ―it seems to go beyond Nietzsche‘s customary 
perspectivism and allow for an experience of the world that is not merely ―from our 
little corner‖ but from a horizon that transcends anthropocentric values.‖ (ibid.)   
 
In blessing all things in the ―well of eternity‖ and Yes and Amen, Zarathustra has 
what is like an enlightenment experience, which is best exemplified by the dance. 
Zarathustra finds himself dancing ―on the feet of Chance.‖(Z, III: ‗Before Sunrise‘) 
This type of enlightenment is inextricably linked with ―reading and writing in blood,‖ 
a higher education (self-knowledge) that involves entering into the Oneness of things. 
It is an ecstatic experience: ―Now I am light, now I fly, now I see myself beneath 
myself, now a god dances through me.‖ (Z, I: ‗On Reading & Writing‘) In the chapter 
entitled ―On Reading and Writing‖ of Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche reveals his 
affinity with a god who can dance: ―I would believe only in a god who could dance.‖ 
(ibid.) 
 
Nietzsche also wishes to overturn the association of purity with Christian morality; he 
rather advocates a purity that comes with experiencing the blessedness of all things in 
Yes and Amen. Nietzsche equates purity with a Yes-saying spirit to all of life‘s 
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experiences of going beyond good and evil. Zarathustra‘s purity is in turn a reflection 
of the purity of the heavens:  
 
O heaven over me, pure and high! That is what your purity is to me now, 
that there is no eternal spider or spider web of reason; that you are to me a 
dance floor for divine accidents, that you are to me a divine table for divine 
dice and dice-players... (Z, III: ‗Before Sunrise‘)  
 
Nietzsche‘s reference to the heavens as a ―dance-floor‖ reiterates the notion that the 
earth is to become heavenly. In using the term ―the dance-floor,‖ the heavenly is no 
longer transcendent set apart from the earth but rather embodies the earth; the earth in 
this sense becomes divine. Zarathustra‘s proclamation to ―remain faithful to the 
earth,‖ and do not believe those who speak of otherworldly hopes (Z, Prologue: §3), 
as Parkes maintains, does  imply a ―renunciation of transcendent perspectives in 
favour of a focus on the human.‖ (Parkes 2000: 184) Nietzsche rather claims that in 
overcoming anthropocentric perspectives that the earth now becomes divine. (ibid.) 
The transcendence of human perspectives in the sense of anthropocentric 
representations of reality coincides with the recognition that there is an objective 
reality. Nietzsche revaluates the relationship between the earth and eternity such that 
eternity is not set apart from the earth (as a static transcendent realm) but becomes one 
with the earth; it is in this way that Nietzsche is an advocate of eternity in the 
immanent sense. However, for Nietzsche there is a distinction between the earth and 
objective reality or eternity. For Nietzsche, earth and eternity will become one, in this 
way the earth will become a place of the most intense energy and joy. In overcoming 
the ―spirit of gravity,‖ the earth will be rebaptized as ―the light one.‖ (Z, III: ‗On the 
Spirit of Gravity‘) The ‗Before Sunrise‘ passage shows firstly that the earth is no 
longer as Lampert (1986: 174) suggests in his ―Nietzsche‘s Teaching‖ ―under the 
sway of the heavens‖; and secondly, that a blessing has been conferred on earthly 
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things ―that will be like a heavenly dome in providing security and well-being...‖ 
Zarathustra is the figure, who according to Lampert, in ―having journeyed to the 
underworld and found the earth to have a heart of gold (Z, II: ‗On Great Events‘)‖ that 
he here ―ascends to the sky and finds in its openness a blessing for the earth.‖ (ibid.) 
The earth is no longer to be robbed of yes and amen in ―Before Sunrise‖, and this 
comes to a climax in the ―The Yes and Amen Song‖ of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
Zarathustra‘s ―bird-wisdom‖ in the song of yes and amen proves that he is fit enough 
to marry life
164
. This marriage coincides with his highest victory that of the creation of 
a new earth. The images of rapture, dancing and flying are to be associated with a 
victory and form the culmination of the marriage song. As Lampert (1986: 243) 
suggests that the image of the ―bird‖, for Nietzsche stands for complete victory over 
the spirit of gravity; it involves the transformation of heavy and grave into light and 
easy, of the body into dancer. The singing and flying of ―bird-wisdom‖ represents the 
epitome of Zarathustra‘s redemption. It includes the experience of singing; ―Sing! 
Speak no more! Are not all words made for the grave and heavy?‖ (Z, III: 16) His 
singing and dancing redemption is of a silent nature, and involves entering into the 
silent logos of Becoming.  
 
It is in this way that Nietzsche speaks of ―this- worldly comfort‖ in his ―Attempt at a 
Self-Criticism‖ of The Birth of Tragedy; his embrace of ―this-worldly comfort‖ is 
                                                          
164
 Lampert in his ‗Nietzsche‘s Teaching; An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra‘ examines the 
chapter entitled ‗The Other Dancing Song‘ that which is previous to the ‗The Yes and Amen Song‘. 
This chapter shows that Zarathustra in being in a dance with life shows that he has achieved a certain 
intimacy with life, and renders him suitable enough to marry her. This other dancing song acts as 
preparation for the ensuing marriage in the next chapter of yes and amen. As Lampert states, ―It is 
followed by a song that completes the dance by transforming it into a procession preparatory to the 
consummating marriage‖ (Yale University Press, London, 1986, p.235) This Other Dancing Song is 
comparable to The Yes and Amen Song in that it is a song of overcoming the spirit of gravity. 
According to Lampert, Life can only offer herself up to Zarathustra if ―Zarathustra does not abandon 
her in favour of a vengeful wisdom that condemns life.‖ (ibid., p.237) He goes on to claim that life then 
goes on to reciprocate his love from the heart, and the complementary pair that of Zarathustra and life 
prepare to marry, and in marrying life he marries eternity. (ibid., p.238)  
273 
    
intimately tied up with a rejection of after-worldly joy. For Nietzsche, joy is attainable 
in the here and now by those ―dragon-slayers‖ who ―‗live resolutely‘ in wholeness‖ 
and embody an artist‘s metaphysics. (BT, ‗Attempt at a Self-Criticism‘: §7) They are 
the ones who pronounce laughter and dancing as ―holy,‖ and play a role in initiating 
the ―heavenly‖ on earth, as the New Dionysian Age. (ibid.) His embrace of ―this-
worldly comfort‖ does not imply that he abandons what is real. The concept of 
eternity is ever-present in his later works; however, eternity and world become one. It 
is in this way that joy can be felt in the here and now.  
 
Roberts, in his essay ‗Ecstatic Philosophy,‘ notes that in Nietzsche‘s ‗Attempt at a 
Self-Criticism‘ of The Birth of Tragedy in 1886 that Nietzsche seems to level criticism 
at his first book, and explicitly rejects its call for ―metaphysical comfort.‖ (Roberts 
2000: 203 citing BT: ‗Attempt at a Self-Criticism‘: §7) He argues that in spite of this 
rejection that there is a positive role for mysticism in his work.
165
 It would seem that 
                                                          
165Roberts wishes to argue that in spite of Nietzsche‘s rejection of metaphysical comfort in his 
―Attempt at a Self-Criticism,‖ that Nietzsche remains a metaphysician of the real in his later works. He 
also maintains that Nietzsche‘s advocacy of a ―this-worldly comfort‖ does not imply a mere 
empiricism. This thesis coincides with Roberts on this point. Roberts refers to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
a later work, to compound his argument. However, although Roberts states that Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
resembles The Birth of Tragedy in its mysticism, he claims that this early work illustrates a 
metaphysical dualism or a Schopenhauerian pessimism, which he argues Nietzsche later abandons. In 
other words, Nietzsche abandons this pessimism in his later works, and this is why Nietzsche is so 
critical of his early work in his ―Attempt at a Self-Criticism.‖ For an alternative argument that The 
Birth does not withhold a Schopenhauerian pessimism, see the translator‘s introduction to The Birth of 
Tragedy, Kaufmann claims that Nietzsche did not come under the influence of a Schopenhauerian 
pessimism, as argued by Richard Oehler: (See Kaufmann‘s introduction to The Birth p.11) 
 
  
The Birth embodies a metaphysics of the Thing-in-itself but only as  reality where the Primal Unity 
(BT: §4) is not viewed as a causal ground (or as substance), and the phenomenal realm is an appearance 
of this primordial reality. This primal realm can be accessed through tragic pathos (insight), in 
becoming one with it in the experience of intoxication whereby the spell of individuation is broken. 
The artist is in this way the ―most accurate representation‖ of reality. The process of the principium 
individuationis is that it is a necessary prerequisite stage to entering into a unity with the Primal Being. 
This process involves a removal from the empirical or herd-self; it is a process of individuation or 
solitude. It is through ―the cry of Dionysus‖ that the spell of individuation can be broken: ―... and the 
way lies open to the Mothers of Being, to the innermost heart of things.‖ (BT: §16) It is in this respect 
that the early work embodies an artist‘s metaphysics.  
 
274 
    
by Nietzsche rejecting the idea of metaphysical comfort that there is no room for 
mysticism in his thought. He contends that Nietzsche‘s embrace of ―this-worldly 
comfort‖ is intended as an argument against metaphysical after-worldliness but not a 
rejection of metaphysical reality. Roberts draws upon Joan Stambaugh‘s The Other 
Nietzsche to argue that there is a mysticism at the heart of Thus Spoke Zarathustra: 
―Zarathustra undergoes an ecstatic experience born of the painful experience of the 
abyss, in which the boundaries of his self dissolve in a song of love and participation 
in the cosmos.‖ (Roberts 2000: 204) It is in this way that Zarathustra finds himself in 
love with life and eternity, which is evident in the final two songs of Book III of Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, ―The Other Dancing Song‖ and ―The Seven Seals.‖ Roberts states 
that ―Despite what the late Nietzsche says about his first book, Zarathustra‘s ecstasy 
refigures the Dionysian as delineated in The Birth of Tragedy: ―In song and dance 
man expresses himself as a member of a higher community; he has forgotten how to 
walk and speak and is on the way toward flying into the air, dancing.‖ (Roberts 2000: 
204 citing BT: §1) In the penultimate section of Book Four of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, after his ―Last Supper‖ with the higher men, Zarathustra undergoes a 
visionary experience that reprises the ecstasy of Book Three. In the ―Drunken Song‖ 
Zarathustra‘s spirit flies ahead and comes to rest on a high ridge, the same ridge that is 
mentioned in ‗The Seven Seals‘, which is ―between two seas, wandering like a heavy 
cloud between past and future.‖(Z, IV: ‗The Yes & Amen song‘) In Zarathustra re-
mentioning the high ridge, of standing between past and future, he reiterates an 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
The question however arises, which is also noted by Roberts why is Nietzsche critical of his early work 
in the later period. This question has already been addressed in the third section of the first chapter. 
However another possible answer to this important question may be that Nietzsche didn‘t want the 
primal unity of The Birth to be in any way viewed in terms of the After-worldly. In writing in the 
shadows of Kant and Schopenhauer, he may feel that he came across this way in the early work. In the 
‗Attempt at a Self-Criticism‘ Nietzsche has become his true self, he speaks as a foreseer of the 
oncoming ―dragon-slayers‖ who will overturn the old ascetic ideal, and wear the ―crown of the 
laugher,‖ of holy laughter. The most erroneous interpretation that one can infer from Nietzsche‘s 
emphasis on ―this-worldly comfort‖ in the ‗Attempt at a Self-Criticism‘ is that there is no room for 
mysticism in his thought      
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apocalyptic image of making the transition from an old era to a new one. He speaks of 
sinking into ―deep-wells,‖ of experiencing ―the untimely‖, as the ―hour approaches‖ 
the world becomes perfect. (ibid.) The midnight bell tolls and Zarathustra tells the 
higher men not in his own words but in the words of the bell that ―tell of the complex 
intertwining of pain and joy in which joy desires the return of all pain.‖ (Roberts 
2000: 204) In the world becoming perfect, silence or stillness reigns, and such 
opposites as pain-joy, day-night, time-eternity collapse: ―Just now my world became 
perfect: midnight too is noon; pain is a joy; curses too are a blessing; night too is a 
sun—go away or you will learn; a sage too is a fool‖ (Roberts 2000: 204 citing Z, IV: 
‗The Drunken Song‘) According to Roberts, the presence of ecstatic moments of 
perfection and joyful eternity invoke certain themes from The Birth of Tragedy and 
complicate the sense of Nietzsche‘s ―this-worldly comfort.‖ (2000: 205) Roberts 
argues that for Zarathustra ―joy‘s love for eternity includes the desire for suffering‖, 
which is to be distinguished from after-worldly answers to the problem of suffering 
which promise some sort of escape from it. (ibid.) He contends that Nietzsche‘s 
embrace of ―this-worldly comfort‖ does not imply that there is no love of the real or 
the eternal in Nietzsche; he states that eternity is integrally bound up with the 
becoming of the world. (ibid.) 
 
Roberts argues that Nietzsche upholds an artist‘s metaphysics in the later works. This 
artist‘s metaphysics shows that Nietzsche retains the idea of reality, which in his later 
period is an eternity that is within Becoming. The artist‘s affirmation of eternity is 
―not a simple affirmation of this worldly reality understood as empirical appearance.‖ 
(Roberts 2000: 216) The artist as an expression of reality is an appearance of reality or 
―signifies reality once more.‖ (Roberts 2000: 216 citing TI: ‗Reason‘ §6) He claims 
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that it is in this way that Nietzsche overturns the opposition between true and apparent 
worlds. He replaces this opposition with one of relative difference: ―Nietzsche‘s 
Dionysian artist works with a relative difference between ‗reality‘ and appearance. 
Appearance, in this case, is not opposed to reality, but is, as Nietzsche puts it, ‗reality 
once more.‘‖166(Roberts 2000: 216) The artist as ―the most accurate representation of 
reality‖ is no longer in opposition to reality. This reality which the artist affirms is 
Becoming.  Roberts claims that for Nietzsche there is only ―becoming,‖ ―a never-
ending movement of concealing and revealing, that is never known ‗in-itself.‘‖, and 
―Like lightning, a mark of the Dionysian, we can only glimpse becoming in the 
reiteration of the ‗once more.‘‖ (ibid.) It must be stressed that when it comes to 
glimpsing reality in the reiteration of the ―once more,‖ that this thesis contends that 
this reality of the later period is not the ‗mere‘ flux of Becoming but rather an 
―eternity‖ within Becoming.  
 
Nietzsche describes his inspiration as a feeling of Gottlichkeit or of divinity. (EH, ‗Z‘: 
§3) This feeling of divinity is an expression of Dionysian appearance; it is ―reality 
                                                          
166
 In Robert‘s work entitled ‗Contesting Spirit: Nietzsche, Affirmation, Religion‘ he also discusses 
Nietzsche‘s artist metaphysics. He claims that in spite of Nietzsche‘s rejection of the apparent 
world/true world opposition, the appearance he attributes to the Dionysian artist must be something 
other than simple untruth or illusion. It is in this work that Roberts first highlights Nietzsche‘s relative 
difference (not one of opposition) between artistic appearance and reality, where artistic appearance is 
―reality once more.‖ Roberts also notes a passage from Beyond Good and Evil (§34)which shows that 
Nietzsche looks at the truth/falsity distinction in terms of varying degrees of appearance, that there are 
―lighter and darker shadows of appearance.‖ Roberts refers to this passage to reveal an artist‘s 
metaphysics in Nietzsche‘s later works.  
 
Roberts looks at the artist as an expression of becoming, that reality for Nietzsche, is strictly becoming. 
He argues that Being is denied by Nietzsche as causal ground.  Nonetheless, Roberts does make an 
important point in a similar line to this thesis that the reality that is affirmed by the artist is not the 
reality that is to be grasped by the senses. This would imply a ―paltry empiricism,‖ becoming is 
something more than ―mere appearance,‖ more than that particular empirical reality that one ordinarily 
encounters as ―this world.‖  (Roberts, T., Op. cit., p.145)  Roberts then refers to Stanley Rosen to 
support his point that Nietzsche does not adhere to a ―paltry empiricism‖ in footnote no. 8 where he 
notes Rosen‘s distinction between the two types of metaphysics. He distinguishes between metaphysics 
in the Aristotelian sense as the study of Being qua being (which, for Nietzsche, is already committed to 
dualism) and metaphysics as claims about the whole beyond the empirical. Roberts claims that it is in 
the last sense that Nietzsche remains a metaphysician. (Roberts, ibid., p.145 citing Rosen, 1993, p.141) 
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once more.‖ It is through Nietzsche‘s tragic pathos or the ―great reason of the body‖ 
self, that Becoming reveals itself; it is the realm of the unsaid. It is through 
Nietzsche‘s writing as a therapy, where philosophy is the activity of writing the self 
that he himself becomes the artist or the most accurate representation of reality. He 
writes his own experience of ecstasy where Becoming or ―‗things themselves‘‖ 
reveals themselves through him as a writer. (Roberts 2000: 213) It is in this way the 
divinity of Nietzsche‘s artistic metaphysics is comparable to the evangelical practices 
of Christ. In The Antichrist, Nietzsche claims that Jesus ―knows that it is only in the 
practice of life that one feels ―divine,‖ ―blessed,‖ ―evangelical,‖ at all times a ―child 
of God...‖‖ (AC: §33) The most divine, for Nietzsche is in human creativity, in 
dancing and noble laughter, in reaching the ideal of ―the Great health.‖ (GS: §382)  
Nietzsche refers to his artist‘s metaphysics as the ―transfiguring power of 
intoxication‖ rooted in the higher type‘s overabundant ―gratitude and love.‖ (GS: 
§328) It is a feeling of divinity that marks the artist becoming one with eternity. In the 
same way ―Existence‖ as the world is eternally ―deifying and undeifying.‖ (WP: 
§712) It is through the deification of the world that the world becomes ‗godlike,‘ that 
it reaches its perfection. (Z, IV: ‗At Noon‘) For Nietzsche, this is existence taking on 
the character of eternity. In homecoming, the ‗self‘ that is at one with eternity returns 
home to itself. This experience occurs in silence or stillness, within the realm of the 
unsaid. 
 
 
What happened to me? Listen! Did time perhaps fly away? Do I not fall? 
Did I not fall—listen!—into the well of eternity? What is happening to me? 
Still! I have been stung, alas—in the heart? In the heart! Oh break, break, 
heart, after such happiness, after such a sting. How? Did not the world 
become perfect just now? Round and ripe? Oh, the golden round ring—
where may it fly? Shall I run after it? Quick! Still! (Z, IV: ‗At Noon‘)  
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Conclusion 
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The main focus of this thesis has been with establishing Nietzsche as a metaphysician 
of Becoming, as a foreseer of the immanence of eternity and also in turn with 
establishing that there is a deep relation between his writing style, his unconscious, his 
higher self and his account of  reality, of Becoming. Nietzsche chooses a certain style 
that of the Dionysian Dithyramb, of dancing-musical rhythms as the best means of 
expressing his own experience of the Dionysian, of relating to reality in the most 
primordial way. He chooses this style as he recognizes the limits of propositional and 
conceptual language for expressing reality.. Nietzsche brings his own experience of 
the Dionysian, of tragic pathos, or primordial truth to his works; he therefore writes 
from his unconscious, or a horizon that is open-ended to the future and is therefore 
untimely. . It is this higher self that is of the realm of truth, of Becoming, of the 
unsaid, of silence; it is the realm of truth revealing itself. Nietzsche‘s experience of 
truth is a divine revelatory experience of reality itself, of an ―eternity‖ that is within 
Becoming, which cannot be expressed in everyday language. His writings emerge 
from Becoming, the divine logos, where ―things themselves‖ speak through 
Nietzsche, the writer. This type of experience, as has been outlined earlier is one of 
―inspiration‖, ―rapture‖, or ―revelation‖, where he views himself as ―a medium of 
overpowering forces‖ as ―a mouthpiece‖ (EH, ‗Z‘: §3). His works emerge from an 
―inspirational‖ experience where he stands as a prophet in the face of a new totality.  
 
In the first part of this thesis, Nietzsche has been looked at as a metaphysician of 
Becoming, that he upholds the possibility of ―metaphysical knowledge‖ that is 
existentialist in nature, a tragic insight into a new Dionysian totality. This thesis 
looked at the possibility of truth in Nietzsche in spite of his rejection of the term in 
particular in its dogmatic and moralistic forms. He declares absolute or dogmatic truth 
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to be actually perspectival or interpretive in nature. However, one of the main 
questions posed was could Nietzsche the ultimate critic of truth be an advocate of it? 
Could Nietzsche uphold the possibility of new truth? Or does perspectival truth 
reduce Nietzsche‘s philosophy to a relativism such that his own philosophical claims 
are deemed self-refuting? This thesis came to the conclusion that Nietzsche does 
embrace a new truth in the form of tragic insight such that reality can be glimpsed in 
amor fati. This tragic wisdom is itself an interpretation of the world. Although this 
tragic insight is an interpretation, its ontological status of glimpsing reality implies 
that it acts as a ―new standard‖ in truth evaluation. His works also emerge from such 
insight and in this way his philosophy is not self-refuting. It became apparent that 
Nietzsche views conscious, linguistic and rational thought as a falsification of reality 
and that in spite of the limits of human reason that Nietzsche himself wishes to assert 
a new metaphysics that proclaims that Becoming or reality is accessible, and can be 
meaningful for us. It is possible to now contend that truth, for Nietzsche is revealing 
and concealing, that when it comes to rational, conscious and abstract thought or the 
herd use of language that reality conceals itself, and that through the unconscious, 
tragic pathos and silence that reality reveals itself. For Nietzsche, ―metaphysical 
knowledge‖ or what might be more appropriately referred to as tragic wisdom takes 
the form of ―rapture‖ or ―intoxication‖. It is through the unconscious, ―intuition‖ (BT: 
§1) in the early period (a term Nietzsche drops) or the ―Great Reason‖ of the body (Z, 
I: §7) in the later period that one enters into the most truthful standpoint with reality. 
Nietzsche wishes to replace the Kantian ascetic ideal with a counter-ideal, an ideal 
that is made available by the advent of Zarathustra: ―Above-all, a counterideal was 
lacking—until Zarathustra.‖ (EH, ‗Why I Write Such Good Books‘: ‗GM‘) Nietzsche 
advocates a genuine asceticism that makes possible insight into Becoming in a 
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moment of amor fati. It is a life-affirming ascetic ideal that involves the sublimation 
of the senses. This asceticism provides the ideal conditions for participating in the 
truth or belonging to the whole such as suffering, discipline, solitude, ―reading and 
writing in blood‖, and self-overcoming. It is the higher type that fulfils these 
conditions in his ascent to Becoming. Nietzsche advocates ―metaphysical knowledge‖ 
in the form of tragic pathos or tragic wisdom, which is to be distinguished from mere 
conscious or rational knowledge.  
 
As I have already noted that this  tragic wisdom involves entering into the silent logos 
of Becoming; it is through silence that one experiences the ―revelation‖ or the 
―showing‖ of truth. It is an unconscious experience in the form of entering into a 
dancing oneness with reality whereby the individual type is a direct expression of this 
reality and becomes it most beautiful appearance. The Dionysian artist becomes the 
―most accurate representation of reality‖ and is no longer in opposition to reality but 
is as Nietzsche puts it ―reality once more‖ (BGE: §34) It has been maintained that 
Nietzsche himself embodies this type of truth, and that his writings emerge from his 
tragic insight into  Becoming, and that this occurs though his ―higher‖ (SE: §6) self, 
the unconscious or what he refers to as that ―granite of spiritual fatum‖ (BGE: §231). 
This idea of a higher self is comparable to Wittgenstein‘s idea of the metaphysical self 
in The Tractatus, the ‗I‘ that cannot be referred to by language. The philosophical 
type in his experience of ―rapture‖ is the most adequate expression of reality. It is an 
experience that is one of silence, as it is through the non-linguistic rapture or tragic 
pathos that one belongs to reality as it is.  In this way, Nietzsche views the conceptual 
and scientific modes of discourse as an inadequate means of expressing the logos. 
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This thesis was also asking the question what for Nietzsche is the most fundamental 
relation to an author or a text? It focused particularly on the reference from The 
Antichrist (§52): ―What is here meant by philology is, in a very broad sense, the art of 
reading well—of reading facts without falsifying them by interpretation...‖  The art of 
philology for Nietzsche intersects with the question of truth. This art form must 
include the recognition of the metaphysical independence of an author or the text from 
interpretation. The author must be recognized while asking such questions like what is 
his most fundamental relation to his works?, and in turn to reality? The ―art of reading 
well‖ has been identified as a way of relating to Becoming through pathos and the 
unconscious. It became apparent that Nietzsche prioritizes pathos, unique experience, 
blood and the unconscious over conscious and linguistic  thinking when it comes to 
relating to an author primordially. This art of reading involves reading with ears, 
entering into the musical totality that Nietzsche‘s works are attuned to, and in turn 
making the transition to entering into the silent logos of his works. Reading Nietzsche 
primordially involves the cultivation of one‘s higher self or one‘s ―life-task‖ (EH, 
‗Clever‘: §9) through its impact on the unconscious and in turn encountering reality as 
it is in the moment of amor fati. This cultivation involves an untimely relation to 
Nietzsche as educator. This shows that ―reading in blood‖ plays a role in encountering 
truth or reality as it is. The meaning of Nietzsche‘s works is in his unconscious, his 
tragic pathos (silence), and in turn in their relation to Becoming. This is the author 
revealing himself. The author can also be concealed through the reader‘s ability to 
digest the text, whereby it has an impact on his unconscious. The reader who enters 
into the silent logos of an author is the ideal reader who brings his most fundamental 
self to the text, his higher self, and shares the same tragic pathos as Nietzsche. He 
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enters into and participates in the ―total union of all Being‖ (HH, I: §208) that 
Nietzsche‘s works belong to.  
 
Finally, the thesis continued to look at the relationship between objective reality and 
human subjectivity while asking the question what is the most truthful relationship to 
reality for Nietzsche? It asked the question what was reality for Nietzsche in the later 
period? It argued that reality for Nietzsche is a new ―yes-saying‖ totality or the 
Innocence of Becoming as the eternal return of the same, and that it is through tragic 
pathos or the unconscious that one enters into the most fundamental relation to it. 
Nietzsche raises the ontological status of Becoming in the later period through the 
eternal return of the same, something is attained at every moment within the 
process—and always the same (WP: §55). The ontological status of Becoming is 
raised, as there is an ―eternity‖ that is within Becoming, and in this way, it is not to be 
confused with the mere flux of becoming or time as duration. The latter is ―man-time‖ 
or is a perspectival construction of the human mind. For Nietzsche, the eternal return 
of the same is not to be wrongfully conflated with the flux of becoming, as ―duration 
―in vain,‖ without end or aim‖ (WP: §55) It is rather the ring as the highest form of 
affirmation where ―something is attained in every moment‖. (ibid.) It became evident 
that this relates to Nietzsche‘s pantheistic conception of God that God is ―in every 
moment‖ and that the world is ―the attained release of God in every moment‖ (BT, 
‗Attempt at a Self-Criticism‘: §5). There was a question that emerged in the thesis on 
what is the relationship between eternity and the temporal? Nietzsche‘s notion of 
eternity relates to the temporal in that ―in every moment something is attained and is 
always of the same‖; it relates to the immanence of eternity, the fullness of time or the 
moment. If this idea of the temporal is not time as duration (succession), that is time 
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that is constructed by the human mind or the flux of becoming then it must be 
irreducible to the human. This implies that there is an aspect to Becoming or a reality 
to time that is irreducible to the human, whereby there is ―an eternity‖ that is within it 
or in the form of something that is attained and is always of the same. This is 
Becoming of the later period and is not to be conflated with the flux; it is the 
Innocence of Becoming or an ―eternity‖ within Becoming. This notion of time is not 
―man-time‖, linear time but is rather a notion of the temporal, of ―eternity‖ that is 
vertical in nature.  
 
This chapter also includes a brief look at Nietzsche‘s ―The History of a Error‖ 
passage of Twilight of the Idols. In the first stage of ―How the ―true world‖ finally 
became a Fable‖ Nietzsche is comparable to Plato but strictly insofar as for Plato, 
knowledge of reality can be attained through insight and that it is attainable on earth 
or in the here and now. Nietzsche however is to be distinguished from Platonism 
where knowledge of Being as a ―Beyond‖ is viewed as an unattainable ideal. It 
becomes apparent that Nietzsche in the successive stages of ―The History of an Error‖ 
is not rejecting reality or denying its accessibility but rather the idea of unattainable 
ideals where knowledge of reality has been rendered unattainable. These ideals are 
under the guise of after-worldly ethics and are deemed life-denying by Nietzsche. The 
ascetic ideal in its Kantian or Platonist form renders knowledge of Being an 
unattainable ideal. Nietzsche is rejecting a rational approach to accessing reality in 
favour of a sensuous one. In the final stage of ―How the ―true world‖ finally became a 
Fable‖, Nietzsche refers to the final stage as the beginning of the Zarathustra reign 
―(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of 
humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA‖). The end of longest error can be argued to be 
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―the unattainable ideal‖, which is dogmatic knowledge that is actually perspectival 
knowledge. In being a foreseer of the immanence of eternity in the world, Nietzsche 
contends that insight into reality is attainable. In this way, he introduces the idea of a 
new ideal that is in the form of tragic insight and is life-affirmative. This new ideal as 
the ―most accurate‖ representation of reality is in turn the most truthful interpretation 
of reality. The ―Zarathustra reign‖ is of the earth becoming eternal or of eternity 
manifesting itself in the world. In this way Nietzsche is an advocate of the immanence 
of eternity; it can be felt by man in this life, which is comparable to Christian praxis 
or the original teachings of Christ. (AC: §34) 
 
Nietzsche‘s conception of eternity does not present itself as something that stands in 
opposition to time, but rather as a dimension of time itself (the eternal return of the 
same moment): the ground for opposition is removed, and eternity brightens at noon. 
(Z, IV: ‗At Noon‘) The noon period is the world becoming perfect, the world entering 
into the fullness of time, that the Noon or ―Epoch‖ is imminent, where the world 
―culminates into God‖. This noon period also refers to the radical idea of a new 
Dionysian age, of the ―Zarathustra Kingdom of a thousand years‖ (Z, IV: §1) It is in 
this way that Nietzsche is a foreseer of the world being raised to the highest level. 
 
This thesis also explored tragic wisdom of the later period in particular Nietzsche‘s 
idea of ―The Homecoming‖ (Z, III: ‗The Return Home‘) and the climax of 
Zarathustra‘s redemption that of ―bird-wisdom‖ in ―The Yes & Amen Song‖ in order 
to argue that it is through pathos and the unconscious that one enters into the most 
truthful relation to reality. The highest type in his experience of a dancing ―rapture‖ is 
the most adequate expression  of an ―eternity‖ that is within Becoming. It is an 
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experience of amor fati; it is to encounter the most life-affirming moment. For 
Nietzsche, it is the self that experiences eternity, which is neither spatial nor the flux 
as duration. The meeting of past and future in the moment is not spatial. This 
therefore implies that eternity is not spatial. Eternity as the ―inner necessity‖ of 
Becoming is non-spatiotemporal. In the experience of amor fati, the self negates time 
as duration; it involves the experience of timelessness. It is the experience of ―the 
untimely‖. It became evident that Nietzsche‘s metaphor for ―the heavenly‖ is the 
―well of eternity‖. The experience of being released into the well of eternity is an un-
worldly experience; it is an experience of eternity on earth or in this life. Objective 
reality is not to be wrongfully conflated with spatiotemporal external reality, reality 
‗out there‘; therefore the experience of the objective must occur through the subjective 
or within you. It is also in this way that the self encompasses space and time. It is 
through self that one glimpses or encounters eternity (objective reality). This raises 
significantly the relevance of the self. It is a self that is impersonal in that it belongs to 
the whole; it is an unconscious or becoming self. This is what Nietzsche refers to as 
―The Homecoming‖ experience‖ (Z, III: ‗The Return Home‘), which is reminiscent of 
Hölderlin‘s elegy ―Homecoming‖.  
 
 
 I looked at this passage of ―The Homecoming‖ to show that Nietzsche is a thinker 
who wishes to overturn the sense of homelessness that comes with the loss of the old 
absolute. This homecoming experience is where reality reveals itself to the 
unconscious, the ―great reason‖ of the body.. It involves ―true knowledge‖ in the form 
of tragic insight whereby the higher self, as the most necessary self, the divine self 
glimpses eternity in ―deep wells‖ (Z, III: ‗Before Sunrise‘) which we have seen is 
Nietzsche‘s metaphor for the heavens or ―the highest spheres‖ (Z, II: ‗On the 
287 
    
Rabble‘). This experience climaxes in ―The Yes and Amen song‖ as ―bird-wisdom‖ 
where Zarathustra is no longer determined by the logic of space or of directionality. 
Zarathustra‘s redemption in the form of tragic wisdom is an interpretation of the 
world, and as has been aforementioned is the new standard of truth. The main 
question that emerged from this thesis was does the perspective deny ―access‖ to 
reality, for Nietzsche? It is only possible to argue that the latter is the case if 
perspective is defined strictly in terms of conscious knowledge of things such that 
perspective as a mode of consciousness is a falsification of reality. However, one must 
consider Nietzsche‘s ―physiological perspectivism‖ and the idea that tragic insight 
could be an unconscious interpretation of the world and in this way could be a more 
fundamental way of relating to reality. There is also the possibility that for Nietzsche 
tragic insight is not a perspective, and in this way can glimpse reality as it is. This 
could only be the case, if tragic insight is to be distinguished from a conscious 
perspective such that consciousness is a falsification of reality. This also could only 
be possible if there is an aspect to the self that is irreducible to the perspective, which 
would render the experience of encountering the whole as ‗non-perspectival‘. The 
question that then arose could there be a reality or an aspect to a text, an author, or self 
that is metaphysically irreducible to a perspective? It seems that there is an aspect to 
the self that is irreducible to a perspective; he refers to it as ―granite of spiritual 
fatum‖ (BGE: §231). It is this aspect to the self that is impersonal or belongs to the 
whole, which makes it possible that the experience of belonging to reality is ‗non-
perspectival‘. However, in glimpsing ―eternity‖ one is encountering an eternity that is 
immanent in the world. In this way, tragic insight must be mediated through the 
world, which brings us back to the idea that for Nietzsche tragic insight is an 
interpretation of the world.  
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It has become clear that for Nietzsche, there is truth  such that reality that is non-
spatial can be accessed or glimpsed, and that in amor fati, the higher self belongs to it. 
The self that experiences eternity is the self that experiences the blessedness of all 
things, that ―all is one‖. It is an enlightenment experience whereby one enters into a 
dancing unity with the unsayable God. This type of enlightenment is inextricably 
linked with ―reading and writing in blood‖ (Z, I: §7) where the higher self is 
cultivated towards Becoming. It is through tragic pathos or the ―higher self‖ that one 
experiences the oneness of all things. Nietzsche in ―writing in blood‖ or in writing the 
self is disciplined to the whole or a new totality as the Innocence of Becoming. In his 
experience of Dionysian ―rapture‖, Nietzsche himself is the most adequate expression 
of reality. This state of rapturous insight into truth is one of silence. He therefore 
chooses a writing style that best expresses his experience of the Dionysian. Therefore 
his writing style is an expression of tragic pathos, ―the unsaid‖ and unconscious-
musical rhythms. In this way, the content of Nietzsche‘s works includes the idea that 
pathos and the dance are better modes of expressing reality than that of the conceptual 
or propositional uses of language.  
Speaking is a beautiful folly: with that man dances over all things. How 
lovely is all talking, and all deception of sounds! With sounds our love 
dances on many-hued rainbows. (Z, III: ‗The Convalescent‘: §2) 
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